

# History of the British in India

Arthur D Innes

**LAL PUBLISHERS**

20/66, Punjabi Bagh,  
New Delhi-110026

*Published by*  
**Lal Publishers**  
20/66, Punjabi Bagh.  
New Delhi-110026

*First Published* : 1902  
*First Indian Reprint* : 1988  
*Price* : **Rs. 340 -**

W. G. ... LEONE,  
M. A. K. ... nagar,  
General Library Books,  
Acc. No 25.090

*Printed at*  
**Lakshmi Printing Works**  
Madarsa Meerjumla  
Lalkuan, Delhi-110006



**A SHORT HISTORY  
OF  
THE BRITISH IN INDIA**

**BY**  
**ARTHUR D. INNES**  
**SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD**

**WITH EIGHT MAPS**

**NEW AND CHEAPER ISSUE**

**SHAIKH MOHAMAD USMAN & SONS (REGD.)**  
Book Seller's & Stationer's  
**Exchange Road (Gow Kadal Chowk)**  
**SRINAGAR KASHMIR**  
**METHUEN & CO.**  
**36 ESSEX STREET W.C.**  
**LONDON**



## TO THE READER

**T**HE object of the present volume is to set before the ordinary reader the story of the steps by which India came gradually to be painted red on the map—of the development of the British Supremacy out of the Tenancy of a Trading company; a development fostered by the best brains and watered by the best blood of Britain. I have attempted to do this within the compass of a single volume of a size and form which can be handled with ease: and to do it as fully as the space permits, accurately, clearly, and (I hope) not unattractively.

The  
author's  
objects.

For the serious student of Indian History, such a volume can only be made the basis for further study; but it should help him to get a preliminary grip of the whole subject which will be of material assistance in classifying and in co-ordinating the detailed information which must be derived from other sources. That a book is wanted which will serve that purpose I infer from the fact that in spite of a fairly extensive acquaintance with the literature of the subject, I have never succeeded in finding one. Sir Alfred Lyall has indeed gone near to supply it in his "British Dominion in India," but from the time of Lord Wellesley, his narrative lacks the fulness of the earlier chapters. On the other hand, a work as Marshman's is too bulky for the purpose—least, it is more than four times the length of this volume.

Macaulay's Essays have made Clive and Warren Hastings more or less familiar to most of us; but the period of progress from Warren Hastings to the Mutiny is to most minds very nearly a blank. It seems tolerably obvious that having on our hands the responsibility for governing India, we ought not to leave the study of Indian conditions—which involves the study of Indian History—entirely to candidates



for the Indian Civil Service, while reserving the right to comment on their subsequent administration on the strength of data derived either from our own inner consciousness or from newspaper articles which have been called into being for the purpose of advocating a particular course at a moment of crisis.

**Autho-  
rities.** In an appendix to this volume, I have given with details a list of books which may with advantage be consulted in dealing with particular persons, periods, and episodes—a list which might of itself be expanded into a volume. That list as it stands comprises: (1) Official records: (2) Standard Historical works: (3) Detailed Biographies: (4) Essays on aspects of the subject: (5) Studies at first or second hand of episodes or persons. For the *verification* of facts, the first class is obviously the most important; it is from the second and the last that we must ordinarily, for the most part fill in the outlines; from the third and fourth that we must obtain detailed specific knowledge. Here however, I may mention that *Marshman's History* is the most satisfactory general account with which I am acquainted, as Elphinstone's remains the standard account of the Hindu and Mohammedan periods. The entire series of the "*Rulers of India*," issued by the Clarendon Press, is admirably adapted for intelligent popular consumption, though suffering from the inevitable defect that each writer is disposed more or less consciously to become the advocate of his particular subject. And Sir Alfred Lyall's "*Asiatic Studies*"—may one, in such a connection mention also his *Verses written in India?*—and Sleeman's *Rambles and Recollections* are the most illuminating studies of the Oriental mind.

**Spelling.** I would add here some remarks on the rule I have followed in spelling Indian names. As late as thirty years ago it was the custom to anglicise the spelling of every word. Recently a Scientific method has been adopted; Macaulay's *Budge-budge* has become Báĳ Báĳ; and the Map-makers give us Machlipatnam for Masulipatam. On the other hand, while studying the period of the Sikh wars, I noted at least six different ways of spelling Firozshah; and even under the orthodox editorship of Sir William Hunter it has



been found impossible to maintain an absolutely uniform spelling.

Again, there is one respect in which the modern orthodox spelling is trying: that is in the use of the accent to distinguish between long and short vowels. To read of the "Rájá" has a peculiarly irritating effect, something like reading a page peppered with words in italics, nor is it in any way helpful to have Alláhábád thrust upon you: these symbols often render no aid towards discovering the syllable on which stress is laid. I have therefore generally dispensed with accents in the text, but on the first occurrence of a name and in the glossary I have introduced the long and short marks - ˘ where it seemed likely that the reader would thereby be helped to a more correct pronunciation.

There are certain words and names which may fairly be regarded as having passed into English Literature. Such are Arcot and Plassey, Assaye, Lucknow, Cawnpore, the Mogul, rupee, sepoy. To discard these forms is very much like writing of Aelfred and Eadward. Wherever such a form appears to me to be really established, I have kept to it. Where two forms are almost equally familiar, as with Haidar Ali and Hyder Ali, I have adopted the more modern one, mentioning the alternative where the name comes in for the first time. Where usage has not established any particular form, I have endeavoured to conform to the system of the "Imperial Gazetteer" save for the omission of accents. Roughly speaking, to find the common equivalent of the old quasi-phonetic spelling in the modern form, and *vice versa*, the following tables may be useful:—

## TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

*Showing the commoner variations found in the Modern spelling.*

Old	Modern	Old	Modern
ai	e	Mair	Mer
au	a	Punjaub	Panjab
aw	a	adawlut	adalat
e	i	Ferozepore	Firozpur
ee	i	Meerut	Mirat

Old	Modern	Old	Modern
oa	o	Broach	Baroch
oo	u	Hindoo	Hindu
ou }	{ ao	chout	chaith
ow }	{ au	Morari Row	Morari Rao
ore	ur	Nagpore	Nagpur
„	ar	Chundernagore	Chandarnagar
u	a	Meerut	Mirat
y	ai	Khyber	Khai bar
c hard	k	Cabul	Kabul
c soft	s	Circars	Sarkars
g soft	i	Gingee	Jinji
x	ks	Buxar	Baksar

e mute in the old spelling is omitted in the modern : e.g. Ferozepore becomes Firozpur.

#### VALUES OF LETTERS IN MODERN SPELLING

*As commonly pronounced by the British in India.*

ā : as a in <i>call</i> or <i>palm</i> .	ā : as a in <i>man</i> or u in <i>up</i> .
ē : as a in <i>mate</i> or <i>hare</i> .	ē : as e in <i>men</i> .
i : as i in <i>police</i> .	i : as i in <i>fil</i> .
ō : as o in <i>pope</i> .	o : as o in <i>hot</i> .
ū : as oo in <i>pool</i> , <i>poor</i> .	ū : as u in <i>put</i> .
ai : as i in <i>site</i> .	ao, au : as ow in <i>owl</i> .

ch, ph, sh, th, j, w, and y all follow the ordinary English pronunciation : but p-h and t-h are sometimes sounded separately. n is sometimes nasal (Fr. *bon*), e.g. in Bhonsla.



# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

	PAGE
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY . . . . .	xix

## BOOK I.--HINDU AND MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

### CHAPTER I

#### THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Boundaries—Hindustan--The Dekhan—Climate—Races and languages—The Aryan Invasion—Mohammedan Invaders—The Indian People—Hinduism: Caste—In modern times--Other religions—Indian Nationality—The British Conquest . . . . .	3
--	---

### CHAPTER II

#### MOHAMMEDAN DOMINION

India before Mohammed--Mahmud of Ghazni—Successive Mussulman dynasties—The Mohammedans before Baber—The Tartars—Baber—His conquest of Hindostan—Humayun—Akbar--His policy—Results of his rule—Jehangir—Shah Jehan—The Mogul Zenith—Aurangzib . . . . .	12
--	----

### CHAPTER III

#### THE MOGUL DISRUPTION, AND THE MARATHAS

The great Moguls—Elements of disintegration—Aurangzib's first years—His Mohammedan fanaticism—Hindu antagonism—The Maratha Race—Shahji Bhonsla—Rise of Sivaji—His exploits—His negotiations—Sivaji and Aurangzib—Reconciliation—Successful defiance— <i>Chauth</i> —Extension of Sivaji's domain—His death—Aurangzib in the Dekhan—End of the Dekhan kingdoms--Maratha resistance—Death of Aurangzib—His successors—Rise of the Peshwas—Break-up of the Mogul Empire—The Nizam-ul-Mulk—The new Powers—Nadir Shah—He sacks Delhi—Extension of Maratha dominions . . . . .	24
--	----

# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

## CHAPTER IV

PAGE

### THE EUROPEAN TRADERS

The Indian Myth—Discovery of the Cape Route—The Portuguese—The British and Dutch East India Companies—First establishment of British Factories—Sir T. Roe's Embassy—Concessions to the British in Bengal—and on the Coromandel Coast—Development of French Colonial Policy: Colbert—Relations of France, Holland, and England—Calcutta—The Interlopers—A rival East India Company—Amalgamation of the two—Retrogression of the Dutch—The French Company—François Martin—Lenoir—Dumas—The Rival National Companies—Relations of the Companies and their Governments—Constitution of the British Company in India—and in England. . . . .	39
---	----

## CHAPTER V

### RULERS AND SUBJECTS

Distribution of the Indian Powers—Character of Government after Aurangzib—François Bernier—European conception of a State—Contrast of the Oriental system—Defective Justice—Absence of Public Spirit—Instability of Government—Position of Moham-medan Nobility—Insecurity of property—Semblance and reality—The Soldiery—Condition of the Population—The European communities. . . . .	50
---	----

## BOOK II.—RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

### CHAPTER VI

#### THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH

The coming world-contest—Summary of the struggle—Prospects at the beginning—Dupleix at Pondichery—His scheme—The Nawab of the Carnatic checks the British—La Bourdonnais—He captures Madras—Dupleix defeats the Nawab—Defence of Fort St David—Defence of Pondichery—Peace of Aix-la-chapelle—Claimants to the Nawabship—Dupleix and Chanda Sahib—Claimants to the Nizamship—British blunders—Triumph of Dupleix's schemes—The turn of the tide—Robert Clive—Capture and defence of Arcot—French surrender at Trichinopoli—Dupleix superseded—Bussy at Haidarabad—Renewal of hostilities—The last phase—Lally—Frustration of his plans—Capture of Masulipatam—Eyre Coote—Victory of Wandewash—Fate of Lally . . . . .	61
---	----



# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

xi

PAGE

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CONQUEST OF BENGAL

Different nature of the contest in Bengal—Position of the Nawab—and of the British at Calcutta—Suraj-ud-daulah—The Black Hole—The punitory expedition—Intrigues of Suraj-ud-daulah—The British dilemma—Conspiracy against Suraj-ud-daulah—The Red and Black treaties—The gage of battle—Clive before Plassey—Victory of Plassey—Mir Jafar proclaimed Nawab—Supremacy of Clive—His government of Bengal—Invasion by the Shahzada repelled—Collision with the Dutch—Clive leaves India . . . . . 75

## CHAPTER VIII

### TRANSITION

A period of transition—Ahmed Shah Durani—Progress of the Marathas—Battle of Panipat—its results—Rise of Haidar Ali—The Madras Government—Renewed advance of the Marathas—British mis-rule in Bengal—Revolt of Mir Cassim—Munro's victory at Buxar—Return of Clive to India—The Augean Stable—Suppression of military opposition—Clive and the Diwani—Clive's attitude to the Mogul—and to the Country Powers—Clive's achievement—English Party Politics—Attitude of Parliament towards Indian affairs—Directors and Proprietors—Parliament intervenes—North's Regulating Act—1774-1784: Great Britain's difficulties . . . . . 83

## CHAPTER IX

### WARREN HASTINGS AND THE COUNTRY POWERS

The famine of 1770—Further advance of the Marathas—The Peshwa succession—Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal—Shuja Daulah and the Rohillas—Hastings grants assistance to the Nawab—Conquest of Rohilkhand—The Bombay Council and the Peshwa-ship—Treaty of Surat—Battle at Arras—Treaty of Purandar—Complications at Puna and Calcutta—The disaster of Wargam—Goddard's march—A diversion in Malwa—The Nizam, Haidar Ali and Madras—Increasing power of Haidar—Anti-British combination—Great Britain at bay—Haidar invades the Carnatic—Capture of Gwalior by Popham and Bruce—Its effect on the Marathas—Eyre Coote at Madras—Improvement in southern affairs—Suffren and Hughes—Death of Haidar Ali—Withdrawal of the French—Treaty with Tippu—Foreign Policy of Warren Hastings . . . . . 95

## CHAPTER X

## WARREN HASTINGS, THE COUNCIL AND THE GANGES PROVINCES

Lack of organisation in Bengal—Four periods of the rule of Warren Hastings—Hastings and the Diwani—The new members of Council—The Council and the Oudh Nawab—The attack on Hastings—Nuncomar's charges—Mohan Persad—Execution of Nuncomar—The struggle on the Council—Hastings predominant—The Revenue Board—The Subsidiary Alliance with Oudh—The Supreme Court—Its contest with the Council—Hastings' arrangement—The Raja of Benares—Hastings and the Raja—The Benares insurrection—The Oudh Begums—Character of Warren Hastings—Britain and her pro-consuls . . . . . 107

## BOOK III.—THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH ASCENDANCY

## § I. EXPANSION

## CHAPTER XI

## NEW CONDITIONS : CORNWALLIS AND SHORE

Course of growth of the British Power—Mutual influence of events in East and West—Fox's India Bill—Pitt's India Bill—Lord Cornwallis—The Powers in the Dekhan—Madhava Rao Sindhia—Sindhia's attitude to the British—Cornwallis and the Country Powers—His reforms—The Nizami—Letter of Cornwallis to the Nizam—The Governor-General's freedom of action—Tippu attacks Travancore—1790: opening campaign against Tippu—1791: campaign of Cornwallis against Tippu—1792: decisive campaign—Resulting acquisition of territory—Approval of Cornwallis's policy—His further reforms—His retirement—Sir John Shore—Maratha affairs—Shore in Oudh—His contest with the army—End of his administration . . . . . 121

## CHAPTER XII

## LORD WELLESLEY : (1) 1798-1802

The new Governor-General—Indian Foreign Policy—The danger from France—The situation: 1798—Preparations for a Mysore War—1799: The Mysore campaign—Fall of Seringapatam—The Mysore dynasty—Partition of Mysore—Subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, 1800—Annexation of Surat, Tanjur, and Arcot—The problem of Oudh—New subsidiary treaty with the Nawab—Peculiar position of Oudh—Wellesley's schemes against France . . . . . 136



# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

xiii

PAGE

## CHAPTER XIII

### LORD WELLESLEY : (2) 1802-1805

Dissensions between Wellesley and the Indian House—Feuds of the Maratha leaders—Reluctance of Country Powers to accept Subsidiary Treaties—1802: Treaty of Bassein—Grounds for the treaty—1803: Combination of the Maratha chiefs—The Maratha dominions—Battle of Assaye—Successes of Lake in Hindostan—Submission of the Bhonsla and Sindhia—Resistance of Holkar—Monson's retreat—Alarm in England—Successful operations against Holkar—Recall of Wellesley . . . . . 146

## CHAPTER XIV

### NON-INTERVENTION

Reversal of Wellesley's policy—Cornwallis—Barlow—Lord Minto—The French menace—The Russian menace—Wellesley's policy left uncompleted—Reactionary policy under Cornwallis and Barlow—Barlow's concessions to Holkar—His occasional firmness—The Vellur mutiny—Mutiny of the Madras army—Persia and France—Counter-embassies of Malcolm and Jones—Missions to Kabul and Sindh—Bandelkhand—Lord Minto and the Sikhs—Metcalf and Ranjit Singh—Rise of the Pindaris—Capture of the Mauritius and Java—Lord Minto recalled . . . . . 155

## CHAPTER XV

### LORD HASTINGS

Lord Hastings—The Gurkhas—The challenge from Nepal—1814: The Gurkha war: disastrous opening—Excitement in Hindostan—1815: Success of Ochterlony—Conquest of the Gurkhas—Pathans and Pindaris—Disturbances in Central India—Intrigues of Baji Rao Peshwa—Subsidiary treaty with Nagpur—1816-17: the situation—Need of a paramount Power—Attitude of the Marathas—1817: opening of the Campaign—Skilful dispositions of Lord Hastings—Forced inactivity of Sindhia and Holkar—The Peshwa defeated at Kirki—Apa Sahib defeated at Sitabaldi—Submission of Amir Khan—Collapse of Holkar—Successes against the Peshwa—Final operations—Results of the war—The kingdom of Oudh and the Mogul—The affair of Palmer & Co.—Conduct of the India House—Retirement of Lord Hastings . . . . . 164

## CHAPTER XVI

### BETWEEN LORD HASTINGS AND LORD AUCKLAND

Lord Amherst—"Further India"—Retrospect of relations with Burma—Collision with the Burmese—1824: Plan of Campaign—

	PAGE
Operations of 1824—Operations at the beginning of 1825—1826 : termination of the war—Considerations on the war—The Barrackpore mutiny—1825 : Troubles at Bhartpur—Ochterlony—Capture of Bhartpur—A pause in the Expansion—Lord William Bentinck—Non-intervention again—Minor annexations—Metcalf Governor-General <i>ad interim</i> —Appointment of Lord Auckland	179

## § 2. ORGANISATION

### CHAPTER XVII

#### THE SYSTEM

First stages of Ascendancy—The growth of the three Presidencies—The Constitution of 1784—The Governor-General : his technical powers—His practical powers—The Board of Control—The Charter Acts of 1813 and 1833—Political relations—The Company's Service—Early administrative methods—Changes under Cornwallis—Changes under Bentinck—Regulation and non-regulation Provinces—Three administrative periods—The army in India	187
--	-----

### CHAPTER XVIII

#### LAND SETTLEMENT

Land-taxation the main source of Indian Revenue—The Mogul system—The Zemindar—Want of security—Bengal—The English land-owner—Theory of the Zemindari Settlement—The Permanent Settlement : its effect on the Zemindar—Its defect—The Ryotwari settlements : in Madras—In Bombay—The north-west Provinces—The Talukdar—The village community—Theory of Thomason's settlement—Objectives offered thereto	196
--	-----

### CHAPTER XIX

#### GENERAL PROGRESS

Settled Government—Difficulty of introducing reforms—Thuggee—Its suppression—Dacoity—The conflict with it—Suttee—Need for its suppression—It is suppressed—Infanticide—Difficulty of dealing with it—Effected by minimising the most active inducements to it—These reforms due to British rule—The civilising of Merwara—The Bhils—Oudumbar—Education—The Orientalist method—The learning of the West—Public works	206
---	-----



# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

xv

## BOOK IV.—THE COMPLETION OF BRITISH DOMINION

### CHAPTER XX

PAGE

#### TRANS-INDUS : A RETROSPECT

The new era of wars—The Panjab—The Sikhs—Nanuk, founder of the sect—Govind Singh, the organiser of the Sikhs—Development of the Khalsa—The Afghan Frontier—Zeman Shah—The Barakzai brothers—1808 : Mission to Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh—Ranjit and Shah Shuja—Estimate of Ranjit—Estimate of Shah Shuja—Commerce as a political end—Insight of Ranjit—Development of his army—His aims—Shah Shuja driven from Kabul—Ranjit absorbs Multan—Embroidments in Afghanistan—Ranjit secures Kashmir—Rise of Dost Mohammed—Shah Shuja's attempts at a restoration—Ranjit secures Peshawar—Ranjit and Sindh—Persia and Russia—Russo-Persian war, 1825—Persia as Russia's protégé—Aggressive designs of Persia, 1834—March on Herat, 1837 . . . . . 219

### CHAPTER XXI

#### THE AFGHAN EXPEDITION : AUCKLAND AND ELLENBOROUGH

Lord Auckland—1837 : the situation—The true British policy—Lord Auckland's policy, to restore Shah Shuja—With British troops—The successful defence of Herat—Persistence of Auckland in his policy—Plan of campaign—Advance on Kandahar—Capture of Ghazni—Shah Shuja at Kabul—British occupation of Afghanistan—Surrender of Dost Mohammed—Murder of Burnes, November '41—Mismanagement of British Authorities at Kabul—Murder of Macnaghten—The great disaster—Auckland succeeded by Ellenborough—Events at Kandahar—Defence of Jellalabad—The position in April '42—"Withdrawal *via* Kabul"—The British prisoners—The triumphal march back—Effect of the episode . . . . . 234

### CHAPTER XXII

#### SINDH AND GWALIOR : AUCKLAND AND ELLENBOROUGH

Sindh and the Sindh Amirs—Outram—Sir Charles Napier and the Amirs—The Sindh war—Miani—Annexation of Sindh—Mutinies among Sepoys—Gwalior—Intrigues for power—The Gwalior Army—Withdrawal of the British Resident—Demands of Lord Ellenborough—Maharajpur—Puniar—New arrangements at Gwalior—Lord Ellenborough recalled . . . . . 247

## CHAPTER XXIII

PAGE

## THE PANJAB: HARDINGE

Sir Henry Hardinge—The Panjab after Ranjit Singh—The Khalsa—Intrigues and Anarchy—The Sikh problem—Disposition of British forces—The Sikhs cross the Satlej—Mudki—Ferozpur—Ferozshah—Current criticisms on the battle—Sobraon—The Lahore treaty—Henry Lawrence—Treaty of Bhairawal—The Panjab officers—Outlook in the Panjab . . . . . 256

## CHAPTER XXIV

## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB AND OF PEGU: DALHOUSIE

Position of British forces—The Multan revolt—The Campaign deferred—Herbert Edwardes—Sher Singh—Whish sent to Multan—Rising of the Khalsa—Gough's advance—Raninagar—Sadulapur—Chillianwalla—Fall of Multan—Gujerat—The Panjab annexed—Henry Lawrence and the annexation—The Governing Board—Henry Lawrence transferred to Rajputana—Dost Mohammed—Burmese affairs—Insult to the British—Preparations for war—Capture of Rangoon and Pegu—Annexation of Lower Burma . . . . . 266

## CHAPTER XXV

## DALHOUSIE AND THE NATIVE THRONES

The annexations by conquest—The "Annexation Policy"—Dalhousie's theory—The opposed theory—Conflicting views as to landholders—Policy in the past—Nature of Dalhousie's "departure"—Different grounds for annexations—The adoption question—The instructions of 1834—The case of Sattara—The case of Jhansi—The case of Kerauli—The case of Nagpur—The case of Oudh—Persistent misgovernment—Alternative proposals—Annexation of Oudh—The Berar Assignment—The Nagpur treasures—The Arcot family—Baji Rao and the Nana Sahib . . . . . 277

## CHAPTER XXVI

## GENERAL PROGRESS

1838-1848—Public works—The Khonds of Orissa—The Gumsur Khonds and Macpherson—Abolition of human sacrifice—1848-1856—Dalhousie and the Panjab—The Lawrence Brothers—Benefits of their rule—Increased importance of the Upper Provinces—Education—Importance of communication—Railways—The telegraph—Public works department—Half-penny post—Estimate of Lord Dalhousie . . . . . 288



# ANALYTICAL CONTENTS

xvii

## BOOK V.—THE CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

### CHAPTER XXVII

PAGE

#### THE EVE OF THE MUTINY

Lord Canning—Disappearance of Independent States—British *versus* Native Dominion—The Predatory classes—The Ruling classes—The Industrial classes—The Sepoys—Deficiency of European troops—Official unconsciousness of danger—The religious disquietude—The British tone—The condition of Oudh—Rajputana and the Panjab—The Bengal army—The General Service Enlistment Act—The Persian expedition—The cartridge incident—The Mussulmans and the Nana Sahib—Signs of unrest—Was the revolt organised?—The outbreak . . . . . 297

### CHAPTER XXVIII

#### REVOLT

Breathing time—Disposition of forces—Area of the mutiny—The Panjab secured—Series of mutinies—The force before Delhi—The fate of Cawnpore—Preparations at Lucknow—Composition of the mutineer armies—Their distribution—Operations before Delhi—Reinforcements from the Panjab—The storming of Delhi—Defence of the Lucknow Residency—Character of the siege—Perilous position of the garrison—Havelock's advance to Cawnpore—Havelock in Oudh—Havelock falls back to Cawnpore—Joined by Outram—Rescue of the Lucknow Residency . . . . . 309

### CHAPTER XXIX

#### CONQUEST AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Events elsewhere—Change in the situation—Campbell's relief of the residency—Tantia Topi—Capture of Lucknow—Sir Hugh Rose—Capture of Jhansi—Recrudescence of the struggle in Oudh—Termination of the contest—Who took part in the Revolt—Active participants—Neutral elements—General conclusions—Behaviour of Dost Mohammed—Attitude of the Panjab—Conduct of the Hindostani Sepoys—Lord Canning—His Oudh proclamations—Canning and his critics . . . . . 320

### CHAPTER XXX

#### EPILOGUE

The Company's Record—The Company's Task—Transfer of Government to the Crown—Last words . . . . . 329

## APPENDICES—

PAGE

I. NOTES :—Impeachment of Warren Hastings—Dalhousie and the Army—Lord Canning . . . . .	337
II. AUTHORITIES . . . . .	343
INDEX TO MAPS . . . . .	354
GENERAL INDEX . . . . .	359

## MAPS

I. INDIA : GENERAL MAP . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
II. INDIA : PHYSICAL FEATURES AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS . . . . .	<i>Facing page 3</i>
III. THE CARNATIC AND MYSORE . . . . .	61
IV. THE GANGES PROVINCES (LOWER) . . . . .	75
V. THE MARATHA WARS . . . . .	147
VI. THE PANJAB AND AFGHANISTAN . . . . .	219
VII. THE MUTINY AREA . . . . .	309
VIII. THE BRITISH EXPANSION. A : to 1783 . . . . .	328
B : to 1808 . . . . .	
C : to 1833 . . . . .	
D : to 1858 . . . . .	



## CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

Leading events are printed in heavy type.

Events outside the Indian radius are printed in italics.

The name of each Governor-General is printed in small capitals, at the time of his entering on the office.

The chapters in which events are narrated are denoted in the left hand column.

### § I. *From the first Mohammedan Invasion to the commencement of the Anglo-French struggle.* [Book I.]

#### (i.) *Pre-Mogul period.*

- 11.      664    First Mohammedan (Arab) invasion.
- 1001-1026    Mahmud of Ghazni.
- 1176-1206    Shahab-ud-Din (Mohammed Ghori).
- 1189    *Richard I. of England.*
- 1206-1288    Slave Dynasty of Delhi.
- 1215    *The Great Charter.*
- 1272    *Edward I. of England.*
- 1288-1321    Khilji Dynasty of Delhi.
- 1314    *Bannockburn.*
- 1321-1412    Tughlak Dynasty of Delhi.
- 1346    *Crccy.*
- 1347    Bahmani Dynasty in the Dekhan.
- 1398    Tamerlane's Invasion.
- 1414-1450    Seiad Dynasty of Delhi.
- 1415    *Agincourt.*
- 1450-1526    Lodi Dynasty of Delhi.
- 1453    *Constantinople taken by the Ottoman Turks.*
- 1489    The Five Kingdoms of the Dekhan.
- 1498    **Vasco di Gama rounds the Cape and reaches Kalikat.**
- Nanuk, founder of the Sikh sect, *fl.*
- 1507    Albuquerque at Goa.
- 1517    *Luther and Tetzel.*

(ii.) *Mogul Period.*

- |           |      |   |
|-----------|------|---|
| II.       | 1526 | <b>Baber's Conquest of Hindostan.</b>                           |
|           | 1531 | Humayun succeeds Baber.   |
|           | 1533 | <i>Henry VIII.'s Reformation Parliament.</i>                    |
|           | 1540 | Humayun expelled. Sher Shah.                                    |
|           | 1555 | Humayun restored.   |
|           | 1556 | <b>Akbar</b> succeeds Humayun.                                  |
|           | 1558 | <i>Queen Elizabeth.</i>   |
|           | 1588 | <i>Defeat of the Armada. Naval supremacy passes to England.</i> |
| IV.       | 1600 | <b>English East India Company.</b>                              |
|           | 1601 | <i>Dutch East India Company.</i>                                |
| II.       | 1605 | <b>Jehangir</b> succeeds Akbar.                                 |
| IV.       | 1613 | British Factory established at Surat.                           |
|           | 1615 | Sir T. Roe's Embassy to the Mogul.                              |
|           | 1620 | First British settlement in Bengal.                             |
| II.       | 1627 | <b>Shah Jehan</b> succeeds Jehangir. Sivaji born.               |
| IV.       | 1632 | Overthrow of Portuguese power in Indian seas.                   |
|           | 1639 | First British settlement at Madras.                             |
|           | 1653 | <i>Cromwell's charter to the E.I.C.</i>                         |
| II.       | 1658 | <b>Aurangzib</b> deposes Shah Jehan.                            |
| III.      | 1659 | <b>Sivaji</b> in the Dekhan.                                    |
| IV.       | 1660 | <i>Charles II.</i>  |
|           | 1661 | <i>Death of Mazarin.</i>  |
|           | 1662 | Acquisition of Bombay from Portugal.                            |
|           | 1664 | <b>French E.I.C. constituted.</b>                               |
|           | 1666 | <i>France and Holland in Alliance.</i>                          |
|           | 1668 | <i>England and Holland in Alliance.</i>                         |
|           | 1670 | <i>France and England in Alliance.</i>                          |
|           | 1672 | <i>War between England and Holland.</i>                         |
|           | 1674 | <i>Peace with Holland.</i>                                      |
|           | 1678 | <i>Secret treaty between Charles II. and Louis XIV.</i>         |
| III.      | 1679 | Aurangzib attacks Bijapur.                                      |
|           | 1680 | Death of Sivaji.  |
|           | 1685 | War between British and Aurangzib.                              |
|           | 1686 | Fall of Bijapur.  |
|           | 1687 | Fall of Golconda.   |
|           | 1688 | <i>William of Orange becomes King of England.</i>               |
| IV.       | 1690 | Establishment of Fort-William (Calcutta).                       |
|           | 1698 | Rival English East India Company.                               |
| III., XX. | 1700 | Govind Singh (Sikh Guru) fl.                                    |
| IV.       | 1701 | <b>François Martin.</b>   |
|           | 1702 | Amalgamation of E.I. Companies.                                 |
| III.      | 1707 | <b>Death of Aurangzib.</b> Bahadur Shah Mogul.                  |

## (iii.) *The Mogul Disintegration.*

- III. 1712 Jehandar Shah Mogul.
- 1713 *Treaty of Utrecht.*  
Farokshir Mogul.
- 1714 *Accession of House of Hanover.*
- 1715 *Death of Louis XIV.*
- 1717 Balaji Wiswanath Peshwa.
- 1718 Puppet Moguls, under the Seiads.
- 1719 Mohammed Shah Mogul.
- 1720 Baji Rao I. Peshwa.
- IV. 1721 Lenoir Governor at Pondichery.
- III. 1724 Asaf Jah (Nizam ul Mulk) established in Dekhan.
- 1733 *Bourbon Family Compact.*
- IV. 1734 Dumas Governor at Pondichery.
- III. 1737 Extension of Maratha Ascendancy in Hindostan.
- 1739 *War declared between England and Spain.*  
**Nadir Shah sacks Delhi.**
- IV. 1740 Dumas resists the Nagpur Raja.
- III. Balaji Rao Peshwa.  
Anwar-ud-Din Nawab of Carnatic.  
Sadat Khan Nawab Wazir of Oudh.  
Ali Vardi Khan Nawab of Bengal.
- IV. 1741 **Dupleix Governor of Pondichery.**
- VI. 1744 *War declared in the West between France and Great Britain.*
- 1745 Rise of the Rohillas.  
The Nawab of Arcot protects the French.
- 1746 *Jacobitism extinguished at Culloden.*

## § II. *Rise of the British Power.*

### (i.) *Anglo-French Contest in the Carnatic.*

- 1746 Commencement of the contest in the Carnatic.  
La Bourdonnais captures Madras (Sept.).  
Dupleix retains Madras. French troops defeat the Nawab's army.
- 1747 Unsuccessful attacks on Fort St David.  
Appearance of Griffin's squadron.
- 1748 Stringer Lawrence holds Fort St David (June).  
Unsuccessful siege of Pondichery.



- VI. 1748 *Peace of Aix-la-chapelle. Restoration of Conquests.*  
 Death of Nizam-ul-Mulk. Disputed succession.
- 1749 Dupleix ransoms Chanda Sahib.  
 Anwar-ud-Din killed at Ambur.  
 Departure of British Fleet.  
 Mohammed Ali at Trichinopoli.  
 Muzaffar Jang Nizam (Dec.).
- 1750 Muzaffar Jang killed; Salabat Jang Nizam.
- 1751 The Nizam withdraws to Haidarabad with Bussy.  
**Robert Clive : Capture and defence of Arcot.**
- 1752 French surrender at Trichinopoli. Death of Chanda Sahib.
- 1753 Northern Sarkars granted to Bussy by Nizam.
- 1754 Dupleix recalled.

*(ii.) The Company becomes a Territorial Power.*

- VII. 1756 Suppression of the pirate Angria by Clive and Watson.  
**Black Hole of Calcutta** (July).  
*The Seven Years' War begins.*  
 Clive and Watson enter the Hugli (Dec.).
- 1757 Clive in Calcutta (Jan.).  
 Capture of Chandernagar (March).  
 The Omichund treaties (May).  
**Battle of Plassey** (June).  
 Clive supreme in Bengal. Mir Jafar Nawab.  
*Pitt's great administration begins* (June).
- VI. 1758 Madras : arrival of Lally (April).  
 Lally captures Fort St David.  
 Bussy summoned to the Carnatic from Haidarabad.  
 Madras besieged (Dec.).  
 Development of Pitt's Naval Policy.
- 1759 Siege of Madras raised (Feb.).  
**Forde captures Masulipatam** (April). Northern Sarkars ceded to British.
- VII. Shah Alam's futile invasion of Bengal.  
 Collision with the Dutch on the Hugli.  
*Victories of Quebec and Quiberon.*
- VI. 1760 **Victory of Wandewash** (Jan.).  
 Clive leaves India (Feb.).

## CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY xxiii

- VI. 1760 *Accession of George III. (Oct.).*
- 1761 Capture of Pondichery. End of French power in India.
- VIII. **Ahmed Shah Durani overthrows the Marathas at Panipat.** Madhava Rao Sindhia escapes. Death of Balaji Rao Peshwa.
- Siege of Patna raised by Calliaud and Knox.
- 1762 **Haidar Ali seizes the throne of Mysore.**
- Mir Cassim made Nawab of Bengal.
- 1763 *Peace of Paris.*
- Massacre of Patna, and flight of Mir Cassim.
- 1764 *Grenville's Stamp Act.*
- Battle of Buxar:** Munro overthrows the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh.
- 1765 **Clive returns to India,** to "cleanse the Augean Stable."
- The Nawab Wazir confirmed in the throne of Oudh.
- The Mogul grants the Diwani of Bengal, and the Northern Sarkars, to the Company.
- 1766 Clive's reforms. The Double Batta incident.
- Rockingham Ministry (July).*
- 1767 Clive leaves India.
- Grafton Ministry (July).*
- 1768 Madras treaty with Nizam.
- 1769 Madras treaty with Haidar Ali.
- 1770 *Lord North's Ministry.*
- IX. 1771 Shah Alam Mogul, under Maratha protection.
- 1772 Disputed succession at Puna.
- Warren Hastings Governor of Bengal.
- The Company resolves to "stand forth as Diwan."

### (iii.) *The Rule of Warren Hastings.*

- IX., XVII. 1773 **North's Regulating Acts.** Warren Hastings appointed Governor-General.
- IX. **Suppression of the Rohillas.**
- 1774 Nana Farnavis at Puna.
- WARREN HASTINGS** Governor-General. The New Council and Judges.
- Clive commits suicide.*
- The Calcutta Triumvirate over-rule Hastings.**
- 1775 Asaf-ud-daulah succeeds as Nawab-Wazir (Oudh).
- Bombay treaty of Surat with Ragoba (March).
- X. Calcutta Council supports Nuncomar against Hastings.



- x. 1775 Hastings' letter of Resignation.  
Beginning of American War of Independence.  
Execution of Nuncomar.
- ix. 1776 Treaty of Purandar with Marathas.  
Lord Pigot, Governor of Madras, deposed.  
Monson (one of the Triumvirate) dies.
- x. 1777 The Chevalier St Lubin at Puna.  
Contest as to Hastings' resignation. Death of Clavering.  
**Hastings predominant.**  
*Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga.*
- 1778 *France openly supports America.*  
*Death of Chatham.*
- ix. Hastings authorises a Maratha war.  
Seizure of French ports.
- 1779 Disaster of Wargam.  
Goddard's march across Hindostan to Surat.  
Nizam's scheme for Anti-British confederacy.
- x. Contest between the High Court and Council (Calcutta).  
*Spain joins France against Britain.*
- ix. 1780 Goddard in Gujerat.
- x. Impey made head of the Sadr Adalat.
- ix. **Haidar Ali invades the Carnatic.** Baillie's disaster.  
**Gwalior captured by Popham.**  
Eyre Coote sent to Madras (Nov.).
- 1781 Holkar checks Goddard.  
Sindhia defeated in Malwa.  
Coote's victories in the Carnatic.  
Negapatam captured. Braithwaite's disaster.
- x **Benares insurrection.**  
*Surrender of Yorktown.*
- ix. 1782 Suffren's battles with Hughes.  
*Rodney's victory of the Saints. Naval predominance recovered.*  
*Shelburne ministry (July).*
- x. **Affair of the Oudh Begums.**
- ix. Treaty of Salbai with Marathas.  
**Death of Haidar Ali : Tippu Sahib Sultan.**
- 1783 Operations at Gudalur. *Treaty of Versailles.*  
Fullerton in Mysore.  
*Coalition Ministry (April). Fox's India Bill (Dec.).*
- 1784 Treaty of Mangalur with Tippu.  
*Pitt with Dundas in power.*
- xi., xvii. **The Pitt-Dundas India Act.**
- x. 1785 Hastings leaves India.

§ III. *Development of British Ascendancy.*(i.) *Cornwallis and Shore.*

- XI. 1785 SIR JOHN MACPHERSON *ad interim*.  
 Sindhia's claim for tribute to the Mogul repudiated.  
 1786 Tippu at war with the Nizam and Puna.  
 CORNWALLIS (Sept.).  
 Arrangements made in Oudh.  
 XVII. 1787 Administrative reforms of Cornwallis.  
 1788 *Impeachment of Warren Hastings.*  
*Declaratory Act on Indian Government.*  
 XI. The Nizam and the Guntur Sarkars.  
 1789 Letter of Cornwallis to the Nizam.  
*Fall of the Bastille.*  
 Tippu attacks Travancore.  
 1790 Campaign of Medows against Tippu.  
 1791 Cornwallis's first campaign against Tippu. He captures  
 Bangalur, but has to retreat.  
 1792 Cornwallis's final campaign. Tippu submits.  
**Acquisition of Mysore districts.**  
 XVIII. Beginning of Ryotwari land settlement in Madras  
 presidency.  
*The "September Massacres."*  
 1793 *Beginning of the great French War.*  
**Permanent zemindari settlement** in Bengal.  
 XVII. Company's Charter Act.  
 XI. SIR JOHN SHORE, afterwards Lord Teignmouth.  
 1794 Death of Madhava Rao Sindhia (Mahdoji). He is suc-  
 ceeded by Daulat Rao.  
 1795 French influence at Haidarabad. Raymond's corps.  
*Cape of Good Hope taken.*  
 Mutiny of Bengal officers.  
 1796 Shore concedes the military demands.  
 Baji Rao II. Peshwa.  
*Bonaparte in Italy.*  
 1797 New treaty with Oudh.  
*Mornington appointed to succeed Shore.*  
*Battles of Cape St Vincent and Camperdown.*

(ii.) *Wellesley.*

- XII. 1798 LORD MORNINGTON, afterwards MARQUESS WELLESLEY.



- xii. 1798 Wellesley reaches Calcutta (May).  
Alarm of Afghan invasion under Zeman Shah.  
The Mauritius Proclamation made known (June).  
Fresh alliance with the Nizam.  
*Battle of the Nile* (Aug.).
- 1799 **Conquest of Mysore.** Death of Tippu (May).  
Re-establishment of Hindu Dynasty in Mysore.  
Partition of Mysore.  
**Carnatic, Surat, and Tangier under British rule.**
- 1800 *Battle of Marengo.*  
Malcolm's Embassy to Persia.  
"Subsidiary" cessions of territory by the Nizam.  
Munro engaged on *Kyotwari* Settlement: Madras.  
Egyptian expedition under Baird.  
Death of Nana Farnavis. Rise of Jeswant Rao Holkar  
and Amir Khan, and of Ranjit Singh.  
Wellesley foiled in his plan to seize the Mauritius.
- xviii. 1801 New treaty with Oudh: Henry Wellesley. **Oudh**  
xii. **territories ceded.**  
*Pitt resigns.*  
*Battles of Alexandria and Copenhagen.*  
Rise of the Barakzais in Afghanistan.  
*Peace of Amiens.*  
Wellesley's resignation declined.
- xiii. 1802 Holkar defeats Sindhia and the Peshwa before Puna.  
Baji Rao surrenders Maratha independence by the **Treaty**  
**of Bassein.**
- 1803 *War with France renewed.*  
Coalition of Marathas. **Maratha War** (Aug.). Victories  
of **Assaye** (Sept.), **Laswari** (Oct.), **Argaon** (Nov.).  
Treaties with Sindhia and Bhonsla.
- 1804 *Napoleon made Emperor.* *Pitt takes office again.*  
Holkar renews the Maratha war. Monson's disaster.  
Ochterlony's defence of Delhi. **Battle of Dig.**
- 1805 Failure of Lake at Bhartpur.  
Wellesley retires.
- (iii.) *Non-Intervention.*
- xiv. 1805 CORNWALLIS (July). He dies in Oct.  
SIR GEORGE BARLOW (Oct.) *ad interim.*  
Lake's pursuit of Holkar. Terms made with Sindhia.  
*Fall of Dundas.* *Battle of Trafalgar* (Oct.).  
*Death of Pitt.* Ministry of "All the Talents" (Jan.).



# CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

xxvii

- xiv. 1806 Terms made with Holkar.  
Vellur mutiny. Bentinck recalled from Madras.  
*Battle of Jena.*
- 1807 *Treaty of Tilsit.*  
LORD MINTO.
- 1808 *Peninsula War begins. Growing coolness between Tsar and Napoleon. Convention of Cintra.*  
Persian Missions of Harford, Jones, and Malcolm.  
Missions to Kabul, Panjab, and Sindh.
- 1809 Barlow at Madras: collision with Madras officers.  
*Percival Prime Minister. Battles of Corunna, Talavera, and Wagram.*  
**Treaty with Ranjit Singh.** Protectorate of Cis-Satlaj.  
Minto supports Nagpur against Amir Khan.
- 1810 *Torres Vedras.*  
Capture of Mauritius.
- xx. Afghanistan; expulsion of Shah Shuja; the Barakzais.
- 1811 *Albuera.*
- xiv. Seizure of Java.  
Rise of the Pindaris.
- 1812 *Lord Liverpool Prime Minister.*  
*Napoleon's Russian Expedition.*  
Minto superseded.

## (iv.) *Renewed Expansion.*

- xvii. 1813 *Battles of Vittoria, Dresden and Leipzig.*  
Renewal of E.I.C. charter.
- xv. LORD MOIRA, afterwards LORD HASTINGS  
Ghurka aggression.
- 1814 **Ghurka War.** Early disasters.  
Aggression of Pindaris in Central India.  
Hastings supports Bhopal against Marathas  
Persian treaty.
- 1815 Success of Ochterlony against the Ghurkas.  
**Treaty with Nepal.**  
Intrigues of Baji Rao Peshwa.  
*European War ended by Waterloo.*
- 1816 Hastings resolves to suppress Pindaris. George Canning's  
dispatch.  
Subsidiary alliance accepted for Nagpur by Apa Sahib.
- 1817 Hastings extends alliances and prepares Pindari cam-  
paign.

## xxviii CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- xv. 1817 **War begins** (Pindari and Maratha) Oct.  
 Battles of Kirki and Sitabaldi (Nov.).  
 Suppression of Pindaris and Pathans.
- 1818 Subjection of Central India. Sattara state set up.  
 Surrender and deposition of Baji Rao. **Maratha treaties. Annexation of Maratha territory.**  
 Panjab : Ranjit Singh takes Multan.
- 1819 The Nawab of Oudh made king.  
*Death of Warren Hastings.*  
 Ranjit Singh annexes Kashmir.
- xviii. 1820 Elphinstone and the Bombay Land Settlement.  
 xv. The affairs of Palmer & Co.
- xix. 1821 Captain Hall in Merwara.
- xv. 1822 Lord Hastings resigns.  
*Suicide of Castlereagh; prevents Canning from assuming the office of Governor-General.*
- xvi. 1823 LORD AMHERST.  
 Burmese challenge to war.
- 1824 **Burma war declared** (Feb.).  
 Barrackpore mutiny.  
 Rangoon taken.
- 1825 Difficulties of the troops in Burma.  
 Occupation of Prome.  
 Outram among the Bhils.  
 The Bhartpur troubles.
- 1826 Fall of Bhartpur (Jan.).  
 Successes in Burma.  
 Peace : **cession of Assam, Arakan, and Tenasserim.**
- xx. Dost Mohammed supreme at Kabul.  
 Russo-Persian war.

### (v.) *An Interval of Rest.*

- 1827 **Russo-Persian rapprochement.**
- 1828 *Wellington Prime Minister.*  
 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.
- xix. 1829 Movement to check Infanticide.  
**Decree abolishing Suttee.**
- 1830 *Lord Grey Prime Minister.*  
 Sleeman's campaign against Thuggee.
- xx. 1831 Mission of Alexander Burnes to Sindh and Lahore.
- 1832 *Reform Act.*
- xvi. Annexation of Kurg and Kachar.  
 Administration of Mysore taken over.



- |        |      |  |
|--------|------|--|
| xvii.  | 1833 | <b>Revised Charter Act.</b><br>Death of Daulat Rao Sindhia.  |
| xviii. |      | Robert M. Bird in the North-West Provinces.  |
|        | 1834 | Increased control over Rajput princes.   |
| xxv.   |      | Director's dispatch, discouraging adoption.  |
| xix.   |      | The education problem acute.   |
|        | 1835 | <b>Educational victory of the Western School.</b>  |
| xvi.   |      | SIR CHARLES METCALFE <i>ad interim</i> .<br>Liberation of the Press.   |
| xix.   |      | Dixon in Merwara.  |
| xxi.   | 1836 | <b>LORD AUCKLAND.</b>  |
|        | 1837 | <i>Accession of Queen Victoria.</i><br>Persian advance on Herat.<br>Peshawar finally secured by Ranjit Singh.<br>Mission of Burnes to Kabul.<br>Siege of Herat begun (Nov.). |
| xx.    |      |  |

## § IV. *Completion of British Dominion.*

### (i.) *Auckland, Ellenborough and Hardinge.*

- |       |      |   |
|-------|------|---|
| xxi.  | 1838 | Auckland resolves to restore Shah Shuja.<br>Siege of Herat raised.<br>Preparations for Afghan Expedition.   |
|       | 1839 | British advance from Shikarpur (Feb.).<br>Kandahar occupied (April). Ghazni captured (July).<br><b>Death of Ranjit Singh</b> (June).<br><b>Restoration of Shah Shuja at Kabul</b> (Aug.).   |
|       | 1840 | Surrender of Dost Mohammed.<br>Macnaghten and Burnes at Kabul, with British army.   |
|       | 1841 | Rising at Kabul. Murder of Burnes and Macnaghten (Dec.).  |
|       | 1842 | <b>Kabul Disaster</b> (Jan.).<br>Defence of Kandahar and Jellalabad.<br><b>LORD ELLENBOROUGH</b> (Feb.).<br>Retirement ordered. Siege of Jellalabad raised (April).<br>Nott and Pollock instructed to withdraw <i>via</i> Kabul (July).<br><b>Kabul re-occupied</b> (Sept.).<br>Triumphal withdrawal from Afghanistan.<br>Charles Napier in Sindh.<br>Restoration of Dost Mohammed. |
| xxvi. |      | Macpherson among the Khonds.<br>P. and O. Company instituted.   |

## CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- xxii. 1843 Battle of Miani (Feb.). **Sindh annexed.**  
 Gwalior : death of Jankoji Sindhia (Feb.).  
**Maharajpur campaign** (Dec.).  
 Panjab : murder of Maharaja Sher Singh.  
 Thomason in the North-West Provinces.
- xix. 1844 New arrangements at Gwalior.  
 Mutinies of Sepoys ordered to Sindh.  
 Recall of Lord Ellenborough.
- xxiii. SIR HENRY afterwards LORD HARDINGE.  
 Domination of the Khalsa in the Panjab.
- 1845 Ganges Canal.  
 Sikhs cross the Satlej (Dec. 11).  
 Battles of Mudki (Dec. 18) and Firozshah (Dec. 21 and 22).
- 1846 Battles of Aliwal (Jan. 26) and **Sobraon** (Jan. 10).  
**Lahore treaty** (March). Cession of Jalandar and Kashmir. Sale of Kashmir to Gholab Singh.  
**Bhairowal treaty** (Dec.).  
*Repeal of Corn Laws.*
- 1847 Henry Lawrence in the Panjab to end of year.

*(ii.) Dalhousie.*

- xxiv. 1848 LORD DALHOUSIE (Jan.).  
 Revolt of Mulraj at Multan (April).  
 Herbert Edwardes before Multan (July).  
 Sher Singh raises the Khalsa (Sept.).  
 Gough enters the Panjab (Nov.).  
 Battles of Ramnagar (Nov.) and Sadulapur (Dec.).
- 1849 Battle of Chillianwalla (Jan. 13).  
 Fall of Multan (Jan. 22).  
**Battle of Gujra** (Feb. 21).  
**Panjab annexed** (March 30).  
 Governing Board established in Panjab.
- xxv. **Annexation of Sattara.** Adoption Annexation.
- xxiv. 1851 Troubles with the Burmese Government.
- 1852 Ultimatum to Burma.  
 Capture of Rangoon (April 11).  
 Capture of Prome (Oct.).  
**Annexation of Lower Burma.**  
 John Lawrence chief commissioner of Panjab.  
*Aberdeen Ministry.*
- xxv. 1853 Annexation of Jhansi.  
 Annexation of Nagpur.

# CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

xxxi

- xxv. 1853 Assignment of Berar by the Nizam.  
Claims of the Arcot family, and of Nana Sahib as heir  
to Baji Rao, rejected.  
Renewal of Charter.
- xxvi. Railway construction.  
Cheap postage.
- 1854 Sir Charles Wood's Education dispatch.  
*Crimean War begins.*
- 1855 Electric telegraph.  
*Palmerston Premier.*  
*Fall of Sebastopol.*
- 1856 End of Crimean War.  
Annexation of Oudh (Feb.).
- xxv. (iii.) *The final stage.*
- xxvii. 1856 LORD CANNING (Feb.).  
General Service Enlistment Act.  
Disturbances in Oudh.  
Persian War.
- 1857 Jan. **Cartridge incident.**  
Sporadic mutinies.  
Treaty with Dost Mohammed.  
China War.
- May 10 **Mirat outbreak.**  
11 Mogul proclaimed.  
28 Series of mutinies begins.
- xxviii. June 6 Allahabad secured.  
12 **Ridge at Delhi occupied by British.**  
14 Gwalior Mutiny.  
26 **Fall of Cawnpore.**  
30 Havelock takes command at Allahabad.  
30 **Siege of Lucknow Residency begins.**
- July 17 **Havelock reaches Cawnpore** after hard fighting.  
29 Havelock crosses Ganges into Oudh.
- Aug. 12 **Havelock falls back to Cawnpore.**  
Oudh clansmen join the Lucknow mutineers.
- Sept. 6 Siege train reaches Delhi.
- 1857 Sept. 14 **Storming of Delhi walls.**  
15 Outram's junction with Havelock.  
21 Delhi cleared of mutineers.  
25 **Outram and Havelock enter Lucknow.**
- xxix. Nov. 12 **Sir Colin Campbell relieves Lucknow.**
- 1858 Mar. **Capture of Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell.**



## xxxii

## CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

XXIX.

1858

## April

**Capture of Jhansi by Sir Hugh Rose.**  
**Canning's Oudh proclamation. Recrudescence**  
**of the war in Oudh.**

Dec.

**End of the war.**

**XXX.**

**Transfer of Government of India to the Crown.  
End of the H.E.I.C. Lord Canning first Viceroy.**

# **BRITISH IN INDIA**

## **BOOK I**


### **HINDU AND MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION**





# INDIA

GENERAL MAP  
showing  
TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS  
ABOUT 1760  
Scale 1 Inch = 240 Miles













## CHAPTER I

# THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

(*Maps I. and II.*)

THE great territory to which we give the name of India <sup>Boundaries.</sup> is separated from the rest of Asia by a vast bulwark of tremendous mountains, forming a kind of arc round its northern half, the ends of the arc resting on the sea. One half of her frontier is the mountains, the other half is the ocean. Outside the barrier lie Biluchistan and Afghanistan, Turkistan, Tibet, Burma. On one side only, the western, does the great barrier offer practicable passes. Therefore it is either through the Suleiman mountains by one of those gateways, or by crossing the sea, that the stranger has always made his way into India. The Himalayan chain from Kashmir to Assam has been an impassable wall.

From North to South, parallel to the Suleiman range, <sup>Hindostan.</sup> and along its base, flows the great river Indus; joined by the united waters of five great streams. The land through which those rivers flow is the "Land of the Five Rivers," the Panjab or Punjaub. Below the junction is Sindh. East of Sindh, east and south of the Panjab, is a great expanse of territory having but little water, and in part sheer desert, named Rajpūtāna or Rajasthan.

Only a little east of the Sātlej (Sutledge), the most easterly of the Panjab rivers, the Ganges and the Jāmna (Jumna) take their rise in the Himalayas, flowing at first almost due south, then sweeping eastward to mingle at Allahabad, and thence onward in the same direction till the sacred stream takes a sudden turn south to empty its waters into the Bay of Bengal. Other great rivers join

## 4 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

it on its way, the country through which they pass being described generally as the Ganges basin. From the mountains of Assam and Tibet on the far East the mighty Brahmapūtra descends to join the Ganges almost where it reaches the sea. The lower portion of the Ganges basin is Bengal; the name of Hindostan is sometimes restricted to the upper portion.

Carrying the eye southward down the map; the mountain chain of the Vindhya runs inland from the western coast, extending to Orissa on the east: the river Nerbadda (Nerbudda), flowing from East to West, skirting its southern foothills. The Nerbadda is the southern boundary of Hindostan in the larger sense of the term; the line being continued to the East coast, corresponding approximately to the course of the Mahanadi (Mahanuddy). Thus applied, the name of Hindostan covers the Northern half of India, as that of Dekhan or Deccan covers the southern half.

The Dekhan. South of the Nerbudda, along the west side of the peninsula, separated from the sea by only a narrow strip of plain, the Western Ghāts rise steeply; forming the western side of a plateau which falls slowly towards the east, from which side it is comparatively, but only comparatively, easy of access. The stretch of plain between the hills and the coast is much wider on the east than on the west. The course of the great rivers Godaveri and Krishna shows the fall of the country. The fundamental distinction to be observed is, that Hindostan is in the first place richer and therefore more tempting to the invader than the Dekhan, and in the second place that it is more easy of access. The Vindhya form a barrier between the Dekhan and Hindostan, which has generally intervened effectively to prevent the political subjection of the south to the north.

Of the rivers, it is to be noted that the Satlej has recently been found to be an effective boundary between the Panjab and the districts on its south and east: while the Nerbadda has been a nominal boundary between Hindostan and the Dekhan. The Warda, joining the Godaveri and flowing to the east coast, is a line of demarcation between a wild country of hills and jungles eastwards and the more cultivated



and civilised portion of the Dekhan plateau westwards. Further south, the Tānghābādra and the Krishna set the limits to the Northward movements of aggressors from Mysore. The richest land in India is the basin of the Ganges—Ganga, the holy stream

Certain characteristics of the climate exercise an important Climate. influence on the sequence of events.

India is roughly speaking the size of Europe without Russia. Within that space there is room for considerable varieties of climate. In the north, the thermometer sometimes touches freezing point by night in the cold season: while on the plains in the hot weather the heat becomes extreme. In the Dekhan the temperature is more equable. But in the south there is less cold season, the hot weather setting in in March while in the Panjab it does not set in till May.

In the Panjab and to some degree on the upper Ganges, the mean level of the country is fairly high, and the heat is fierce but dry till the rains come; in Bengal, where the level is low, the air is moist and the heat more enervating. From the end of May till September south-westerly winds blow, called the monsoons, bringing with them the rains: rain in quantities entirely beyond European experience. Except for the modification introduced by artificial irrigation, the productiveness of the country depends entirely on the rains, and their failure means inevitable famine. In the North West, the monsoons coming less off the ocean, bring with them less water. In the Dekhan, caught by the Western Ghats, much of the rainfall is exhausted before the eastern plains are reached: but over Hindostan it is distributed fairly evenly. The hot season interferes greatly with military operations, especially for European troops; when the rains set in, active operations are often rendered almost impossible.

In October, a sort of counter-monsoon begins blowing from the North East, giving the south-eastern coasts their rainfall, though not so lavishly as the south-western monsoons elsewhere. The whole stretch of the east coast below Bengal being very deficient in harbourage, naval operations



## 6 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

are liable to be brought to a standstill while the counter monsoon is blowing from October to December.

Races and  
languages.

From these geographical conditions certain results follow. Primitive populations tend to be forced back into the hilly regions by immigrant hordes of different race. The immigrants come always by the same route, through the Suleiman mountains, across the Panjab, and then spread themselves over all Hindostan. The primitive peoples are absorbed or enslaved, but make their stand at the passes into the Dekhan, where they hold their own very much as the Celtic populations maintained their resistance to the Teutonic invaders in Wales, and in the Highlands of Scotland. Hence the languages of the Dekhan—Tamil, Telugu, Canarese—are pre-Aryan tongues; although the later invaders who did succeed in making good their footing in these regions, introduced also the modified language, Urdu or Hindostani, the language of the camp, which is a sort of composite chiefly of Hindi (the purest offspring of Sanskrit) and Persian—the last having become the prevailing language of the eastern peoples for mutual intercourse very much as French achieved a like position though a less universal one in Europe.

Invaders.

Many centuries before the Christian era, a branch of the great Aryan or Indo-European race descended upon Hindostan, subjugating or expelling the earlier inhabitants, and introducing the religion, the laws, and the language of the conquerors. The Hindu advance was checked by the mountains and jungles of the northern Dekhan, into which their supremacy never seems to have penetrated, though curiously enough their religion did. It is probable that there were subsequent Scythian incursions, but these invaders were absorbed, subjugated, or assimilated, by their Hindu predecessors. The descent of Alexander was a unique episode, introducing no permanent Occidentalism into the East, no continued intercourse of East and West. The actual records of Hindu history are about ninety-nine parts myth to one part fact, which affords a large field for hypothetical reconstruction; but after Mohammed arose, the warriors who carried the banner of Islam into the land of the Hindus were accompanied by chroniclers whose historical



perceptions were doubtless defective, but who recognised a marked distinction between recording facts and inventing fables. These conquerors carried their arms from end to end of Hindostan, and established monarchies over great part of the Dekhan. The Moslem invasions culminated with the establishment of the Mogul or Mughal empire in the sixteenth century A.D.; the hordes of Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Durāni, a couple of hundred years afterwards, neglecting to secure any permanent foothold.

Now we can observe the elements of which is constructed the India known to the Western race which was destined in its turn to acquire a new supremacy over the peoples of the East. First, the great pre-Aryan population of various types, speaking varying tongues, worshipping ancestors, native gods, devils innumerable, with every variety of primitive rite. Then a conquering Aryan race, always probably a minority of the population, establishing itself as a ruling patrician class all over Hindostan, professing and enforcing a religion pantheistic in idea but suggestive of a refined nature-worship in fact, of which the influence extends over the unconquered portion of the peninsula. Then an admixture of warlike barbarian tribes who do not predominate but are absorbed. Hence throughout the fertile plains of Hindostan, the development of a civilisation very far from contemptible, accompanied by the gradual evolution of religion in two very different directions—one esoteric, mystical ascetic, reserved to the initiated, the other popular, gross idolatrous, deformed by pre-historic superstitions; not without its parallel in the absorption by primitive Christianity of pagan imaginings which it had failed to eradicate. And then, century by century, wave after wave of fanatical Mussulman conquerors, Arab and Persian, Pathān and Turki and Tartar, whose political ideal is conquest for its own sake, save when there arises now and again a Sher Shah or an Akbar with larger conceptions: Mussulmans and Hindus always remaining separate though not absolutely without admixture; while the former necessarily retain the character of a military caste, amongst a more or less subject population outnumbering them by four or five to one.

The  
Indian  
People



## 8 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Hindu-ism : Caste. The Hindu religion has changed very considerably, as we have noted, from the form in which it is presented in the early sacred books known as the Vedas. The institution which has always appeared to be most essentially characteristic of it is *Caste*. This may be described as the permanent division of the whole Hindu society into hereditary classes, whose intercourse with each other is restricted under a religious sanction : demanding the strictest fulfilment of all manner of rites and observances on pain of losing caste, and deriving its tremendous influence from the conviction that caste extends to the life beyond the grave, controlling the transmigration and re-incarnations of the soul. Primarily, all Hindus fall into two categories—the “Twice-born” and the rest ; which the learned seem on the whole to agree in regarding as a race distinction between the Aryan and his predecessor. The Twice-born, again, are in three divisions : the Brahmin or priestly caste, the Kshātr̥yas (otherwise Rajputs) or military, and the Vaisyas or industrial. The rest are Sūdras, not precisely slaves but altogether inferior. These may be called the four original Castes. The basis of division is the hereditary distinction of function, maintained by the impassable character of the barrier between one caste and another. There is a time during which the Kshatryas challenge the supremacy of the Brahmins, but the attempt fails. It is a curious point that the law against intermarriage is not absolute. A man may take a wife from a lower caste—not indeed without penalty, but without complete degradation ; but a woman must marry in her own caste or above it. Naturally, the Brahmins to whom the caste-distinction was of the greatest consequence maintained their purity of caste with greater accuracy and remain at least almost pure-blooded \* to this day. With the others extreme strictness appears to have been periodically relaxed, and the Brahmins are apt to deny that any of the rest have remained pure, though Rajputs declare themselves to be pure Kshatryas. Throughout Hindostan there are now races or castes, such as there is some doubt whether the Brahmins of the Dekhan are pure Brahmins, or descended from progenitors who were allowed to amalgamate with the unconquered non-Aryan Dekhanis without losing caste.

Caste in modern times.



as the Jats, who account themselves very little lower than Rajputs. The Marathas, on the other hand, are said to be almost entirely low-caste, though some claim a Rajput descent, and Brahmins have held a large share in their government. But the practical result is, that whereas of the four original castes the Brahmins remain, the Rajputs or Kshatriyas have been little modified, while the rest have become indistinguishable; yet among all, distinction of hereditary function and also of locality have been carried to such a pitch that there are now some hundreds of castes for which intermarriage, eating together, and other details of social intercourse, are forbidden under various pains and penalties; while to all the out-caste or non-Hindu is unclean, and to all the person of a Brahmin is sacred.

Buddhism, a variant which sprung out of Brahminism in India, and spread over the East, becoming the recognised religion of Chinese, Tibetans, and Burmese, was also for a time dominant in India itself, but finally gave place again to the religion which it had attempted to supplant; so that apart from Christianity practically all natives of India are either professing Hindus or professing Mohammedans. One Hindu sect, that of the Sikhs, who reject the religious validity of caste altogether, has played an important part in history, more particularly during the last century and a half; but their unorthodoxy has not separated them from the Hindu body. To the Mussulmans, all alike are idolaters; while to all Hindus the Mussulman is out-caste and unclean equally with the Christian.

From these considerations we can derive a comparatively definite idea of what may be meant by Indian Nationality. A territory as large as Europe without Russia: in which the population is everywhere practically divided between two religions extremely hostile to each other in character: with races and languages as divergent as those of the Celt, the Teuton, the Roman, and the Slav: which at no period known to history has been organized as one State;—this is not a nation at all in the sense in which we distinguish the nations of Europe. In the eyes of an Oriental, it would be much easier to distinguish and class at sight a Bengali

Other religions.

Indian Nationality.



## 10 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Brahmin, a Sikh, a Ghurka, and a Marātha, than a Frenchman, an Englishman, a Spaniard, and an Austrian. The religious antagonism between the Calvinist and the Romanist is nothing compared with that between the devout followers of Vishnu or Khali and the followers of the Arab prophet.

But the distinction between East and West is more than between nation and nation, or between creed and creed. Peoples who have no sense of unity will become united to resist a more intensely alien force. The Maratha is more akin to the Pathan than to the Englishman; as the Englishman is more akin to the Frenchman than to the Maratha. There are Indian habits of mind as there are European habits of mind. We cannot quite formulate the distinction as one between Orientalism and Occidentalism, for the Chinaman is an Oriental who is hardly if at all more akin to the Indian than is the European. If we had a term to distinguish the Brown from the Yellow Oriental, generalisation would be easier to express and less liable to misapprehension when formulated. The East has its two great divisions, which are little better adapted for amalgamation than the Indian and the European. The primary facts to be grasped however are two: the Indo-orientals, Pathans, Rajputs, Bengalis, or Marathas, may be opposed to each other as Frenchmen and Germans or English may be; but the opposition is insignificant in comparison to that subsisting between all of them and the European; just as the type-distinctions of European nations become insignificant in comparison to that between all of them and the Indo-oriental. Europe might, imaginably, be formed into a Commonwealth—one federation of autonomous states: India actually is a Dominion, an Empire, where one supreme government controls subordinate States: but it needs a powerful and untrammelled imagination to conceive of either India or Europe as a State, single, centralised and homogeneous.

The British Conquest. Similarly it is a mere parody of history, as we shall see, to talk of the British, led by Clive, having overthrown a mighty Empire; unless the Nawab of Bengal is to be called an Emperor.



Before Clive's time, the Mogul Empire had already ceased to subsist except as a legal fiction: as a legal fiction, it continued to subsist for nearly half a century after the conquest of Bengal.

One after another, in the course of a hundred years, the kingdoms and confederacies of India fell under British dominion. But a clear century passed between the time when the game of king-making was begun by Dupleix in the Carnatic, and that when British dominion was extended to Peshawar; though each step forward might be called a stride, the process was one of gradual advance; of the successive overthrow of Powers which had flung down the gage of battle. When the contest began, the Mogul empire—the only one which ever had any pretension to extend its sway over the whole peninsula, and which might fairly be said only to have clutched at Universal dominion without grasping it—was a mere congeries of practically independent principalities. And when the great upheaval came in 1857, one at least of the most potent causes which held back the native princes from joining it was the revelation of the intention of a section of its most active promoters to use it for a Mogul restoration. India did not take up arms against the British for a national idea; the peoples of India had never possessed a common national idea. So far as there was a common motive force, it was entirely negative and destructive. Had the mutiny been successful, it would not have established a new Empire in India, but a collection of warring races and factions. Great Britain has never pursued the policy of the phrase "*Divide et impera.*" The tendency of her rule is in fact to reduce the impossibility of union for a single political end by a gradual elimination of discordant factors: a course which will supply the political philosopher of a hundred years hence with very interesting material. The British Rāj in India is the most gigantic political experiment that the world has known: its outcome still lies upon the knees of the gods.

## CHAPTER II

### MOHAMMEDAN DOMINION

(*Maps I. and II.*)

India  
before Mo-  
hammed.

WHEN the prophet of Arabia arose and kindled the torch of Islam, India was a congeries of Hindu kingdoms. Throughout Hindostan, the military and quasi-military functions, including those of royalty, were roughly all in the hands of Rajputs and the administrative in those of Brahmins, while in the Dekhan these two superior castes were comparatively little represented, though held in due respect. The Rajputs were not, and are not now confined to Rajputana; which is the name given to the great district in the West, which remained under Rajput dominion, and was never brought into complete subjection by Mohammedan conquerors. The rise of Mohammedanism in western and central Asia led to the series of Moslem conquests culminating early in the sixteenth century with that of Bāber, the founder of the so-called Mogul dynasty.

Mohammed launched the Arabs on a career of conquest which extended their Empire to Spain on the West, and over Persia on the East; and spread their religion till it was embraced by the Afghans and Bilūchis lying between Persia and India, and by two of the three great divisions of the Tartar race occupying central India. With the third of these, the Manchus, who made themselves masters of China, Indian history has no concern; the other two, the Turks and the Mughals play an important part in Indian affairs.

The first year of the Mohammedan era, commonly called the Hegira, is the year 622 A.D. Within a century, the Arabs had themselves crossed the Indus; but they obtained



no foothold. Islam had been enthusiastically adopted by races whose religion was effete, but it did not offer the same attractions to peoples whose own faith was a lively reality. The natives of India never accepted it save at the point of the sword; and a stronger impulse to conquest than that which inspired the Arabs was required to subdue Hindostan by force of arms.

From time immemorial, it has been a recognised custom in the east for monarchs to elevate capable slaves into provincial governors. It has also been the custom for them to depend largely on slave or mercenary troops drawn from fighting tribes beyond their own actual dominions. Towards the close of the tenth century, a Turk slave named Alptegin, made governor of Afghanistan, established himself as an independent sovereign, with an army composed partly of Turks and partly of Afghans. His successor was another Turk slave to whom he gave his daughter in marriage; and their son was the famous Mahmud of Ghazni.

Between the years 1000 and 1030 Mahmud made twelve expeditions into India, carrying his arms to Somnāth in Gujerat (whence he took away the sandal-wood gates of a great Hindu shrine, whereof more was heard in 1842), and to Kanauj half-way between Lucknow and Agra. He came, however, not to stay but to collect treasure and to spread the Mohammedan faith. It was not till the last quarter of the following century that the Ghōri dynasty—probably Afghan—founded a Mohammedan dominion in India. Between 1176 and 1206, Mohammed Ghorī, otherwise called Shahāb-ud-din, conquered all the countries of the Ganges basin, with much of Rajputana. An entire Rajput clan migrated bodily in consequence from Kanauj to Jōdpūr. The Ghorī dominion broke up into separate kingdoms almost immediately. Another dynasty, taking its rise from a Turk slave of Shahab-ud-din, took up the reins of empire at Delhi. These "slave" emperors practically end with the energetic, but unattractive Balban; whose successor made way in 1288 for a fresh dynasty, the Khilji, of Afghan stock. During the next five and twenty years, the Delhi empire which already included the whole of Hindostan with varying

Mahmud  
of Ghazni.

Successive  
Mussul-  
man  
dynasties.



## 14 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

degrees of effectiveness was extended by Ala-ud-dīn over most of the Dekhan. His successor was dethroned in a revolt which again raised a Turk family to the highest place. This, the Tughlak dynasty, brought a larger share of the whole peninsula under Mohammedan dominion than could be claimed even for Aurangzib; but the success was short-lived. Before 1350, a part of the Dekhan had reverted to its Hindu princes, and the whole of it as well as Bengal, was in revolt against the Delhi monarchy. The collapse of the Empire was completed by the devastating invasion of Timur or Tamerlane in 1398. For a century and a quarter thereafter there was no really dominant power in India. In Hindostan some Rajput princes recovered complete independence; the Delhi government fell into the hands of a Seiad dynasty (*i.e.* a family claiming descent from the Prophet) for fifty years, and then into those of the Lōdi (Afghan) dynasty, who once more added the Panjab and Sirhind to the surviving fraction of the old empire. Elsewhere, in Gujerat, in Malwa, in Bengal, Mohammedans retained the supremacy, but in separate monarchies. In the Dekhan for some time after the revolt from the Tughlaks the Mohammedan "Bhāmāni" dynasty was the chief power, with the Hindu kingdom of Bijanagar (Beejanugger) or Vizayanagar on the west holding second place. During the fifteenth century, the Bhamanis extended their dominion over the Hindus; but early in the next century the kingdom broke up into the three main Mohammedan States of Bijapur, Ahmednagar (Ahmednugger) and Golconda, and two minor ones.

Moham- With the coming of Baber in 1524 a new era may be said  
medans to commence. From the first successes of Shahab-ud-din  
before (Mohammed Ghorī) in 1193 to Baber's invasion, no fresh  
Baber. conqueror had led victorious armies into Hindostan save  
Tamerlane; who had appeared and disappeared merely, like  
a devastating pestilence. A Mohammedan empire had been  
established. Its successive dynasties, Afghan or Turk, had  
wrested the government from each other, but each had  
arisen within the empire. Their dominion, extending at an  
early stage over most of Hindostan, was carried into the



Dekhan; and then Mussulman generals and governors set themselves up as independent potentates, resting their power mainly on armies composed of Turks, Mughals, and Afghans, exacting revenues from their Hindu subjects. The process of Moslem conquest was simple. Professedly its primary intent was the spread of Islam. It offered to the infidel the three alternatives—conversion, tribute, or death. When it was resisted, victory was followed by the slaughter of the fighting men, and sweeping measures of enslavement for their women and children. Those who yielded timely submission, were treated as subjects, not on an equality with the conquerors; still they were spared the merciless treatment meted out to those who resisted. But everywhere, to the Hindus, the Turks or Mughals or Afghans alike were foreign conquerors of an alien and detested religion.

Thus when Baber came, he was not a Moslem smiting or subduing the infidel, but a Moslem overthrowing Moslem Powers. The amalgamation of the invaders and the invaded—of the new and the old Mohammedan ruling classes—was an easy matter. Mohammedan dominion was again organised; but again its extension beyond Hindostan was soon followed by disruption, and the Mogul Empire would have given place, in all probability, to a recovered Hindu ascendancy, but for the introduction into India of the new European factor.

Ever since the establishment of the Arab Empire, the Turk and Mughal divisions of the Tartar race had supplied The Tartars. dynasties and mercenary troops for the various kingdoms which rose and fell in Western and Central Asia. Early in the thirteenth century, about the time when in England the barons were extorting the Great Charter from John, the Mughals under Chenghis, Jenghis, or Zenghis Khan, swept over half the Eastern world slaughtering and burning; happily for India, they left it practically alone. Less than two centuries later, Tamerlane the Turk, with hordes of Turks and Mughals, emulated the deeds of Jenghis Khan, incidentally falling upon Hindostan. Tamerlane's descendants held among them vast territories in central Asia; of whom one was Baber, born of a Mughal mother in 1482. Baber. His figure stands out in the page of history, picturesque,



## 16 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

romantic, fascinating; a soldier and a poet, revelling in adventure, buoyant of spirit in adversity, generous in prosperity, rejoicing in deeds of prowess and at the same time enjoying the society of men of wit and wisdom. His large humanity did not indeed lift him entirely clear of the inhumanities which were to be taken for granted in every Asiatic conqueror, and more particularly in any Tartar; his attitude on such points as the slaughter of stubborn opponents must be compared not with contemporary European standards but with those of the days of Charlemagne. He did not organise the empire he won; but the winning of it was a brilliant achievement the work of a born leader and a singularly attractive personality.

The Lodi Kings of Delhi had extended their sway over the Panjab to the North West and Behar on the East: but Oudh, Behar and the Panjab all revolted. Baber, after adventures enough, between the ages of twelve and twenty-four, to satisfy for life half a dozen potentates of mature age, had found himself king of Kābūl in 1506: after a variety of further vicissitudes he was still king of Kabul when in 1524 the revolting governor of the Panjab invited his assistance. Baber promptly responded to the invitation, invading and taking possession of the Panjab; but he found it necessary to return to Kabul, leaving a lieutenant who advanced against Delhi, but was severely defeated. In December, Baber returned with an army of only 12,000 men; shattered at Pānipat the Delhi monarch's troops, which outnumbered his own by something like ten to one; and in May 1525 was master of Delhi and Agra. Those chiefs, however, who had already been more or less in revolt against the Lodi King were in no hurry to acquiesce in the domination of Baber and the small army, very unlike the vast hordes of Tamerlane, which he had brought with him. But Baber's troops, encouraged by a tone and spirit on the part of their commander which find an apt parallel in those of Edward III. at Crecy, and of Henry V. at Agincourt, stood by him loyally; successes brought submission and fresh adherents; and before the end of the following year, all the Mussulman territories that had owned submission to the

Baber  
invades  
India.



Delhi kings accepted the rule of the Turk, misnamed Mughal, who founded the dynasty known to the English as that of the Moguls.

Now however the independent Rajput princes of Rajputana and Malwa continued to do battle with the new monarchy. The armies met and lay facing each other at Sikri, some twenty miles from Agra; a panic was all but created among the Tartar forces by an astrologer who proclaimed that the planets foretold their certain destruction, but again Baber appealed to their chivalry with success; every man swore to conquer or to die; and they conquered. The rest of that year and of the year following were occupied in establishing the Mogul government on the borders and in Oudh and Behar. In 1529, Bengal also was added to Baber's dominions, and in 1530 he died, being succeeded by his son Humayūn.

In six years Baber, had made himself lord of nearly all of Hindostan; but the achievement was mainly due to his own unique personality; elements of stability were conspicuously wanting in the empire which his son inherited. Humayun Humayūn. had brothers who also according to Oriental custom, disputed the succession and succeeded in appropriating Kabul. He then became engaged in a war with Gujerāt; and in the meantime a noble of the Afghan stock, Shēr Khān (soon to become Sher Shah) got possession of Behar and Bengal. When Humayun was free from the Gujerat complication, he marched against Sher Shah; but the latter avoided facing his full strength in the field until the Mogul army began to grow demoralized; and then by unusually skilful strategical and tactical moves succeeded in surprising him and scattering his army. Later on Sher Shah again inflicted on him so serious a defeat that he had to make his way to Kabul as a fugitive (1540).

For the next five years, Sher Shah reigned and reigned well in Hindostan, anticipating Akbar's methods; for ten more his successors reigned ill. The provinces revolted; Humayun after fifteen years of exile, made his way back to India and recovered Delhi and Agra. But he had hardly returned when he met with a fatal accident; and Akbar, the



## 18 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

greatest of the Moguls ascended the throne, being thirteen years of age (1556).

The affairs of the rival monarchy were curiously enough in the hands of a Hindu minister of low caste, who showed conspicuous ability and valour. But Bairam, the young Akbar's guardian, was a Turkman of tried capacity ; the army of the Afghan dynasty with its Hindu leader was met and vanquished at Panipat, a very favourite battlefield : the Panjab had already been subdued ; and the house of Timur (Tamerlane) was once more dominant by force of arms in Hindostan.

**Akbar.** Akbar came to the throne two years before the accession of Elizabeth in England ; he died two years after her. The reigns of his son and grandson covered another half century ; that of Aurangzib fifty years more, a quite extraordinary period for four generations of rulers, though just exceeded by Henry III. of England and his three successors. It was the glory of Akbar that he was no mere conqueror, but the real creator of a true and majestic empire such as India had never known ; not the mere military despotism of a conquering race, but a rule under which the Hindu and the Mussulman found approximately equal scope. It was reserved for Aurangzib to desert his great ancestor's policy and, by reverting to a militant Mohammedanism, to destroy the scheme of unity which it was Akbar's chief aim to foster.

During the first years of Akbar's reign, until he reached the age of eighteen, the government was ably but arrogantly administered by Bairam, who recovered the Imperial territory as far east as Behār, as well as the districts of Malwa bordering on the Jamna provinces. At the age of eighteen, Akbar suddenly asserted himself, and terminated the period of his tutelage, showing much magnanimity towards the fallen minister ; who however was shortly afterwards assassinated by a private enemy.

In the circumstances in which the young monarch found himself, the mere maintenance of a military despotism would have been a task demanding unusual ability. Of the Mussulmans in his dominions, a great proportion were Afghans, favouring an Afghan dynasty in preference to the



Moguls. The Hindus regarded Moguls and Afghans impartially as foreign conquerors. Akbar's own dynasty had begun with Baber, who had himself only entered India some five and thirty years before; while Humayun had passed fifteen of the intervening years in exile. His grandfather's military exploits were an inadequate basis for Akbar's empire over Hindostan to rest upon. Carried on according to the old lines, the reign would have resolved itself into an endless series of revolts, probably ending with a struggle for the succession between the sons of the monarch, and a subversion of the dynasty at an early date.

Akbar however, invented a policy, foreshadowed by Sher Shah, but otherwise unprecedented in Hindostan: a policy <sup>Akbar's policy.</sup> not so much of dominion as of union. It was his normal practice, when Afghans or Rajputs set him at defiance, first to crush their resistance and then to give their chiefs high rank in the empire. Sometimes, a chief would take advantage of this magnanimity to plot further revolts: but in general the effect was to convert enemies into loyal supporters. In particular, the Rajput princes with the exception of the irreconcilable Rāna of Ūdaipur (Oodeypore) found themselves adopting an entirely new attitude. Instead of being under the dominion of Afghan and Turk governors and armies, they became themselves princes of the Empire. Their daughters were numbered among the wives of the Imperial family; they themselves commanded the imperial armies and administered the imperial provinces. The Hindu ceased to be taxed for not being a Mussulman. The intolerance of Islam, officially mitigated by a monarch who was ready to listen to and argue with Brahmin *pandits* and Jesuit missionaries, became unofficially also greatly relaxed. Akbar chose his servants with immense skill, and the revenue arrangements made by Tōdar Mal—himself a Hindu—diminished the burden of taxation while greatly increasing the Imperial receipts.

Given oriental conditions to work in, Akbar appears to have more nearly realised the Platonic conception of the philosopher-king than any monarch of history, except Marcus Aurelius. Baber had been almost an ideal mediæval knight.



## 20 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Akbar was a modern in mediæval surroundings; great as a soldier, great as a statesman, a thinker of no mean order; personally brave with the most daring, generous and humane beyond the highest standards of his day. By the time that he was fifty years old, all Hindostan with Kabul beyond the mountains formed one vast organised dominion, throughout which something very like equal government and equal rights prevailed for Hindus and Mussulmans.

**Results of his rule.** Akbar failed in a long effort to bring under his rule the mountain tribes of that northern frontier, which at this day is hardly under the control of the British government. On the other hand, he became during the last twelve years of his life engaged in wars in the Dekhan, which resulted in the annexation of Khandēsh and part of Berār; but the three great Mohammedan kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Golconda remained independent, to be only by degrees overthrown during the next hundred years.

The empire which passed to the successor of Akbar on the great king's death in 1605 was a mighty heritage, embracing more than half India. The vast territory was divided into governorships, none of them large enough to offer inducements for attempts at independence. The enlightenment of the monarch had placed a check on extravagantly inhuman practices, such as the compulsory self-immolation of widows among the Hindus, while it had protected them from interference with their less objectionable observances, and had raised their status in relation to the dominant Mohammedan races. Taxation had been reduced, and the tyranny of local or provincial magnates brought under restraint.

**Jehangir.** The accession of the king's son, Selim, now known as Jehāngir, hardly gave promise of a continuation of such beneficent government; for the new ruler had shown unmistakable signs of a cruel disposition and a taste for debauchery. Happily however, he had not been long on the throne, when he married the celebrated Nūr Jchān, who exercised over him a supreme, and usually most salutary influence.

In fact the reign of Jehangir was not conspicuous either for increase of territory or development of organisation.



In Hindostan, Akbar's principles of administration were maintained, though probably the whole moral atmosphere and the ethical standards of governors and officers were lowered. The Imperial pomp and magnificence gave the tone to the nobility, and European travellers found not a little to admire, while they were struck by the venality of officials. In the Dekhan, throughout the reign, Ahmednagar under the government of an Abyssinian minister named Malik Amber maintained its position successfully, its ruler proving in the game of war, a match for the Mogul commanders, except Prince Khärram, later known as Shah Jehan. Before he was five and twenty, this prince showed extraordinary abilities both political and military. But the inherent weakness of all oriental monarchies became apparent when the queen Nur Jehan began to intrigue against his succession. From 1620 Shah Jehan (who had already been granted the royal Shah title) was in perpetual revolt, or on the verge of it, not with Jehan. the design of displacing his father, but in self-defence; and although on the Emperor's death, in 1627, he established himself on the throne with little difficulty, he in his turn, found thirty years later that the precedent of filial disobedience is one which the next generation is particularly ready to copy.

The death of Malik Amber shortly before that of Jehangir altered the relations between the Dekhan and the empire of Hindostan. The kingdom of Ahmednagar under a less capable ruler than the Abyssinian, could neither avoid collision with the Mogul, nor resist his armies; and the reign of Shah Jehan saw the ruin of that kingdom and the partition of its territory between the Empire and the astute prince of Bijapur; who turned the contest to his own advantage, while the less skilful monarch of Golconda found himself compelled to pay a heavy tribute to the Mogul. During the war with Ahmednagar, the name of a Maratha chief for the first time appears prominently. This was Shahji Bhonsla, whose son Sivaji was the founder of Maratha greatness. Shahji supported the dynasty of Ahmednagar till the cause had become entirely hopeless; after which he became attached to Bijapur.



## 22 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

This war was finished before Shah Jehan had been reigning ten years, and for a considerable time thereafter the only serious military operations were carried on beyond the Afghan frontier of India, where the future monarch Aurangzib learned some of the unpleasant lessons of failure. Transferred to the Dekhan, his armies met with more success, and the crooked methods of his policy found scope. In 1657, Shah Jehan fell ill; the usual antagonism among the sons who were each of them prepared to bid for the succession arose: and Aurangzib made up his own mind that the question would be best settled by his own occupation of the throne, and the deposition of his father. This plan he carried out in the course of 1658 from which date his reign begins. Shah Jehan was simply deprived of power, but otherwise was treated with respect and honour for the remaining years of his life.

The Mogul  
zenith.

When the deposed Shah Jehan had succeeded his father at the age of thirty-seven, he had already for fifteen years been constantly and honourably engaged in war, in administration, and in diplomacy: and latterly he had been ill-rewarded. When the sceptre of the Moguls fell definitely into his hands, he proved a less strenuous ruler than might have been expected from his earlier record; perhaps because he now had the opportunity for gratifying other tastes. He had no craving for conquest; nor did he change the methods of administration. Nevertheless, he was by no means unworthy to be the grandson of Akbar. Until the latter days when his sons began to dispute about the succession, peace reigned within the wide borders of Hindostan itself. He did not fully maintain the policy of equality for Hindus and Mussulmans; but his departure from it was not very grave: under him, Hindostan obtained a high pitch of prosperity, the highest it had known. Hence, although no additional burdens were laid upon his subjects, the imperial revenues were greatly enhanced; and while there was no curtailment of the expenditure on public works of utility, an immense outlay on mere magnificence was rendered possible without diminishing the balance in the imperial treasury. The cities of Hindostan obtained an unprecedented splendour; it was the wealth of Shah Jehan that constructed the famous Pea-



cock Throne ; to him India owes many of the wonderful buildings which have excited the astonished admiration of so many travellers, and most of all the incomparable Moti Masjid or Pearl Mosque, and the Taj Mahal, the mausoleum of his favourite wife, at Agra. The highest panegyrics of the Mohammedan historians are reserved for the Mohammedan zealot Aurangzib ; Akbar the liberal and unorthodox creator of the Empire demands universal admiration however grudging ; but the golden age of the Mogul dominion is the reign of Shah Jehan.

But in the East, though a great man build up a noble empire, and his son and his son's son maintain it, so soon as the sceptre falls into incapable hands, dynasty and empire crumble together. Shah Jehan's successor maintained the empire and enlarged its borders—but in so doing he prepared the way to make its collapse the more complete and irretrievable. Aurang-zib.

### CHAPTER III

## THE MOGUL DISRUPTION AND THE MARATHAS

(*Maps I. and II.*)

The great  
Moguls.

THROUGHOUT the three great reigns last chronicled, the effective extent of the Mogul dominion in India corresponds practically with what we have called Greater Hindostan; Mohammedan dynasties at Ahmednagar, Bijapur, and Golconda dominating the Dekhan. Both in Hindostan and the Dekhan the tendency to religious toleration had been fairly maintained; and though *ceteris paribus* the Mussulman was preferred to the Hindu by the ruling powers, the latter was by no means excluded from offices of honour, responsibility and emolument, nor could it fairly be said that the Hindu religion suffered definite persecution.

Elements  
of dis-  
integration.

In the eyes of faithful Mohammedans Aurangzib is the greatest of his line. Others find that both the ends which he set before himself and the methods by which he pursued them led directly to that collapse of the Mogul Power which followed immediately on his death; and that the revival of militant Hinduism, which had almost disappeared for a century, made use of and was fostered by the emperor's intolerant Mohammedanism, associated with his aggressively destructive policy towards the Mohammedan kingdoms of the south. In grasping at the Dekhan, he extended the bounds of the Empire too far for efficient control by the central power, while the Hindu Marathas utilised the strife of their nominal over-lords to develop a power which before the middle of the eighteenth century had become at least as formidable as any existing Moslem State. To the same period, and largely to the same intolerant attitude on the



part of the Emperor, must be ascribed the formation of the disciples of the Hindu reformer Nanuk, in the North West into a fighting sect under the Guru Govind Singh; whereof later on came important developments; the Sikhs of the Panjab becoming a barrier against Afghan incursions, and then an organised State which in its turn challenged the British dominion, and has subsequently after annexation supplied our armies with many of their most trusty troops. Unlike the Marathas, however, the Sikhs do not become a recognised factor in the situation till the close of the eighteenth century. Their growth will form the subject of a later chapter: we have here to follow the aggressive and disintegrating policy of Aurangzib, the growth of the Marathas, and the breaking up of the unwieldy Empire into great provinces, nominally subject to the Mogul or Padishah at Delhi, really independent sovereign States; with whom we were to fight or over whom we were to extend our protection, until according to circumstances, they were ultimately absorbed into the Protectorate or the Dominion of Great Britain.

The accession of Aurangzib (1658) and the deposition of Shah Jehan were followed according to Oriental custom by a period of contested successions. Three brothers, their sons, a son of his own, and the Rajput chiefs of Jeipur and Jodpur, with their varying combinations, kept Aurangzib (otherwise known as Alam Gir) fully occupied for some four years before his position was definitely secured; and possibly the remarkable courage, self-possession and resource which he displayed when suffering from a severe illness, went far in deciding waverers to support his cause. It was not, however, till he had been on the throne for more than twenty years that he began that series of campaigns in the Dekhan which, while adding greatly to the extent of his empire, made it practically impossible to preserve its integrity. But in the interval the lust of conquest made him pursue through his viceroys a policy in the Dekhan which weakened the Mohammedan states of Bijapur and Golconda, and thereby enabled the Maratha Sivaji to lay the foundations of a far more formidable Power; one, moreover, which being Hindu with Hindu sympathies, was infinitely more destructive of

Aurang-  
zib's first  
years.



## 26 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

the Mogul supremacy throughout Hindostan itself. It is probable, however, that Aurangzib would have thrown his full energies into the suppression of Sivaji at an earlier date, but for the troublesome necessities of campaigns on the Afghan frontier where the methods and manners of the tribesmen were very much what they are to-day.

Aurang-  
zib's Mo-  
hammedan  
fanaticism.

When this contest in the North was brought to an end, Aurangzib found himself involved, by the intolerant bigotry of his Mohammedan predilections, in a prolonged struggle with the Hindu Rajputs. In part the character of his innovations on the tolerant practice of his predecessors was something of the same kind as might have been found in the rule of an austere Puritan, set down to govern autocratically a population consisting mainly of Roman Catholics whose religious observances he regarded as idolatrous, and whose amusements he accounted as inventions of the Arch Enemy. But besides the decrees which were felt as insulting to the Hindu religion, he altered the incidence of taxation in accordance with the dictates of Mohammedan law; whereby relief was nominally given to large traders, though practically the revenue officers merely continued to enforce the charges while rendering no account of them; the taxes from which the commonalty suffered were left untouched: and presently he directly differentiated between Hindus and Mohammedans, by reducing the customs claims against the latter by one-half.

Hindu an-  
tagonism.

Then he went further, issuing to all his principal officers orders for the general exclusion of Hindus from appointments; and re-instituted the poll-tax on "infidels" which had originally been imposed as a kind of commutation of the alternative of death or conversion, but had been abolished at the beginning of Akbar's reign. These measures had the effect of creating general disaffection among the Hindus, and of strengthening their sympathy with the Marathas throughout the Dekhan; moreover in conjunction with another act of Aurangzib, they had the effect of permanently alienating practically all Rajputana, and turning the hitherto constant and loyal support of its chiefs into a hostility to the Moguls either latent or active. This act was the emperor's attempt to get into his own hands the widow and children of



Jeswant Singh of Jodpur (who died at Kabul during the settlement of the Afghan troubles) on their way back through the Panjab. The Rajputs smuggled the Rani and the princes out of camp, and then fought stubbornly in professed defence of substitutes left behind in their place—whom Aurangzib afterwards made a point of treating as the genuine family of Jeswant Singh. Raj Singh of Udaipur threw in his lot with the Jodpur people; the Mogul marched armies against them with orders to burn and destroy, and to carry off women and children. The Rajputs retaliated by intriguing with his sons, and persuading one of them, Akbar, to revolt and join them. Akbar's army however was persuaded to return to its allegiance, and the prince made his way to the Maratha country as promising a more favourable field of operations; this being about the time of Sivaji's death (1680). The necessity of reducing the Dekhan had now become so important that Aurangzib patched up a peace with the Rajputs on terms which saved his credit, but nothing more; while their loyalty of a century had been finally and fatally destroyed.

Five and twenty years before, the Marathas had not begun to exist as a Power. The home of that race lies roughly within a mountainous triangle, having the West coast from Goa northwards to Kandesh as its base, and its apex near Nagpur; for the most part within the domains of Ahmednagar and Bijapur while those two monarchies were flourishing. The race, including its chiefs is of low caste, though here and there a claim with possible justification is put forward to an infusion of Rajput blood. The numerous Brahmins politically associated with them, are presumably of different race, duly and religiously honoured as Brahmins; having in one case of primary importance acquired political leadership, but being more often found in the character of ministers or diplomatists than in that of military chiefs.

The Marathas are little mentioned until the beginning of the seventeenth century, when they were beginning to acquire a high fighting reputation especially as light horse. At that time two of them, Jādū Rao and Mālōji Bhonsla were prominent soldiers in the service of Ahmednagar. Shahji

The  
Maratha  
race.

Shahji  
Bhonsla.



## 28 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Bhonsla, son of the latter, was married to Jadu's daughter, the fruit of the union being Sivaji the founder of the Maratha power.

Rise of  
Sivaji. Shahji played an effective part and acquired large possessions, in the struggle of Ahmednagar against Shah Jehan. When the kingdom fell, the lands of Shahji and his services went to the kingdom of Bijapur, Shahji himself going to the *jaghir* \* granted to him at its southern extremity in Mysore, and leaving the young Sivaji to be educated on his northern jaghir at Puna. Here at a very early age the youth appears to have conceived the idea of gradually resuscitating a Hindu power, by the ostensible process of merely securing a strong strategical position for himself among the hills, without any actual appearance of treasonous designs against the Bijapur sovereignty. His methods, however, carried him a good deal further than seemed compatible with loyalty; his father remonstrated in vain, and was punished for his failure by suspicion and imprisonment. Sivaji thereupon sought protection for himself and intervention on behalf of his father from Shah Jehan, and obtained it. Shahji was formally released to attend to affairs in Mysore, and Sivaji promptly renewed his aggressive action in the North; maintaining, in spite of a premature incursion into Mogul territories, the fiction of loyalty to the Empire.

Just about the time when Aurangzib was occupied in dethroning Shah Jehan, Sivaji dealt a tremendous blow to Bijapur by decoying an army which the monarch had sent against him into the mountain defiles, on pretext of submission, and there falling on and slaughtering them after treacherously assassinating their commander with his own hand. The instrument with which the deed was done is known as the "tiger's claw"—a sharp steel claw concealed in the assassin's hand, and thrust into the victim in the act of embracing. Overwhelming forces were sent to punish him, but he evaded capture; revolts in other parts of the kingdom drew the royal army off; and in 1662 his father Shahji succeeded in negotiating terms which left him master of a territory about half the size of Great Britain, with a

\* *Jaghir*: an estate held on condition of military service.



## MOGUL DISRUPTION AND MARATHAS 29

population eminently fitted to provide an army of the most serviceable type, and numbering more than fifty thousand fighting men—the nucleus of the great Maratha dominion.

Sivaji had hardly made his peace with Bijapur when he was again moved to turn his arms against the Mogul territories. The imperial commander, Shaista Khan, marched from Aurangabad to chastise his insolence, and took possession of Puna (Poonah). The Maratha however with a small escort contrived to enter the town along with a marriage procession, made for the house where the general was to be found, surprised it, and all but captured Shaista Khan himself, besides slaying his son and most of his attendants. Having accomplished this feat, he successfully effected his retirement; winning by the performance much popularity and applause, and also causing a serious quarrel between the Khan and Jeswant Singh of Jodpur who had reinforced him. Sivaji followed up his success by a raid to the north-west and the looting of Surat; though his attack on the European factories there was repelled. Moreover, he employed himself in fitting out a fleet with which he raided the southern ports of Bijapur; and set himself up as an independent sovereign, with Raighar, near Puna, as his capital, coining money and assuming the title of Raja. Jey Singh another of the Rajputana princes was now sent by Aurangzib to suppress Sivaji and go on to attack Bijapur; and the Maratha, thinking the enemy too strong, at once set about making terms. The results were exceedingly favourable; for while he was obliged to surrender more than half his forts with the territories attached, and to hold the remainder not as an independent kingdom, but as a jaghir from the Mogul, he was compensated by a somewhat indefinite grant of claims on the revenues of Bijapur districts, which were subsequently found to be most conveniently elastic.

Sivaji's exploits.

Sivaji negotiates.

The services which he rendered in the following Bijapur campaign were succeeded by a highly characteristic episode. Aurangzib invited him to Delhi, and he went, probably feeling very well pleased with himself. The invitation, however, expressed the limit of the emperor's condescension;

Sivaji and Aurangzib



## 30 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

and his reception was not only cold but contemptuous. His protests were not taken in good part, and he soon found himself practically a prisoner. Feeling the risks of the situation, he succeeded in getting himself carried through the lines of sentinels concealed in a basket, took horse, and then travelling in various disguises succeeded in reaching his own country nine months after his escape from Delhi. Jey Singh's operations in Bijapur miscarried, and the Raja himself died; being replaced by a prince of the blood, associated with Jeswant Singh. The Jodpur Raja being always particularly well disposed towards Hindus, used his influence to obtain fresh terms for Sivaji, of a still more favourable character than before; including the restoration of a part of the confiscated territory, the grant of a new jaghir in Berar, and the recognition of his title as Raja.

**Reconciliation.** Sivaji used this period of professed reconciliation with the emperor, first to threaten the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda, which preferred paying a tribute to fighting; and secondly to organise his own government which was highly systematised; all the principal civil and several of the military posts being in the hands of Brahmins.

Aurangzib's friendliness was however of a deceptive character, his real object being to draw Sivaji into his power again without actual war. But Jeswant Singh and the prince Moazzim, were quite capable of playing a double game, and it was not long before both sides were aware that duplicity was at work. Consequently Aurangzib at last decided on open war as the better course.

**Successful defiance.** The results were decidedly favourable to Sivaji; who captured a number of forts, notably the apparently inaccessible one of Singhar, near Puna, and again ravaged Mogul territory as far north as Surat which he plundered for the second time. The Mogul armies were seriously handicapped by the emperor's distrust of all his principal officers, which led him into the unfortunate practice of having two or more generals, none of them definitely in supreme command, and all on the watch and suspicious of each other. From want of co-operation between the imperial forces Sivaji was enabled for the first time to inflict a severe defeat on them in



## MOGUL DISRUPTION AND MARATHAS 31

the open field (1672): with the usual result for them of ill success, in the removal of the commanders and the appearance of a new viceroy for the Dekhan. The need however for military measures in other parts of the Empire made it necessary to suspend active operations against the Marathas for a time.

The institution known as *chauth* or *chout* dates from this Chauth. last incursion of Sivaji into Mogul territory. He demanded one-fourth of the revenue of the invaded provinces as blackmail in the sense in which that term was applied by the reivers of the Scottish Highlands—a payment in consideration of which the contributing districts were to be guaranteed by the blackmailer against further spoliation.

The suspension of hostilities by the Mogul government left Sivaji free to extend his conquests southward and eastwards over Bijapur territory, the death of the Bijapur king having left a young child on the throne. His pose as a hero of Hinduism, and his further assumption of regal dignities and splendours, set the imperial forces in motion against him once more: but only to bring about vigorous retaliatory incursions into Berar and even Gujerat. Sivaji then turned his attention once more to the south, and making an alliance with the King of Golconda who undertook to cover his rear against possible attacks from Bijapur or on the part of the Mogul, he set about the subjugation of the greater part of Mysore and the Carnatic; occupying part of the conquered territory and leaving part in possession of the previous proprietor on condition of receiving half the revenue. This applied to the tract which had been held as a jaghir by his father Shahji. The aggression of the Moguls in the meantime enabled him to carry his plans to formal completeness; their attack on Bijapur causing the regency there to call for Sivaji's assistance, as the price of which he demanded the entire cession of Sivaji's jaghir, and of other territory in addition.

But death prevented him from making his dominions secure. He fell ill and died early in 1680. Though the son of a great magnate, he had practically started his own career as a brigand chief. By treachery, cajolery, and sheer

Sivaji extends his dominions southwards.

Death of Sivaji.



## 32 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

hard fighting he had when he died at the age of fifty-three made himself and his Marathas masters of the Konkans—the coast and mountain strip running from Goa up to Kandesh—and of half Mysore and the Carnatic; laying very substantially the foundations of the great Maratha Dominion. He was succeeded by his Son Sambaji, a dissolute and violent prince who had already once deserted to the Moguls; a succession with the usual accompaniments of a rival nominee, much bloodshed, and serious if temporary disintegration of the Maratha power.

Aurang-  
zib policy  
in the  
Dekhan.

In 1683 Aurangzib had made terms with the Raja of Udaipur; Sambaji was acknowledged head of the Marathas and had just been joined by the Mogul prince Akbar. With a curious lack of perception Aurangzib, who had resolved to make himself master of the Dekhan, decided to destroy the monarchies of Bijapur and Golconda before curbing the Marathas—perhaps imagining that the last named would no longer prove really formidable now that Sivaji was dead. He also found this a fitting opportunity for pressing the enforcement of the revived poll-tax on Hindus, thereby exciting the animosity of the great bulk of the Dekhan population. Finally, he adopted a plan of campaign unsuited to the country in which he had to work; and vitiated by that distrust of any and every general which led him to combine incompatibles in one command, and to allow no one a sufficient body of troops for the particular ends that he was ordered to achieve. Consequently one prince marched through the Konkans (where the Marathas evaded battle), losing men and killing horses in large numbers by the way; and another prince moved on Bijapur from the north-east. When these two armies had got well to the south, Sambaji emerged, and raided into Gujerat and Berar: the princes in the meantime finding themselves in insufficient force to attack Bijapur with effect.

End of the  
Dekhan  
kingdoms.

Finding that Sambaji was now in alliance with Golconda, Aurangzib turned on the latter kingdom, where the rivalry of the Mussulman commander and the Brahmin chief minister resulted in the desertion of the former with most of the army—which, as always in the Mohammedan kingdoms, consisted



largely of Pathans or Afghans: the capital, Haidarabad, was sacked, and a heavy money payment exacted from the king. Reverting to Bijapur, where the resistance seems somewhat unaccountably to have melted away, he captured it very shortly after completing the investment, and then once more fell upon Golconda; abolishing the two monarchies, absorbing them into provinces of the Empire, and establishing a military occupation as far south as Tanjur. These successes were rounded off by the unexpected capture of the person of Sambaji, and his execution; followed not long after by the capture of Raighar, and with it Saho the infant son and recognised heir of Sambaji.

Now ensued a long guerilla war. Raja Rām, uncle of Maratha Saho, acting as regent in his name, escaped from the Konkans <sup>resistance.</sup> where large Mogul forces were in comparatively dangerous proximity, to the strong fort of Jinji or Gingee in the Carnatic; while all over the Maratha country the chiefs were instructed and encouraged to carry into the Mogul territories an organised and lucrative system of raiding and plundering. The next few years passed in a process of the gradual reduction of Maratha forts by the emperor, and the constant retaliatory raids of the Marathas: a process under which on the whole the Marathas seemed to thrive, not only carrying their incursions into Malwa, but presently attaining such strength as to set about recapturing the captured forts: while a constantly increasing demoralisation was sapping the effectiveness of the Mogul armies.

At last, in 1707, in the forty-ninth year of his rule, and the eighty-ninth of his life, the last great ruler of the Mogul <sup>Death of Aurangzib</sup> family died. A grim and austere zealot, with an immense capacity for work, a remarkable grasp of detail, and insatiable ambition, he extended the bounds of his empire far beyond the limits of his ancestral dominion; but in such wise that it straightway fell to pieces in fact if not in form as soon as the reins dropped from his hands; and even in the hour of his death the coming doom of the Empire was foreseen by shrewd observers.

After Aurangzib's death, definite policy disappears from <sup>Aurangzib's suc-</sup> the counsels of his successors. His son Moazzim, who had <sup>cessors.</sup>



## 34 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

seen much service and acquitted himself with credit in the Dekhan, became emperor under the title of Bahādur Shah, being already over sixty years old. The five years of his reign were mainly occupied in maintaining the throne against his brothers and in composing complications in Rajputana. Incidentally, Saho the grandson of Sivaji was set at liberty, and Maratha activities were in some degree absorbed by internal dissensions in consequence; the son of the late regent having been set up as a rival claimant to the succession. Bahadur Shah was succeeded by his son Jehāndar Shah, who in his turn was deposed and executed by a nephew, Farokshir, a year later, the control of the government falling into the hands of the Seiads, Abdallah Khan and Hosein Ali, of Mohammed's line. (1713.)

Rise of the Peshwas. Thenceforth, the empire became a mere hot-bed of intrigues, open revolts, and gradual assertion by viceroys of *de facto* (though not *de jure*) independence; the fruits of these troubles being appropriated mainly by the Marathas. Among them, two families first rise into prominence—that of the Brahmin Bālaji Wiswanath, from whom sprang the Pēshwas who gradually obtained recognition as the real heads of the Maratha confederacy: and that of Pantoji Bhonsla, who, though apparently not connected with the family of Sivaji, for a long time contested the supremacy of the Peshwas—each appearing in the character of a hereditary minister of the nominal monarch, Sivaji's descendant. The marked ability not only of Balaji Wiswanath, but still more of his son Bāji Rao and his grandson Balaji Rao ultimately secured the Peshwa predominance; three other families—the Gaikwars of Baroda, the Sindhias, and the Holkars—also acquiring prominence, but none of them for many years aspiring to the actual supremacy of the Maratha confederacy; while the Peshwas themselves continued to recognise the nominal authority of Sivaji's successors.

Break up of the Mogul Empire. The immense extension of the Maratha power over the vast dominion shewn in the Map (II) really took place roughly between 1720 and 1750; the imperial province of the Dekhan, with the Carnatic under a subordinate governor or Nawāb being consolidated during much the same period



into a powerful independent state by the Nizam-ūl-Mulk, Asaf Jah. The death-blow to the real Mogul Power was dealt by the great invasion of Nadir Shah from Persia, and the sack of Delhi in 1739.

The administration of the Sciads (1713-1720), which terminated shortly after the accession of Mohammed Shah to the throne of the Moguls, is notable chiefly for the treaty made with Saho by Hosein Ali—whereby the Maratha was officially confirmed in authority over all the districts possessed by Sivaji as well as subsequent conquests, and also in his claim to the *chauth* (one fourth of the revenue) of the Dekhan, and ten per cent. of the remaining revenue; in return for which he was to guarantee the whole district against any depredations, to furnish 15,000 horse, and to pay a tribute of about £100,000 recognising what may be called the Suzerainty of the Emperor. This treaty was repudiated at the time by Farokshir, but was confirmed afterwards by Mohammed, Shah.

For a brief period after the fall of the Sciads, Asaf Jah, already viceroy of the Dekhan, acted as Wazir. It was not long however before he became disgusted with the court, and withdrew to his province, in which from thenceforth he made the merest pretence of submission to the Imperial authority, at the same time encouraging the aggressive advance of the Marathas in Hindostan in order to divert them from hostilities in the Dekhan itself. Haidarabad now becomes the capital of the Nizam's dominions. The Carnatic remained under the governorship of the family to which it had been delegated about 1710 by a predecessor of the Nizam.

Between 1720 and 1730, then, the great divisions and dynasties with whom the British were shortly to come into conflict have approximately taken form. The grandsons of Sivaji is at the head of the Maratha nation; Balaji Wiswanath the Peshwa, (succeeded by his son Baji Rao), and the Bhonsla, are the two chief ministers whose offices are to become hereditary; Sindhia, Holkar, and the Gaikwar, are taking their places as the leading chiefs, though they have not yet absorbed the tracts of Hindostan

Asaf Jah,  
the Nizam-  
ul-Mulk.

The new  
Powers.

### 38 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Bengal. Malwa was apportioned to Holkar and Sindhia, and Gujerat to the Gaikwar; so that the Maratha domain now reached from sea to sea between the Ganges basin on the north and the Nizam's dominions on the south.

Finally the death of the Raja Saho without issue in 1749 was followed next year by the recognition of the Peshwa as head of the whole Maratha confederacy, at Puna; with a *roi fainéant* lacking even the shadow of authority, in the person of a supposed grandson of Raja Ram (the regent when Sambaji died) to represent the house of Sivaji.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE EUROPEAN TRADERS

*(Maps I and II)*

UNTIL the close of the fifteenth century, India was an almost mythical country to the nations of the west. Alexander had entered the Panjab, and after him occasional Greeks penetrated into Hindostan; but it lay beyond the borders of the Roman empire, beyond the range of maritime adventure. The sailors of Venice and Genoa were limited virtually to the Mediterranean, and the commerce of India found its way to European markets mainly through the Levant. But the great Oceanic movement of the fifteenth century brought about the discovery of America by Columbus and of the Cape Route to India, first sailed by Vasco di Gama in 1497. The great commerce passed from the Italian States to the countries with an Atlantic sea-board, Spain and Portugal leading till their supremacy was challenged by England and Holland and finally by France.

The  
Indian  
Myth.

Discovery  
of the Cape  
Route.

The great discoveries led to a remarkable Papal pronouncement, by which the new world was parted between Spain and Portugal. The new century was more than half over before English sailors began to make a claim in America on their own account: and the Portuguese had been established on the coast of India, and in the Spice Islands, for a full hundred years before the English and the Dutch commenced active trading operations in those regions. The Portuguese, then, were the pioneers. Their energy in the early part of the sixteenth century was immense; and in the first quarter of it, Albuquerque had already established a maritime empire in the Indian Ocean. The Mogul dominion was not yet created: the Maratha name

The Portu-  
guese.



## 40 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

was unknown. The Portuguese ruled the sea, but made no attempt to usurp sovereignty by land. Their principal settlement at Goa on the Malabar coast was practically impregnable. In India, they had not to deal with a folk so unsophisticated in the arts of war as was found by the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru; the Indian artillery was good and plentiful; still the lesson was early learned of the difference between European and Oriental discipline, and it was quickly found that a handful of resolute adventurers could defy a host of native levies. On the other hand it was soon apparent that while the presence of Portuguese fleets offered no menace to the Country Powers, the trade they brought was extremely desirable. Yet the kings of Gujerat and the Dekhan coast varied between fear and favour towards the foreigners; and twice at least great combined attempts were made to annihilate them, about the middle of the century and again in 1570. The attempts were met and frustrated with stubborn valour, and the Portuguese fleets remained supreme.

But in 1580 the absorption of Portugal by Spain robbed the smaller country of life and energy. A few years later, the independence of Holland had become an established fact and the naval supremacy had passed from Spain to the land of Drake and Hawkins. In India the Empire of Hindostan had again taken enduring form under Akbar. English merchants began to dream of wealth to be gathered in the East as well as in the West. A merchant adventurer named Fitch, carrying letters from Elizabeth herself, made a tour of enquiry in India, bringing home golden reports. In 1599, an association was formed in London for Eastern trade which was incorporated by Charter in the following year, with exclusive rights. The East India Company was born. Dutch ships had already rounded the Cape; in 1603 the Dutch East India Company was established.

The  
British and  
Dutch  
East India  
Com-  
panies.

Within Asiatic waters, these companies behaved practically as if they were sovereign Powers, their proceedings having very little connection with the diplomatic relations between their governments at home. In effect, they were given exclusive rights as against other traders and were then left to take



care of themselves. If they thought fit to raid each other's factories (as trading stations were called) and to sink each other's ships, no one except the injured Company objected unless in very flagrant cases: and the injured Company retaliated when opportunity offered.

The Portuguese, with military establishments at Aden and Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, at Surat and Goa, at Masulipatam and Hugli, dominated the Indian littoral. They claimed an exclusive right to the entire trade both there and in the Spice Islands. During forty years, the Dutch gradually superseded them in the Islands, and it was in the Islands also that the English Company began its operations; which when successful were extremely profitable. But within a very few years, it turned its attention to India: the Portuguese were defeated in attempting to suppress an expedition to Surat: the Mogul Jehangir was favourably disposed to competition against the Portuguese: and in 1613, an Imperial *firman* authorised the establishment of British factories at Surat and some other places. Establishment of British factories.

The next important step was the famous embassy of Sir Thomas Roe from James I. of England and VI. of Scotland to the Court of Jehangir. Sir Thomas was much impressed by the splendour of the Court and the venality of the courtiers. He did not like the Prince who afterwards became Shah Jehan, and his admiration for Jehangir was qualified. But he obtained concessions. Sir T. Roe's embassy.

In 1632, the Portuguese having taken an aggressive attitude in Bengal their power was destroyed by Shah Jehan. The English were then allowed to establish a factory on the Ganges Delta, but under close restrictions; the memory of the Portuguese being fresh. Shortly after, however, the good offices of a European surgeon being requisitioned for a daughter of the Emperor, Mr. Boughton performed his task so successfully that he was invited to choose his own reward; and he chose nothing for himself, but much for the Company—the right of trading duty-free in Bengal, and of establishing factories. The request was granted; Boughton went to Bengal to make the arrangements; while there he was again called in professionally, by the Prince Concessions to the British in Bengal.



## 42 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

who was Governor of the province; and his success was again rewarded by a permission to the Company to establish a factory at Hugli. In 1639, by the invitation of the Hindu Raja, another factory was established on the Coromandel coast, and fortified under the title of Fort St George; the city which grew up around it developing into Madras.

The civil wars in England delayed active progress. Portugal had now fallen out of the contest, and the rivalry in Asiatic waters was between English and Dutch. The advantage lay on the side of the latter, their Company being intimately associated with the States Government, while the English were dependent on private energy and enterprise, which were handicapped by the civil broils. The Protector dealt vigorously with the Dutch, and the position was a good deal improved under his rule; but these circumstances were to a great extent responsible for the comparatively large share which India occupied of the British Company's attention, as against the Islands.

About the year 1660 three important events took place—the accession of Aurangzib in India; the restoration of Charles II. in England; and the death of Cardinal Mazarin in France. There Louis XIV. himself assumed the direction of the State, and Colbert became his chief minister. For some years to come, the political relations of England, France and Holland shifted perpetually, the European interests of England and Holland agreeing, while their commercial interests were in constant antagonism. Moreover, Colbert resolved that France should enter on the Oceanic rivalry; French fleets and harbours had unexampled sums spent on them, and the French Government gave financial support to Colonial enterprise. Under Colbert's auspices a French East India Company was formed in 1664, which after various vicissitudes finally formed its Indian headquarters at Pondichery under the remarkably able control and guidance of François Martin.

One early consequence of the Restoration in England was the cession of Bombay to the English Crown by Portugal, under the Royal Marriage Treaty. The Crown, not seeing its way to making the most of the gift, transferred it a few



years later to the East India Company; and it shortly became the principal British settlement on the West Coast.

Temporary alliance with England against Holland enabled the French Company to make a footing good in India; the flight of James II., and the accession of his son-in-law "Dutch William" in England then definitely united the Dutch and the British against the aggressive policy of Louis; and from this time, as far as India is concerned, Dutch hostility ceases to be an active factor in the Company's calculations. But a consciousness of the coming disintegration of the Empire grows. As early as 1685, the British had been audacious enough to levy war against the Mogul on account of grievances, and were in danger of being wiped out of the country, when they were saved practically owing to the Moslem fanaticism of Aurangzib. The capture of pilgrim-ships on the way to Mecca pointed to a danger which he was not prepared to face. This together with a general sense of the financial advantage derivable from the Company's trade, induced the Mogul to come to terms, and allow a fresh settlement in Bengal. The factories having been destroyed, a new settlement was made on the banks of the Hugli, which developed into Calcutta. Five years later, under the pressure of a revolt in Orissa, permission was given to erect the fortifications which became known as Fort William.

Complicated relations between France, Holland and England.

Calcutta.

The Company's monopoly of trade had long been a source of antagonism to them on the part of other merchants. In the abstract, the argument of the free-traders was sound; in the concrete, it was vitiated by conditions which the economic thesis left out of count. Trade with India was only possible if the traders were protected by land and sea. International Law gave practically no protection, and Government was not prepared to provide it. The traders therefore must be in a position to protect themselves. This the Company was able to do; interlopers, as the unlicensed traders were called, were not. Moreover the Company could control their own servants on land, and their own ships by sea; but they were held responsible by the Native authorities for the conduct of all traders of their own nation; and

The Interlopers.



## 44 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

this gave them a fair title to demand that none should be recognised who were not under their control. A Parliamentary Resolution affirming the right of free trading, hampered the Company, and increased the activity of interlopers; many of whom in effect became mere pirates, while the Company's servants were held liable for their misdeeds.

A rival East India Company. Cromwell in his day, had been much tempted by the offer of an association which desired to set up as rivals of the old Company; but he had not yielded. Now at the close of the century, another attempt of the same kind was made, and for a time succeeded. A new Company was formed, which offered an immense price for a charter; the existing Company could not make an adequate competitive offer; the new Company was incorporated, and the result was temporary chaos. The Native functionaries pocketed huge donations from both parties; the competition between them raised prices; while each was alternately charged with the responsibility for the exploits of the notorious pirate, Captain Kidd. Happily, both were quick to recognise that alliance was better than rivalry; and in 1702 the two Companies were amalgamated. Once more a single Company was supreme, with a Charter giving the right to make war and to conclude peace with any non-Christian Power in the East; having jurisdiction over British subjects, and authority to suppress interlopers.

Amalgamation of the Companies. During the earlier portion of the century, the Company is principally occupied in trying to obtain concessions from Viceroys or from the Mogul, and complaining bitterly of the price which had to be paid for them. The most important of these was granted in 1715 by a *firman* of the Mogul Farokshir, who was cured of an alarming disease by Dr Hamilton; the reward asked and obtained, as in the previous case of Boughton, being privileges for the Company in Bengal. The transaction incidentally gives a curious illustration of a powerful Viceroy's evasion of the Imperial decree. The British were given permission to purchase the *zemindari* or lordship of a number of towns in the Calcutta district, but the Viceroy forbade the zemindars to sell.



During this period, the Dutch fell more and more into the background. As Portugal had failed to maintain strength sufficient to meet the strain of a great Oceanic Empire, so Holland also became exhausted by the perpetual struggle in Europe, first with Spain, then with France, enhanced by the destructive naval conflicts with England, and sank to the position of a Power of the second rank ; while in India the French under a series of able organisers and administrators took the place of the Dutch as the leading competitor with Great Britain.

Retrogression of the Dutch.

The earliest efforts of the French were devoted to the establishment of a station not in the Indies but on the route thither. Before Colbert's time, they had tried to secure a position in Madagascar, which for some while continued to be the headquarters of their Eastern trade. There however, the situation was always precarious, owing to the climate, the animosity of the natives, and the difficulty offered for military movements by the nature of the country. Early in the eighteenth century, the station was transferred to the neighbouring Isles of France and Bourbon, otherwise known as the Mauritius ; from whence La Bourdonnais in 1746 and Suffren in 1782 conducted the operations which for the time threatened to win for the French the superior position in Eastern waters.

The French Company.

In India itself, Colbert's Company was first allowed to open a factory at Surat ; and a little later, when the English and French were in alliance against the Dutch, they made good a footing on the Coromandel or Carnatic coast. The kingdom of Bijapur had not yet perished, and that district still formed a part of it. François Martin, left in charge of the Carnatic settlement, made friends with the Governor. Temporary difficulties had arisen in the way of investing the specie at his disposal in merchandise, but a loan to the Native Governor, a man of honour, was safe and profitable. When circumstances made it desirable to call in the loan some years later, Martin being by that time established at Pondichery, it was found more convenient to the Governor and more advantageous to the French, that a grant of land should be made, as an equivalent. It was consistently

François Martin.



## 46 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

Martin's policy to impress native rulers with the idea that the French were desirable and useful tenants; and so successful was he that the fortification of Pondichery in 1789, instead of being looked on with jealousy, met with their favourable approval. A serious check to the rising and prosperous community occurred when it passed for a time into the hands of the Dutch. Martin returned to France, and when there succeeded in so impressing on the authorities the importance of the place, that its restoration was one of the stipulations in the treaty of Ryswick (1697). Martin went back as Governor, and head of the whole of the French settlements in the East; and from that time Pondichery continued to flourish.

In 1688, the factory of Chandarnagar on the Hugli was opened, but it was not till Dupleix was sent there about 1730 that the Bengal trade was really developed. In the meantime, Surat had been given up altogether, with discredit, a heavy debt being left behind. The ill effects were successfully removed by Governor Lenoir of Pondichery; who, receiving unexpected supplies from France with a promise of more to follow, wisely considered the liquidation of the Surat debt as, indirectly, a better investment than the purchase of merchandise. French credit was so immensely enhanced by this transaction, that when fresh financial difficulties arose almost immediately afterwards, assistance which would otherwise certainly not have been forthcoming was freely and without hesitation rendered by the wealthy Natives. In 1725 a new fortified port was secured on the Malabar coast by the establishment of the French at Mahi, the name of which was changed to Mahé in honour of La Bourdonnais, who had it as one of his Christian names.

Finally the prestige of the French in the Carnatic was raised to an unprecedented level by the cool and far-sighted courage of Lenoir's successor Dumas. He had cultivated the friendliest relations with the reigning Nawab (the lieutenant of the Nizam) and his kinsman. In 1739 the restless Bhonsla, the Maratha Raja of Nagpur, invaded the Carnatic. The Princes placed their wives and families under the protection of Dumas at Pondichery, and he



accepted the charge. The Maratha defeated the Nawab's armies; and ordered Dumas to surrender the families on pain of Pondichery being demolished. Dumas showed his envoy over the place, and indicated that the Bhonsla might come and take the families if he could, but that Pondichery, their city of refuge, would be held against him to the last. The attitude of defiance was tempered by a polite present of sundry bottles of "cordial waters," and the Marathas amicably retired. The Nizam was greatly impressed by the Frenchman's courage and address, and he was rewarded by Imperial honours, and the official designation of a "Commander of five thousand."

This then, about 1741, was the position of the two rival companies. The British had been in the field about twice as long as the French. They held important fortified settlements; in the Carnatic at Madras, with the subsidiary fort of St David some hundred miles to the south: on the Hugli at Calcutta or Fort William: on the west coast at Bombay: besides minor factories, as at Surat and Patna. The French, besides minor factories, had Pondichery in the Carnatic, Chandarnagar on the Hugli, and Mahé on the west coast. The Dutch and Portuguese also had their establishments at Goa, Chinsura, Negapatam, and elsewhere: but they took no effective part in the struggle.

Essentially, the conditions were nearly the same for both. Governors in India could follow their own line, without waiting for the endorsement of Directors at home: but if the Directors ultimately refused endorsement, the Indian Governor was liable to complete shipwreck. What Directors at home wanted was dividends; they could be relied on to estimate Glory in pounds, shillings and pence. But there was an important difference in their several relations to the National Government at home. The French Company was a perpetual tax on the Exchequer: the English Company paid money into it. Consequently there was a standing inducement to the British Government to support the Company even at some risk. In France the inducement was to be deaf to the Company's appeals. Consequently, though the Indian Governors of both might be equally

The rival  
National  
Com-  
panies.

Relations  
of the  
Com-  
panies to  
their  
Govern-  
ments.



## 48 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

enterprising, the attitude at home was more antagonistic to enterprise in France than in England. If by any accident the will to back the respective Companies should become equalised, the present strength of the two in India was fairly equal, but the French had the advantage of the special prestige acquired by Dumas with the Natives: so that a contest would turn on the comparative ability of the home-governments to throw their weight into the scale. As it was however, the favourable inclination of the British Government was the stronger, and events proved its naval preponderance to be so complete as entirely to cancel any advantage won by the temporary superiority of the French *personnel* upon Indian soil.

Constitu-  
tion of the  
British  
Company  
in India.

Finally we may observe the Constitution of the British Company, as bearing upon the problems developed when it became an actual territorial Power. In India itself, the Company's possessions were divided between three independent Presidencies, in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Each Presidency had its own Governor and Council, with its servants graded as senior and junior Merchants, and Writers. The salaries of all were so low that they were in effect allowed to increase their incomes by unrestricted private trading. The governing bodies had jurisdiction within their own areas; but whatever lands they held, they held as tenants of the Country Powers. They had authority to raise troops, of which they maintained only a few hundreds until the practice of raising and training regiments of Sepoys was developed; and their chief settlements were fortified; but none of the Carnatic ports had adequate harbourage for shelter when the monsoons set in.

Homecon-  
stitution of  
the E.I.C.

The power however of the authorities in India was modified by that of the superior authorities at home. When twelve months was about the least time that could pass between the sending of a dispatch and the receipt of the answer thereto, it was obvious that very much must be left to the judgment of the authority on the spot. Yet it was necessary to avoid steps which would involve a grave risk of censure, and no line of policy could be adopted which would seriously subvert that laid down in instructions



from home. Finally, it was possible for collisions to occur between the two governing bodies in London—the Court of Proprietors, consisting of all who held five hundred pounds worth of stock, to whom lay the final appeal, and the Court of Directors, elected from the Proprietors, in whose hands was the general management; to which possibility may be added that of Parliamentary pressure, whenever questions could be raised as to the scope of the Company's Charter, and the legitimacy of introducing modification therein.

## CHAPTER V

### RULERS AND SUBJECTS

**T**HE direct contest between French and British in India began in the fifth decade of the eighteenth century. A hundred years before, all Hindostan—from the Indus to the Brahmaputra, from the Himalayas to the Nerbadda—had for some time acknowledged one sovereign. South of the Nerbadda, though the great kingdom of Ahmednagar was in its last throes, Bijapur and Golconda still maintained independence. Between 1640 and 1700, for the most part in the long reign of Aurangzib, all three bowed to the yoke of the Mogul: but during the same period, Sivaji made his Marathas *de facto* lords over great part of the Dekhan. At the end of the next forty years, the Mogul was reigning at Delhi by permission of Nadir Shah the Persian: the governor of Oudh called himself the Mogul's Wazir, but was independent; the governor of Bengal and Behar was equally independent: the Marathas had extended their rule over so much of Hindostan as lay between the Chambal, the Jamna, and the Nerbadda; as well as over parts of the Dekhan. Over the rest of the Dekhan the Nizam held sway, with the barest pretence of acknowledging the overlordship of Delhi, and having delegated his authority over the Carnatic to a loyal Nawab of his own choosing. The Panjab was a hunting ground for Afghan invaders: Rajputana, a collection of principalities where no strong hand ruled, and the chiefs had long unlearnt any but the most primitive arts of government. And upon the sea coast, or on a great estuary, here and there was a petty colony of European traders, French or British or Dutch; owning two or three forts and a few companies of drilled white men.

Distribu-  
tion of the  
Indian  
Powers.



During the last century there was no respect in which **India** had progressed. In the Dekhan the rule of the Mogul governors was no whit better than that of the royal lines of Bijapur and Golconda. The Marathas were as rapacious as the Mussulman Lords, more blood-thirsty and restless, even less vexed with theories about the good of the governed. The Provincial Governors of the Empire were concerned in establishing their own power and independence. Before the disintegration set in, Aurangzib had deserted the comparatively liberal policy of his predecessors. In those years, every reproach that could be urged against the Mogul government became intensified; and history gives no sign that there was anywhere existing either the will or the capacity to reorganise order out of the growing chaos.

Character  
of the  
Govern-  
ment since  
Aurang-  
zib.

Immense progress had been made under the wise sway of Akbar; but it had been his task to introduce order and system where they had never yet prevailed, at the same time that he was establishing a new dynasty. No great positive prosperity could therefore be reached. The way was made ready by him for his son and grandson, and it is only natural that, by common consent, the most prosperous period of Hindostan was in the reign of Shah Jehan. When Aurangzib seated himself upon his father's throne, there arrived at the court of the old Mogul a French Physician, François Bernier, who left to posterity sundry vivid descriptions of men, manners, and events in India as he saw them with keen observant eyes and an honest, intelligent brain. From him we may learn what the Mogul Empire was capable of at its normal best—that is, when not under the control of that rare creation, a despot who was at once an idealist and a practical man—the best that could be provided except by an Akbar succeeding an Akbar; the best that could be maintained even for a short time, under any system of Oriental despotism.

François  
Bernier.

The earliest records of Greeks and Romans assume the conception or idea of a State, a Body Politic; a systematic relation between the grades of society; a unity pervading each particular society and distinguishing it from others. This conception permeates all the peoples of Europe. If

European  
conception  
of a State.



## 52 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

one State conquers another, the citizens of the conquered State sooner or later become citizens of the conquering one. The ruling and privileged classes always recognise that the State as a whole has claims upon their individual services, and that they have some sort of obligations towards the classes below them. The normal condition of affairs is an organised government which recognises and enforces in a general way the right to protection of life and property, and it is the business of the sovereign power to ensure these things in some degree. There are in every State intervals of anarchy, when every man lives by the strength of his own arm and the wiliness of his own brain; but these intervals are abnormal. Hence there is a general encouragement to industry: the private citizen can count, at least up to a certain point, on enjoying the fruits of his labours, and profiting by his accumulations and thrift. The theory is that the State is organised for the common benefit of all its constituent members, though some may claim a larger share than others in that benefit.

No such conception in India. In India, however, this idea of the State was practically non-existent. The object of Government was to extract from the country the largest amount of revenue for the governing members; and to maintain at disposal a mass of troops which could prevent rebellion, and extend dominion.

The Oriental System. Every monarch was constantly occupied either in making war on his neighbours, to exact tribute or capture their thrones, or in defending his own throne against foreign aggressors or rebels within the borders. The Empire was parcelled out into Provinces of whose rulers two things were expected—that they would march troops in the Mogul's service, and that they would produce funds for the Mogul's treasury. The Provinces were sub-divided into districts whose rulers owed a like responsibility to the Provincial Governors. Rules and regulations of procedure were laid down, on which was based the calculation of the amount which was required to be produced; but so long as that amount was forthcoming, the man at the top cared very little how far his subordinates kept to the rules in producing it. The district officer saw that the local magnate provided



as much as the assessment required, and as much more as he could see his way to extract. The local magnate exacted of course from the populace as much as would satisfy the district officer: but there was practically no check on additional extortions; since there was no real means of appeal to a higher power, no court before which misrule could be challenged. Industry became absurd, when the possession of savings in any form was simply an incitement to extortion; justice was a mere travesty when its appointed administrators gave their awards in accordance with the size of the *douceurs* offered by the respective litigants. Defective Justice.

Good governors were of course to be found as well as bad, and the good governor would at any rate seek to appoint subordinates of comparatively high character; but the system offered no security. A vigorous expression of public opinion and a high individual sense of public spirit might at times and in places counteract the strong temptations to venality and indifference; but public spirit was rare and public opinion was voiceless.

In Europe, public spirit is engendered by ideas of family honour and by service traditions. Absence of Public Spirit.

In the one case a certain standard is maintained because by falling utterly below it a man loses social caste: in the other, it is maintained by *esprit de corps*. But India was the land of adventurers. Power was the reward of the daring swordsman or the crafty intriguer, whose antecedents were no bar to success. Many a governor had commenced his career as a slave. Such men had no traditions to live up to. They fought for their own hand, and when they acquired power, used it for their own immediate gratification, knowing the uncertainty of the tenure under which they held it.

The keynote of the whole system is Instability. In Europe, every reigning dynasty ruled in virtue of descent more or less direct from ancient princes: the Moguls in India dated no further back than the reign of our Henry VIII. The individual monarch secured himself on the throne usually at the cost of a war with one or another of his brothers, and possibly with his own father. He held it with a consciousness that as soon as his sons were grown Instability of Government.



## 54 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

up, he might have to fight them for it in turn. He lived of necessity in an atmosphere of suspicion. Jehangir intrigued against Akbar, Shah Jehan was in arms against Jehangir, Aurangzib deposed Shah Jehan; and his own latter days were a burden to him by reason of his perpetual suspicions of his own sons. Yet the circumstances, from the accession of Akbar to the death of Aurangzib a hundred and fifty years later, were extraordinarily favourable; inasmuch as there were but four reigns covering the whole period; and it might generally be said that the longer a monarch occupied the throne the firmer grew his seat.

**Position of the Mohammedan Nobility.** Still more uncertain was the position of the Omrahs, the Mussulman lords and officers. Their functions were not hereditary, but terminable simply at the royal pleasure. Their possessions were granted as from the Mogul, and might be renewed by him at will. It was only when the Empire was already breaking up that they began to found families. After the Mogul family, there was no Mussulman house of front rank in India whose rise was not subsequent to the death of Aurangzib, except that of Haidarabad: founded by the Nizam-ul-Mulk, himself a distinguished officer of Aurangzib, who established his family because he outlived his master by forty years. Had he died twenty or even ten years earlier, the Dekhan would have passed into other hands. In short, before the eighteenth century no Mussulman *House* could be said to exist. Akbar in his boyhood had a great minister, Bairam; and Bairam's son became one of his greatest generals; but even that was exceptional.

**Insecurity of property.** Hereditary position did indeed belong to the Rajput chiefs, who traced their genealogies to remote antiquity. There were even Mussulman princes as at Bhopal, whose dynasties were continuous; but in almost all cases, their power was local, limited, and maintained because it was so. The Rajas of Jodpur and Jeipur and Udaipur were usually prominent men, sometimes trusted officers of the Empire; but their dominions were all in the comparatively barren regions of Rajputana. Briefly, heredity in the possession of property applied with effect only to small estates, and did



not serve as a protection against open appropriation or practical confiscation by higher powers, though it gave the chief or the village community a degree of protection as against neighbours of the same status: while the accumulation of personal wealth in the form of portable property merely provided a magnet attracting the greed of officials, who had achieved their own position mainly by making it worth the while of their superiors to appoint them.

Under such conditions no very high pitch of prosperity could well be attained. Wealth could only accumulate in the hands of the few nobles who had strength and wit to keep it by force. The Court was magnificent, beyond European parallel; but there the splendour ended. There were glorious buildings at Delhi and Agra; but apart from mosques and palaces, these cities were constructed more as if intended to be temporary camps than anything else. The Moguls raised monumental structures, they made some great roads and canals. But this had more to do with making things pleasant for themselves and their *entourage*, than with thought for the public good. The works were constructed by the forced labour of the peasantry in the districts selected for Imperial residence. And it is to be remarked that wherever the Mogul was in person, there also was a large army, with innumerable camp-followers. As the great Court moved from spot to spot in its leisurely progresses, the populace was subjected to constant and heavy contributions. The emperors were in the habit of holding audiences for dispensing justice, and they enjoyed the *rôle*—which indeed they filled with credit—of “protectors of the poor” in a strictly personal capacity; but one *cadi* or magistrate could accomplish more injustice in a day than the Mogul could remedy in a week. When the ordinary channels of the law were hopelessly polluted, and no effort was made to cleanse them, the beneficent decisions in occasional cases were a very inefficient antidote. The high standard set by Akbar himself and the men he selected was not maintained even by his two immediate successors, as was testified by Sir Thomas Roe in Jehangir’s time, and by Bernier in the last days of Shah Jehan. When the ruler never hesitated to make away with

Semblance  
and  
reality.



## 56 HINDU & MOHAMMEDAN DOMINATION

any inconvenient person, human life was likely to be held cheap; when he could transfer any subject's property to his own coffers without scandal, respect for the rights of others was not likely to prevail in less exalted ranks.

The soldiery. The armies of the Moguls were counted in myriads; but they were in fact made up in great part of very ill-disciplined mercenaries. Their military value was gauged—and over-rated—by Bernier, when he said that Condé or Turenne with twenty-five thousand Frenchmen could shatter the whole power of the Empire. The support of this vast number of troops, of whom an immense proportion were mounted, was a constant drain on the resources of the country; and the soldiery supplemented their legitimate maintenance by forcible exactions. Matters became worse with the development of the Maratha power, whose hordes of light horsemen swept the country, stuffing their saddlebags as they went, and claiming *chauth* from the rulers in addition to their other spoils. They surged northward up to the gates of Delhi and southward into the Carnatic: in self-defence, Calcutta had to construct the famous "Maratha ditch"; where they passed, rapine and pillage accompanied them. And finally, where there were hills, there were fortresses, and where there were fortresses there were robbers.

Condition of the population. Oppression and lawlessness were not indeed carried to the point at which industry perishes altogether; the same sort of protection was extended to the trading classes as was granted to Jews in Mediæval Europe; they were a convenience to their masters, as long as they could pay ransom. But enterprise has little chance under such conditions; its rewards are insufficient save in the eyes of the few; and commerce was further hampered by the imposition of innumerable taxes, market dues, and tolls. The mass of the population attempted to do little more than to live from hand to mouth, with at the most an effort to collect and bury in some secret place enough to provide the cost of marrying a daughter.

Such were the general results of Mohammedan or Maratha supremacy. There was no inducement to progress, except



where a particular Governor happened to be endowed with a higher sense of duty, or a keener perception of the sources of wealth, than most of his compeers. There were such exceptions, and so one district or another, one town or another, would flourish for a season; but there is small room to doubt that in respect of the prevalent conditions of life, India at the time when the House of Hanover succeeded to the throne of Great Britain was five hundred years behind Europe: while she showed no sign of containing within herself the germs of redemption.

As for the little European communities, they consisted practically of exiles, many of whom never set foot again on their native shores after they had once landed in India: or, if they did so, found that the habits they had contracted in the East were not easily made compatible with Western social conditions. The extent to which they were cut off from European associations is not readily realised until we remember that a favourable voyage round the Cape rarely occupied much less than six months; and that something like a year and a half actually elapsed between the time of Clive's sailing from England, and his landing at Madras.

The  
European  
com-  
munities.





**BOOK II**

**THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER**








THE  
CARNATIC:  
AND  
MYSORE

ABOUT 1780

Scale: 1 Inch = 105 Miles

oGolconda  
•HAIDARABAD  
N I Z A M





## CHAPTER VI

# THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH

(*Map III.*)

**A**BOUT the time when Nadir Shah was sacking Delhi, Robert Walpole in England was lamenting the violent outburst of public feeling which plunged the country into a struggle with Spain. That Spanish war was in a way the beginning of the fierce contest for dominion beyond the seas, which terminated after a complete triumph of the British in the Peace of 1763. Commercial rivalry with Spain in the South Seas, colonial rivalry with the French in North America, and commercial rivalry with the French in India, induced wars which by sea, or on the American continent, or in India, continued practically without an interval for twenty-four years and ended by giving Britain the complete dominion of the ocean, and expelling the French as a Power from America and India alike.

When Walpole went to war with Spain very much against his own will, the presumption was strong that sooner or later France would throw her weight into the scale along with the sister Bourbon Monarchy. A secret treaty for the aggrandisement of the Bourbon houses was in existence; and it was the English minister's firm conviction that the combined fleets of France and Spain would prove too strong for that of England. But war, declared against Spain in 1739, was not formally declared with France until 1744; in 1746 Great Britain was finally freed from the haunting spectre of civil strife which had vexed her statesmen ever since the expulsion of James II.; by the collapse of the last Jacobite rising; and when a

The coming World-contest.

Summary of the struggle.



## 62 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

general peace was concluded in 1748, she had definitely succeeded in holding her own, though no settlement was reached of the questions which had been the ostensible causes of the conflagration. The struggle was renewed in 1756, when the British under the guiding genius of the elder Pitt developed an overwhelming naval supremacy which paralysed the resistance of the French in lands which could only receive reinforcements by sea. Had Britons and French in India been left to fight their quarrels out between themselves, it is at least possible that French, not British, would have become the arbiters of India. But they were not left to themselves; their battles were fought at Quiberon and Quebec as well as at Trichinopoly and Wandewash; and afterwards France was never able to place a rival armament in India.

Prospects  
of the  
struggle.

At the time, however, when the challenge was planned, the chances of the issue were extremely doubtful. Had France pursued in the first war, or had Pitt failed to pursue in the second, a vigorous naval policy, the position of affairs might very possibly have been reversed. As it turned out it is hardly too much to say that the British entered upon the inheritance which Dupleix prepared.

Dupleix at  
Pondichery.

Dupleix had been for some years at Chandernagar on the Hugli when he was appointed to the leading post of Governor of Pondichery in succession to Dumas. There he arrived in 1741. About the time when he was leaving Bengal, Ali Vardi Khan, previously Governor of Behar, had intrigued himself into the position of Nawab of Behar and Bengal. In the Carnatic Dupleix found a new Nawab, Anwar-ud-din, only just appointed by the Nizam, to the exclusion of a family which had held the office for thirty years. A year or two earlier, Nadir Shah had sacked the home of the Padishah himself. The instability of Oriental dynasties, in short, had only just been emphatically and variously illustrated, and the already immense age of the Nizam pointed to a prospect of its further illustration in the immediate future.

The  
scheme of  
Dupleix.

Hence two ideas presented themselves to the mind of Dupleix in close association. If the Europeans gave their



minds to doing it they could make themselves the determining factor in the rivalries of natives; if the French got rid of the English they could secure that position for themselves, and if they worked skilfully for that position they would be able to get rid of the English. Further, although in the field Dupleix was not adapted for soldiering, he had an intelligent perception of sundry military principles whereby he formulated the law that the kind of discipline prevailing in the levies of native princes was of very little value against the kind of discipline which prevails among the most inadequate European troops, while the European discipline could be imparted to native troops by European officers.

In 1744 France and Great Britain went to war; but the French and British East India Companies' Directors at home were thinking about dividends, not politics, and instructed their officials in India to maintain friendly relations. Their officials in India saw matters in a different light. Governor Morse at Madras, and Governor Dupleix at Pondichery, each meant to use the opportunity for a blow at his commercial rivals. Dupleix, however, had laid his plans: Morse had not. The British at the outset found their intention of marching on Pondichery frustrated by a warning from the Nawab that they would move at their peril: nor had it occurred to any one that such a threat could possibly be defied. Dupleix had taken time by the forelock, and secured the condescending protection of Anwar-ud-din till he himself should be ready to strike. Check to the British in the Carnatic.

This, however, was a merely precautionary move. At La Bourdonnais. that time, the islands of the Mauritius were a French Naval station. The Commander there was La Bourdonnais, a man of great ability and energy. Dupleix had been for some time in communication with him, when an English squadron under Peyton appeared before Pondichery, prepared to ignore—from the sea—the Nawab's prohibition of hostilities. But Peyton had hardly arrived when La Bourdonnais also came on the scene of action with ships and troops. Peyton found himself obliged to withdraw. La Bourdonnais sailed for Madras; the Governor made a vain appeal to the Nawab for the protection previously extended to the French; there



## 64 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

He was no force in the place to resist La Bourdonnais, and in September 1746, after a short bombardment, Madras surrendered. The Admiral had promised that the town should be restored on payment of a ransom; but Dupleix repudiated the terms, declaring that La Bourdonnais had acted without authority. There was a hot altercation, but Dupleix was in the stronger position: and La Bourdonnais's ships were not in a condition to await the approaching monsoon. He had to withdraw, leaving some troops, to the Mauritius—whence he was almost immediately recalled, to be thrown into prison by way of encouragement—and Dupleix took possession of Madras, explaining to the Nawab that this was merely a preliminary to handing it over to him.

It was not long, however, before Anwar-ud-din came to the conclusion that the presumptuous Frenchman meant to keep Madras himself; whereupon he sent his son at the head of some ten thousand men to compel obedience. Then Dupleix put his theory to the test. The garrison, numbering not more than five hundred men, sallied out against the Nawab's troops, and routed them. Reinforcements, consisting of two hundred and thirty Europeans, and seven hundred sepoy—natives drilled on the European model, and under European officers—were on their way to Madras, and again scattered the native levies. Quite suddenly it was revealed that odds of twenty to one were by no means sufficient to ensure victory against Europeans and sepoy in combination.

Madras had fallen, and its English occupants had been paraded through Pondichery as prisoners of war, but Fort St David, a hundred miles to the south, was standing. Two attempts to capture it were, however, repelled, and the appearance of a small British squadron under Griffin sufficed to check active hostilities without enabling the British to assume the offensive. In June of the following year (1748) the attack on Fort St David was vigorously renewed, but triumphantly repelled by Major Stringer Lawrence who had recently taken over the command. In August a considerable fleet from England commanded by Boscawen appeared off Pondichery, and the French port was besieged. The siege



was very ill managed, and the defence brilliantly conducted. Defence of Pondichery.  
 After fifty days, Boscawen was obliged to withdraw by the approach of the monsoon — for the harbourage on the Coromandel coast was quite inadequate under these conditions. The raising of the siege was a triumph for the French, whose military prestige was now incomparably higher than that of their rivals and their interest at the Nawab's court proportionately stronger: and the news of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle prevented the return of Boscawen when the monsoons should be over. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and restoration of conquests.

One result of the treaty however, was not to Dupleix's taste. In the course of the war, the British in America had taken Louisburg on the St Lawrence from the French: and Dupleix had to give up Madras in India in return for the restoration of Louisburg in Canada.

There was peace between France and England, and the two Companies were no longer at liberty to make war on each other; both however, were bent on carrying on the struggle, and a means of doing so was promptly discovered. But while the British waited upon fortune, Dupleix created his own opportunity.

Anwar-ud-din had been, as we have observed, appointed Nawab of the Carnatic by the Nizam in 1740: displacing a family which, in the person of Sadutulla, had begun to rule in 1710. Sadutulla had been succeeded in 1732 by his nephew Dost Ali; both had been good and popular governors and the Nizam had not found it convenient to interfere. A few years later, the Marathas raided the Carnatic in force: Dost Ali was killed. His son, Safdar Ali, in turn was proclaimed Nawab. He had two brothers-in-law: one Chanda Sahib, who was able, popular, and bore a very high character. With the connivance of Safdar Ali, who feared Chanda Sahib as a possible rival, the Marathas attacked and captured the latter and carried him off to Satara, where they held him to ransom. He however, in anticipation of disturbed times, had already placed his family in charge of Dumas at Pondichery; a confidence of which, as we have seen, the Governor had shown himself thoroughly worthy. Then Safdar Ali had been assassinated by the other brother-



## 66 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

in-law ; the Nizam had considered it time to interfere with a strong hand ; Anwar-ud-din was appointed Governor, and Guardian of Safdar Ali's young son, and on the boy's death shortly after was formally made Nawab.

Dupleix and Chanda Sahib. Thus, when the war between French and English formally terminated in 1748, Chanda Sahib represented the family of Sadutulla, which had during its power endeared itself to the population. He himself was deservedly a favourite with them : but he was a prisoner at Satara. Anwar-ud-din was an old and fairly capable soldier, but was disliked both personally and as a supplanter of the popular house. Chanda Sahib was bound by strong ties to the French. Dupleix conceived the idea of obtaining the release of Chanda Sahib and establishing him on the throne of the Carnatic : and as the first step, provided a ransom sufficient to satisfy the Marathas.

Rival claimants to the Nizamship. King-making in the Carnatic was the scheme by which Dupleix intended to accomplish his purposes ; but circumstances enlarged the scope of his operations. Just at this time the old Nizam Asaf Jah himself died ; whereupon the succession was immediately seized by his son Nasir Jang, and claimed by a grandson Muzaffar Jang : who affirmed that the Mogul himself had made the appointment. It was natural that the two claimants, Muzaffar Jang, and Chanda Sahib, should make common cause against the *de facto* Nizam, and Nawab, while Dupleix could support them under colour of loyalty to the Imperial Power. Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib marched into the Carnatic, accompanied by a contingent of French and Sepoys under the able French general Bussy. Anwar-ud-din was defeated and slain at Ambur (July 1749), while his son Mohammed Ali escaped to Trichinopoli : Bussy and his contingent having rendered invaluable service in the fight.

Blunders of the British. Meantime the British had been wasting their energies in a futile and aimless attempt to restore the incompetent ex-Raja of the little Maratha principality of Tanjur, in the place of his brother the reigning Raja. The attempt failed, and the Company gained nothing but the cession of the fort of Devikōta. Nor could they rise to the occasion when



the successful move of Dupleix ought to have opened their eyes to the necessity for prompt and energetic action. They allowed the fleet and most of the land forces to depart for England; and, in response to Mohammed Ali's appeal for their assistance sent him a hundred and twenty men.

Dupleix saw that the course for his candidates for office to follow was the immediate and complete suppression of Mohammed Ali; which would then enable them to concentrate against Nasir Jang. But Chanda Sahib wasted time in a prolonged attack on Tanjur: so that before he could move on Trichinopoli, Nadir Jang had himself appeared in the Carnatic with a vast army, joined by a British contingent from Madras under Major Lawrence. As the result of an engagement, Muzaffar Jang fell into his uncle's hands and Chanda Sahib had to fall back on Pondichery.

The resourceful Frenchman however, at once opened negotiations with Nasir Jang, in the course of which he discovered that several of the chiefs were ill-affected towards him. With them he immediately began to intrigue; and while Nasir Jang lay idle at Arcot, made a dash at Masulipatam which was captured, attacked Mohammed Ali and put him to flight, and seized the strong fort of Jinji. Nasir Jang was now disposed to revert to Dupleix's terms, which involved the liberation of Muzaffar Jang and the recognition of Chanda Sahib as Nawab of the Carnatic: but an engagement was brought on by the French force marching from Jinji, which was unaware that the treaty had been actually ratified: Nasir Jang was assassinated on the field of battle: and Muzaffar Jang was again hailed as Nizam.

Triumph  
of  
Dupleix's  
schemes.

This took place in December 1749. The result was that Dupleix's candidates now appeared to be completely masters of the Dekhan and the Carnatic, and he himself received the official Nawabship from the Mogul. Nor was the position materially affected by the death of Muzaffar Jang in Jan. 1750 in a skirmish with rebels on his way back to Haidarabad: for Bussy, who was with him, secured the succession to his own nominee, Salabat Jang, whom he accompanied to the capital.

With his instinctive appreciation of the effects of display



## 68 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

on Oriental minds, Dupleix set up a pillar near the spot where Nadir Jang fell recording his own glories, and named the place Dupleix-Fātēhabad—the city of the Victory of Dupleix.

The turn of the tide. Mohammed Ali however, was again holding Trichinopoli, and Chanda Sahib marched against him early in 1751. But the tide of Dupleix's success had now reached its highest point.

A new Governor, Mr Saunders, had recently arrived at Madras, who was alive to the immense need of vigorous counteraction to the French. He dispatched reinforcements to the force at Trichinopoli; but, what was of more importance, he gave an independent command to Robert Clive.

Robert Clive. The founder of our Indian Empire was now in his twenty-sixth year. He had arrived at Madras in the capacity of a "writer"—*i.e.* a junior clerk in the employ of the East India Company—at the age of nineteen. At the first outbreak of hostilities, he had volunteered; when Madras fell, he escaped to Fort St David, in the defence of which, as well as in the operations against Tanjur, he had shown conspicuous bravery and coolness; and was allowed to exchange his writership for a commission in the Company's service. Now his opportunity had come. He pointed out to Saunders that a direct relief of Trichinopoli would be vain, but that a diversion might be effected by a blow at Arcot, the Nawab's capital. Desperately audacious as the scheme was, Saunders resolved to take the risk. With eight officers, only two of whom had been in action before, two hundred British soldiers, and three hundred Sepoys, Clive started on his perilous expedition. So suddenly was the blow conceived, so swiftly executed, that on his arrival at Arcot the garrison was seized with panic and evacuated the fort without a blow.

Capture of Arcot.

The young commander made instant preparations to stand a siege. The fugitive garrison, far more numerous than his own little force, rallied and encamped close by. Clive again surprised them in a night attack, slew large numbers of them, and withdrew without loss.



His specific object was perfectly attained. Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoli immediately divided his forces, (thereby affording considerable relief to the beleaguered troops), in order to send four thousand of them to recover Arcot. These with other detachments collected by the way—including a small body of French from Pondichery—formed an investing army of ten thousand men: with Chanda Sahib's son Raja Sahib in command. For fifty days, Clive with his little force, already much reduced, held the feeble fortifications of Arcot. The fame of the bold defence spread: the native chiefs began to revise their estimates of British enterprise and valour, hitherto painfully low. The sepoys in the little garrison shewed their devotion by offering to live on the water used for boiling the rice in order that the grain might be reserved for the Europeans. Raja Sahib, fearing that relief might come, resolved to storm the place: but Clive was ready. The desperate valour and activity of the besieged completely foiled the besiegers after a hot contest. The siege was raised and Raja Sahib retired. Clive sallied forth and again defeated him at Arni, and yet again, having been at last joined by considerable reinforcements and by a band of Marathas, at Kaveripak: presently thereafter razing Dupleix-Fatehabad to the ground.

The defence of Arcot (1751) was the turn of the tide. The prestige which had hitherto accompanied the French arms was now matched if not excelled by that of the British. A new and brilliant leader had suddenly come to the front, and Stringer Lawrence was just returned to the scene of action. The very able French commander, Bussy, was at Haidarabad; in the Carnatic, Law of Laureston (of an exiled Scottish house)—an admirable subordinate but an incapable chief—was with Chanda Sahib's forces.

Lawrence and Clive proceeded against the investing army before Trichinopoli, where Mohammed Ali had purchased by promises a very unsubstantial assistance from Morari Rao, the Maratha chief of Gūti, and from the Raja—or rather the regent—of Mysore. Trichinopoli was relieved: Law with his army and Chanda Sahib's were manœuvred into an impossible

Defence of  
Arcot.

French  
surrender  
at Trichi-  
nopoli.



## 70 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

position, and compelled to surrender; and Chanda Sahib himself was murdered. If Bussy had secured the Nizam, Mohammed Ali, the British protégé, was at any rate Nawab of the Carnatic (June 1752).

Super-session of Dupleix. Dupleix however, continued to display an astonishingly resourceful activity in carrying on the contest: nor was it finally the British, but they of his own household, that destroyed him. His imperial schemes awakened no responsive ardour in the breasts of directors at home; but for his enormous personal outlay in giving them effect, they would have broken down long before for want of financial support. The French East India Company resolved to supersede the too enterprising Governor, who returned home in 1754 to meet with nothing but insult and spoliation; leaving a safe commercial gentleman in charge at Pondichery. Both Clive and Lawrence returned to England. The two Companies agreed to interfere no more with native politics. Despite these amicable arrangements, the declaration of war between Britain and France in 1756 caused the renewal of active hostilities in India in 1758: and in the meantime various events had taken place which were not without influence on the course of the last struggle.

Bussy at Haidarabad. Salabat Jang, the last Nizam placed on the throne by the turn of fortune's wheel, had retired to Haidarabad in the spring of 1751, and Bussy had gone with him. The succession was of course disputed by a brother, who bribed the Peshwa (now definitely supreme in the Maratha confederacy) and the Bhonsla to attack the Nizam; but Bussy's military skill, his troops, and his artillery, played havoc with the invaders, who were finally conciliated by a cession of territory. Shortly afterwards, a similar cession—that of the Northern Sarkars or Circars, a large and rich district—was made to Bussy himself for the maintenance of his forces. In 1755, the Nizam made an expedition to the south against Morari Rao and the Mysore Raja, in which Bussy again illustrated the invincible superiority of European methods in the field. Attempts were made to upset his influence, but they were foiled, and in 1757 he was still supreme at Haidarabad. But in 1757, Clive also was back in India; not in Madras, but



occupied with the conquest of Bengal, which placed new and immense resources in the hands of the British Company.

It was generally understood in 1756 that war was soon to be expected in Europe, and the attitude the Companies would adopt towards each other in India was uncertain. Clive, returning to India after a visit to England where he had been very warmly received, intended himself and was intended by the Directors in London, to take active measures for counteracting Bussy at Haidarabad; but found himself precluded from so doing by the convention between the Governors in the Carnatic. Having first, with the aid of Admiral Watson, suppressed a piratical chief named Angria, at Geriah on the west coast, he was at the end of the year dispatched to Bengal on account of the proceedings of the Nawab of that province. During previous disturbances, Calcutta and Chandernagar had abstained from hostilities, but on the news arriving (1757) that war had been declared, Clive at once seized the French settlement. Bussy was not disposed to weaken his grip on Haidarabad in order to contest the position in Bengal: and hostilities in the south only reached an acute stage with the arrival of Lally. Renewal  
of  
hostilities.

The chances of the French in India depended on two things—persistence in the policy of Dupleix, and support from France on a scale equal to that given to the British by the home authorities. But Lally was ordered to leave the native courts alone, confining himself to direct contest with the British; while the inauguration of Pitt's aggressive naval policy very soon ensured full occupation in the West, for any ships that could make their way out of French ports; France was not willing, and lacked the power if she had been willing, to do more than let the forces actually in India win if they could. The opposed forces on the spot at the beginning of 1758 were not unequal; but the French were fighting in isolation, the British with almost unlimited reserves from England to bring up if required; and time after time the French operations were baffled by the appearance of an unopposed British squadron. The last  
phase.

Lally arrived in India at the end of April 1758. An Lally.



## 72 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

Irishman, born in exile, the son of one of the valiant defenders of Limerick, he had served brilliantly in the armies of France. But his valour in the field was counterbalanced by a disposition so overbearing and tactless that his officers could hardly keep on terms with him. Many of them were in a habitual state of practical if not technical mutiny, and the Natives were enraged by his total disregard for the sentiments prejudices and principles which were a part of their being. The labour and the supplies readily provided for the diplomatic Dupleix were grudgingly and with every possible evasion and delay extracted by Lally.

Yet he began successfully enough with an attack on Fort St David; which should have been able to hold out indefinitely, but surrendered within a month. He could not however, get money from the civil authorities at Pondichery; so attempted to acquire the sinews of war by compelling the Raja of Tanjur to pay moneys due. The Raja resisted; Lally was on the verge of capturing the town and burning his last cartridge in doing so, when a British squadron appeared off Karikal, at the time Lally's military base. He had to leave Tanjur, and hurry back to Pondichery, while D'Aché, in command of the French squadron with which he had arrived, declined to do battle with the British and withdrew to the Mauritius.

Frustration of Lally's plans.

Lally now summoned Bussy and the troops from Haidarabad and the Sarkars to his assistance. Bussy obeyed the order, and his obedience destroyed the last chance of carrying out the Dupleix policy. Lally laid seige to Madras in December; but there was a sufficient garrison, with Lawrence in command. After two months siege, Lally was about to storm; when once more a British squadron appeared on the scenes, a panic seized Lally's troops, and he was obliged to retire precipitately to Pondichery, leaving many of his guns behind. (Feb. 1759).

In this year, Lally paid the penalty for withdrawing Bussy from Haidarabad, and the officers and troops from the Sarkars. To them he might have looked for the supplies and the money which were not forthcoming in the Carnatic. Bussy's influence with the Nizam amounted to very little



when the great soldier and his forces were at a distance and in a subordinate position: the Sarkars, instead of feeding the French, fell a prey to their opponents. The immense value of that district was apparent to Clive at Calcutta; and in spite of his seemingly precarious position there, he dispatched Colonel Forde, in the autumn of 1758, with every available soldier, on an expedition against Masulipatam; trusting to his own prestige, and his own unmatched audacity and resourcefulness, to maintain his position in Bengal. Forde conducted his operations with brilliant success, and though the Nizam at last moved in support of the French, Masulipatam was taken in April before he arrived. Consequently the Nizam, instead of attempting force, transferred his alliance to the British and made over formally to them the territories previously granted to Bussy.

Capture of  
Masuli-  
patam by  
Forde.

Meantime Lally, with troops ragged, half-starved, and more than half-mutinous, was quite unable to operate effectively in the Carnatic. Here towards the close of the year, the command of the British was taken up by Colonel Eyre Coote, a brilliant officer sent down from Bengal by Clive, who had recognised his abilities at Plassey. Coote recovered Wandewash, which had been occupied by the French. Lally's attempt to recapture it resulted in the battle of Wandewash (Jan. 21, 1760) which was practically decisive. Coote had under his command rather less, Lally rather more, than 2000 Europeans. There was also a much larger body of Sepoys and Marathas present, but these took practically no part in the engagement. The fight was well contested but the British victory was complete. Bussy himself was among the prisoners. One after the other, the French posts fell into the hands of their rivals. Pondichery itself was invested in October, and surrendered in January (1761); and although the trading stations were restored to the French as trading stations when the Peace of Paris was concluded in 1763, they were dismantled and made permanently useless for military purposes. Twenty years later, in the hour of Britain's worst peril, it seemed for a moment possible that a blow might be struck for France; twenty years after that again the shadow of Napoleon vexed the souls of Indian

Eyre  
Coote.

Wande-  
wash.


## 74 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

statesmen ; but the question whether France or Britain should dominate India ceased in actual fact to be a question from the hour of Lally's final failure

Fate of Lally. For Lally himself, with his valour, his arrogance, and his great talents, France reserved a fate appropriate to the successor of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix. Slandered by his own countrymen, he returned to Paris, to be flung into the Bastille, and later executed with extreme ignominy : a doom more shameful to France than even that of Admiral Byng to England, ten years before.









## CHAPTER VII

# THE CONQUEST OF BENGAL

(*Map IV.*)

THE wars in which the British were engaged in Southern India for fifteen years, from 1746 to 1761, were directly or indirectly waged against a rival European Power. Neither British nor French had levied war directly upon any Native State; in form they had only lent their help to one or another of rival factions within a State, where the legitimate sovereignty was in dispute. The primary purpose was the suppression of a commercial rival: the secondary purpose, influence at Native Courts.

Different  
nature of  
the contest  
in Bengal.

In Bengal, however, the situation from the outset was quite different. The commercial rivalry of French and British settlements was but an accident in a greater conflict. The British as a grievously insulted Power attacked the Power which had insulted them, overthrew it in the field, and found themselves with no alternative—even had they desired one—to the substitution of their own effective dominion for that which they had demolished. We have noted already how substantially their conquest aided them in the last phase of the struggle in the Carnatic: yet in itself it was not part of that struggle, but was the first positive step in the direction not of influence but of dominion.

Between the time of Nadir Shah's invasion and the collision between the Bengal Court and the British, the position of affairs in Hindostan had not materially altered except for an increased definiteness in the independence of the provinces. The Maratha chiefs who supported the Peshwa had marched up to the banks of the Jamna. The Berar Raja, otherwise known as the Bhonsla, had penetrated

Position of  
the Nawab  
of Bengal.



## 76 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

Oudh and Bengal and threatened Calcutta. The assassination of Nadir Shah had enabled Ahmed Khan, chief of the Abdali tribe of Afghans, to become Ahmed Shah the king of Kabul, and, in virtue of incursions which led to another sacking of Delhi, more or less the acknowledged lord of the Panjab and Sirhind. Safdat Ali, Wazir and Nawab of Oudh, had dropped the functions of Wazir and confined his energies to securing the practical independence of his province. Ali Vardi Khan had made himself Nawab of Bengal and Behar, and come to terms with his dangerous neighbour of Berar. No one in Hindostan attached political significance to the British and French factories at Calcutta and Chandernagar; even the startling developments of 1747-1751, amounting in the Dekhan to a revelation and a revolution, had hardly been recognised in their full importance when Ali Vardi Khan died in 1756, and was succeeded by his youthful grandson, the incapable and unspeakable Suraj-ud-daulah.

The  
British at  
Calcutta.

Fort William, the British settlement in Calcutta, was in singularly incompetent hands. In spite of repeated and pressing advices from the Directors in London, the Governor, Drake, had completely neglected the defences of the fort, and even in immediate anticipation of a Franco-British War made only the most elementary provision for contingencies; doubtless reckoning that Fort William and Chandernagar would keep the peace between themselves as they had done before.

Suraj-ud-  
daulah.

Suraj-ud-daulah had a singularly keen scent for treasure. The breath was hardly out of his grandfather's body when he sent from Mūrshidabad to Calcutta to demand the person and the property of a wealthy Hindu recently arrived there; following this up by an order to demolish the fortifications. By way of reply to a remonstrance, the Nawab commanded his army to march on Calcutta. Drake and the military commandant stole out in boats to the British ships on the Hugli; the ships dropped down the river and left the factory to its fate; after a brief but hopeless resistance, Fort William was captured on July 21, 1756. Then ensued the ghastly tragedy of the Black Hole. The prisoners—a hundred and forty-six of them—were thrust into a room where they had about two square feet apiece for standing-room, and nothing

The Black  
Hole.



out a small grating to let in air. It was in Calcutta and it was midsummer. When the survivors were allowed to stagger out in the morning there were one hundred and twenty-three corpses in the chamber.

Early in August the hideous story reached Madras. Two months later Clive and Admiral Watson, fresh from destroying the pirate Angria, sailed for Bengal to exact restitution and reparation from the Nawab: on December 15 they came with their ten ships to Fulta on the Hugli, where Drake was lying. The fort of Baj-Baj was promptly captured; on Jan. 2 the avengers were in Fort William. A week later the fort of Hugli was taken. The Nawab's troops scattered before them. Within a month the Nawab had collected his forces, marched on Calcutta, suffered considerably from an assault conducted by Clive (which was deprived of its full effect and almost converted into a disaster by the rising of a fog), fled back to Murshidabad, and concluded a treaty of restitution and compensation. The punitive expedition.

Now Suraj-ud-daulah had been possessed with a conviction that the Europeans were to be utterly despised; in the course of these two months that opinion had been rudely shattered; consequently, while he publicly cringed to Clive, privately he began to entreat for assistance from the French at Chandernagar and in the Sarkars. A combined movement against the British in Bengal might have very serious results; and the official news that war had broken out between France and Britain decided Clive and Watson to strike at Chandernagar forthwith. In spite of the remonstrances of the Nawab, they proceeded against the French settlement, capturing it after a gallant resistance, and securing some five hundred prisoners (March 23). If Bussy in the Sarkars had been doubtful before whether to listen to Suraj-ud-daulah, this success settled the question. There could be no co-operation from Chandernagar, and his troops would be of more use in the Dekhan. Intrigues of Suraj-ud-daulah.

To decide on the course next to be followed was no easy matter. There were urgent reasons for withdrawing from Bengal and concentrating troops in the Dekhan for the coming struggle. But to do so would involve leaving the The British dilemma.



## 78 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

British settlement again in the hands of the incapable Drake, and at the mercy of the Nawab, whose promises depended for their value entirely on the presence of fear, while he was very indignant at the disregard of his authority shewn in the attack on Chandernagar. How was he to be muzzled, so as to make the desired withdrawal of troops possible?

**Conspiracy against Suraj-ud-daulah.** The practical answer was given by the Nawab's own ministers. A monarch so bloodthirsty, so capricious, and so greedy, made every man's life uncertain. His commander-in-chief Mir Jafar, and his chief financial advisers, conceived the idea of deposing him and placing Mir Jafar on the throne with British assistance. Communications were opened between the conspirators and the British through the agency of the Hindu Amin Chand, popularly known as Omichund. It is commonly believed that European diplomacy consists largely of skilful lying; Oriental diplomacy may be said to discard truth altogether. The general principle which has guided the British in dealing with Orientals is that of being absolutely straightforward, standing fast by every pledge, and securing confidence by force of frankness. The only alternative course is to accept not the European but the Oriental standard, and act down to it. On this one occasion Clive adopted the latter course. It is not impossible to find excuse for the theory of meeting guile with guile and treachery with falsehood; but morally it cannot be justified, and its expediency is more than doubtful in the long run. Sometimes, however, it is a policy which succeeds.

**The Red and Black Treaties.** It succeeded now. In the early stages of the intrigue, it was only so far called into play that the British maintained in their correspondence with the Nawab an air of unsuspecting friendliness, while they were as a matter of fact arranging with his courtiers for his overthrow. The huge act of deception was perpetrated in dealing with Omichund. When the crafty Hindu had all the threads of the plot in his hands—when it was in his power to shatter the whole scheme by a word to Suraj-ud-daulah—he suddenly put forward the most extravagant demands as the price of silence, requiring their embodiment in the treaty to be drawn up



between the British and Mir Jafar. To refuse meant ruin: to submit to so vast a levy of blackmail—considerably over a quarter of a million sterling—seemed preposterous. The Calcutta Council accepted Clive's method of solution. Two copies of the treaty were made, one of which, written on red paper, contained Omichund's clauses: the other copy omitted them. The red treaty only, signed by the members of Council, was shown to the Bengali who did not know that one signature, that of Admiral Watson, had been deliberately forged on his refusal to set his hand to the fraud. The other parties to the contract signed the White Treaty (May 19), the Mussulmans swearing on the Koran to be faithful. Omichund was satisfied.

Then Clive's tone to the Nawab changed. He wrote, The gage of battle. setting forth the British complaints, and announced that he was coming with his men to Murshidabad to take the opinion of the Nawab's council or Durbar thereon. After which virtual declaration of war, the Nawab with his army moved downwards and Clive with his army upwards towards Plassey.

Clive's letter was despatched on June 13, and he commenced his march the same day with his whole force—1,100 Europeans, double that number of sepoy, and ten guns. On the 18th, Katwa, with a fort and granary, was reached and seized. Then came a pause. There were rumours of Mir Jafar's defection. The monsoon set in stormily. Advance meant triumph or annihilation. Retreat meant collapse. There remained the alternative of entrenching at Katwa, and negotiating with the Marathas—with a risk of Bussy intervening. Clive hesitated for long. On the 21st he Clive's only Council of War. called a Council of War, and announced that his own vote was against advancing. Eleven of the council supported him: seven, headed by Eyre Coote, voted against him. Clive retired, and spent an hour by himself debating in solitude. The promptings of audacity gained the day. He returned to camp, and simply announced that the advance would be renewed next morning.

A stream lay on the British front which was crossed at an early hour. Messages, reassuring but not convincing, came Arrival at Plassey. from Mir Jafar. The army went forward, reaching Plassey



## 80 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

after midnight ; when the presence in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, supposed to be some miles off, was discovered. The British, who had had a drenching and fatiguing march, bivouacked as best they might in a grove. With the early dawn Clive drew up his men ; Europeans in the centre, sepoy on the wings. Facing these were fifty thousand men ; of these fifty thousand, how many were going to fight, how many to desert, how many to stand by and wait on events, no one knew.

There were fifty French with the Nawab ; at 8 o'clock on the morning of June 23, 1757, their cannon began the fight on which the destinies of Bengal depended. A cannonading duel was kept up for three hours, and still Mir Jafar made no sign. Clive prepared to maintain a defence throughout the day, and trust to darkness and relaxation of discipline in the enemy's camp to enable him to make a successful night attack. But early in the afternoon, some movement was evidently on foot in the Nawab's army. Then the French were seen to withdraw from their position ; it was promptly seized by a British officer, a move which made a general engagement inevitable : Clive turned a heavy fire on the enemy's guns, throwing them completely out of action : then his whole line advanced. The rout of the Nawab was immediate and complete ; so prompt was the flight, that only five or six hundred of his army fell, the victors losing but seventy men. The Nawab escaped at speed to Murshidabad : not feeling safe there, he attempted further flight in disguise, but was recognised, brought back to his capital secretly, and then flung into prison and murdered by the son of Mir Jafar. A body of French troops had been on their way from Patna to join the Nawab, but in the light of recent developments they turned and were chased over the frontier by Eyre Coote. To the general astonishment, the revolution was not succeeded by a massacre ; and Mir Jafar must have been immensely relieved to find that Clive was carrying out the bargain as if he had fulfilled his own part to perfection. On June 27th he was proclaimed Nawab in Murshidabad, and the British were virtually lords of Bengal. The hapless Omichund was calmly thrown over. The shock, when he

Victory of Plassey.

Mir Jafar proclaimed Nawab.



found that he had been tricked and was to receive nothing, turned his brain.

Although Mir Jafar was Nawab, all power was in the hands of Clive. In the eyes of every native he was incomparable, invincible; his personal prestige was without parallel. With a word he might have doubled or trebled the immense sum allotted to him from the royal treasury; others of the English received vast gifts; the compensation awarded to the Company was ample. Supremacy of Clive.

For the next two years and a half Clive found his hands full. Mir Jafar expected to reap the benefits of royalty in the ordinary Oriental fashion, but the natives found in Clive a protector not to be trifled with. He restrained the Nawab; he quelled revolts almost with a word. He never played any man false except Omichund, and that single lapse from rectitude appeared to the native mind so entirely normal that it in no way injured his repute. About the end of the year, an invasion was threatened by the Nawab of Oudh; but the danger was quelled by the mere approach of Clive. The task of at once controlling and conciliating the natives was singularly difficult; happily the British officers at Calcutta were so far from being jealous of him that when a singularly clumsy scheme of government omitting him entirely was propounded from London, they practically combined to subordinate themselves to their great chief; the Directors shortly afterwards making the *amende* for their blunder and appointing him Governor with many compliments. His government of Bengal.

In 1758, Clive despatched to the Sarkars the expedition under Forde, whose successful course has already been narrated. The risk he ran thereby was illustrated early in the following year by the reported advance of the Nawab of Oudh in conjunction with the Shahzada, the heir of the Mogul (afterwards Shah Alam), upon Patna. Mir Jafar wanted to buy them off. Clive would have none of it. The Shahzada promised the Englishmen unlimited territory for his support: Clive declined. With four hundred Europeans, two thousand five hundred sepoy, and some troops of the Nawab's, he marched four hundred miles in twenty-three days to the relief of Patna which was holding out stoutly. Invasion by the Shahzada repelled.



## 82 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

The Shahzada's army scattered, and he himself fled. Clive accepted as a reward what is known as his jaghir, the quit-rents of the districts granted to the Company on Mir Jafar's accession.

**Collision with the Dutch.** This took place about the time when Forde was capturing Masulipatam. Later in the year there was to be still another episode of conflict with a European power—the Dutch this time. The story illustrates the idea hitherto prevalent that the Commercial Companies were quite entitled to wage war with each other irrespective of the amicable relations of their respective governments. The Dutch at Chinsura were not profiting by the British ascendancy. Mir Jafar, who was very ill pleased at his practical subordination, entered on an intrigue with them: in consequence of which, a fleet of seven Dutch ships from Batavia appeared in the Hugli in October. They required a free passage up the river to Chinsura: Clive, suspecting their purpose and the good faith of Mir Jafar, was still uncertain how to treat the ships of a professedly friendly nation, when they gave him his cue by seizing some English vessels. Forde, back from the Sarkars, attacked the Chinsura garrison; on the river, Captain Wilson with three ships attacked the seven Dutchmen. Both actions were brilliantly successful. The Dutch had to sue for Clive's protection against the Nawab's son who was possessed with a natural desire to trample on the unsuccessful, whom he had previously intended to help: and the Dutch opposition was terminated by a treaty under which they acknowledged their aggression, made due compensation, and agreed to maintain no more than one hundred and twenty five soldiers in Bengal.

**Departure of Clive.** This for the time concluded Clive's sojourn in India. In February (1760) he sailed for England, though he was still to return once more for a salutary if brief visit.



## CHAPTER VIII

### TRANSITION

(*Maps I. and II.*)

WHEN Clive left Bengal, and the struggle between French and English on Indian soil was virtually over, the Company had not yet acquired Sovereign rights. The rulers of Bengal and of the Carnatic were both in effect the servants of the Company's Servants; the British had suddenly taken undeniable rank as a military Power; but technically their lands were held by them as *zemindars*, i.e. landholders paying rent to the crown; and their dominion was the ascendancy of advisers who can compel obedience. Both Bengal and the Carnatic remained in form Native States. The exercise of the avowed dominion begins with the Governor-Generalship of Warren Hastings; the interval is a transition period, to a large extent chaotic, but with the elements of order emerging.

In the two preceding chapters, we have followed the first steps by which the British Power was established in India between 1745 and 1761. Before proceeding to its further stages, we have to observe the developments which took place among the Native Powers during the same period; culminating, in 1761, in the crushing blow dealt to the Marathas by Ahmed Shah Durani, at Panipat in Hindostan, and the seizure of the throne of Mysore by Haidar Ali, creating a new and aggressive military Power in the South.

Nadir Shah, the Persian, after his sack of Delhi, developed the worst characteristics of Oriental Tyranny. A few years later, he was assassinated; and in the resulting confusion Ahmed Khan, chief of the Abdali tribe of Afghans

A period of transition.

Ahmed Shah Durani.



## 84 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

made himself master of Kabul, and re-established an independent monarchy there. For some superstitious reason, he re-named his tribe *Durāni* instead of Abdali; in consequence of which he became known indifferently as Ahmed Shah Abdali or Durani. He led a series of invasions into the Panjab and Sirhind between 1749 and 1759 with by no means uniform success, but with the result that the Panjab became practically a province of the Kabul Monarchy, instead of the Mogul Empire.

**Progress of the Marathas.** In the meantime the Maratha dominion was increasing. The Berar Raja had obtained the cession of Orissa, and levied chauth from Bengal and Behar. The Peshwa, Balaji Rao, secured recognition as the head of the whole confederacy, with Sivaji's descendant at Satara for a figure head. His armies pushed up to the banks of the Jamna; his brother Ragonath Rao, commonly known as Ragoba, marched into the Panjab, and for a time expelled the Durani Governor. In the South, while Bussy remained with the Nizam, neither the Peshwa nor the Bhonsla could operate effectively against that monarch; but the withdrawal of the Frenchman at Lally's call increased Maratha activities, and produced the cession to them of further territories; though when they invaded the Mysore district, they found their match in Haidar Naik—afterwards known as Haidar Ali—the Mussulman adventurer who had become chief of the Mysore army. Nevertheless, the Marathas' domain was now so vast, the dread they inspired so great, that they had begun to count upon establishing a Hindu Empire on the ruins of the Mogul dominion. Fortunately, their challenge was taken up by the Durani: the Mohammedan and Hindu Powers met in the tremendous shock of Panipat. The Marathas were shattered: the campaign cost them 200,000 men: and though they remained collectively the greatest Power in the Peninsula, the danger of their overwhelming predominance was indefinitely postponed, and rivalry among the great chiefs for supremacy within the confederacy was renewed. The Peshwa, Balaji Rao, died shortly, and was succeeded by his energetic and capable son, Madhu Rao; whose supremacy however, was less assured than his father's had been.

**Battle of Panipat.**



On the other hand, the victorious Durani made no attempt to organise a State in the North-West, but retired across the mountains, carrying away loot, and leaving behind Governors to exact tribute. It may here be remarked that a colony of tribesmen from the Afghan borders had a few years before established themselves under the name of Rohillas in the district west of Oudh known as Rohilkhand as masters of the Hindu population. The services rendered by them to Ahmed Shah at Panipat confirmed their position in Rohilkhand, while establishing a hostile tradition between them and the Marathas. The Mogul himself—now that same Shah Alam whom Clive had dealt with as Shahzada—while his authority continued to be recognised as Padishah and titular head of the whole Empire, was practically without territories of his own, or means of enforcing his decrees. Results of Panipat.

About the same time Haidar Naik compelled the Raja of Mysore—a Hindu State which had never hitherto played more than a very minor part—to abdicate in his favour; and assumed under the name of Haidar Ali a Sultanate which his genius rapidly transformed into a great military Power. Rise of Haidar Ali.

In 1765 Clive, returning to Bengal, obtained from the Mogul, then residing at Allahabad, two decrees: one of them constituting the Nawab of the Carnatic independent of the Nizam, to whom he had hitherto been technically subordinate; the other bestowing on the English as from the Imperial authority the Sarkars which had been held since 1759 as from the Nizam.

Thus in the south there existed four military Powers; the British of the Madras Presidency with the Carnatic virtually under their control: the Puna branch of the Maratha confederacy: the Nizam: and Haidar Ali. The conduct of affairs by the Madras authorities was consistently incompetent. The Nizam, the Peshwa, and Haidar were in a perpetual condition of forming and dissolving various combinations against each other; the British making treaties with one or the other, of which the intention was to avoid military operations and the practical outcome was to drag them into war in support of one or other ally. Nor had The Madras Government.



## 86 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

they the firmness to make an independent stand, but habitually found themselves making concessions which were repaid by desertion as soon as the tug of war commenced; even agreeing to pay the Nizam a heavy rent for the Sarkars in spite of the Mogul's decree. Although the military skill of the British commander, Colonel Smith, enabled him to win victories in the field, he was so hampered by the civil authorities that those victories could never be turned to account; and in 1769 mismanagement had reached such a point that Haidar dictated the terms of an accommodation under the walls of Madras, at a time when Smith, if he had been allowed to act, was in a position to inflict certain defeat upon him.

By this treaty the British bound themselves to assist Haidar in case he should be attacked by the Marathas or the Nizam; but when in the following year the Marathas did attack him, they refused assistance on the ground that the provocation had been Haidar's. The Mysore Sultan had much the worse of the encounter, and he never forgave the British for what he regarded as a treacherous desertion.

**Renewed  
advance  
of the  
Marathas.** The Marathas, who had somewhat recovered from the blow at Panipat, again began to assert their dominion in upper Hindostan about 1769, and two years later restored Shah Alam to the throne at Delhi. They then proceeded to attack Rohilkhand, retiring presently on the promise of a payment by the Rohillas of forty lacs of rupees (£400,000), guaranteed by the Nawab of Oudh, who felt himself very seriously menaced by the proximity of the Marathas. Out of this transaction a little later arose the Rohilla war of which we shall hear in the time of Warren Hastings.

Outside of Bengal then the positive changes during this transition period are the development of a new military power in Mysore, the extension of Maratha ascendancy, and the decline of the Nizam; negatively, the check to the Marathas inflicted by Ahmed Shah, and the diplomatic failures of the Madras Government, who lost with the native princes much of the prestige which had been gained by the overthrow of the French.

We can now follow the course of events in Bengal, and



the influences connected therewith in London, which led up to the first experiment in British Government carried out under Lord North's Regulating Acts.

Clive's departure for England in February 1760 was the signal for the commencement of a period of grave misrule in Bengal.

In spite of his absence, the military prestige of the British was well maintained during the first months by Colonels Calliaud and Knox; Shah Alam having again invaded the country and laid siege to Patna, and being thoroughly routed by them.

The position at Calcutta was one offering immense temptations to the Council in charge. Clive was gone: three or four more of the most capable officers were withdrawn on account of differences with the Directors; Vansittart, the Governor, though well meaning, had neither the nerve nor the weight for anything in the nature of a crisis. Uncontrolled, the Company's servants scandalously abused their position. They were preposterously underpaid: private trading had always been looked to, to supplement their incomes, and they neglected the Company's interests for their own. The Company had trade privileges and exemptions from duties: the Company's servants claimed those privileges and exemptions for themselves, and their native agents. The agents behaved as if the Company's troops were at their beck and call, exercising every form of oppression in the certainty of immunity from punishment. The extortion of presents from wealthy natives was carried to an outrageous extent. The Council, so far from interfering, were the worst offenders; Vansittart found only one man, Warren Hastings, who was disposed to support him in resisting the majority. Mir Jafar, his treasury depleted by the loss of revenue as well as by the extravagant expenditure, was unable to pay the Council's claims, and was compelled to abdicate in favour of his son-in-law Mir Cassim.

Mir Cassim, once in power, resolved to free himself from the intolerable yoke laid on him by the British: but he worked warily. He privately drilled an army on the sepoy model. Finding that he could not enforce the trading duties

British  
mis-  
govern-  
ment in  
Bengal.

Revolt of  
Mir  
Cassim



## 88 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

against the British he removed them altogether, so that the British were no longer at an advantage. By the abolition of wasteful sources of expenditure, he found sufficient means to discharge his actual obligations. By 1763 he had immensely improved his position, and was then allowed by Vansittart, despite the protests of Colonels Coote and Carnac, to fall upon the native Governor of Patna and others, and fill his own coffers at the expense of theirs. Matters came to a head when Ellis, in charge of the factory at Patna, seized the town, and was in turn seized and imprisoned with his companions. The Council declared war on Mir Cassim, proclaimed Mir Jafar once more Nawab, and advanced against the reigning ruler, who was defeated after a hard battle. Mir Cassim in consequence massacred his prisoners at Patna, and when that place was captured escaped over the border to Shuja Daulah, the Nawab of Oudh.

**Munro's  
victory at  
Buxar.**

Some months later Shuja Daulah resolved to invade Bengal. A mutiny among the sepoys was sternly crushed by Major Munro, who had the ringleaders blown from guns: and later in the year marched against Shuja Daulah on whom he inflicted a complete and crushing defeat at Buxar, or Baksar (Oct. 1764), which he followed up by marching on Allahabad; thereby impressing on the Nawab the folly of making war against the British, and bringing Oudh into the sphere of British ascendancy.

**Return of  
Clive to  
India.**

In January Mir Jafar died, and his son was proclaimed Nawab: then, happily for the good name of the British, Clive himself reappeared in May as Governor, with absolute freedom of action, only nominally fettered by a Council of four members chosen by himself.

**The  
Augean  
stable.**

It was evident that the servants of the Company must either have adequate provision made for them by the Company, or must be expected, whether with or without permission, to make provision for themselves from other sources. A strong Governor might keep them within bounds; but there would be no permanent improvement until the temptations to misconduct were removed. Clive acted with his accustomed energy. Orders were issued forbidding the Company's servants to receive presents or to carry on private trade.



The native agents were forbidden to trade under colour of the Company's authority. By way of compensation, the profits of the trade in salt of which the Company had the monopoly were to be added to the salaries of the officers. Every civilian in Bengal was furious; but it was no use to be furious with Clive.

The military body in turn had its collision with the Governor: with the usual result. Extra pay, known as "double batta," had been awarded to the officers as a temporary grant after Plassey; they had grown to regard it as a right. In January (1766) double batta ceased by Clive's order. The officers agreed among themselves to resign in a body on June 1st, demanding the restitution of double batta. They were astonished to find that Clive was quite prepared to accept all their resignations, re-officer his army, and inflict condign punishment not only on them but also on any of the Company's civilian servants who countenanced them. Ringleaders were placed under arrest and shipped off to England. Of the rest, those who were prompt to own their folly, were for the most part reinstated. Clive had dealt with the crisis in such a manner as to win a victory not less complete, and not less honourable, than that of Plassey.

Suppression of the military opposition.

It is to be observed that Clive had arrived intending to abolish the salt monopoly altogether; he retained it, that the profits might be used in the manner explained. This arrangement was cancelled by the directors; who made an increase in the salaries, but not a sufficient one. As a consequence neither private trading nor the receipt of presents disappeared, but continued to be abuses for several years, though not on the same scale as before.

The army in Bengal was also re-organised on the basis of an establishment of 3000 Europeans, with Sepoys in due proportion formed in three brigades.

Clive's first reform was in the direction of controlling the Company's servants. The second was the reconstruction of relations between the Company and the Bengal Government. Hitherto, the Council had imposed their will upon the Native Government, but had entirely refused responsibility.

Clive and the Diwani.



## 90 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

Clive now accepted from the Padishah the *Diwani*, i.e. the control of the revenues of the Province. The Company themselves were to be responsible for collecting and administering the revenues, subject to specific payments to the Padishah and the Nawab, the army being removed from the control of the latter. They thus became not only virtual but responsible rulers of the country, at the same time acquiring a source of ample and legitimate revenue.

Clive's  
attitude to  
the Mogul.

In the next place, Clive had to lay down the lines of foreign policy. The first article therein was the recognition of the Padishah's formal authority: the power of appealing to the Imperial decrees, and so providing the Company with a legitimate backing. On this ground, the proceedings of August 12, 1765, are of special importance. On that day Clive met Shah Alam, and received from him not only the Diwani of Bengal, but also the cession of the Sarkars, besides obtaining the separation of the Carnatic from the Nizam's dominions. The titles of the Viceroys being held also from the Mogul, repudiation of the title conceded by him to the Company would be formally an act of rebellion on their part.

Clive  
and the  
Country  
Powers.

Next, Clive recognised in the Marathas the most formidable Power in India; while he was of opinion that the territories now in the hands of the British were as much as they could properly manage. Further conquests were not to be thought of. Consequently the Berar Raja, whose territories lay between Bengal and the southern British districts, was to be conciliated; the payment of chauth was to be conceded in return for zemindari rights in Orissa. The Peshwa was to be balanced in the Dekhan by support of the Nizam, and Maratha aggression on the N.W. was to be held in check by the establishment of Oudh as a buffer State. By all Oriental precedent, the British after the battle of Buxar had not only the power, but also the right, to take possession of that province. Instead, Clive reinstated the Nawab, only the districts of Allahabad and Kora being ceded and then transferred by him to Shah Alam.

Clive's  
achievement.

Clive had returned to Bengal in May 1765; he left it finally in January 1767. In those two years he had not



provided the country with a permanent Constitution ; yet it would be hard to overrate the value of his services during that time. He terminated the anarchy and oppression which he found, and would have done so still more effectively if his measures had not been in part overridden by the directors. He put the Company's servants in a position to learn how the country ought to be governed ; he curtailed expenditure ; he laid down the rules for the definite foreign policy which he initiated, the soundness of which is beyond question ; and he did it all in the teeth of the most rancorous opposition and insubordination, absolutely for the public good, with no sort of advantage to himself, and at the cost of raising up a host of bitter enemies whose malignity pursued him to the end of his life. Not his own countrymen only, but the natives of India, and most among them those of Bengal, owe an incalculable debt to Clive, the "daring in war," daring in peace, "fearfully courageous."

The first time Clive returned to England with the laurels won at Arcot, Pitt had not yet won the lead in English politics, though the country was already looking to him as its greatest statesman. During Clive's second sojourn in India, Pitt and Newcastle had made terms with each other, and Pitt had already in 1760 raised Britain from the depths of humiliation to the heights of triumph. Quiberon had been won and Quebec had fallen, before Clive set sail from Calcutta. But he had hardly reached England when the old king died, George III. ascended the throne, and his favourite Bute became a political power. In 1761 Pitt resigned and Bute ruled supreme. Bute made the Peace of Paris, and then the Bedford ministry followed, with George Grenville, Wilkes prosecutions, and the American Stamp Act. While Clive was setting Bengal in order, the Rockingham ministry came in, did what it could to palliate the harm done by its predecessor, and went out again. Clive was still in Bengal when Pitt again consented to take office, was made Earl of Chatham, and then became totally incapacitated by ill-health. When Clive re-appeared in England in 1767, Chatham was still nominal head of a



## 92 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

ministry which was carrying out none of his plans, habitually ran counter to his principles, and was doing everything in its power to undo all that the great administration of 1757-1761 had accomplished. Before 1770 when Lord North began his long and disastrous rule, Great Britain was already being ignored by Europe and defied by her American Colonies.

Attitude of Parliament towards Indian affairs. It is hardly too much to say that during the whole of this period there were in England only two statesmen with enough imagination to realise either the possibilities or the responsibilities of our newly born Empire in India. Those two were Pitt and Edmund Burke: and to neither of them was it given to control the policy of Britain. Had either been able to do so, the course of events would undoubtedly have been very different. Clive at one time certainly contemplated the transfer of authority from the Company to the Crown—an idea carried out a hundred years later: but at that time he was reckoning on Pitt being the man to carry the scheme through. Pitt himself was in favour of it, and might have done it, but for his break-down. Without Pitt, no one knew better than Clive that it was not possible. To other politicians, India represented in the main two ideas—a country where private fortunes could be made with unequalled rapidity; and a country out of which the Company could suck revenue like a sponge—and sponges may be squeezed. The Company should be taxed to the utmost for its privileges: and the clients of the Great—to whom clients were useful—might at the worst have prosperous occupations found for their sons. In addition to which, the Great themselves, as well as their clients, could arrive at satisfactory understandings with the “Nabobs”—as the gentlemen were called who about this time began returning from the East with defective livers, and swollen money bags.

Directors and Proprietors. The ultimate control of the Indian Presidencies, the appointment of the officers, and the dictation of policy, lay with the Company's Courts of Directors and Proprietors in London. The Government at Westminster collectively could bring pressure to bear on the Company collectively



by with-holding or granting military assistance, by threats of challenging the Company's right to hold territorial acquisitions, by implying that Charters require periodical renewal and may demand modification even between renewals. Individually, politicians might acquire influence by accumulating shares and extending their representation as Proprietors and on the Directorate. It is obvious that such a state of affairs gave almost unlimited play to personal preferences, jealousies and animosities, besides intensifying the normal desire of any Commercial body as such to show the biggest possible revenue from year to year.

Thus, when a crisis arose in Bengal so serious that Clive's return as virtual dictator was clearly the only chance of averting a huge disaster, Clive's party carried the day triumphantly in Leadenhall Street: but when such a crisis was not on hand, Clive's enemies cancelled a great deal of what he had accomplished—very much as parliamentary faction treated Chatham. At last, however, the chaotic results of the existing method of carrying on the government of the Provinces, made a change absolutely imperative; and the first experiment in Imperial constitution-making was embodied in North's "Regulating Act" of 1773. Parliament intervenes.

By this Act the authority of the Courts of Proprietors and Directors was retained; but the Government of India was effectively vested in two bodies—a Council, appointed in the first instance by Government, and a Commission of Judges. The Council consisted of five members: the Governor of Bengal became Governor General and President of the Council, the Governor and Council of Bombay and of Madras being subordinated; but the supreme authority was not the Governor General himself, but the majority of the Council for the time being, the majority vote being conclusive. Where the vote was even the Governor General had a casting vote; otherwise, against an adverse majority he was powerless. Warren Hastings, already Governor of Bengal, was made the first Governor General; with one experienced Indian official, Barwell, on the Council. The other three were Philip Francis—almost universally identified with Junius of the Letters—Monson and General Clavering, who were North's Regulating Act.

## 94 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

apparently selected on the ground that they had already prejudged and condemned the opinions and actions of their President for the future as well as for the past.

**1774-1784.** The new *régime* began with the arrival of the Members of Council at Calcutta in 1774. It was terminated by the India Act of 1784. Outside of India these years were among the most disastrous of the British annals. The war with the American Colonies broke out in 1775. At the end of 1777 it turned definitely against the Mother Country, with the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. Early in 1778 France took up arms in support of the Colonies. In 1779 she was joined by Spain. By land the British were out-generalled; by sea they were out-numbered. For three years Gibraltar was besieged; it was not till the naval power of the allies was broken by Rodney's victory of the Saints that the country could begin to breathe freely; and before that Britain and the thirteen American colonies had already been irrevocably parted.



## CHAPTER IX

### WARREN HASTINGS AND THE COUNTRY POWERS

(*Maps I., III., IV., VIII.*)

**L**ORD NORTH'S Regulating Act did not take effect until 1774. Between 1770 and that date events of some consequence had occurred in India. First in time was the great famine in Bengal of 1770, which emphasised the necessity for a strong administration of the Diwani; since it appeared that the English, instead of devoting their efforts to the alleviation of the catastrophe, preferred to use it as a means to their private enrichment by buying up grain and then selling it at a merciless profit. The famine of 1770.

About the same time Shah Alam put himself in the hands of the Marathas by accepting their offer to replace him on the throne of Delhi, contrary to the advice of the Calcutta Council. The Marathas under Sindhia and Holkar took advantage of the position to make themselves masters of the Jamna districts, enter Rohilkhand and threaten Oudh, retiring on the promise of a heavy cash payment. Shah Alam had proposed to reward them by the cession of Allahabad, granted to him by Clive in 1765; but, as this was by no means in accord with the objects for which the grant had been made the British reoccupied the district. Further advance of the Marathas

In 1772 died the Peshwa Madhu Rao, who had given promise of a great career. His younger brother and successor in the office was assassinated nine months later; according to general belief, by the order of his uncle Ragonath Rao, otherwise called Ragoba. Ragoba became Peshwa: but his predecessor's widow bore a son who was immediately proclaimed Peshwa, and a Council of Regency The Peshwa succession.



## 96 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

was formed at Puna of which the leading spirit was the Nana Farnavis.

Warren Hastings  
Governor of Bengal. In 1772, also, the Governorship of Bengal was bestowed upon Warren Hastings, whose abilities had attracted Clive's attention in 1757. He had then been made Resident at Mir Jafar's court; had been honourably distinguished among the Calcutta Council in the evil years for his rectitude and his support of Vansittart; and had subsequently, after an interval in England, held an appointment at Madras.

Shuja Daulah and the Rohillas. For some time past, Shuja Daulah, the Oudh Nawab, had been hankering after Rohilkhand which lay on his North West frontier. The Marathas had just retired from an incursion thither, and he feared or pretended to fear that the Rohillas would join hands with that aggressive Power and seriously endanger his position. The normal population of the country consisted of quite unwarlike Hindus; the Rohillas, few in number but fine soldiers, had not been in possession for so much as forty years. According to Oriental international ethics, he was quite entitled to turn them out by force of arms if he could: but he wanted the help of the British. A bargain was in process of completion, by which the Allahabad district was to be transferred to the Nawab by the British, and garrisoned by the latter at the cost of the former. Thus a convenient opportunity presented itself for appealing to the British for assistance. To obtain that, he was aware that some plausible excuse beyond mere aggression was needed; and he accordingly supported his application to Calcutta with a moral argument and a material one. The moral one had just enough relation to the truth to pass muster—he averred that the Rohillas had been delivered from the Marathas by the presence of his own army, and the British troops in Oudh, backed by the payment by him of forty lacs of rupees (about £400,000) which they had undertaken to repay; that they had repaid nothing and were intriguing with the Marathas. The material argument was, that the Company would be remunerated in hard cash.

The evidence is obscure; but the fact appears to be that the Nawab had guaranteed the forty lacs, had not paid it



to the Marathas but had received a first instalment from the Rohillas who were not unwilling to compound. Hastings however was easily satisfied. The security of Bengal depended a good deal on the security of Oudh, which would be very much increased if Rohilkhand and the line of the Ganges were held by the Nawab instead of by a fighting community which might turn its arms against him and help the Marathas to an entry. If the Nawab had a tolerable excuse, the British would have reasonable ground for helping him. The excuse put forward was tolerable. Then the material reasons came in. The Directors in England were bombarding Calcutta with demands for retrenchment and money. Here was an opportunity. The army, which could not be disbanded, would find employment at Shuja Daulah's expense, and there would also of course be a substantial cash payment.

The bargain was concluded. Forty lacs were paid to the Company, who were to receive a subsidy for maintaining troops in the Allahabad district. They were to send a contingent to help the Nawab in coercing the Rohillas. The precaution, the need of which has since been fully recognised, of securing control to the British commander, was omitted; and the coercion was carried out with gross and superfluous violence. The Rohillas were crushed, and Rohilkhand became a part of Oudh. On the ground of expediency, there was much to be said in favour of the transaction; and its moral enormity has been absurdly exaggerated. The inducement to Hastings was particularly strong, and it did not occur to his censors in the Company either to restore Rohilkhand to the Rohillas, or to refuse the price of the offence. Macaulay's rhetoric bears little relation to the facts, except in so far as the reigning Rohilla chief happened to be a good ruler. Nevertheless the affair was discreditable. A better case for attacking the Rohillas should have been required, and a strict adherence demanded to the rules of civilised warfare, as a condition of the employment of British troops.

The Rohilla war was carried through by Warren Hastings in his capacity as Governor of Bengal; and before his appoint-



## 98 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

The Bombay Council and the Peshwa-ship. ment as Governor-General, the Bombay Presidency had been seduced into mixing itself up with the Maratha affairs—the three Presidencies being at the time independent.

Madhu Rao Peshwa died in Nov. 1772: his brother Naraian Rao was assassinated in August 1773, when Ragoba became Peshwa. In January 1774, Nana Farnavis and his party set up a Council of Regency on behalf of the expected posthumous son of Naraian Rao; the babe was born in April and promptly proclaimed Peshwa. Ragoba however obtained the support of Sindhia and Holkar, the Malwa chiefs, negotiated with the Bhonsla and the Gaikwar, and finally laid proposals for assistance before the Governor of Bombay. Bombay wanted to acquire the neighbouring ports of Salsette and Bassein, but this was at first too much for Ragoba to agree to. In the meantime, however, the Puna regency had bought over Sindhia and Holkar, while the Bhonsla and the Gaikwar were in no haste to commit themselves to either party. Ragoba narrowly escaped capture, fled to Bombay, and in March (1775) concluded the Treaty of Surat, ceding Salsette and Bassein, assigning some additional territory, and promising an annual cash payment; for which the British were to furnish three thousand troops to aid him. In signing the treaty, Hornby the Governor of Bombay exceeded his authority; as by this time the Presidencies were subordinate to the Governor-General and his Council. A couple of

Battle of Arras. months later there was a sharp engagement at Arras in Gujerat between Colonel Keating and a Maratha force; in which the British, though severely handled, drove the enemy in rout across the Nerbadda—whereby the Nizam was encouraged to give his support to what looked like the winning side.

A Maratha war was the last thing wanted at Calcutta; but Hastings was aware that Bombay had practically committed him, and that as it was too late to draw back the only safe course was to fight for conclusive victory. Unfortunately, the Council established by Lord North's Act could overrule the Governor-General. There were four members besides Hastings, and three of them acted consistently against him. The Triumvirate—Francis, Clavering and



Monson—quashed the treaty of Surat, and despatched an agent, Colonel Upton, to Puna, to negotiate with the Regency. The result was the new treaty of Purandar (Poorunder), March 1776, which cancelled the pledges given to Ragoba and retained for the British only Salsette and a contribution towards expenses. Treaty of Purandar.

Hastings was at daggers drawn with the Triumvirate: Bombay was furious with them: and in August, dispatches arrived from the Directors approving the treaty of Surat; whereby Bombay was encouraged.

Early in the next year a French adventurer, St Lubin, appeared at Puna promising French assistance; by this time Great Britain was in the thick of the struggle with the American colonies, and the prospect of a French intervention therein was really imminent; the P. Regency received St Lubin with open arms; and in the meantime Bombay was giving an asylum to Ragoba, contrary to the terms of the Purandar Treaty. Then came more dispatches from the Directors, ratifying the Purandar Treaty under protest, as being now impossible to repudiate except on the ground of infractions by the Puna Government. Meantime, the Maratha chiefs were quarrelling, and Holkar changed sides; while at Calcutta, Hastings at last got the upper hand with his Council owing to the successive deaths of Monson and Clavering. In March (1778), he wrote to Bombay practically authorising war, and prepared to send an expedition across India. In November, a new treaty was made with Ragoba on the lines of the Surat treaty: and then came a disaster. Complications at Puna and Calcutta.

Bombay wished to have to itself the credit of victory. So an expedition started from it in December, without waiting for the Bengal contingent. But the leadership was in hopelessly incompetent hands; having got within twenty miles of Puna, the chiefs were seized with a panic; it was only the brilliant behaviour of the rear-guard under Lieutenant Hartley that saved the force from being cut up; and on Jan. 12 the disgraceful Convention of Wargam, made with Sindhia, threw over Ragoba and gave up everything that Bombay had hitherto obtained. The disaster of Wargam.



## 100 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

France had declared war against Great Britain on behalf of the American colonies in the summer of 1778; affairs were going exceedingly ill in the western hemisphere; and the prospect of French intervention in India had become extremely serious. Hastings was taking energetic measures for strengthening the forces, and an expedition under Goddard's march. was on its way to Bombay, which had got as far as Burhampur (about 100 miles north of Aurangabad) with some assistance from the Raja of Bhopal, and also from the Bhonsla, when the news of Wargam arrived. Goddard at once made a swift march for Surat; covering some 300 miles in 20 days, and by his timely arrival preventing any further disaster. Shortly afterwards Sindhia, who was now aiming at being the arbiter among the Marathas and posing to the British as their friend, allowed Ragoba, who had surrendered to him, to escape to Surat. Nana Farnavis required that Ragoba and Salsette, should be handed over as a preliminary to further negotiations. Goddard replied by making overtures to the Gaikwar, enforced by a military demonstration; captured Ahmedabad in February (1780); and dispersed the troops brought against him by Sindhia and Holkar.

A diversion in Malwa. A little later in the same year, a detachment was sent from Bengal under Captain Popham to create a diversion in the Northern part of Sindhia's country, at the timely request of the Rana of Gohud; a little principality some sixty miles from Agra on which the Marathas were encroaching.

But the sudden and tremendous invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar Ali in July gave the war a new aspect, and we must now turn to the events in Southern India which led up to that great irruption.

The Nizam, Haidar Ali, and Madras. Throughout the sixties, as we have seen, the government of the Madras Presidency had been distinguished for its general incapacity; and the close of that decade found both Haidar Ali and the Nizam very ill disposed towards the British Power. Matters were by no means improved during the decade ensuing. The Nawab of the Carnatic or of Arcot—to adopt the more familiar title—a singularly worthless monarch, was very much in debt to the Company, and also to sundry servants of the Company who held security in



the way of mortgages on lands and revenues. It seemed good to him that his coffers should be filled by appropriating Tanjur: the Madras Government found it reasonable to support this idea, on the theory that Tanjur might, if treated with sufficiently consistent injustice, become hostile to the British. So at the end of 1773 Tanjur was compulsorily transferred to the Nawab. The proceeding was so shameless that the Directors in London dismissed the Governor of Madras, and sent out Pigot, who had previously done good service in the same position, to replace him. Pigot set about rectifying the prevailing abuses; but in the attempt to override the corrupt coterie at the head of affairs, he exceeded his constitutional powers, and was deposed and imprisoned by the stronger party. He died before the next orders arrived from London, and was presently succeeded in office by Rumbold, who appears to have regarded his position primarily as a cover for the illegitimate acquisition of wealth. Within two years, Hastings as Governor-General had practically suspended him, but not before mortal offence had been given to the Nizam, by cool proposals to ignore inconvenient points in the existing treaties with him. This took place at the beginning of 1779 when the convention of Wargam had just reduced British prestige to the lowest point. Consequently the Nizam devised and set about actualising the project of a great confederacy of all the southern Native Powers against the British.

In the meantime, Haidar Ali had been taking every advantage of the Maratha complications. The Marathas were too much occupied with internal rivalries turning on the contest between Ragoba and the Regency, and with the hostilities and negotiations with Bombay and Calcutta, to concentrate against him. So from 1773 to 1779 he steadily enlarged his dominions; not only absorbing minor principalities southwards, but pushing steadily north to the river Krishna. Angry as he was with the British, he was far too astute a statesman to allow his feelings to control his policy, and made repeated overtures to them, which, however, were received with extreme coolness. Then came the prospect of renewed hostilities between France and England, and Haidar

Increasing  
power of  
Haidar  
Ali.



## 102 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

opened communications with the Mauritius. In 1778, war was actually declared. Hastings issued prompt orders for the seizure of all French stations. Pondichery was captured; so was Mahé on the west coast. But Mahé was, in Haidar's view, under his protection; that protection was ignored by the British, and Haidar felt that the cup was full. A few months later the Nizam made his proposals for the great joint attack. The Bhonsla was to deal with Bengal: the western Marathas were to deal with Bombay: Mysore and Haidarabad were to invade Madras. Haidar was prepared to compose his differences. He had for long been building up such an army as no Indian monarch had ever brought into the field before; suddenly in July 1780 the great invasion burst like a tornado upon the Carnatic.

Thus, in this summer of 1780 it was not only in India but in every quarter of the globe that Britain was battling for bare life. Since 1775 she had been fighting her American colonies, in whose favour the tide of war had definitely turned with Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in the end of 1777. In the following spring France had declared war, and appeared capable of keeping the British fleets very thoroughly occupied. By June 1779, Spain had added herself and her fleet to the anti-British combination. It seemed that there was more likelihood of French than of British armaments and reinforcements finding their way to India. And in India itself, the only compensation for the bad business of Wargam had so far been the successes of Goddard in Gujerat and on the Nerbadda; while it appeared that owing to the Nizam's successful combinations, every native army in India was to be hurled simultaneously upon the British.

Madras, with the fatuity which marked its rulers, had made no preparation for the storm. The General in command was Hector Munro, the hero of Buxar—but the energy and ability he had then shown were now no longer forthcoming. For six weeks Haidar and his hordes swept the Carnatic with fire and sword, ravaging and pillaging almost to the gates of Madras, without let or hindrance save for the splendid defence of an occasional outpost, such as that of Wandewash by Lieutenant Flint. At the beginning of September an



attempt was made to unite the main Madras column under Munro with a column from the Northern districts under Baillie; but the incapacity of the commanders allowed Haidar to drive a wedge between them, cut up Baillie's army, and drive Munro back on Madras in precipitate retreat.

In other fields, fortunately, affairs were taking a different course. During the summer Popham in northern Malwa had been operating with success against the Marathas in that region; on August 3rd he, with his subordinate Bruce, startled the Indian world and retrieved completely the fame of the British arms by the brilliant feat of capturing by a surprise the all but impregnable fort of Gwalior. The effect on our prestige was immediate and striking; and the influence on the Confederacy of the change was invaluable. The Bhonsla had never been more than half-hearted and the Nizam was already half repentant. Beyond this, the capture had a most important strategical result, inasmuch as it at once withdrew Sindhia from the south to take care of his own dominions. Goddard's earlier operations had successfully separated the Gaikwar from the Confederacy, so that now the Bombay forces had only the Regency and Holkar to deal with.

The capture of Gwalior.

Results.

This was particularly fortunate, as the affairs of Madras demanded every rupee and every man that Bengal could provide, and Bombay was left entirely to its own resources. The Governor, Hornby, displayed a seasonable energy. Before the end of the year the Konkans were cleared of the enemy by Hartley (who had almost saved the situation at Wargam) and Goddard. In the spring the British met with a reverse in attempting to attack Puna, the credit of which fell to Holkar; but this was counterbalanced by another success in the north. Popham had been inexplicably superseded. In April his successor appeared to be practically at Sindhia's mercy, when by the daring counsels of Bruce a sudden attack entirely reversed the position, and Sindhia's army was completely routed.

Sindhia, whose hostility to the British had never been of an uncompromising character, found Holkar's reputation



greatly raised at the very moment when his own had suffered seriously, and began to look to diplomacy as the means to recover his lost ground. The Bhonsla some time before had come to a private understanding with the British, and was helping rather than hindering Hastings in sending a force overland from Bengal to the Carnatic. In short, after April 1781 actual hostilities with the Marathas practically came to an end.

Eyre Coote in Madras. In the Carnatic, however, the war with Haidar Ali continued to rage. On the news of the irruption and of Baillie's disaster, Hastings acted boldly and vigorously. Sir Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandewash, now a member of Council and in supreme military command, sailed from Calcutta for Madras, which he reached in November 1780, and the old Sultan of Mysore knew that he had a great soldier matched against him. Coote was scandalously hampered by the incompetence of the Madras authorities and the want of supplies; nor was it till June that he was able to take the offensive. In three months from July 1st, Coote was victorious in three engagements—at Porto Novo, at Pollilur (the scene of Baillie's disaster), and at Solingarh, near Vellur. In June a new Governor, Lord Macartney, arrived at Madras with news that Holland had declared war on England; and Macartney, conscious of the uses to which the Dutch ports might be put under the circumstances, succeeded in raising an additional force, which captured Negapatam in November, and Trincomali in Ceylon in January.

Improved position in the South. Thus in the fifteen months since Baillie's disaster the position of the British had greatly improved. The Bhonsla had definitely withdrawn from the Confederacy. Sindhia was conducting negotiations on the basis of the Purandar treaty; the Dutch declaration of war had been converted to the advantage of the British; and Haidar Ali, though not expelled from the Carnatic, had more than found his match whenever it had been possible to force an engagement. The cutting up of a detachment under Colonel Brathwaite was counterbalanced by a disaster to Haidar's forces on the Malabar coast, followed by the revolt of the principalities



which he had seized in that region. But it still remained extremely doubtful whether Haidar could be fairly beaten off. Britain's enemies were still facing her on equal terms by sea; and a French fleet, and French troops under Bussy, were a very imminent danger. Already a squadron under D'Orvès had appeared, which, with a more capable commander, might have completely paralysed Coote. Fortunately it had retired, and the British squadron under Hughes was now a fairly strong one.

Hardly, however, had Trincomali been taken when a new French squadron arrived, under Suffren, perhaps the best naval commander France ever produced. Four times in the course of the year the two squadrons met and fought stubbornly. In none of the four fights could it be said that either side had inflicted defeat on the other. But Suffren was enabled to throw reinforcements into the Carnatic and to recapture Trincomali, while the operations by land produced little advantage to either side. At the end of the year Coote's health broke down completely; but to counter-balance that, Haidar Ali died at the advanced age of eighty, leaving his son Tippu Sahib to succeed him. This turned the scale as concerned the Marathas. The Puna Government, which had hitherto held back from finally committing itself to peace, signed the proposed treaty forthwith. The arrival of Bussy at Gudalur or Cuddalore early in the year, its investment by a strong British force under an incompetent commander, the return of Suffren on one side and Hughes on the other, pointed to a crisis in which the odds were in favour of the triumph of Bussy and Tippu, when the main hostilities were suddenly terminated by news of the peace between France and Great Britain.

Suffren  
and  
Hughes.

Death of  
Haidar  
Ali.

With-  
drawal  
of the  
French.

Tippu was now the sole open antagonist left. He was on the Malabar coast, and Colonel Fullarton was sent to operate in Mysore, which he did with great success until the Madras Government, in the exercise of its recently habitual functions as the evil genius of the British Power, chose to negotiate with Tippu, and to order Fullarton to cease hostilities and abandon his conquests. The cabal against Hastings in England had by this time gained the day, and the great



## 106 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

Governor-General was unable to compel the obedience of the Madras Government. Tippu succeeded in making it appear that the British had sued to him for peace. The Madras Government succeeded in making it appear that they would submit to any ignominy for the sake of coming to terms.

Treaty  
with  
Tippu. Peace was finally concluded with Mysore on the basis of a general restitution of conquests. The struggle with the Marathas had concluded with the resignation of Ragoba's claims, and the restoration of territories as they were before the Purandar treaty.

The  
foreign  
policy of  
Warren  
Hastings. The only addition to British territory in India made in the time of Warren Hastings was that of the zemindari of Benares, ceded by Oudh. But it was the genius of Hastings which mainly saved India at all in a period of extraordinary peril. His own policy was one not of extension or aggression, but of consolidation and conciliation. War was forced upon him by the blunders of Bombay and the blunders of Madras. When he had to fight, his plans were laid with equal audacity and skill, for he knew that in India he must fight to win. The disastrous errors of Bombay were redeemed by the brilliant audacity of Goddard's march across the peninsula, and the no less brilliantly conceived and executed movements of Popham and Bruce in the north. The folly of Madras brought the Southern Powers upon us in a mass at the time when half Europe was attacking us in the west; the skill of Hastings broke up the confederacy by detaching the Bhonsla, neutralising the Nizam and flattering Sindhia. Thwarted at every turn, sometimes by the incapacity and quite as often by the insubordination and rancorous opposition of subordinates and colleagues, he nevertheless maintained the position in India against enormous odds, whilst his enemies made him the mark of every species of obloquy and misrepresentation at home. In his conduct throughout the Maratha and Mysore wars, his worst enemies can now hardly find opportunity for detraction. In the next chapter we shall examine that portion of his public career—his administration in Bengal—for which he has been most severely censured.



## CHAPTER X

# WARREN HASTINGS, THE COUNCIL, AND THE GANGES PROVINCES

*(Maps I. and IV.)*

THE acceptance by Clive for the Company of the Bengal Diwani in return for an annual payment to be made to the Padishah, failed of the intended effect after Clive's departure. The Company's servants in Bengal had not themselves the knowledge and experience requisite for organising a revenue department, and the authority was placed primarily in the hands of a Native, Mohammed Rheza Khan, with Native revenue collectors. A little later, British collectors were appointed to supervise the natives; but instead of supervising they practically worked with the Native subordinates, to their mutual private profit, and the loss of the Company. It was with the intention of remedying this state of things that Warren Hastings was made governor of Bengal in 1772, being then forty years of age. For the past two years, he had been rendering excellent service in Madras, after an interval of four years spent in England.

The rule of Hastings falls into four periods. In the first period, he was Governor of Bengal, and supreme in his province. This lasted from April 1772 to October 1774. In that month, the new members of Council and the four Judges reached Calcutta, and the system devised under Lord North's Regulating Act came into force. From that time until Monson's death in Sept. 1776, Hastings was systematically over-ruled by his Council, nor did he definitely recover control until the death of Clavering, a year later. From 1777 to 1782 he held the supremacy, though with a somewhat uncertain tenure; and again from that time to his

Lack of  
organisa-  
tion in  
Bengal.

Four  
periods  
of the rule  
of Warren  
Hastings.



## 108 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

departure from India the attitude of the Directors at home enabled his opponents in India to thwart him at every turn.

Hastings  
and the  
Diwani.

In the matter of the Diwani, Hastings took prompt and effective steps. Under the existing conditions the soil was tilled by the *ryots* or peasants, paying rent to the *zemindars* or landholders, who in turn paid a tax or rent to the Government. Between zemindars and Government collectors, it was certain that the amount which reached the treasury was not what it ought to have been; but the data for a new and sound assessment were insufficient. Hastings adopted the plan of putting up the land to competition—making the highest bidders zemindars—for a period of five years. Control of the department, now made more simple by definiteness, was transferred from Murshidabad to the Company's headquarters at Calcutta. At the same time, courts of justice with European magistrates were established in each district, with a court of appeal at the capital. In connection with these reforms, Mohammed Rheza Khan was removed from office, pending inquiry into various charges of peculation which had been brought against him, by order of the Directors; who were ready enough to attribute the deficiencies of revenue to fraud in a Native. The charges were energetically pushed by the notorious Nuncomar (more correctly Nanda Kumar) a high-caste Brahmin who had acquired much power, and wished to supplant the Mussulman; but the completion of the new arrangements preceded that of the investigation, when Mohammed Rheza Khan was cleared of suspicion. Nuncomar however had in the interval succeeded in obtaining for his own son the post of manager to the Nawab's household, or more accurately the household of the Mani Begum, widow of a former Nawab, to whose care the infant ruler was entrusted.

The new  
Members  
of Council.

In October 1774, the new members of the new Council reached Calcutta. Without delay the Triumvirate—Francis, Clavering and Monson—proceeded to set themselves openly against Hastings and his loyal supporter Barwell. They condemned everything Hastings had done—the transfer of Allahabad to Oudh, the Rohilla war, the presence of British



~~Troops~~ in Oudh, and the new revenue arrangements. They withdrew the Resident placed by Hastings in Lucknow, the Oudh capital, and sent a nominee of their own in his place. They even demanded to see the private correspondence between the previous Resident and Hastings.

In January, Shuja Daulah died, and was succeeded by The Asaf-ud-Daulah. The Begums—Shuja Daulah's mother and Council and the widow—claimed not only an immense proportion of the Oudh late Nawab's accumulated treasures, but also the revenues of Nawab. large estates, under a will which was not produced. There were no documents to support the claim; even if there had been it is more than doubtful whether the depletion of the State treasury involved could have been regarded as legal, while its inexpediency was patent. To support the claim of the Begums was to cripple the Nawab. But it was the aim of the policy of Hastings, as it had been of Clive's, to strengthen the Nawab's Government; his vehement opposition to the Begums was enough for the Triumvirate. They were the majority; they compelled the Nawab to submit; they guaranteed the property to the Begums on behalf of the British; and on the plea that Shuja Daulah's death cancelled obligations entered upon to him personally, they required the cession of the zemindari of Benares and an increase of his subsidy on pain of withdrawal of the British troops. As the Nawab's own troops were in revolt for lack of pay, and the Begums had all the money, Asaf-ud-Daulah was wholly dependent on the British troops for the maintenance of his throne, and had no choice but to submit. The responsibility for these transactions lay entirely with the Triumvirate, Hastings being at every point opposed by them; but technically the Triumvirate's doings were the doings of Government.

The next move was a personal attack upon Hastings. Its The interest is, strictly speaking, more personal than political, but attack on it looms so large in the pages of historians as to demand full Hastings. relation. For it has, in fact, been used to blacken the characters of Hastings and of the Chief Justice Impey, very notably in Macaulay's Essay, whereas the investigations of later judicial enquirers show conclusively that no real reproach attached either to the one or the other.



## 110 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

It had become evident, from the moment of the Triumvirate's arrival, that they were prepared to welcome any sort of evidence which would tend to discredit the Governor-General and to shelter his accusers. Charges against him of having received gratifications—otherwise called bribes—began to appear before the Council. Nuncomar, whose enmity towards him dated back as far as 1764, came forward with a string of charges and documentary evidence of gross corruption, including what purported to be a letter written by the Mani Begum which referred to bribes in connection with the guardianship of the young Nawab. The signature was doubtful; the Begum repudiated the letter; the seal appeared genuine, but a perfect counterpart was subsequently found among Nuncomar's effects. The Triumvirate demanded that Nuncomar should be heard before the Council. Hastings declined entirely to preside at his own trial, refused Nuncomar a hearing, but offered to submit the charges to a Committee. Thrice he broke up the Council, and on his retirement with Barwell the rest carried on the sittings. At last he resolved on a counter-stroke, indicting Nuncomar for conspiracy. The Council ostentatiously took Nuncomar's part.

The upshot was doubtful enough, when a *deus ex machina* appeared. For years a legal feud had been carried on with Nuncomar by a native named Mohan Persad. The establishment of the new High Court with its English Judges and English law presented an unlooked for opportunity to this man's legal adviser. The Brahmin was indicted for forgery—a minor offence in the eyes of the Hindus, but a capital one at that date in the view of English law. Nuncomar was tried before the full court, found guilty, condemned and executed.

There is no shadow of evidence that the trial was conducted otherwise than with absolute fairness. The Judges were unanimous; nor is it disputed that the evidence was conclusive. The propriety of the sentence can only be questioned on the ground that it was in accord not with Hindu but with English law. That fault belonged to the constitution of the Court. That was sufficient reason for



## HASTINGS AND GANGES PROVINCES 111

the Council to obtain a respite in order to refer the matter to England; but when the Triumvirate, the friends of Nuncomar, refused to move, it was hardly to be expected that Hastings should go out of his way to protect his own enemy. Nor is there the faintest evidence that Hastings had pulled the strings which set the trial in motion. The circumstances are fully sufficient to account, without any imputations on the Governor-General, for Mohan Persad's action; the charge was brought by him with a vindictive intent, when he realised how much heavier the blow would be in consequence of the establishment of the Supreme Court. Hastings himself made oath that he had neither suggested nor encouraged it. But it fell so pat—it so completely served the purpose of wrecking the attack on Hastings—that the mere human tendency to disbelieve in convenient coincidences remains as a sediment at the bottom of the otherwise empty cup of evidences against the Governor-General.

With Nuncomar's death, the case against Hastings collapsed completely. This took place in June 1775. In the previous March, when the discussions in the Council were raging, Hastings had written to his agents in England authorising them to lay his resignation before the Directors, if his conduct in regard to the Rohillas and Oudh were censured. In May, he had retracted this authorisation; nevertheless his resignation was subsequently submitted, by his agent in England, to the Directors, and acted upon by them.

For the next twelve months, the struggle between Hastings and the majority of his Council continued; his arrangements establishing district courts of justice were cancelled, and the jurisdiction was restored to the Nawab's officers; Mohammed Rheza Khan being reinstated to that end. The difficulties of the Bombay Government with the Marathas narrated in the previous chapter at this time offered the principal problem, the Surat treaty having taken place while the Nuncomar affair was in progress, and that of Purandar in the March following. Much of the Council's time was also occupied in conflicts with the Supreme Court, to which we

The struggle on the Council.



## 112 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

shall presently revert. Monson's death in 1776 gave Hastings predominance in the Council, and in the following year came the information from London that the resignation of Hastings had been accepted, that a Mr Wheler was appointed to take his place, and that Clavering was to act in the interval. Hastings repudiated the resignation; he and Clavering issued antagonistic orders to the Military, who supported Hastings, and each claimed to act as Governor-General; finally the question was referred to the arbitration of the Judges, who unanimously decided in favour of Hastings. Shortly afterwards, Clavering died; Hastings was confirmed in his office by the Directors and Wheler arrived to take Monson's place, the fifth seat on the Council being filled by Eyre Coote as military member. The re-establishment of Hastings was probably in part due to the disastrous turn of events at this time in America, which made the maintenance of a strong chief in India the more imperative.

**Hastings pre-dominant.** The change inaugurated the third phase of Hastings's Governorship—the second after he became Governor-General. It is necessary to observe that broadly speaking, his rule coincides in time with that of North's ministry in England. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga corresponded with Clavering's death at Calcutta: from that time till Rodney's victory of The Saints in 1782, the war by sea and land went steadily against the British, and Hastings was not only left to his own resources in combating the coalitions of Native Powers, but was expected to find profits for the Company to pay in to the Treasury.

**The Revenue Board.** Two reforms he was enabled by his newly acquired superiority in the Council to carry out. The first was the establishment of a Board for the systematic examination of land tenures, and for the provision of a sound basis of assessment—a matter of the utmost importance, where the Government revenue is in the main derived from land. The second was the reconstruction of military arrangements in

**The Subsidiary Alliance with Oudh.** The Oudh—the first example of the "Subsidiary Alliances" which later developed into an immense instrument of ascendancy. Under treaty, the Oudh Nawab was bound to maintain an army for the defence of the Ganges provinces: assisted by a



brigade of the Company's troops. It was now arranged that the Nawab should have an army drilled, officered, controlled and paid by the British, who in return were to have the revenues of certain districts allotted to them for that purpose. Systematically applied, it is easy to see that such an arrangement would have far-reaching effects, practically turning the Native ally into a protected instead of an independent State, while in effect adding the allotted districts to the Company's territorial possessions.

Now also Hastings was enabled to deal with one of the most serious problems created by North's Regulating Act—the position of the Supreme Court.

From the outset this was a most extraordinary anomaly. The device of a Council ruling by a majority vote was sufficiently strange; but on to this North had tacked a High Court, consisting of four judges to administer the law, without defining the relations between them and the Council. The Court then declared that its members were responsible to the Crown at home, and to no one else, though they were acting in a country where professedly the Nawab was sovereign, subject to a sort of undefined allegiance to the Padishah; while the *de facto* ruler, controlling the military forces, which are the ultimate sanction of every government, was the Council. The Court claimed the right of haling all cases before itself, constituted itself a general authority for hearing and deciding on all complaints, and refused to recognise any superior authority. The Company's servants up-country, and the zemindars, found themselves liable to be dragged down to Calcutta every time that it suited an honest or dishonest person to make a charge frivolous, fraudulent or genuine. Such a state of affairs was manifestly intolerable. Hastings at an early stage endeavoured to urge upon Lord North the need of terminating it by the definite assertion of the sovereignty of the British Crown in the Company's territories; but North was not the man to carry out such a scheme. At last matters reached such a pitch that Hastings, despite his personal friendship with Impey, was forced to join with Francis in asserting the authority of the Council; the process of the Court was disregarded by

The  
Supreme  
Court.

Contest  
between  
the Court  
and the  
Council.



## 114 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

order of the Council, backed by the troops; the Court issued writs, summonses, and fulminations against the Council and its abettors, who ignored them. The remedy was devised by Hastings.

Hastings's  
arrange-  
ment. The Council had seen fit to restore the Nawab's criminal jurisdiction in the districts of the Provinces, the civil and fiscal jurisdiction being combined in the hands of the Company's revenue officers. Hastings now separated the civil and the fiscal, established civil courts in the districts, and transferred the appeal, which had lain to the Council, to a Court of Appeal—the "Sadr Diwāni Adālat"—in Calcutta, and offered the position of chief in this court and general supervisor of the system to Impey as an officer under the Company. Impey accepted, the deadlock was removed, and it was immediately found that the new system promised to work very satisfactorily. Hastings has been charged with giving, and Impey with receiving a bribe. But the plain fact is that a compromise between the two rival authorities was the only available method by which either could escape without discredit from an impossible situation, and the compromise was acted upon loyally and judiciously, and entirely to the public advantage.

Two more episodes of his Governor-Generalship were afterwards used against Hastings with great effect, and do, as a matter of fact, illustrate the great difficulties of his position and the undesirable expedients which he was forced to adopt—not in any sense to his personal advantage, but to obtain the funds without which the position in India would have been untenable. These are the affairs of Benares and of the Oudh Begums.

The  
Raja of  
Benares. Benares was transferred to the British on the accession of Asaf-ud-Daulah, which in effect meant that the Raja of Benares paid a tax or tribute to the British instead of to the Nawab. The title of Raja does not imply independence; there is no precise European equivalent; it was borne both by independent sovereigns and by vassals of the great potentates. The Raja of Benares held his province by a sort of feudal tenure analogous to, but not identical with, the mediæval tenures of the West. Thus it is clear that while



under ordinary circumstances he was liable for the amount of his tribute or rent and no more, he was also in time of war, or under other extraordinary conditions, liable to be called on for additional contributions by his superior, the rights having been surrendered by the Oudh Nawab to the British. It was a matter of course in the East that any vassal thinking himself strong enough to resist such claims should do so; but so far as the term legal is applicable to rules depending for their enforcement mainly on the relative strength of the individuals concerned, the claims to extraordinary aids were legal.

Now the Raja, Cheyt Singh, was quite strong enough to have resisted pressure from the Oudh Nawab; pressure from the British was another matter. In 1778 Hastings, embarrassed by the financial strain of the Maratha troubles, demanded an extra contribution of five lakhs—£50,000—from Benares. This was paid. The demand was renewed next year, and again paid, but only after much delay. Then a contingent of horse was called for, but not provided; and the suspicion grew very strong that between Haidar Ali and the Marathas, Cheyt Singh thought the British were sufficiently deep in difficulties to warrant him in an attempt to throw off the yoke. Hastings, on the other hand, considered that the utmost severity was needed in dealing with any sort of recalcitrancy under such conditions, and that the Raja might very well be compelled to pay heavily, to the advantage of the Calcutta coffers. Therefore, instead of modifying his demands, he ordered Cheyt Singh to pay a fine of fifty lakhs, and proceeded to enforce the demand in person, entering the Raja's territory with what was, under the circumstances, a very small escort. The Raja was placed under arrest in his own capital; thereupon his soldiers rose and cut up the sepoys; he himself escaped to one of his fortresses; and Hastings had to effect a rapid withdrawal to Chunar, a few miles down the river. From thence he conducted operations and carried on business with extraordinary coolness and vigour. The nearest detachments of troops were ordered up, and Hastings was lucky in having Popham to command them. The district

Hastings  
and the  
Raja.

The  
Benares  
insurrec-  
tion.



## 116 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

had broken into a flame, but it was quenched with great promptitude and skill. Cheyt Singh fled to Bandelkhand, and a new Raja was set up, whose family still hold the position. It was while at Chunar that Hastings carried on those negotiations with Sindhia which led definitely to the Maratha's adoption of a friendly policy.

**The Oudh Begums.** At Chunar also the Nawab of Oudh came to see him. Hastings wanted money from the Nawab, whose subsidies were much in arrear, and Asaf-ud-Daulah took the opportunity to point out that while he had none, the Begums had plenty which really belonged to him. It was only the British who prevented him from claiming his own, and if he did claim it, and get it, the British could have a share. It was true that the British had guaranteed the Begums their jaghirs or estates: but this had been done in despite of Hastings, and there was a plausible case for maintaining that the Begums, by fostering the Benares insurrection and acting against the British, had forfeited the support promised. Hastings was quite satisfied with the argument, which afforded fair justification for withdrawing British protection from the Begums; but he went further, ordered the Nawab to seize forcibly not only the jaghirs, but also the treasures in the palace of Faizabad (the abode of the Begums), used the Company's troops, and sanctioned a severity and a violence in carrying out the programme of compulsion which were an outrage to European ideas though mild enough according to Oriental practice. The Begums, however, were granted an abundant pension, while the Nawab was enabled to pay up his arrears.

**Warren Hastings:** Hastings acted with his eyes open; he reckoned on being held up as an object of horror to the British public; and he accepted the obloquy for himself that the State might have the gain. In the case of Nuncomar, the worst that can be said of Hastings is that he did not go out of his way to be magnanimous. In fact, magnanimity appears to have been the great want of his character. To friends he could be generous, towards opponents he came perilously near to being vindictive. He treated the politics of India as a matter of business in which there was no room for senti-



mental considerations. The three episodes on which hostile historians fasten are the Rohilla war, and the affairs of Cheyt Singh and of the Oudh Begums. It is probable that in each of these cases Hastings honestly persuaded himself of the justice of his course. In none of the three is it possible to find a hint of any personal benefit to himself as a motive. By all three, the Company profited greatly. On each of the three occasions revenue was raised which was imperatively needed in order to avert disaster, and each time it was obtained from parties whose supposed hostility to the British gave the exactions the colour of reasonable if severe penalties. To a man endowed with a larger natural magnanimity, the penalties would have seemed extortionate, and the proof of the justifying hostility inadequate; yet it is extremely doubtful whether such a man would not have failed where Hastings succeeded, under the actual conditions. The difficulties were enormous; the stake was enormous; European dominion among Orientals was in its infancy. We have learnt by experience that European rulers must apply European standards to the ethics of government; but Clive in one notable instance had deviated from that rule and declared ever after that he had taken the right course. Hastings was satisfied to know that not the most enlightened of Orientals would have had a moment's scruple in taking the course which he took. The British reaped the advantages, and Warren Hastings paid the penalty. In 1785 he returned to England, and was attacked with all the virulence of Francis, the dramatic sensibility of Sheridan, and the moral lightnings of Edmund Burke. The exigencies of party politics turned the scale with Pitt and Dundas; Hastings was impeached; and although after some years the Lords gave him honourable acquittal, the man who saved India and whose departure from Bengal was genuinely lamented by the natives, is still, to the eyes of many of his countrymen, presented as the type of all that a pro-consul ought not to be.

Clive after his retirement from India became the target of the bitterest animosity in England. Warren Hastings was impeached. Wellesley was censured. Lord Hastings died the victim of unwarranted attacks. Later years have not

## 118 THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER

been lacking in parallel cases. The treatment by the British Nation of the men who have to solve the problems of government in remote territories is scarcely a source of self-congratulation. Perhaps the best that can be said for it is, that at the worst it has never been quite so scandalous as the treatment of La Bourdonnais, of Dupleix, and of Lally.



**BOOK III**

**EXTENSION OF SUPREMACY**





## CHAPTER XI

### NEW CONDITIONS: CORNWALLIS AND SHORE

*(Maps III. and VIII.)*

FROM the foregoing chapters, the reader will have learnt, Growth  
of the  
British  
Power. if indeed he had not previously realised, the intimate relation between the course of events in India and occurrences in the West. The first stage of our struggle on Indian soil and in Indian waters had been one of rivalry with France: its outcome had depended less on the comparative capacities of French and English in India than on the naval contest fought out for the most part in European seas. As its result, the French rivalry was permanently removed from the effective to the merely potential sphere; so that the British were enabled to reap unchallenged the fruits of Clive's triumphs in Bengal. In the second stage, the British were involved in prolonged complications with the Country Powers, in which they were forced to depend entirely on their own resources in India; and to strain those resources to the very uttermost, because the Mother Country chose to involve herself in a conflict with her own American colonies, which expanded into a struggle for life against the combined forces of France and Spain.

Throughout both phases, the chief authority in India was perpetually hampered by the authority in Leadenhall Street, which in its turn was largely manipulated according to the exigencies and the varying influences of parties and groups at Westminster, which cared little and knew less about the actual conditions prevailing in Hindostan and the Dekhan. The genius and resolution of Warren Hastings achieved victory in the face of difficulties to which almost any other man would have succumbed; but at the cost of such mis-



representation and vilification of that great statesman that it has taken the best part of a century to restore—and not even now completely to restore—the good name of which he ought never to have been robbed.

Mutual  
influence  
of events  
in East  
and West.

From the peace of 1783 till the outbreak of the war with the French Republic in 1793, and indeed for some years longer, affairs in India ceased to be affected directly by the European relations of Great Britain. Then, as the vast designs of the new Military Chief of France began to be revealed, the idea of French intervention again assumed huge proportions in the eyes of Indian statesmen, and dominated their policy, until that Titanic career was checked by Nelson and finally broken by Wellington. But if European international politics cease for a time to influence the policy of Indian Governors, the period before us opens with a parliamentary struggle at Westminster as a factor of primary importance: Indian affairs playing a very large part therein. For it is a mutual influence that we have to recognise: the influence of India in England, as well as that of England in India.

The long and disastrous government called Lord North's, but in truth that of King George III. himself, had at last given place to a Whig Administration: but when after a few months Lord Shelburne became its head, parties broke up and the famous Coalition ministry resulted—the ministry in which Fox and North, who held no political principles whatever in common, combined to drive out Shelburne. It was recognised on all hands that a new system must be introduced in India, and the Coalition Government brought in an Indian Bill.

**Fox's India Bill.** It was manifest that whatever the new Constitution for India might be, two things were absolutely necessary. The Governor-General must have immense latitude of action; and political control could no longer be allowed to rest in the hands of a body of men who in the nature of things could not depose Dividends from being their first and second and third consideration. Government must assume a largely increased share of the responsibilities. Fox's bill however, while covering these two points, included as a cardinal



part of it a proposal which aroused the passionate opposition of the King, the Company and every politician who was not in the Coalition. Control was to be vested in a body of seven commissioners, appointed for a term of four years by the legislature; who should not only dictate policy, but should hold the bestowal of all appointments in their hands. The patronage of the Crown, and the patronage of the Company were annihilated; and to make matters worse, even the commercial management was to be transferred to a new body not elected by the Company but chosen by the legislature—that is, by Government—from among the Proprietors. A storm of opposition arose; it was a trick, men said, by which ministers hoped not only to enrich their own followers forthwith, but to acquire during the four years ensuing such a force of “Nabobs” behind them as would give a permanent control over parliamentary elections. Secure in a big majority, ministers defied the storm; their Bill went triumphantly through the Commons; but the King, in flagrant violation of constitutional practice, gave the Peers to understand that he would regard their votes as personal to himself. The Lords threw out the Bill; the King required the resignation of ministers; to the general astonishment, the young William Pitt accepted the leadership, and fought almost single-handed for three months against the banded forces of the ablest debaters and most experienced parliamentary hands; while his popularity rose, the majorities against him diminished, and the mockery of his antagonists gave place to alarm. In March 1784, parliament was dissolved: when the new one met, Pitt’s minority had been turned into an overwhelming majority.

The regulation of Indian affairs was now in the hands of Pitt’s Pitt and his right hand man Dundas. The India Bill India Bill. brought in by them supplemented by a declaratory Act a few years later, remained the instrument under which our Indian possessions were governed, with minor modifications, until the extinction of the Company in 1858.

The vital features of Pitt’s India Act were these. Each of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, was to have its own Governor, and its own Commander-in-



Chief, and two other members of Council ; but the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Bengal were to be supreme also over the other two provinces. The Governor-General had very full powers, which were so far increased at the insistence of Lord Cornwallis that he could act on emergency without his Council. He was, however, to abstain from compromising alliances without directions from home. The Directors retained their patronage, and their general power of issuing instructions ; but they were subordinated to a parliamentary Board of Control, changing with the ministry of the day, with a minister at its head, having access to all correspondence and general powers of supervision. Thus while the Directors retained the bulk of the patronage, the Board of Control—in other words the ministry—could exercise a very effective share therein (utilised, as some complained, by Dundas, who was first President of the Board, to inundate India with Scotsmen) and practically had the most important appointments in its own hands.

Lord Cornwallis. The first Governor-General appointed under the new system was Lord Cornwallis ; a man whose sterling character and high ability were sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that he retained the entire confidence of the public in spite of his having been in command at Yorktown when it was forced to surrender, and thereby ended the effective contest between Britain and the American colonies. The office of Governor-General was held *ad interim* from the recall of Hastings to the arrival in India of Cornwallis in September 1786 by Sir John Macpherson. It had been intended to appoint Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras ; but the claims to authority which he desired to have formally ratified were made an excuse for cancelling the appointment, which was unpopular, although the same claims were conceded to Cornwallis. The final appointment was made in accordance with the rule generally but not quite universally recognised thereafter, that while the Council should consist of Indian experts, the Governor-General should be a man trained in another arena.

Cornwallis reached India in September 1786, with the avowed intention of carrying out a policy not of expansion



but of consolidation and retrenchment. Like not a few of his successors, however, he found that, opposed as he might be to British aggression, anti-British aggression demanded a response more stringent than diplomacy; and that in India, the policy of restoring conquests after victory is not understood, but regarded as an invitation to challenge a fresh contest at a convenient opportunity.

The Marathas, as we have seen, made their peace with the British when Haidar Ali died. Tippu, the new Sultan of Mysore had also made his peace some while after; but on terms, and under circumstances which the fatuity of the Madras Government had enabled him to regard and to represent as magnanimous concessions to the humble entreaties of the British. His subsequent conduct showed that he was filled with extravagant ideas of his own power and abilities, and of his rôle as a propagandist of Islam. He forcibly converted tens of thousands of his subjects, Hindus, or Christians, to the Faith, with sundry barbarities; and Nana Farnavis at Puna became seriously alarmed; the more so as the recent proceedings of the British did not point to their taking an active part in keeping the Sultan in check. Now the Nana's theory of allies was that they were meant to serve as catspaws. The most effective catspaws failing, he fell back on the Nizam: who, however, held his own theory *mutatis mutandis*. So the Nizam and the Nana continued to operate against the formidable Tippu, each seeking to shift the burden of work on to the other without prejudice to his own claim on the spoils.

The Puna Government had another reason for activity in the Dekhan. Madhava Rao or Madhoji Sindhia in Hindostan was working out a policy of his own. We have already observed, how that able diplomatist had made it his business to fulfil the rôle of conciliator and arbitrator, with a particularly keen eye to his own advantage in every instance. So skilfully had he handled his opportunities that even the disasters inflicted on him by Popham and Bruce had not prevented him from emerging successfully out of the treaty of Salbai with dominions and prestige undiminished. This threatened ascendancy was eyed askance

The Powers in the Dekhan.

Madhava Rao Sindhia.



by the Puna Durbar; none the less as the ambitions of the Gwalior chief became more clearly revealed. The object to which he now devoted himself was in fact the domination of Upper Hindostan, under a specious display of ostentatious personal humility and loyalty to the ghost of an Emperor at Delhi, and the ghost of a Peshwa at Puna, whose ancestors had been served by his own in the capacity of slipper-bearer. The very ingenious pose adopted was that of a mere instrument of the Padishah, who was lord of India, and of his vicegerent, the acknowledged chief of the Marathas. The Panjab was beyond Sindhia's range: the gradual mastery of Mohammedan rivals at Delhi, and of native chiefs in Rajputana, sufficiently occupied his energies. The peculiarity of the position lay however in this: that ostensibly the *Patēl*<sup>1</sup> as he was called, assumed no rivalry with other Maratha chiefs, made no attacks on them, and gave them no opportunity for attacks on him. The only method of counterbalancing his power was for them to achieve independent successes in other regions—that is to say in the Dekhan.

Sindhia  
and the  
British.

Sindhia's attitude to the British is open to various interpretations. He has been credited with a life-long endeavour to combine the natives of India against them. On the other hand he has been credited with anticipating the attitude adopted in the Panjab at a later date by Ranjit Singh, of seeking a steady alliance with them, much in the same way as he anticipated that astute monarch's schemes of military reconstruction on a European basis. The latter theory appears at least to be nearer the truth than the former. But it is not altogether the truth. In the seventies, the military strength of the British was an uncertain quantity. Well led, they were invincible: but there was no certainty that they would be well led. Sindhia, therefore, was only inclined to oppose them as one who might desire their friendship to-morrow. The vicissitudes of Ragoba's wars, established in his mind two convictions; one, that if they showed military incapacity in one quarter, they were tolerably certain to redress the balance with startling effect in another: the second, that the folly of subordinates could

<sup>1</sup> Patel, sometimes written Potail, is the title of a village head-man.



not cancel, however it might hamper, the supreme capacity of Hastings. Thereupon, his attitude underwent a slight change. He became the friend of the British, with a mental reservation: remaining on the watch for any display of weakness. No sooner was Hastings out of the country, and control for the time vested in Sir John Macpherson, than he put the new chief to the test by reviving the Emperor's claims to tribute. Sir John's reply was decisive, and the demand was promptly withdrawn with explanations. The experiment was repeated with a like result towards the close of the Cornwallis administration. Briefly, if the British should show a becomingly retiring disposition, Sindhia meant to take full advantage of it: but he was quite resolved to have no war with them, to display no active hostility in his own person, unless quite unexpectedly favourable circumstances should arise.

Thus when Cornwallis appeared in India in the autumn of 1786, he found Tippu in the Dekhan waging war with the Nizam and the Southern Marathas, on the whole to the advantage of Mysore, while Madras stood aloof; and Sindhia working out his own private policy in Upper Hindostan. Here, there was certainly no demand for intervention; while a reorganisation of the military establishment in the South was a sufficient warning to Tippu, that if intervention there should become necessary it would be effective. For the time being therefore, peace was restored in the Dekhan, and the Governor-General was able to give his attention to the reform of abuses, and a modification of the treaty with Oudh, where the incapacity and misrule of successive Nawabs was to be a perpetual source of perplexity to one Governor-General after another. On this occasion, the Nawab's Government was hardly touched, but his finances were assisted by a reduction of the subsidy claimed by the British, and by the repudiation on his behalf of the private debts, most of which in fact if not in form were in the nature of outrageously usurious loans.

Cornwallis  
and the  
Country  
Powers.

The abuses attacked at this time were of the personal kind—jobbery, corruption and extortion. The great weight of Cornwallis's name enabled him to take a firm stand,

Reforms  
of Corn-  
wallis.



and flatly refuse to pay attention to the countless applications which poured in from influential quarters—from the Prince of Wales downwards—for posts for incompetent or worse than incompetent protégés; and even to force upon the Directors what the Governor-General's predecessors had striven for in vain, the appropriation to the Company's servants of salaries reasonably commensurate with the responsibilities of their position.

It was not till 1788 that the relations with the Country Powers began to look threatening. As long ago as 1768, The a treaty had been made between the Nizam and the Madras Nizam. Government, by which the former agreed that on the demise of the then Governor, Basalat Jangh, brother of the Nizam, a district known as the Guntur Sarkar should be ceded to the British. This cession had never been carried out; and Cornwallis, in accordance with instructions from home, having waited till the Nizam was free from the embarrassments of his quarrel with Tippu, now required that the provisions of the treaty should be given immediate effect. To the perplexed astonishment of the British, the Nizam replied by a prompt expression of his readiness to effect the cession, if they would duly carry out their part of the contract, and supply him on demand with forces to recover certain districts usurped—as the old treaty put it—by “Haidar Naik.” However awkward or unreasonable now, there stood the obligation by treaty, though in the interval, the British had twice over formally acknowledged Haidar and Tippu as sovereigns of the districts in question. In short, the ingenious ineptitude of the Madras Government twenty years before was responsible for a very awkward situation. The British claim to the Guntur Sarkar had been quite independent of conditions; yet a pledge had gratuitously been given which retained a technical validity, though its fulfilment had been rendered impracticable in the interval.

Corn- The solution found by Cornwallis was a compromise.  
wallis's There was no sort of doubt that Tippu was merely waiting  
Letter to his opportunity to renew hostilities with the British—that  
the Nizam. their extermination was the object he had most at heart;



while Cornwallis was not disposed to take the initiative and make the attack himself. Accordingly he wrote a letter to the Nizam, on July 7th, 1789, explaining his view of the obligation imposed by the treaty. The troops as stipulated were to be supplied to the Nizam, but were not to be employed against any Power in alliance with the British. If the districts named should come into possession of the British by the Nizam's help, they should be handed over to him. A list of the "allies" was appended, in which Tippu was not named. The letter was virtually an undertaking that if the Nizam attacked Tippu, he should have the assistance as stipulated. On the other hand it required the active co-operation of the Nizam, and threw upon him the *onus* of challenging Mysore.

The India Act had expressly forbidden the formation of alliances without authority from London; but it was one of the many advantages of the Cornwallis appointment that he could take risks which no other man could have done, and was able to establish invaluable precedents. If a Clive or a Hastings cut through red-tape for the public service he did it at the risk of his own ruin. Cornwallis, without any pretensions to the genius of either of those great men, but with the advantage of a high and unsullied name, was able by sheer force of character and a sound and sober intelligence to achieve such a measure of public confidence as rendered him unassailable. In spite of technical restrictions, he had in fact a free hand, and the precedent greatly increased the freedom of his successors.

It is impossible to judge whether the letter to the Nizam precipitated Tippu's action: his preparations for a movement were already virtually complete. By the treaty of Mangalur at the conclusion of the last war, Travancore at the extreme south of India, much coveted by Tippu, had been placed under British protection. Now, in spite of warning, Tippu attacked Travancore before the end of December. He was repulsed, and thereupon gathered a great army to effect the desired conquest. The gage of battle was fairly flung down. The Nizam and the Puna Government were both ready to combine in the attack upon him after their own fashion.



The British army was placed under the command of General Medows.

Opening campaign against Tippu : 1790. Owing to the deliberate, continuous, and criminal neglect of the Governor of Madras, who took an early opportunity of leaving the country, Medows found himself in difficulties from lack of supplies and of transport, very much as Eyre Coote had done in the war with Haidar. The Madras army was to operate on the south of Mysore, while a second army was to march down the coast from Bengal and to co-operate from the North East of Mysore later in the year. Medows in course of time captured Koimbatur (July 1790); but when he attempted to advance through the passes to Seringapatam he was foiled by the superior skill of his opponent and forced to fall back. In August, the Bengal army reached the Carnatic, and in despite of Tippu a junction was ultimately effected towards the close of the year: but the only satisfactory feature of the campaign was the brilliant success of a small detachment on the Malabar coast under the command of Colonel Hartley.

Cornwallis now resolved to conduct operations in person; for he himself, a distinguished soldier, held the office of Commander-in-Chief as well as that of Governor-General. In February (1791), having concentrated his army at Vellur, some seventy miles from Madras, he marched up to the Mysore plateau, evading Tippu whom he had successfully misled as to his intended route; and captured Bangalur, one of Tippu's most important strongholds, before the end of March. This success had the effect of bringing up the Nizam's army, which had hitherto been amusing itself on the northern borders of Mysore territory, and of encouraging the Marathas who had been similarly employed in a more westerly direction.

But the advance of the Marathas was unknown to the British, and the arrival of the Nizam's forces had enormously increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies, without producing any corresponding advantage. Cornwallis fought a successful action, and arrived before Seringapatam in May: General Abercromby (not Sir Ralph) was on his way up from the Malabar coast: but by this time, men and cattle alike



were in such a condition that offensive operations had become impossible, and Cornwallis was obliged to order a retreat. The arrival of the Marathas did not facilitate matters; in fact they seized the opportunity to ask for funds; and with the implied alternative of their transferring their alliance there and then to Tippu, Cornwallis felt obliged to comply with the demand. The Marathas under their famous leader Hari Pant then retired to the North West, the Nizam to the North East, and Cornwallis himself Eastwards; to spend the remainder of the year in reducing the fortresses of the Bāramahāl district lying between Vellur and Bangalur.

The Mysore Sultan's calculations were however much disturbed when he found that in the following January the Governor-General was again on the march with an army better equipped with war material and supplies than he had yet brought into the field. This, the decisive campaign, was a short one. The British force was not only the best equipped but the largest that had ever taken part in an Indian Campaign. On February 5th it was before an entrenched position, in sight of Seringapatam. The defences were extraordinarily strong, but the English Chief planned and executed a night attack with entire success. Abercromby was coming up with reinforcements, and Tippu found that his best hope lay in submission. By the terms dictated, nearly half of Tippu's dominions were surrendered, as well as the persons of two of his sons and a heavy indemnity. In spite of the discovery of documents which proved that both the Nizam and the Marathas had been corresponding with Tippu throughout the war: in spite also of the purely imaginary character of the assistance they had rendered: Cornwallis treated the bargain with them as binding, and gave to each one-third of the ceded districts and of the indemnity. The British retained for themselves the Baramahal district, before mentioned, in which were important passes into Mysore, with other regions on the South and the West coast: these last being attached to the Bombay Presidency.

This acquisition of territory was of course attacked in Parliament, but Cornwallis was triumphantly vindicated, and rewarded with a marquise. The Statesmen of India and

Third  
campaign  
against  
Tippu :  
1792.

Resulting  
acquisi-  
tion of  
territory.

Approval  
of Corn-  
wallis's  
policy.



Westminster alike viewed territorial expansion with no little apprehension. But it was thoroughly understood that there was no one more thoroughly opposed to an aggressive policy than Cornwallis himself: it was felt that if he transgressed his own theory, it was only under the conviction of imperative political necessity. However reluctantly, it had to be recognised that the only way of dealing with a resolutely aggressive Native potentate was to curtail his dominions; whether the districts of which he was reft were taken under direct British control or only under British protection. Where there was no representative of a recognised and long established authority, the presumption was in favour of direct rule rather than the setting up of an authority incapable of maintaining itself unaided; but the decision in such cases could not profitably rest in other hands than those of the supreme British Authority on the spot.

His further  
reforms. Not only did Cornwallis conduct a great war to a successful issue, and set a precedent in foreign policy; under his rule were also effected far-reaching administrative changes. These will be examined in detail in later chapters; here it will be sufficient merely to mention the famous "permanent settlement" of Bengal under which the land-revenue was established on a permanent system; the final separation of the functions of Collectors and Magistrates; the re-organisation—with very qualified success—of the criminal courts; and the codification of the law, whereby an extremely elaborate code replaced the simple one previously framed by Sir Elijah Impey.

His retire-  
ment. Cornwallis retired from India at the close of 1793, just after the declaration of war between Great Britain and the Revolution Government in France, of which the only immediate effect in India was the seizure of Pondichery. Loyal, just and resolute, he had confirmed the best traditions of British policy and British character; happy in that free exercise of control which had been so desperately needed by his predecessor, and for the lack whereof that predecessor had won through so hardly, and with eternal discredit to the foes that were of his own household.



The intention of those who had framed the new constitution for British India was, that the Governor-General should be chosen from among men at home who combined a confirmed social position with recognised political talent, strong enough to resist the pressure of private influence, and free from the stereotyped preconceptions likely to be produced by an exclusively Oriental training. But such men were not easy to find, and Cornwallis was actually succeeded by an Indian Official, Sir John Shore: an admirable adviser, who had done excellent service in connection with the land-settlement; but wanting in the vigorous self-reliance required to cope successfully with the complex diplomatic and military problems to which in India the term "Political" is appropriated.

His  
successor :  
Sir John  
Shore.

The departure of Cornwallis was followed by a rapid succession of changes in the personnel of the Maratha chiefs. Shore had no confidence in Sir Robert Abercromby, his own commander-in-chief, and was unduly afraid of risking Maratha hostility. In consequence, a good deal of the prestige gained under Cornwallis was lost during his administration. The great Sindhia, Madhava Rao, died in 1794, and was succeeded by a boy Daulat Rao: after two or three changes, a new Baji Rao became Peshwa and the Nana's ascendancy at Puna was very uncertain; Holkar was growing more independent. All were disposed to treat British pretensions with diminished respect. Cornwallis had wished to cap the overthrow of Tippu by a guarantee treaty between the Marathas, the Nizam, and the British, to prevent any of the three being dragged into hostilities with Tippu by one of them, or any one of them adopting an aggressive attitude towards another. This agreement had been avoided by the Marathas who now proceeded to attack the Nizam. Shore persuaded himself that, as the league was broken up, he was not called upon to defend the Nizam, who had to make submission and cede territories to Puna: and that monarch, disgusted by the desertion, attempted to secure his own position by raising fresh troops under the command of a French officer, Raymond, who had already rendered him efficient service. Fortunately the internal

Maratha  
affairs.



partisan troubles of the Marathas called them off from further aggression, and the British saw the necessity of substituting their own support at Haidarabad for the possible dangers of a force under French control.

Sir John  
Shore in  
Oudh.

In Oudh, Shore was more successful. The total incapacity of the Nawab kept the whole Province in a state of flagrant mis-government. In 1797 he died, and was succeeded by a reputed son, Wazir Ali. But Wazir Ali's title was challenged, and on enquiry the Governor-General was fully convinced that he was not the son of the late Nawab at all: nor was there any son alive. Sir John accordingly informed Saadat Ali, brother of the late Nawab, that the British intended to place him on the throne, at the same time requiring him to accept a treaty on these terms. A British army of ten thousand men was to be maintained in Oudh, supported by an annual subsidy. The Nawab's own army was not to exceed thirty-five thousand; and he was to have no independent diplomatic relations with other powers. Allahabad was to be in possession of the British. It was a definite assertion of that British supremacy in Oudh which had been implicitly but not explicitly recognised ever since a previous Nawab had been replaced on his throne by grace of Robert Clive. While the arrangements for Wazir Ali's removal were being made, Sir John remained imperturbably at Lucknow, the Oudh capital, calling up no military assistance; being perfectly aware that he might at any moment be assassinated, but that on the other hand a collision between the British and Wazir Ali's followers might set the whole province in a flame. His cool courage triumphed. Wazir Ali's followers fell away day by day; when Saadat Ali arrived at Lucknow, all opposition had been withdrawn without disturbance, and his rival was removed to meditate revenge, on a comfortable pension.

His  
contest  
with the  
Army.

Very different was the Governor-General's management of a preceding episode, to which brief reference must be made. This was the virtual mutiny of the European officers of the Bengal army in 1795-6. The Company's army had in fact been seething with discontent for a long time past. The total military establishment consisted partly of King's



troops, *i.e.* regiments of the Regular army, partly of Company's troops, that is regiments, of which some consisted of Europeans but most of Sepoys commanded by the Company's officers. There was extreme jealousy between the King's officers and the Company's officers, and between the Company's officers and their Civilian fellows, who in their view were unduly favoured as compared with themselves under the new system of payment which Cornwallis had succeeded in introducing. Cornwallis had proposed a scheme for amalgamating the two military branches; but this had not found favour at home; and the expected alternative scheme of re-organisation was so unsatisfactory that the officers united to demand that certain concessions should be guaranteed, failing which they should seize the government. In effect, Sir John and the Commander-in-Chief surrendered at discretion and granted everything in their power. The Ministry in England entreated Cornwallis to save the situation by returning to India, and he agreed; but when he found that Ministers themselves were negotiating with representatives of the Mutineers in London, and were on the point of inviting him to sail with instructions to concede everything, he resigned in disgust. The office of Governor-General was thereupon accepted by Lord Mornington. Shore however had time to retrieve his reputation in Oudh, and to justify the bestowal of a peerage—he became Lord Teignmouth—before Mornington's arrival.

End of  
Shore's  
adminis-  
tration.

The tact, firmness and courage displayed by Sir John Shore in the Oudh affair contrast curiously with his failure in other cases where vigorous action and readiness to accept responsibility were demanded. His persistent avoidance of interference in the Dekhan had only produced in the Nizam an impression that the British Power was but a broken reed, and in the Marathas and Tippu a belief that its decay was setting in only rather more rapidly than was normal among the eternally changing dynasties of the "unchanging East." The delusion was to be ruthlessly shattered by Sir John's formidable successor.



## CHAPTER XII

### LORD WELLESLEY: (I) 1798-1802

#### *(Map III.)*

The new  
Governor-  
General.

LORD MORNINGTON, better known by his later title as the Marquess Wellesley, was thirty-seven years of age when he was nominated Governor-General of India. He was a brilliant scholar, and had already won considerable distinction as a speaker. On intimate terms with both Pitt and Dundas, he had already been for four years on the Indian Board of Control, and had a thorough knowledge, from that point of view, of Indian politics, as well as of European affairs. The policy of deliberate expansion with which he identified himself was to a great extent engendered by the progress of Napoleon, whose vast designs were beginning to be recognised at the time of Wellesley's appointment.

Indian  
Foreign  
Policy.

The dominant conception in Indian statesmanship had hitherto been the preservation of a balance of power between the three great States of Southern India, Mysore, Haidarabad and the Maratha confederacy. The feasibility of that policy, if no external factors were considered, was still doubtful; since it depended largely on the acquiescence of the three Powers, which could by no means be continuously depended upon. Aggression was ingrained in the minds of Oriental princes, as being, so to speak, part of their profession. None would have had the smallest compunction about annihilating another, if the opportunity occurred. Still the effort was made: and so, when Cornwallis had Tippu under his heel, he did not take advantage of the fact to destroy him, but only to reduce his power for independent aggression.



Now, however, the external factor had to be reckoned with. No one could retell the developments of French power under the guidance of a military genius with an unbridled imagination. If France should succeed in achieving a renewed footing on Indian soil, as the ally of a native Power, the British would certainly have to fight for life. Before Nelson's great victory of the Nile (Aug. 1798) such a consummation was by no means impossible: even after it, the impossibility was very far from clear. To counteract the danger by alliances with Native courts was insufficient, because no Native court could be relied on to maintain an alliance for a day, if any immediate advantage for itself could be acquired by desertion. Hence no opportunity must be lost whereby the British could obtain in the native States a *de facto* military control. This was the more imperative, because each of the States had French officers and sepoy battalions in their service. Madhava Rao Sindhia had achieved the ascendancy, which he bequeathed to the young Daulat Rao, by entrusting his military organisation to a Frenchman, De Boigne: the Nizam, denied assistance by Sir John Shore, had organised a force under the Frenchman Raymond: Tippu had French officers in his pay, and was already very strongly suspected of being in correspondence with France. Finally, Napoleon was now making Egypt his immediate objective; and Egypt was regarded as the half-way house to India.

Wellesley touched at the Cape on his voyage to India, in February (1798). There he discussed the situation with sundry Indian experts—Lord Hobart, the last governor of Madras: Macartney; and others who had a thorough knowledge of the native courts. Hence when he reached Calcutta in May he was already fully informed of the situation, and was prepared to act with the utmost promptitude and vigour. The danger was much more pressing than had been supposed when he left England, because there appeared to be a further probability that the Afghan monarch of Kabul, Zeman Shah, was about to invade India; and his strength, though after events showed it to have been vastly exaggerated, was believed to be very great, rendering the prospect of his

The danger from France.

The situation : 1798.



alliance with the Mussulman zealot at Mysore particularly alarming.

Wellesley had hardly arrived when, in June, a proclamation was printed in Calcutta which had been issued some months earlier by the French governor of Mauritius, inviting French citizens to take service with Tippu, in accordance with proposals received from that monarch. Tippu's intrigues for French assistance were thus no longer a matter of suspicion but of absolute certainty.

Prepara-  
tions for a  
Mysore  
War.

The Marathas were for the time sufficiently occupied with their own rivalries. Tippu required immediate attention; so did the Nizam, lest he should be drawn with his French force into alliance with Mysore. Wellesley forthwith set about preparations for a war with Mysore, and brought immediate pressure to bear on Haidarabad in order to remove danger in that direction. The Nizam succumbed to the judicious vigour of Kirkpatrick and John Malcolm who were sent to negotiate with him. The French corps known as Raymond's was disbanded: a British subsidiary force was substituted, and the Nizam undertook to employ no Europeans without assent of the Company. Malcolm remained at Haidarabad as Resident, his tact and vigilance securing freedom from any further danger in that quarter.

To render Tippu harmless was a much heavier task; involving at least the acquisition by the British of the whole of the Mysore litoral: since, once completely cut off from the sea, the Sultan would not be able to work in concert with the French. The reasons for avoiding a war were sufficiently strong. The Madras authorities, both civil and military were full of apprehension; they remembered how Medows and Cornwallis himself in his first campaign had been foiled in the last war, in spite of the victorious termination of the final campaign. There was still no prospect of efficient help from the Nizam, and a presumption that if the Marathas took a part at all it would be against the British. Wellesley however, had made up his mind: and happily he received dispatches from England which fully supported him. He made strenuous preparations, while pressing Tippu to make an amicable agreement, reject the French alliance,



dismiss all French officers, and accept the presence of a British Resident. As the year went on, he was able to emphasise his representations by reports of French misfortunes in Egypt. His demands were met only by constant evasions. By the New Year, there was still no hint of an accommodation being effected. Wellesley, knowing that the conditions of weather and climate demanded that the campaign should be finished decisively by June, resolved to strike at once.

A Bombay army was collected at Kananur on the Malabar coast, close to Mahé, to advance from the West under General Stewart. The main Madras army, commanded by General Harris, and accompanied by the Governor-General's younger brother, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, was to enter Mysore by way of Bangalur. By March (1799) the advance had begun. Tippu, who had shewn a good deal of his father's military capacity on occasion, displayed little of it in this campaign. He attempted to crush Stewart's smaller force on the South West; but when his attack was repulsed after hard fighting, he changed his plans and fell back to oppose the advance of Harris on the North East. He was again defeated, and retired to cover the expected route of the invaders to Seringapatam: but Harris evaded him, by following a more southerly line of march, which afforded better facilities for transport beside simplifying the junction with the Bombay force: and Tippu had to withdraw rapidly to Seringapatam. Early in April, siege works were advanced close to the town; about the middle of the month, Tippu was sufficiently alarmed to open negotiations. But the General's terms were too severe for him, and he rejected them with great indignation. The besiegers, however, were in desperate need of supplies: a protracted siege was out of the question, and on May 4th Seringapatam was carried by storm. The fight was very fierce; great numbers of the defenders were killed, and among them Tippu himself, whose courage at least did not fail him. With the fall of Seringapatam, the rule of the Mussulman dynasty of Mysore was ended.

The Mysore campaign : 1799.

Fall of Seringapatam.



The Mysore dynasty. The Mysore war differs from those that follow it in this ; that it was a war against a Dynasty, while they were wars with races. The hostility of Mysore to the British ceased with the fall of the house of Haidar Ali. There was no Mysore People with a tradition. But Marathas and Ghurkas and Sikhs retained a national tradition, however their wars with the British might result. In Mysore Haidar himself was but a Mohammedan adventurer who occupied the throne of a Hindu principality and made the neighbouring principalities subject to himself. Tippu has been made the subject of panegyric ; but his fanaticism and his cruelties are unquestionable facts, while his virtues appear to be quite apocryphal. The moral claims of any rule obtained by the sword can be tested only by the beneficial character of the government and its power of resistance to adversaries : at least until a considerable period has elapsed since its establishment. But the Mussulman dominion in Mysore lasted for less than forty years. The Sultan's kin were the only losers by its annihilation ; and membership of an Oriental royal family carries with it so many risks as to be an extremely doubtful privilege.

Partition of Mysore. The division of the spoils offered a serious problem. The Nizam had actually given help and was fairly entitled to a share ; policy required that the Marathas should be offered a share also. On the other hand, it would be unsafe for the British either to seize too much or to give away too much. The solution arrived at was ingenious.

A large portion of the territory was reserved intact, and the representative of the old Hindu dynasty was made Raja under British protection ; that is, under conditions which precluded the protected State from assuming a hostile attitude. The Marathas were offered the north-western districts, on condition of an anti-French alliance, an undertaking to employ no Europeans without the Company's consent, and a promise to guarantee the inviolability of the new Mysore State. They rejected these terms, and the territory was consequently appropriated partly to the British and partly to the Nizam. To the Nizam also were assigned the districts from Chitaldrug to Gutti, his boundaries being thus carried some way south of



the line of the Tanghabadra and Krishna rivers, to which they had been driven back by the aggressive Mohammedan chiefs. The British took the lion's share, appropriating all the Mysore litoral and the southern districts below the Ghats as well as the control of the forts commanding the passes, including Seringapatam; the British and the Nizam between them thus almost completely encircling the new Mysore State.

The value of the conquest was completely secured by a further treaty with the Nizam in 1800. That monarch found himself in serious difficulties. He was not strong enough to resist the constant pressure and claims for *chauth* of the Marathas, or to control his own tributaries who found it safer to resist his demands than those of Puna. Hence also his subsidies to the British fell in arrear. He therefore finally accepted British protection. In return for a British force of ten thousand men—available, not as before only in case of open war, but for general defence against aggression—and in lieu of a subsidy for their maintenance, he handed over to the British his share of the Mysore territories; at the same time agreeing to submit all his disputes to British mediation. Thus the only independent Power left in the Dekhan was that of the Marathas; while this immense advance of the British supremacy had been effected in a manner and under conditions of which the legitimacy was beyond dispute; although the Governor-General had carried the theory of his right to act without specific authority to its extreme limits.

A like extension of supremacy was about to be effected in Oudh; while in the south a supremacy already existing was converted into practically direct dominion. Questions of succession arose at Surat and Tanjur, both small States; in both cases, the British government coupled its recognition of the heir with a treaty which transferred the entire administration civil and military to its own hands. More important was the termination of the system of dual control in the Carnatic. Hitherto, the treaties had provided that the British should protect the Nawab's territories in return for a subsidy: that they should not interfere with his administration; but

Subsidiary  
treaty  
with the  
Nizam:  
1800.

Annexa-  
tion of  
Surat,  
Tanjur,  
and Arcot.



that he should have no independent diplomatic relations with other powers. On the failure of subsidies, districts had been assigned as fixed sources from which the payment should be drawn. The Nawabs however continued to sink deeper and deeper into debt, privately, giving mortgages even on the assigned districts; while their general administration was hopelessly incapable; and finally, convincing evidence was produced that the reigning Nawab was in treasonable correspondence with Tippu even at the time of the last war. These discoveries were not hastily acted upon; but in 1801, Lord Clive the Governor of Madras was instructed to make strong representations to the Nawab, Omdal ul Omrah. Action however was suspended owing to the Nawab's illness. On his death in July, there was as usual a disputed succession; and, also as usual, no decisive rule for judging the force of the respective claims. Government could recognise whom it would; and it put a price on its recognition—the acceptance of a treaty. Under this instrument, the entire administration was transferred to the Company, which took over the responsibility for the liquidation of legitimate debts; while the new Nawab kept the title and dignity, and an assignment of an adequate revenue.

Thus in 1801 all India south of the Tanghabadra and Krishna rivers was under direct British dominion; except the new Mysore State and some small principalities which were however effectively under British control: whilst the Nizam's independence had become very little more than a figure of speech. In the same year, the defensive position in Hindo-  
 The problem of Oudh. stan was secured by the enforcement of a new treaty upon Oudh. There the prevailing conditions were exceedingly anomalous. Oudh lay as a buffer between the British dominion on one side, and on the other Sindhia's dominion, or any invader from beyond the Satlej; whether the Sikhs, who were hardly yet recognised as formidable, or the Afghans who were supposed to be more formidable than the facts warranted. Hence the vital importance of Oudh being thoroughly defensible. Under the existing treaties, a British army was already maintained in Oudh, by means of a subsidy which had been in fact commuted for the cession of territory:



In addition, however, the Nawab of Oudh maintained an army of his own, over which he could exercise only very inefficient control: so much so that while it was of the utmost importance to keep the whole British force ready for action on the frontier, a large portion of it was required to dominate the Nawab's own troops. Moreover the internal administration of Oudh was conspicuously bad.

Wellesley then came to the conclusion that the Nawab's own army must be reduced or disbanded and the British contingent increased. This would involve an increased subsidy; which could only be secured, in the existing state of the Nawab's finances, by a cession of territory; the territory required being roughly Rohilkhand and the district known as the Doab lying between the Ganges and the Jamna. The necessity for this arrangement was impressed on Saadat Ali, who protested vigorously against it, and declared that he would abdicate. Wellesley replied that if he abdicated the Government must be handed over entirely to the Company, since, if he with all his experience was unable to cope with the difficulties of the situation, obviously his youthful heir would be no better off. The Nawab withdrew his suggestion of abdication; Wellesley replied that in that case the cession of the districts and the reform of the army must be forthwith carried out, and the right of the British admitted to advise on internal administration, though this had hitherto been expressly negatived in the treaties. Saadat Ali argued that as he was not in arrears with his subsidies, the British had no right to make new demands. The technical answer to him, that there was no security for his solvency in the immediate future, was clearly insufficient. In effect, the Governor-General's real position was that the public safety imperatively required a reorganisation, and since the existing treaty did not provide for it, the Nawab must accept a new treaty whether he liked it or not. The negotiations were entrusted to another of the Wellesley brothers, Henry, afterwards Lord Cowley: and finally the Nawab submitted under protest, declaring that he did so only because it was not in his power to resist.

New  
subsidiary  
treaty with  
Oudh.



Peculiar  
position of  
Oudh.

The justification of the Governor-General's high-handed action lay in the two principles; that under Oriental conditions, no existing Government in India could be held to have really acquired the full status of what international jurists mean by a State; and that a State in the Oriental sense could not be allowed to subsist on the British border under conditions which made it a standing source of peril. To this it is fair to add that Oudh itself had always stood in a peculiar relation to the British since the battle of Buxar. By all Oriental custom, it had then become forfeit to the British, having been overthrown in a war in which it had openly acted the part of aggressor entirely without provocation; and there was always a tacit sense that while the British had shown a surprising generosity in not claiming the forfeit, their title to do so on occasion still remained morally valid.

Wellesley's  
schemes  
against  
France.

During the first period of his career, the Governor-General's energies were by no means restricted to dealings with the Country Powers. His views of Indian policy had their root in the problem which Bonaparte was presenting to the statesmen of Europe. Having a grasp of the principles of maritime defence, Wellesley would have crippled the activity of the French in Eastern waters by falling upon their naval station at the Mauritius; which they were able to use greatly to the detriment of the traffic round the Cape, and would have become trebly dangerous, if the maritime supremacy of Britain could have been shaken, as a base for attacking India itself. In this, however, he was foiled by the obstinacy of Admiral Rainier, who refused to carry out his instructions without orders from the Admiralty; and the opportunity was lost. Similarly his efforts to make use of Ceylon were foiled by the obstinacy of the Governor, and the refusal of ministers to incorporate that island with the Indian dominions. His activity however was congenially displayed in the dispatch to Egypt in 1800 of an expedition commanded by Sir David Baird. The troops on their arrival found no fighting to do, as their approach decided the French to capitulate to the force from England which was already there. The idea of a combined Franco-Russian invasion overland also led to



the opening of diplomatic relations with Persia, by the magnificently equipped and skilfully conducted mission of John Malcolm to Teheran.

In 1802, however, Wellesley was on the verge of a struggle with the one Power which might, under slightly altered conditions, have seriously contested the British ascendancy in India.

## CHAPTER XIII


### LORD WELLESLEY : (2) 1802-1805

(*Maps V. and VIII.*)

Dis-approval of Wellesley at the India House. **W**ELLESLEY'S Mysore policy and his triumph over Tippu had been hailed with universal applause, alike in England and in India. The subsequent application of the same root principle, the flat negation of the ideal of non-interference, was viewed with much disfavour in Leadenhall Street and with only half-hearted approval by the ministry in London. In fact, the Directors and Proprietors were growing distinctly hostile to the Governor-General. Other causes were combining to this end. The Governor-General was exercising patronage extensively. His appointments were indisputably excellent, but the Directors felt that a privilege which they still regarded as their own was slipping from their hands. They required the cancellation of the appointment of Henry Wellesley to the administration of the districts ceded by Oudh, which were afterwards known as part of the North West Provinces; as well as of other appointments; to the extreme disgust of Lord Wellesley. They were indignant with him, because he recognised what had now become the necessity of admitting merchants other than the Company to the privileges of trade; since they believed that their financial interests would suffer by any relaxation of their monopoly. Wellesley perceived the urgent need of educating the Company's servants in India for the performance of their functions as rulers, and on his own responsibility established a college in Calcutta partly for that purpose. The Company demanded the abolition of the college, and only under pressure from the Board of Control assented to its maintenance in an eviscerated form.



Map V.







They regarded Wellesley's tone towards them as arrogant, he considered their tone to him as insulting. Moreover he was vehemently dissatisfied with the treatment he received from Government, who had rewarded him with an Irish Marquisate for converting the Dekhan into a province of Britain. As yet however, neither directors nor ministers were at all prepared to do without him; and when he sent in his resignation in 1802, he was requested with complimentary phrases to continue at his post.

Now, however, a new phase was opened by the complications of Maratha affairs.

On the death of Madhava Rao Sindhia in 1794, his vast dominion and a somewhat impaired supremacy among the Marathas descended to the young Daulat Rao. The death of the Peshwa, the nominal head of the confederacy, shortly afterwards led to the establishment in that position of Baji Rao, son of that Ragonath Rao or Ragoba who had caused so much disturbance in the time of Warren Hastings. The minister Nana Farnavis, after some fluctuations of fortune, returned to his position as admittedly the shrewdest head in Maratha counsels till his death in 1800. The dominions of the house of Holkar had for some time been well administered by Ahalya Bai, the widow of the last chief, excellently served by Takoji Holkar, a member of the same clan. These two dying within a short time of each other, the Holkar succession and the Holkar dominions fell into the utmost confusion; out of which Jeswant Rao Holkar, son of Takoji, ultimately emerged as the chief; in alliance with Amir Khan, a Pathan leader of free-lances. Throughout 1800-1802, Holkar and Sindhia and the Peshwa were raiding and ravaging in each other's dominions, each striving for his own supremacy. At last, in October 1802, there was a fierce battle fought under the walls of Puna, between Holkar and the allied troops of Sindhia and the Peshwa, in which Holkar's desperate valour in what seemed the moment of defeat changed the fortunes of the day; and Holkar entered Puna in triumph, the Peshwa himself, Baji Rao, having retired precipitately out of reach.

Feuds  
of the  
Maratha  
leaders.

Now Wellesley had already been for some time endeavour.



Reluctance of the Powers to attempt subsidiary alliances. ing to impose his system upon Puna; that is, to repeat at Puna what was accomplished at Ha'jarabad. The establishment there of a strong British subsidiary force, and the dismissal of Frenchmen from the Maratha service, would complete the security of the English dominion; and would naturally result in the extension of a *Pax Britannica* over nearly the whole peninsula. Apart from the question of security, the populations outside our own dominions could not fail to benefit enormously by the termination of a perpetual state of war, waged after the bloodthirsty and desolating Oriental fashion. Naturally, however, the Country Powers took a different view: acquiescence came only when a sovereign felt that his only escape from destruction by rival Powers lay in British protection. It was not an abstract fondness for British rule, or a thirst for the reign of Peace which led the Nizam to accept the Wellesley scheme: it was fear of the Marathas, though the Nizam's peaceable subjects were probably very well pleased. The Marathas therefore themselves, who in combination had nothing to fear from any quarter except the British—especially since Tippu had been removed—united in resisting the most pressing invitations to admit a subsidiary force. None of the rival chiefs wanted protection; each wanted dominion, which was incompatible with British control.

Treaty of Bassein with the Peshwa. Now however the opportunity had at last arrived. To the Peshwa it appeared that his own power was irretrievably ruined by Holkar's victory at Puna; by accepting the British proposals he could recover a position corresponding to that of the Nizam; the only alternative was, to escape to private life in British territory. Accordingly, Baji Rao declared his readiness to accept the proposals which he had previously rejected; and on December 31st, 1802, the treaty of Bassein was signed.

However the actual supremacy among the Marathas might be from time to time absorbed by a Bhonsla, a Sindhia, or a Holkar, the formal primacy of the Peshwa was always recognised. By the treaty of Bassein, the technical head of the Maratha confederacy accepted British control—the



presence of a subsidiary British force, for the support of which districts were assigned ; British arbitration in disputes with the Nizam ; an obligation to employ no European belonging to nations at war with the British, and to enter on no war without the British assent. It was a formal abrogation of Maratha independence.

It is a contingency remotely imaginable that if Wellesley had not made this treaty, the Marathas might have continued fighting each other until they ceased to be a formidable Power. In any other event they must sooner or later have become involved in a life and death struggle with the British. It was still perfectly possible that they might enter on that struggle with the French as allies. The treaty forced their hand. If they acquiesced it would not be long before the British would make their grip in the west too firm to be shaken. If resistance was intended, it must be soon. And the British were in a stronger position for the struggle with the treaty than without it ; the creation of the subsidiary force alone was of no little strategic value as securing a military foothold in the country. The argument for the treaty however involves the recognition of a principle which the Western mind is always disposed *a priori* to reject—that a powerful native State is by its nature aggressive and bellicose ; a consolidated Maratha empire would not have divided India with the British, but would necessarily have challenged the British arms, and have renewed the challenge until one or other was shattered, whether the French intervened or not ; while the continuation of the existing system with unchecked internal rivalries and uncontrolled feuds would be not only ruinous to the Maratha country, but a perpetual incitement to disorder within the British dominions.

In May 1803, Baji Rao was reinstated at Puna ; but already he was repenting. The Bhonsla was making his best endeavours to unite the chiefs in an anti-British league. Sindhia's co-operation was secure, but Holkar from whatever motive was hanging back and the Peshwa with Arthur Wellesley controlling him was powerless to act.

• The General called upon Sindhia and the Bhonsla to

Grounds  
for the  
treaty.

Combina-  
tion of  
Maratha  
chiefs.



retire with their troops to their own respective dominions ; but they remained. In August, the British Agent with Sindhia was instructed to withdraw—which amounted to a declaration of war. To follow the war and the subsequent arrangements, we must note the situation of the various Maratha dominions.<sup>1</sup>

The  
Maratha  
dominions.

The Bhonsla's territories extended from Berar to Kattak ; the Peshwa's embraced the western Dekhan. The lands of the Gaikwar, Holkar and Sindhia are not easy to disentangle. Sindhia's lay chiefly on the North and East, including Gwalior, the upper part of the Ganges and Jamna Doab, and some districts west of the Jamna ; west of Sindhia, with his capital at Indur, and his chief fortress at Rampura, was Holkar ; west of Holkar, the Gaikwar. Both Sindhia and Holkar claimed authority over sundry Rajput States.

During the nine years that had passed since Madhava Rao Sindhia's death, young Daulat Rao had never been in his own territories ; which had been left mainly to the care of the Frenchman Perron, De Boigne's successor. Sindhia himself had spent his time, always with a powerful army, in the Dekhan, occupied with the intrigues at Puna and the operations of Holkar. Thus, when the Maratha war broke out, Sindhia and the Bhonsla were able to act in conjunction in the Dekhan, while Sindhia's second great army with its French general, French officers, and French organisation, was acting in upper Hindostan. Holkar was sulking in his tent, while the Gaikwar, always the least formidable of the "pentarchy," was neutralised by the persuasive diplomacy of the British Agent, Major Walker.

The command of the British army in the Dekhan was entrusted to Arthur Wellesley : that in Hindostan to General Lake. Wellesley struck at once. The Agent had been withdrawn from Sindhia on Aug. 3. Ahmednagar and Assaye : Aurangabad were captured successively, and on Sept. 23 was fought the great battle of Assaye ; where, after a fierce struggle the combined armies of Sindhia and the Bhonsla were routed with great slaughter, and with British losses amounting to nearly one third of the force present. Two

Sept.  
1803.

<sup>1</sup> Maps II. and V.



months later, the Bhonsla again faced the same general at Argaon, where he was completely defeated; and his resistance was ended by the capture of his great fortress of Gawilgarh, a fortnight later.

Equally prompt and vigorous were Lake's measures in Hindostan. Aligarh between Delhi and Agra was taken on Sept. 4. Perron, the French General, whose position had long been rendered extremely difficult by the intrigues of native rivals, learnt just at this time that the intriguers had succeeded in procuring his dismissal—which he anticipated by resignation; a step from which a fine spirit of loyalty had alone hitherto restrained him. The command was taken by another Frenchman, Bourquin, who faced Lake in the neighbourhood of Delhi. He was completely defeated after a hard fight; Delhi, and the person of Shah Alam, fell into the hands of the British, and three days later Bourquin surrendered. Agra was taken on Oct. 18; and on Oct. 31, Sindhia's forces were finally crushed at the battle of Laswari. Throughout the campaign, they had fought magnificently: but the war conveyed two military lessons in particular. One was an old one—that by taking a vigorous offensive, even with very great risks, victory was certain to fall to the British if they were well led. The other had not before been demonstrated; that a native Power which adopted European methods in the field, although placed at a great advantage in fighting Oriental rivals, was less fitted to maintain a prolonged resistance to the British, because the effect of any defeat was much more decisive.

By the end of December 1803, Sindhia and the Bhonsla, both completely worsted, had signed respectively the treaties of Surji Arjangaon and Deogaon. Both surrendered all claim to *chauth*, agreed to accept British arbitration in disputes with the Nizam, and gave up the employment of French officers. Sindhia ceded, in the Dekhan, Baroch and Ahmednagar, the latter being transferred to the Nizam; in Hindostan, the Doab, and other districts north of the Chambal river. The Nagpur Raja ceded Berar (west of the Warda) which was also transferred to the Nizam, and Kattak on the East coast, so that the British territory now

Successes  
of General  
Lake in  
Hindo-  
stan.

mission  
of the  
Bhonsla  
and  
Sindhia.



extended unbroken from Calcutta to the Carnatic. Apart from the new revenues thus acquired these treaties gave the British through communication by land between Bengal and the South, and a defensible frontier in upper Hindostan; besides what was of immense political importance, the guardianship and control of the Mogul himself, and therewith the official responsibility of general sovereignty.

Wellesley's policy up to 1802 had effected a complete change in our position in India: the treaty of Bassein and the war of 1803 expanded the change into a revolution, which proved too much for the nerves of the authorities at home. Their restive disapprobation was converted into panic by the events of 1804. The disturbing factor was Holkar. He had abstained from supporting Sindhia and the Bhonsla: but it became clear as time passed that he was minded to try conclusions with the British on his own account. Within four months of the treaties with Sindhia and the Nagpur Raja, it became necessary to declare war on Jeswant Rao.

The British troops this time were to advance from Gujerat under Murray, and from the Jamna under Lake. Rampura was taken within the month; Holkar retreated. Lake ought either to have moved in hot pursuit or to have waited till after the rains for further action; but unfortunately what he did was to withdraw his main army beyond the Jamna, sending forward Colonel Monson, with a force which only brilliant leadership could have made adequate, that he and Murray might catch Holkar on two sides. But Murray fell back before the Maratha who turned on Monson. Thereupon Monson began to retreat. Holkar's horsemen, without joining battle, harassed him cruelly. The rajas through whose territories he was passing, at Kotah and elsewhere, refused him passage. The rains coming on made the country almost impassable. Supplies were failing, and the intelligence Department was useless. Monson paused in his retreat for some time at Rampura; then he moved again; the retreat became both hasty and disorderly; Holkar's attacks became more and more destructive; it was finally a routed remnant of the corps that found its way



back to Agra, while Holkar swept northwards and laid siege to Delhi.

The triumph was short-lived, but an infinity of harm had already been accomplished. All the Marathas were preparing to rise: insulting ballads were sung all over the country.<sup>1</sup> At home the alarm at the India House spread to Ministers, and Wellesley's recall was decided on. Cornwallis, now sixty-seven years of age, was entreated to go out once more and save India, by reversing the entire policy of the headstrong Governor-General. He consented, and arrived in India in July 1805. In the meantime, Holkar had been just repulsed at Delhi which was brilliantly defended by Ochterlony, afterwards famous in the Ghurka war; then he was routed at Dig, pursued through the Doab, and finally expelled from it by General Fraser. To Lake himself it was due that the recovery of prestige was seriously discounted by the complete and sanguinary failure of his siege of Bhartpur—which had gone over to Holkar in the tide of his success. It was evident however that the Marathas' powers of resistance were practically exhausted, and that Wellesley's policy was on the verge of being decisively vindicated in the military point of view, when he found himself superseded.

Alarm in England.

Successful operations against Holkar.

Wellesley recalled.

On his return to England, Parliament declined to support

<sup>1</sup> A rhyme which survives in nurseries to-day is worth quoting, if only because of Macaulay's curious misinterpretation of it.

“Ghore par hauda,  
Hathi par zin  
Jaldi bhag-gaya  
Kornail Monsin”—

rendered by Yule

Horses with howdahs, and  
Elephants, saddled  
Off helter-skelter the  
Sahibs skedaddled.

Now this rhyme was of early date, and the name of “Warren Hasteen” often takes the place of “Colonel Monseen.” But Macaulay, unaware of the inversion of howdahs and saddles, thought it was a tribute to the splendour of the great Governor-General: whereas it probably refers to his escape from Benares.

the attacks made on the great Empire-builder : but the India House, Directors and Proprietors alike, condemned him ; nor was it till some thirty years later that they rescinded their condemnation and rendered their applause to one of the greatest of their many great servants.



## CHAPTER · XIV

### NON-INTERVENTION

THE immense and far reaching activity of Lord Wellesley had created something like a panic among the authorities in England; and a brief era followed, which began with an energetic reversal of policy, but developed under Lord Minto into a perpetual straining at the Directors' leash—a renewal of activity which required constant defence, and yet fell far short of the necessities of the case. Reversal of Wellesley's policy.

Wellesley's immediate successor was once more Cornwallis, who took up his duties in India in July 1805. Cornwallis however died early in October—not three months after he landed. The home authorities had made no provision for such a contretemps, and Sir George Barlow, the senior Member of Council succeeded to the office of Governor-General, pending a fresh appointment from London. Barlow became an energetic devotee of the new policy and found much favour with the Court of Directors. But in the beginning of 1806 a new ministry was formed at Westminster which included some strong advocates of Wellesley's policy. The Directors wished to confirm Barlow as Governor-General, and Lord Minto, at this time President of the Board of Control, agreed to the appointment as a temporary measure. The Ministry however would have none of him, and appointed Lord Lauderdale. Lauderdale was opposed to the Company's monopoly, besides having indulged in an extravagant display of Jacobinism at an early stage of the French Revolution: so the Directors in their turn would have none of him. The deadlock was removed by the appointment of Lord Minto himself, a capable statesman, well grounded in Indian affairs by his experience at the Board of Control. He arrived in India in 1807, remaining till 1813 when he was succeeded by Lord Moira, better known as Lord Hastings. The successors to the Governor-Generalship: Cornwallis: Barlow. Lord Minto appointed.



The French menace. European affairs continued during this period to have their effect on the government of India, direct or indirect. Napoleon had become Emperor in 1804. In October 1805, the victory of Trafalgar finally ended his maritime ambitions. But in Europe, his course of conquest was maintained at Austerlitz, and in October 1806 at Jena. In 1807, his power attained its most alarming pitch when he entered on the treaty of Tilsit with Russia, and it seemed probable that the combination would not only crush the life out of Europe, but would threaten Asia as well. But in 1808, the Spanish people rose against the Bonapartist dominion; British troops were thrown into Portugal, and the Peninsula war began, absorbing masses of Napoleon's troops. In 1809 the amity between the Tsar and Napoleon was markedly cooling, and in 1810 it had turned into hostility. In 1809 therefore, all dread of immediate aggression in Asia had passed away, and from that time, the terror of France fades and presently vanishes, to be replaced as the years passed on by the ever encroaching, ever approaching shadow of Russia.

The Russian menace. The practical effect then is, that up till 1805, it had continued to be a primary object to guard against the possibilities of French troops being thrown into India by sea, to lend their aid to Native Powers against the British. The reality of the risk had in fact been removed by the battle of the Nile; yet not with sufficient definiteness to allow of its being ignored. After 1805, the possibility to be guarded against becomes that of invasion overland; of which feeling the first clear symptom was Malcolm's mission to Persia in 1800. The problem of external defence is transferred to the North West frontier and the lands beyond it; and even here, after Lord Minto's time, no serious general apprehensions are aroused for a quarter of a century. Since then, the frontier, and frontier policy, have been always with us.

Wellesley's policy left uncompleted. Wellesley had systematically acted with the following objects—to control the international policy and the military armaments of all great Native States; to do so, by maintaining within each of them, a British force, theoretically for



the security of the Native Government; the force being therefore justly supported at the expense of the said Governments; from whom in consequence cessions of territory were demanded, as security for the payment of the forces. It was not however a part of his policy to take over the administration of the States themselves, except in such a case as that of Arcot, where the ruling dynasty had for half a century proved itself consistently incapable beyond hope of revivification. In Mysore an alien dynasty which had usurped dominion less than forty years before, was destroyed; but the earlier dynasty was restored, with very much its original domains, and the administration was not withdrawn. In general, it was required only that the Native rulers should not allow their territories to fall into such a condition of anarchy as would make them a menace to the general peace.

But these ends had been achieved only by a very heavy immediate outlay, alarming to the commercial instincts of Leadenhall Street, where it seemed as though endless vistas of military projects were being opened out. The achievement was yet incomplete, the Marathas had been only partially brought within the scheme, Holkar was still in the field, when the reins were transferred to other hands, the policy was reversed. Yet the work was necessary: it had to be completed a dozen years later; and that it might be completed much of it had then to be done over again.

When Cornwallis arrived, Holkar was still active, and Sindhia's attitude was extremely uncertain. He had agreed to Wellesley's terms under the impression that he was to withdraw from the territories north of the Chambal; but Wellesley demanded also the cession of Gwalior itself, in spite of Lake's remonstrances. Cornwallis however was prepared to go much further in the way of concession; to restore Gwalior and even Delhi to Sindhia, and to withdraw the promised protection from the Rajput princes. These views he embodied in a dispatch to Lake on Sept. 19; but Lake would not act on them till he had submitted his objections, and the Governor-General had died before these reached him. Barlow, taking office declared for the new

Reactionary policy of Cornwallis and Barlow.



policy. In the meantime Lake was simultaneously moving troops, and negotiating with Sindhia, who fortunately had just appointed a minister favourable to the British and animated by a strong dislike to Holkar and his Pathan associate Amir Khan. Sindhia therefore was satisfied with the retention of Gwalior, and the establishment of the Chambal as his boundary.

Holkar withdrew towards the Panjab, raising troops; Lake started in pursuit, chased him across the Satlej, and came to an agreement with Ranjit Singh, the Raja of Lahore, who refused thenceforth to countenance the Maratha chief. Holkar was forced to sue for peace, and got it, very much to his own contemptuous astonishment, on the lines laid down by Barlow. The Governor-General however altered even the accepted proposals in Holkar's favour, gave back to him all possessions south of the Chambal including Rampura which had before been expressly excepted, and entirely withdrew all protection from the Rajput Rajas of Jeipur, Bundi and other States, who had loyally declined to support the Marathas against the British, and were now shamefully left to pay the penalty which Holkar exacted to the full. Lake himself was so scandalised at the desertion that he resigned his political functions. The final result of the Maratha settlement as effected by Sir George Barlow was that the Rajput States, where disorder and violence were normal, passed through a period of desperate turmoil, suffering many things beyond their wont at the hands of Sindhia, Amir Khan, and Holkar. The career of the last however was shortly brought to a close; for in 1808 he became totally insane, and died three years later.

Occasional  
firmness of  
Barlow. Unhappy as were the consequences of Barlow's government on the independent States of Hindostan, within the area where British control had already been definitely established he evinced some degree of firmness. Having originally supported the treaty of Bassein, he declined to recede from it at the call of the Directors; and at Haidarabad, when the Nizam began to display a desire to be rid of his protectors, Sir George insisted on his restoring to office a minister friendly to the British.



The latter part of Barlow's administration was made memorable by the mutiny of the Sepoys at Vellur. The Princes of Tippu's family had been allowed to take up their residence there. The mutineers, one regiment of whom consisted of Mysore Mussulmans, hoisted Tippu's flag, and there was no doubt that the deposed family were responsible for encouraging the movement; though, on investigation, it became tolerably clear that the Sepoys had actually risen on the strength of their own grievances; various new regulations having been introduced by a commander who did not appreciate native prejudices, which appear trivial enough but to them have a serious religious import. The idea was started that the regulations were a step towards imposing Christianity upon the Sepoy. Several officers were murdered: but the mutiny was promptly quelled by the arrival from Arcot of Colonel Gillespie with a small detachment. The ring-leaders were executed; there was some delay in dealing with the rest, as the matter was referred home. It was finally settled by Lord Minto on his arrival, the men being dismissed instead of suffering any severer punishment, on the ground that they had had a really serious grievance. Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras and subsequently Governor-General, was recalled, with the Commander-in-Chief, as soon as the news of the mutiny reached England, though Bentinck was, not in fact to blame. Tippu's family, though not without complicity in the rising, were removed to Calcutta but not otherwise punished.

The  
Vellur  
mutiny.

Another mutiny of a somewhat serious character occurred in 1809-10 when Sir George Barlow was Governor of Madras, whither he had gone on vacating the governor-generalship. This time, the mutineers were the British officers of the Madras army. According to the vicious system of underpaying the Company's servants, and making up the deficiency in anomalous perquisites, certain contracts were placed in the hands of the officers. They were wrong in principle, and ought to have been abolished; but the authorities set about abolishing them by way of curtailing expenditure. Much violent language was used on the part of Sir George Barlow on one side, and the Commander-in-Chief on the other, and

Mutiny of  
the Madras  
officers.



improper arrests were made on both sides. Matters however quieted down on the General's retirement; but some months later Barlow revived the trouble by attacking some of the officers who had taken part in the agitation. The whole military body was furious; but a few stood by the Government as a matter of discipline: and the King's troops were loyal. Barlow successfully defied the mutineers, though strongly advised to give way. The contingents at Haidarabad, Masulipatam and Seringapatam, had all declared their adhesion to the revolt; but in a calmer moment they realised the nature of their action and made submission. The personal feeling against Barlow had counted for much, and the resolute but conciliatory intervention of Lord Minto terminated what had at one time threatened to prove a very serious incident. Barlow was recalled—an unfortunate example of an admirable public servant who was quite unfit to rule.

Persia and France. Lord Minto's arrival in India was signalled almost immediately by a collision with the Home Government. Persia having hastily entered on a Russian War in 1806, appealed for British protection on the strength of the 1800 treaty, in 1807. The appeal was declined, and she turned to Napoleon. A French Embassy arrived and was about to complete arrangements extremely adverse to both Russia and Britain, when the treaty of Tilsit changed the French policy towards the former Power. A British envoy had clearly something to do at Teheran. Lord Minto dispatched Malcolm, whose previous mission qualified him eminently for the post; but ministers sent Sir Harford Jones. Sir Harford was detained at Bombay: but Malcolm, on arriving in Persia, took umbrage at the treatment he received and withdrew. Sir Harford was now allowed to proceed; but a few days later, it was resolved to send a military expedition as the best counterpoise to the French influence at Teheran. Meantime, Sir Harford informed the Shah, speaking as the representative not of the Governor-General but of the Crown, that there should be no aggression against his territories. The change in the attitude of the French towards Russia had now become apparent, and a treaty of friendship was promptly accepted; the Shah agreeing to resist the passage of any European force through his

Counter-embassies of Malcolm and Jones.



territories, while the British engaged to help him with troops or money if Persia were invaded. Lord Minto accepted the treaty, but felt bound to assert himself by sending Malcolm on what may be called an Embassy of Display, and the presence of two opposition British ambassadors at one court was in danger of producing most unseemly results. The two however had the wisdom to join hands; Malcolm had an immense gift of popularity; and the friction was dissolved. The recurrence of the trouble was obviated by the appointment from London of Sir Gore Ouseley, and the withdrawal of both Malcolm and Sir Harford. From that time, British diplomacy in Persia has been controlled not from India but from Westminster—with very little credit to Westminster.

The same anxiety as to the possibilities of a European attack overland brought about the mission to Kabul of Mountstuart Elphinstone; by which little was gained, beyond some knowledge of the country, owing to the fact that the position of the king, Shah Shuja, was at the time too unstable to allow his friendship to be of much value: and he was summarily ejected from his realm a year later. A mission to Sindh about the same time issued in a treaty of friendship of no great value. Missions to Kabul and Sindh.

Within India, Lord Minto was unable to revert to Wellesley's policy; but he saw at once that unmitigated non-intervention was impossible. His attention was called to Bandelkhand immediately on his arrival. Bandelkhand is a district, inhabited largely by Rajput clans, lying on the south of the Jamna, east of its confluence with the Chambal. Bandelkhand. It had owned the supremacy not, as might have been expected, of Sindhia, but of the Peshwa; who, a year after the treaty of Bassein, had exchanged it for territories in the Dekhan, ceded to the British under that instrument. Anarchy and robbery, to which the Marathas had no objection, had habitually prevailed throughout the country which was studded with fortresses. The free-booting Sirdars objected to an organised rule; and despite the representations of Lake, Barlow had not considered it worth while to take the steps necessary for bringing it into order. Lord Minto forthwith made it known that anarchy within the British



dominion would not be tolerated, and most of the rajas were prompt to make submission when they realised that the warning was meant seriously. The wilder spirits however were in possession of the great fortresses, and offered a prolonged resistance; with such vigour indeed that four years elapsed before the last and ablest of them offered to submit, on terms highly favourable to himself, which a weary Government conceded.

Lord Minto and the Sikhs. A more definite breach, however, of the theory of non-intervention was brought about in Sirhind, lying between the Satlej and the Jamna, in the occupation of a number of Sikh chiefs. The trans-Satlej Sikhs of the Panjab had of late years been growing into a strong military organisation, especially since the rise of Ranjit Singh, Maharaja of Lahore, who now sought to extend his dominion over his Cis-Satlej compatriots. They however were not interested in the ambitions of the Panjab Sikhs, nor were they threatened by the same enemies, and they proceeded to request the intervention and protection of the British, in 1808. Ranjit entered his protest, with a declaration that they were his subjects. Lord Minto was alive to the impolicy of allowing the Panjab to absorb Sirhind, but was at the time embarrassed by the desire to secure the friendliness of the frontier State in case of Franco-Russian machinations. Charles Metcalfe was sent to negotiate, and Metcalfe and Ranjit Singh. Ranjit was quite alive to the advantages of his own diplomatic position. The young civilian however encountered him with great firmness and tact. While the diplomatic contest was still going on, the fears of the Government of India were allayed by the severance of France and Russia and the situation changed at once. The astute Ranjit had no intention of risking a war, retreated skilfully from his position, and agreed to withdraw his claims on Sirhind if the British would promise not to interfere with him in the Panjab. From that hour till his death he remained the very good friend and ally of the British—though with a possible moment of wavering, during the Gurkha war.

Rise of the Pindaris. By 1809 the consequences of the lenient treatment of Holkar began to be displayed in unmistakable fashion by the raids of his ally the Pathan free-lance Amir Khan. Holkar's



insanity had already developed, and Amir Khan, who had at his back half the Mussalman and Pindari<sup>1</sup> mercenaries of India, professed to act in Holkar's interests. Having made the most of extensive opportunities in Rajputana, he next thought fit to plunder Nagpur. Now however the limits of British neutrality had been reached. In defiance of doctrines of non-intervention, Lord Minto prepared to take arms in defence of the Bhonsla. The Nagpur troops themselves twice defeated Amir Khan in the field, but he was renewing the attack when he learnt that the British were advancing against him; whereupon he retired to Indur, on the ostensible ground that the regency there required his services. The immediate object of the British being accomplished, the Governor-General held his hand, and turned his attention to other affairs, not without much doubt as to the view that might be taken of his intervention at the India House. So beyond the Nerbadda, Pathans and Pindaris were allowed to wax gross.

To Lord Minto however fell the opportunity, which he seized with great success, of intervention in the deadly struggle with Napoleon. The French naval station at Mauritius was a standing danger while French fleets were powerful: it continued to be a thorn in the side of the East India trade even after Trafalgar. British expeditions thither had proved completely unsuccessful. But at the end of 1810, the Governor-General fitted out a great expedition from India which captured the islands, and permanently extracted the thorn. Further, Napoleon having absorbed Holland, the Spice Islands had become French property. In 1811, the Governor-General, having obtained permission to attack Java, personally accompanied a great expedition to the Island. The prize was secured after some hard fighting in which Colonel Gillespie who had quelled the Vellur mutiny greatly distinguished himself.

Capture of  
Mauritius  
and Java.

Shortly after his return to India, Lord Minto learnt to his surprise that he had been superseded by Lord Hastings. The new Governor-General however did not arrive till the autumn of 1813.

Lord  
Minto  
recalled.

<sup>1</sup> The Pindaris were free-booting bands of light horse, mainly Marathas.



## CHAPTER XV

### LORD HASTINGS

(*Maps I., V. and VIII.*)

Lord Hastings. **L**ORD MOIRA, who soon afterwards was created Marquess of Hastings, was now in his fifty-ninth year. He had seen active service as a very young man in the war of American Independence. He had taken a considerable part in public affairs, was a *persona grata* with the Prince Regent, and had made an unsuccessful attempt to form a ministry. Wellesley had left England with a strong prejudice against Warren Hastings, but his Indian experience rapidly converted him into a political disciple and a personal admirer. Lord Hastings in his turn—he was not related to his predecessor—when in England was strongly opposed to Wellesley's policy of aggrandisement, but in his career as Governor-General, the policy he found it imperative to carry out was that of which Wellésley was the typical exponent—the systematic extension of control over Native States.

The circumstances were in fact too strong for a preconceived judgment to stand against them. The new Governor-General found himself almost at the outset face to face with a new aggressor; by the time that aggressor was disposed of, Pindaris, Pathans, and Marathas, had given such unmistakable proofs that they could be dealt with only by the strong hand that even a Barlow would have been convinced. The necessary policy might however have been pursued reluctantly and incompletely; Hastings having once accepted it carried it out firmly, intelligently and thoroughly.

The Gurkhas. The new aggressor was the Gurkha State of Nepal, lying along the Northern Mountain border of India the whole way



from the Satlej on the west to Sikkim on the east. The Gurkhas are an admirably hardy and courageous race of Mountaineers, claiming a Rajput descent, but probably sprung from a Mongolian stock with a comparatively recent infusion of Rajput blood derived from militant Rajput immigrants. In number they were singularly few, very unlike the hordes of the Marathas, and not even comparable to the Sikh minority which dominated the Panjab; but in fighting qualities they were second to none. They had begun to organise themselves into a State only in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and had rapidly established themselves from end to end of the long and narrow strip of territory known as Nepal. But they were not content with their mountains and began to encroach on the Terai—the fertile plain skirting the foothills, watered by the upper streams of the Ganges and its tributaries. During the first decade of the nineteenth century the encroachments began to affect British territory.

At the close of Lord Minto's administration the advancing Gurkhas laid claim to districts near Gorakhpur, which they occupied. Their claim was negatived, and they were required to withdraw, but before their official answer was received, Lord Hastings was in office. Their reply was a refusal, and Hastings returned a peremptory response, followed up by the occupation of the disputed districts. Counsels were divided at Katmandhu, the Nepal capital. Amar Singh, their best soldier, opposed war; but the Durbar, confident in the impregnability of their mountains, were defiant, and threw down the gauntlet by attacking the occupied district: and war followed.

The  
challenge  
from  
Nepal.

In Indian warfare there is one established rule—not to take the defensive, but to strike and strike hard against almost any odds. In this case, the numerical odds were all against the Gurkhas, whose trained force amounted to little if at all above 12,000 men. In their favour however, they had the extremely difficult nature of the country, while the Governor-General was greatly hampered by want of funds, and neither the officers nor the men of the Bengal army had experience of hill fighting.



**The Gurkha war : disastrous opening.** Hastings was Commander-in-Chief, as well as Governor-General, and controlled the plan of campaign. Two columns were to enter Nepal at the Western end, commanded by Ochterlony and Gillespie; two were to advance on Katmandhu at the Eastern end, from Behar. Ochterlony's skilful manœuvring on the extreme west against Amar Singh was rendered ineffective by a disaster to Gillespie; whose headlong valour led him to a quite unnecessary attempt to storm a Gurkha fort. Gillespie himself was killed; in this and a subsequent attack the valiant defenders slew more of the enemy than their own numbers all told; and the whole column was held at bay throughout the winter (1814). In the meantime, the Eastern columns under Generals Marley and Wood met with no better success: the Gurkhas repulsed their attacks, and the Generals lacked the persistence to force their way and the intelligence to outmanœuvre the much smaller forces opposed to them.

**Excitement in Hindo-stan.** The effect of the check was serious. All over India the natives again began to believe that the decadence of the British power had commenced. The Peshwa renewed intrigues with the other Maratha princes. Sindhia and Amir Khan set their forces in motion. Ranjit Singh moved an army to the Satlej. On the other hand, Hastings raised new regiments and otherwise prepared for emergencies. Fortunately, internal quarrels broke up the hostile armaments. Sindhia's generals fell out: Ranjit Singh found affairs on the Afghan border pressing: Amir Khan could not resist the

**Success of Ochterlony.** opportunity for plundering Jodhpur. Most important of all, Ochterlony turned the tide of failure. After months of skilful manœuvring against a skilful foe, he isolated Amar Singh and his brave followers in the fort of Malaun, in the Simla district, in April. In the same month, a special force of irregulars under Colonels Gardner and Nicholls took Almora, the principal place in Kumaon. When affairs had become desperate, Amar Singh allowed those who would to surrender, but resolved himself to resist to the last with a small but devoted band. Finding however, that this was only to doom them to certain death in a hopeless cause, he at length surrendered. All honour was paid to the heroic



foe ; but the whole territory from the Satlej eastward to the river Kali submitted to the conquerors ; and the Gurkhas of those territories having been fairly beaten in a stand-up struggle forthwith attached themselves heartily and loyally to the new Government.

Hastings now offered terms to the Nepal Government at Katmandhu, and at the end of the year it seemed that his proposal had been accepted, when Amar Singh succeeded in reviving the no-surrender policy. He had raised his voice against the war originally, but he held it shame to surrender now to the British demands. Ochterlony however was placed in command of the force to proceed to Katmandhu. The passes were held, but the British general turned the Gurkha positions, and they had no option save surrender to his superior numbers and armament. The cession of the territory west of the River Kali was confirmed by treaty ; a portion of the Terai was given up and transferred to the Navab of Oudh who had rendered valuable pecuniary assistance ; and a war redounding to the honour of the Gurkhas was concluded by an honourable peace, and an amity no less honourably maintained ever since (March 1816)

Conquest  
of the  
Gurkhas.

Ever since Cornwallis had stopped the completion of Wellesley's schemes, the power of the great free-booting companies assembled about and beyond the Nerbadda valley had been growing increasingly dangerous. These free-booters were of two classes ; the Mussulmans or Pathans who contemned any occupation but that of fighting, and the Pindaris largely Marathas, who also lived by pillage, and had formed themselves into large bands of light horsemen, but had never definitely attached themselves to any one in particular among the Maratha potentates. These two classes, Pathans and Pindaris, were to some extent interchangeable : but for the most part the Pathans served under the banner of Amir Khan, and the Pindaris under those of other captains of whom the ablest was Chitu. The Pindaris proved audacious enough to carry their incursions, which were accompanied by the most ghastly atrocities, even into the British districts of Orissa.

Pathans  
and  
Pindaris.



**Disturbances in Central India.**

To curb these dangerous hands, Lord Hastings sought to establish a subsidiary alliance with Nagpur, but the Bhonsla was too anxious to preserve his independence. Hastings then proposed to follow that course with other minor princes at Sagar near the Bandelkhand border, and notably with the ruler of Bhopal in the Nerbadda valley—a Mussulman principality which had on various occasions rendered loyal service to the British.

In 1813, Sindhia and the Bhonsla combined to attack Bhopal; where however Wazir Mohammed offered a stubborn resistance, and appealed for British help. The Governor-General, in spite of the still active Gurkha complication, took upon himself to warn off the Marathas; and while Sindhia was protesting, Ochterlony was restoring the British fortresses in Nepal. The Bhonsla and Sindhia both retired, but the alliance which Hastings had contemplated was almost simultaneously declined by Wazir Mohammed and vetoed by the India House.

The Members of Council, like the India House, were opposed to the views which Hastings had developed: but the Governor-General laid them before the authorities in London at an auspicious time. George Canning had just become President of the Board of Control; and though his first despatch was antagonistic, the report of the last Pindari irruption caused it to be followed in three weeks by another authorising the most rigorous action and practically allowing Hastings a free hand.

**Intrigues of Baji Rao Peshwa.**

In the meantime, the conduct of Baji Rao the Peshwa had been extremely unsatisfactory. While avoiding any open display of hostility, he was constantly engaged in intriguing against the British at the other Marathi Courts. The Gaikwar was at this time the most friendly of the Powers to the British: partly owing to the influence of a Brahmin minister. On the other hand the Peshwa, himself a Brahmin, was much under the influence of a low-caste Hindu named Trimbakji. Ostensibly for the settlement of disputes between the Peshwa and the Gaikwar, the minister of the latter, known as the Shastri, was inveigled to Puna under a British guarantee of safety, and was then murdered



by Trimbakji's orders (July 1815): no one having a doubt of Baji Rao's complicity. Formally of course his declarations of innocence were accepted; he was obliged however by the resolute attitude of the Resident, Elphinstone, to surrender the person of Trimbakji, but continued his intrigues none the less zealously.

In 1816 affairs at Nagpur took a favourable turn. Raghoji Bhonsla died: his son was an imbecile; the regency was disputed; and Apa Sahib, the heir presumptive, thinking that British support would be useful to him, offered to accept the subsidiary alliance which Raghoji had always declined. He showed clearly enough later on, that he had not been actuated by any pro-British sentiment; but the accomplishment of the treaty gave us a military control within his dominions which proved of no little value. Subsidiary treaty with Nagpur.

The whole position, then, at the close of 1816, may be summarised. The danger which had for a short time arisen with the disasters at the beginning of the Gurkha war, was over: no disturbance threatened from Nepal. The Pindaris in Central India were growing more audacious and irrepressible. The minor princes were divided in mind between their desires for British protection and for their own independence—incompatible advantages. Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, had not been brought under British control; and were certainly not friendly. Daulat Rao, it may be noted, was still little more than thirty; and Holkar was a minor, whose Durbar was divided into factions. The Peshwa and the Bhonsla's regency were now held in check by the British Residents and Contingents, but the former at least was vehemently set upon escaping from the bonds which he had forged for himself. The Nizam had ceased, and the Panjab had not really begun, to be active political factors. The recent performances of the Pindaris had almost converted the opposition members of the Calcutta Council, and Canning's dispatches withdrawing the non-intervention instructions were on the way out. The situation in 1817.

The plain truth was that there never had been order in Hindostan, except while some paramount Power was Need of a paramount Power.



recognised all over it. Hence the Mogul dominion with all its defects had rendered great benefits to the whole population. That dominion had not been overthrown by the British: it had collapsed for reasons already explained. But it had become imperative that its place should be taken by someone, and the only possible someone was the British Power. On us, however reluctant the merchants and politicians in London might be to face the fact, the responsibility had devolved; it was no longer possible to refuse its acceptance.

Attitude  
of the  
Marathas.

In 1817, matters were clearly working up to a crisis. On the one hand, Nasir Mohammed, the successor of Wazir Mohammed in Bhopal, accepted the subsidiary alliance, afterwards displaying the habitual loyalty of his house; and several of the Princes of Rajputana came into the British alliance. On the other hand, the imbecile Bhonsla was murdered and succeeded by the regent Apa Sahib; who, no longer needing external support for his claims, was now as anxious as the Peshwa to be rid of British control. In the Puna country, Trimbakji escaped from confinement, and set actively to work to produce an anti-British insurrection; it was perfectly certain that he was in league with the Peshwa: and the latter after much evasion was compelled to assent to a new treaty confirming that of Bassein, but also accepting an increase of the Contingent, and making material cessions of territory and fortresses besides formally resigning the suzerainty or hegemony of the Maratha Confederacy. Finally, negotiations were entered upon with Sindhia, Amir Khan and Holkar—who were all notoriously interested in maintaining the Pindaris—with a view to persuading or coercing them into taking part in the suppression of the free-booters. In especial, it was impressed upon Sindhia that he had frequently violated the conditions upon which he had been permitted to retain his independence, and that a revision of terms was imperative.

Opening  
of the  
Campaign,  
1817.

The campaign against the Pindaris opened in the Autumn of 1817, on a gigantic scale: for the arrangements were necessarily based on the possibility that the whole force of



the Marathas, as well as of Amir Khan, might act on behalf of the Pindaris.

Of the military operations which followed, it is impossible to do more than attempt to give an intelligible outline.

Looking at the Maratha map (V.): the Pindaris, whose suppression was the prime object of the war, had their head-quarters in and about the valley of the Nerbadda. It must be observed that the Doab had now passed from Sindhia to the British, who were free also to operate from Bandelkhand, from the Bhonsla's dominions, the Haidarabad border, and the districts from Puna north to Gujerat. That is, they formed a sort of horse-shoe embracing Sindhia, the Pindaris, Amir Khan, and Holkar; with the Rajput States on the open side. At the same time, both Puna and Nagpur might rise upon them. Hastings had carefully disposed the divisions of the great army he had been preparing—it numbered nearly 120,000—so that as they moved towards the centre they would come in touch with each other and form a cordon. The first movement however did not take place till the end of October (1817) when two divisions were suddenly advanced from the Doab so as to threaten Gwalior from two sides and paralyse any attempt at adverse action on Sindhia's part: whereby he found himself compelled promptly to sign the treaty which he had been evading for some months past. One of the divisions then pushed southward up the Chambal. Another division was advancing from Bandelkhand under Marshall, and another was already on the upper Nerbadda under Adams, while Malcolm was advancing from Amrawati. The progress of these three drove the Pindaris to retreat, one portion under Chitu moving west, the other under two chiefs named Wasil Mohammed and Karim, towards Gwalior.

Skilful  
disposi-  
tions of  
Lord  
Hastings.

This move was due to Sindhia having received temporary relief, cholera having broken out in the division left to watch him, which in consequence had changed its quarters. But it was brought into the field again in time to isolate and intercept the Pindaris, who now had to make all haste to escape back into Holkar's country; which their extreme

Forced in-  
activity of  
Sindhia  
and  
Holkar.



mobility enabled them to do, though not without suffering heavy losses by the way.

**Fight at Kirki : defeat of the Peshwa.** During this time—roughly the months of November and December—Sindhia had been effectively paralysed by the grip of the northern British divisions. Holkar remained inactive; but both Puna and Nagpur witnessed memorable struggles. The Peshwa collected a large army, ostensibly to attack the Pindaris; but Elphinstone, the Resident, knew their purpose to be different. Accordingly on November 1st he removed the British brigade to a strong position at Kirki, in the immediate neighbourhood. On the fifth, he himself joined them, and had hardly left the Residency when it was sacked. More British troops were expected, and the Peshwa resolved to begin by wiping out those present. He moved his 25,000 men against Kirki: the force in Kirki, about a tenth of their number, took the offensive, and after a sharp action routed them. A fresh attack was not ventured upon: ten days later, the arrival of re-inforcements enabled the British to attack and occupy Puna which the Peshwa evacuated in haste, retiring to Sattara where he carried off the raja—the descendant of Sivaji—and for some time to come found sufficient occupation in evading the British pursuit.

**Fight at Sitabaldi : defeat of Apa Sahib.** Very similar were the events at Nagpur. The still smaller British force there withdrew, with the Resident, Richard Jenkins, to Sitabaldi close by: they were attacked on the 27th after a night of bombardment by masses of the Bhonsla's troops which included a large body of Arab mercenaries; the attack was stoutly resisted and finally dispersed by a brilliant cavalry charge. The Marathas lost heart, and in a few days re-inforcements arrived. The Bhonsla, however, did not escape but surrendered. It was somewhat unfortunate that the Arabs, who had seized the citadel were permitted to surrender on their own terms.

**Submission of Amir Khan.** Amir Khan, who appears to have evinced a wholesome distaste for coming to actual blows with the British, after some hesitation accepted the terms offered him, though the treaty was not signed till December 15. His Pathans, who, unlike their chief, were not comfortably provided for



were in no hurry to lay down their arms ; but Ochterlony, who had brought down a reserve division from the North, drove a wedge between the two main bodies, who thereupon submitted and gave up their arms.

The leaders of Holkar's army, and his Durbar, were divided by faction ; the army itself was eager to rise for the Peshwa. Collapse of Holkar. The more turbulent faction got the upper hand, murdered the regent, a widow of Jeswant Rao, and were consequently promptly attacked, and the army shattered, by the nearest British division. Malcolm marched in pursuit of Holkar, who accepted a treaty on Jan. 6. By Jan. 1818 therefore the war had resolved itself into a pursuit of the scattered bands of Pindaris ; of whose chiefs, Karim made terms, Wasil Mohammed was captured, and Chitu alone made good his escape. By a singularly appropriate nemesis, he was killed in the jungle a year later by a tiger.

Baji Rao and his troops remained to be accounted for, and the treacherous Apa Sahib of Nagpur had not been deposed. At the end of December, the Peshwa was once more marching on Puna when he caught a small body of 800 British on the way to reinforce the garrison there. Successes against the Peshwa. The little force however spent New-year's day in offering an extraordinarily brilliant defence, and the next day—evading the Peshwa by a ruse—their leader, Captain Staunton brought them back in triumph to Sirur, from whence they had started. The Peshwa again retired hastily from the pursuit of the British brigades. He was overtaken however, and fled from the field, while his best general was killed, and his captive, the Sattara Raja, fell into the hands of the British. Baji Rao himself made for Nagpur (March 1818).

It had become evident however that Apa Sahib was preparing for a rising : and in March, Jenkins placed him in confinement. Baji Rao after a series of doubles found himself hemmed in near the Nerbadda : and was finally allowed by Malcolm to surrender on very generous terms. Not the least remarkable achievement during this period was the subjugation of the Southern part of the Peshwa's dominions by Sir Thomas Munro ; who, left with only a very small Final operations.



force, by personal influence and skilful management, gathered troops, overcame all resistance, and converted a hostile into a friendly territory. The escape of Apa Sahib, and the need of reducing fortresses, protracted matters for some time. The ex-Bhonsla disappeared, eventually reaching the Panjab where his presence was ignored by Ranjit Singh, and he ended his career under surveillance in Rajputana. The last fortress—Asirgarh, near Buranpur—did not surrender till April 1819; when it was found that the resistance had been maintained at Sindhia's instigation.

Results of the war. The Governor General's object had been completely achieved. For the sake of clearness the story of the great war has been narrated, without interruption by details of the several treaties entered upon in its course. These may now be reviewed as forming the ground work of the necessary

1. Pathans and Pindaris. reconstruction. With the Pindaris, no treaty was made. They were simply broken up and scattered without possibility of re-combining. The Arab mercenaries in the service of the Bhonsla and the Peshwa were for the most part shipped out of the country. The Pathan chief Amir Khan was favoured with a principality at Tonk; his artillery was handed over to the British; and the Pathan troops were disarmed and disbanded, large numbers of them being transformed into Sepoys of the Company.

2. Sindhia. Sindhia had been ruled out of the conflict from the beginning, by the pressure of the British armies; and had to accept a treaty freeing the British from the obligation, imposed on them by Barlow's earlier treaty, of abstaining from political relations with the Rajput and other chiefs over whom Sindhia claimed supremacy. The extension of the British Protectorate over them followed. Asirgarh was ceded, and a small subsidiary contingent admitted.

3. Nagpur. The treachery of Apa Sahib resulted in his deposition. Instead however of annexing Nagpur, the British set up a new Raja of the Bhonsla family, during whose minority the State was admirably administered by the Resident, Richard Jenkins.

4. Holkar. Holkar, after the brief outbreak, accepted a subsidiary treaty, and resigned all his claims in Rajputana. Some



minor principalities, notably Sagar, whose Rajas had misbehaved, were annexed.

Finally the arch-Maratha, Baji Rao, who had called for Wellesley's protection in 1802, and ever since the granting of it had persistently plotted and intrigued against his protectors, was accounted beyond the pale of political restitution. His office and his honours were abolished, and his dominions were annexed by the British. Yet so strong was the desire to maintain native administrations wherever possible, that a portion of the territory was set aside and erected into the new principality of Sattara with the representative of the house of Sivaji as its head: the principle of political subjection and administrative independence being maintained. The idea of this arrangement was no doubt in part to destroy what had become in the course of a century the traditional elevation of the Peshwa family to the Maratha hegemony, a position which the Sivaji family would have no opportunity of recovering for themselves. Much to the Governor-General's annoyance, the Peshwa himself was allowed by Malcolm to retire to a jaghir in the Doab with a pension four times as large as Hastings had intended to sanction.

The total result therefore was this. Sindhia, despite the privy instigations to resistance of which he was known to have been guilty while openly professing loyalty, was not further penalised. He was allowed to retain a larger degree of independence than any other prince, nor was he deprived of more territory, though certain exchanges were made for greater convenience. Holkar was reduced to the position of a normal subsidiary ally, with an able native minister appointed by the British. The trans-Chambal claims of both Sindhia and Holkar were cancelled. It is noteworthy that Daulat Rao Sindhia at last recognised the logic of facts and remained docile and loyal for the rest of his days. The Gaikwar was already in the position of a subsidiary ally. A new Bhonsla was set up at Nagpur, in a like subordinate position, in preference to annexation. The lands of the fifth member of the pentarchy were annexed, excepting the portion allotted to the new Sattara State. Protection was extended

5. The Peshwa.

Summary of results.



to the provinces of Rajputana, and to the minor principalities within the area of Maratha supremacy. The work of pacification and the introduction of orderly government was carried out under the supervision of that brilliant gathering of administrators, among whom the most famous names are those of Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Jenkins, Ochterlony, and Metcalfe.

The King of Oudh and the Mogul.      The marked loyalty displayed so repeatedly by the Nawab of Oudh was rewarded in a peculiar manner. He was elevated from the rank of Wazir of the Mogul to that of a formally independent sovereign, with the title of Padishah or King. A similar honour offered to the Nizam was indignantly refused as treason to the recognised head of the Mohammedans in India. Wellesley's idea had been to make use of the power of the Mogul's name: that of Hastings was to deprive it of weight, and induce the recognition of the British Empire on its own merits. In Wellesley's time, when the Hindu Sindhia had set so much value on the Mogul fiction, he was certainly right. Time had probably justified the change of view as concerned the Hindus; but it is at least plausibly held that the earlier attitude helped to maintain a hold on the Mussulmans, and that the change was one among the innumerable factors associated with the mutiny of 1857.

The affair of Palmer & Co.      Great as were the services rendered by Lord Hastings, there were those at home whom he had offended, and who wished to enjoy the fruits of his policy, while repudiating its author. A further handle was given to this party by an incident at the close of the Governor-General's career; in which Hastings behaved in a manner sufficiently injudicious to allow of grave misconstruction being placed on his conduct. The trouble arose at Haidarabad. The Nizam was required to maintain a force known as the Haidarabad Contingent, which was separate from the subsidiary force. On this and on other objects an extravagant expenditure was kept up. Finally to help him out of his difficulties, an exception was made to the usual rules, and an English banking house, Palmer & Co., was allowed in 1816 to make advances to the Nizam's treasury. One of the partners



was a connection of the Governor-General, who used expressions which gave rise to a belief that Palmer & Co., could rely upon Government to back them in any differences with their clients. When Metcalfe arrived at Haidarabad in 1820 he found that the position the house had acquired was anomalous, dangerous, and strongly suggestive of jobbery. Hastings at first met his representations with indignation, but on finding how real was the ground on which they were based, he approved the cancelment of the permit granted to Palmer & Co., and provided funds for the Nizam to meet his obligations, by arbitrarily commuting for a lump sum the tribute hitherto paid by the British for the Sarkars. But the accusation of having been improperly connected with the Banking House—which was ultimately ruined by the issue of the transaction—continued to be urged against him by his ill-wishers.

The suppression of the Pindaris had been sanctioned by Canning in 1816; but the authorities in London maintained a consistent incapacity for recognising the necessity of the consequences involved. The great extension of British territory accompanied by the formal acceptance of ever-increasing responsibilities which it would have been a crime towards the weaker States at least to ignore, found no favour in London; while ministers applauded the accomplishment of great military achievements, they regretted the inevitable appearance of insatiable ambition: and when ministers regretted, Directors displayed active hostility. Moreover though the result of the war was to place the Indian treasury in a more completely satisfactory position than had been known for many years, the outlay was of course enormous, and the Company had ever an intense aversion to casting its bread upon the waters. Also, Hastings had a perverse determination to put the best men in positions of responsibility, whereas the directors considered that their own totally irrelevant wishes should be paramount.

Thus the tone of the India House had for some time been captious; on the affair of Palmer & Co. Hastings regarded it as a tantamount to a censure: and he resigned.

Conduct of  
the India  
House.

Retire-  
ment of  
Lord  
Hastings.

## 178      EXTENSION OF SUPREMACY

His resignation was accepted, with formal compliments; but it was strictly in accordance with precedent that two years later the India House practically censured him as guilty in the Palmer matter—only six years after raising a statue to Warren Hastings, who died in 1819.



## CHAPTER XVI

### BETWEEN LORD HASTINGS AND LORD AUCKLAND

(*Map I.*)

**T**HERE was some doubt as to who should succeed Lord Hastings. George Canning had actually been appointed, when the death of Castlereagh made him elect to remain at Westminster. The choice then remained between Lord William Bentinck, to whom reparation was owed for his recall from Madras, and Lord Amherst who had conducted an embassy to China with credit and had suffered from shipwreck and other troubles in connection therewith. Amherst was chosen. Bentinck's turn was to come later.

Hastings left India in Jan. 1823, the administration being conducted in the interim by Mr Adam: and it was not till some months had passed that his successor arrived, to find trouble brewing in a new quarter.

The rulers of Hindostan had never carried their dominion into the mountains on the East of Bengal. Chittagong, lying east of the delta of the Brahmaputra, was included in the Bengal province; otherwise the Brahmaputra valley was in effect its eastern limit, passing along the frontiers of Assam and of the hill tribes of Manipur and Lushai. Immediately south of Chittagong was the kingdom (at one time) of Arakan, south of that Pegu, and south of that the coast of Tenasserim. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Arakan, Pegu, Tenasserim, and the whole basin of the Irawadi, besides Assam, were absorbed into the kingdom of Burma with its capital at Ava. It was the action of the Burmese monarchy which forced upon the new Governor-

General a not very glorious and a particularly expensive war, and a quite unpremeditated extension of territory.

Retrospect  
of relations  
with  
Burma.

As early as the rule of Sir John Shore, the Burmese monarchy had come in contact with the British. Fugitives from Arakan had sought an asylum in Chittagong; the Burmese troops followed them: and Shore declined to shelter the fugitives, provided that the Burmese would keep to their own territories. Consequently the Burmese supposed that the British were a feeble folk. Not long after, several thousands of Arakanese again took flight into British territory. Wellesley was Governor-General, and they were not surrendered; on the contrary they made several armed invasions into Arakan from their new quarters. Three missions were however sent at intervals to Ava; but since their instructions were in each case conciliatory, the earlier impressions of the Burmese court were confirmed. Moreover, the Burmese authorities were as ignorant of affairs outside as the Chinese, and suffered from a similar mental inflation. Therefore, when during the lapse of several years the British steadily declined to surrender the Arakanese, the king of Ava in 1818 sent to Lord Hastings, demanding the restoration of his territories of Chittagong, Dakka and Murshedabad! The communication was returned to the king by Hastings with the remark that of course it was a forgery.

Collision  
with the  
Burmese.

Now the Burmese possessed a by no means contemptible general named Bandula, who was quite confident of his own ability to conquer the British: and the desire to try conclusions developed not only at the Court but all over the country. There is a small island, where the borders of Chittagong and Arakan meet. This the British had always regarded as their own. In 1823 the Governor-General thought it necessary to place a guard on the island. The Burmese sent a force which ejected the guard and took possession. Lord Amherst ejected the ejectors, and wrote to the king saying that his government wished for peace but would find themselves forced to retaliate if persistently insulted. So Bandula prepared to invade Bengal, and the Burmese Governor of Pegu was instructed to inform the



## BETWEEN HASTINGS AND AUCKLAND 181

Governor-General that he had better make his petition to Bandula, as the "Lord of the White Elephant" would receive no more communications. After that, it was sufficiently obvious that a declaration of war was the only course open: and war was declared in Feb. 1824.

Ignorance of the country was the great obstacle with which the British had to contend. There was a strong conviction that any attempt to enter Burma by land would be disastrous from pestilence and the want of supplies. So the plan was devised of sending the expedition by sea to Rangoon, on the hypothesis that it could then proceed up the Irawadi. The Bengal army was largely composed of high-caste Hindus, under a religious prohibition against crossing the sea. The Madras troops being drawn from the lower castes did not feel the same objection; therefore the expedition was made up of Europeans and Madras sepoy.

Plan of  
Campaign:  
1824.

The armament reached Rangoon in May. The town was promptly occupied, but the entire population disappeared from it into the jungle leaving it denuded of every species of supplies. Then came the rains, and with them malaria and dysentery; while the troops were fed on the provisions procured from Calcutta contractors. Calcutta contractors were notorious. The exertions of Sir Thomas Munro, now Governor of Madras, only sufficed to save the situation—but the army was forced to remain almost inactive till nearly the end of the year.

Opera-  
tions of  
1824.

Bandula had started on his invasion of Bengal, also in May. An unsupported British outpost in Chittagong had suffered disaster at his hands; but he was recalled in order to deal with the counter-invasion in Pegu. In December, he arrived before the British position at Rangoon, with sixty thousand men, who threw up a stockade behind which they prepared pits with great rapidity and dexterity. But a fight on December 7 followed by another on the 15th caused him to fall back to a position several miles up the river.

The British General, Sir Archibald Campbell, did not however advance till February. Bandula in his entrenchments repulsed the column sent against him, and the general

Opera-  
tions of  
1825:  
Spring.



advance was delayed till April 1st, when Bandula was killed by a bursting shell, and his army beat a hasty retreat. The British proceeded as far as Prome, which they occupied without resistance, but the rainy season set in, and again stopped offensive operations.

Two other expeditions set out by the routes rejected in the previous year—one by way of Manipur, the other into Arakan. The first found the country hopelessly impassable the moment the rains set in; which they did as early as February. The commander could see no alternative to withdrawal. Morrison in Arakan progressed very slowly; and as soon as the rains began, the greater part of his army was prostrated by disease which killed large numbers, though they found no other enemy to fight.

Operations of 1825: Autumn. As the year passed on, the British offered to negotiate; but the court of Ava though less confident of the invincibility of its army, refused to agree to the cession of Tenasserim and Arakan, with the payment of a heavy indemnity. Another army was collected, but suffered a complete defeat, and the Burmese reopened negotiations. Their envoys agreed to everything except the amount of the indemnity, which was then reduced. But while the ratification of the treaty was being awaited the enemy strengthened their entrenchments. Therefore on Jan. 19 the British attacked and routed them, capturing all their guns and stores, and marched towards the End of capital. A last desperate effort was made with a force of some the war. 16,000 men—all that the Burmese could collect—to crush the British force which now had less than a tenth of that number in its fighting line. The attack was completely defeated; and the Lord of the White Elephant accepted the British terms. Assam, Arakan and Tenasserim were ceded; Manipur was declared independent; a heavy indemnity was paid; and the presence of a British Resident at Ava was assented to.

Considerations thereon. The most remarkable result of the war was the amazing development of the resources of the three ceded provinces, which had not been supposed to have much value. The war itself had been in many respects a disastrous one. It had been declared on Feb. 24, 1824: the treaty of



peace was signed on Feb. 24, 1826 after precisely two years. As a mere matter of fighting the troops opposed to us were of less account than any of our previous antagonists; but there was much gross mismanagement which, coupled with the effects of the climate, caused an appalling amount of disease and a very heavy mortality; attributed by the sepoys to the magic arts of the enemy. To hold back from the war would have been impossible, and the subsequent accession of territory was inevitable—the more so as the population of the ceded districts detested the Burmese rule, which was peculiarly unenlightened.

One unfortunate incident must be noticed—the mutiny of a sepoy regiment at Barrackpur close to Calcutta. The soldiers had been expected to pay for the transport of their own baggage; but this regiment, which was under orders to march for Arakan, asked to be relieved on the ground that the transport expenses were exceptionally high. Their memorial, a perfectly proper one, was curtly rejected by the military authorities. The officers had only been with the regiment for three months, and had not acquired influence; the men became insubordinate. Two European regiments were brought up to the spot by night; the sepoys were paraded and ordered to march or ground arms. They would do neither. The Europeans opened fire on them. No resistance was made: numbers were killed; the ring-leaders were executed and the remainder sent to work in irons. Next year these were pardoned. After the point of mutiny had been reached, it is probable enough that any less severe action would have had a disastrous result; but if the men had been fairly met at first, there would never have been any mutiny.

The  
Barrack-  
pur  
Mutiny.

If the memory of disaster is quickly wiped out by victories, the memory of victories is still more quickly wiped out by disaster. The contrast between the swift successes of Lord Hastings and the dreary drag of the Burmese war, agitated the minds of the Indian population, and there was danger of fresh disturbances. For a moment affairs at Bhartpur, the Jat principality west of the Jamna before whose fortress Lake had so signally failed some years before, became

Trouble at  
Bhartpur:  
1725.



extremely threatening. The succession of a child to the throne was officially recognised: but the child was dispossessed a month later by a cousin named Durjan Sal. Ochterlony, who had been fighting in the Company's armies ever since the days of Haidar Ali, was in charge of the Rajputana and Malwa district. He promptly ordered up a British field force to establish the rightful Raja and vindicate British authority. But in doing so, he exceeded his legal powers; to proceed against Bhartpur meant besieging it again: the place was of immense strength, and had baffled Lake completely in 1805: a fresh failure would certainly have very serious results. Government, which was by no means on the best of terms with the old soldier, snubbed him, and countermanded the force. Durjan Sal, who had manifested a disposition to yield, was encouraged to believe that the British were afraid. Ochterlony, who was perfectly confident of his ability to capture Bhartpur, resigned his position in bitterness of spirit. There were thousands of fighting men deprived of their occupation by the recent settlement, who now flocked to Durjan Sal's standard: disaffection became generally recrudescient. These events took place in 1825, while India was very doubtful as to the probable issue of the Burmese war. The Calcutta Council was divided as to the proper course to take. Thither however came Metcalfe, on his way from Haidarabad to replace Ochterlony in the North-West. With the facts before him, his opinion was emphatic. The circumstances absolutely demanded that the British should assert themselves unmistakably. The Governor-General bowed to his judgment. Metcalfe proceeded to Delhi, and tried a preliminary expostulation with Durjan Sal who continued recalcitrant. The princes of Upper India, deluded by the belief that Burma was exhausting the entire British resources, were surprised by the appearance of an army of twenty thousand men. The great fortifications which Lake had persistently attempted to storm, fell before the science of the Engineers, and in January 1826, the capture of Bhartpur obliterated the misconceptions of twenty years. There was no longer an "impregnable" fortress left. The achievement



## BETWEEN HASTINGS AND AUCKLAND 185

was more convincing to the Native mind than all the successes of the Pindari campaigns: and removed all remaining inclination to challenge the supremacy of British arms.

Bhartpur was the decisive expression of an already accomplished fact. Between the Burmese annexations of 1826 and the conquest of Sindh in 1843 there was no further territorial expansion; nor any serious military operations till the Afghan expedition of 1839. The attention of the Governors-General was concentrated on administration and progress. The further dealings with Native States, up to the time of Lord Auckland may be treated in a few paragraphs.

Amherst was succeeded in 1828 by Lord William Bentinck, formerly Governor of Madras, whose benevolent and progressive government received its merited and eloquent eulogium from the brilliant pen of Macaulay. In his dealings with the Native States among which British Ascendancy was accepted, he was controlled by the emphatic instructions from England to maintain the habit of non-intervention. The unfortunate effects of the extreme application of this policy, especially in Oudh and at Gwalior became apparent in after years.

After the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1827, the affairs of that State fell into considerable disorder, resulting ultimately in the undue predominance of the soldiery therein, which had to be terminated by the campaign of Maharajpur in the time of Lord Ellenborough. In Oudh, the misgovernment became so serious that even the India House authorised annexation in the last resort; but Bentinck contented himself with remonstrances and threats, periodically renewed, but not enforced till the end of Dalhousie's administration.

Some interference however was made necessary by mal-administration in the Rajput State of Jeipur, where a permanent Resident was finally appointed, who exercised a salutary influence. Bentinck also found himself compelled not to annex, but to take over the administration of Mysore; where however the dynasty has since been re-instated in authority. Affairs there had prospered under the first



minister appointed by Wellesley ; but after his death anarchy had developed, and it was the actual revolt of the population against the government which necessitated Bentinck's action—an action received with the complete acquiescence of the Mysore State itself.

The small State of Kurg on the south of Mysore, which had actively helped us against Tippu Sahib was in a somewhat similar manner annexed on account of the general violence of its ruler : and the little province of Kachar, on the borders of Assam and Manipur, was by its own desire, on the death of its Raja without an heir, added to the British dominion.

**Metcalfe**  
**Governor-General** *ad interim.* In 1835, Sir Charles Metcalfe succeeded to the Governor-Generalship ; but in spite of a strong body of opinion which recognised his essential fitness for the post, his appointment was not confirmed in London, and ultimately after long delay the post was bestowed upon Lord Auckland, who went to India in 1836.

Metcalfe had an unusually strong title to exceptional treatment, but was prepared to return to the position of Governor of the North-West Provinces or of Madras. During his tenure of the Governor-Generalship, however, he had taken a strong and independent line in releasing the Press from the strict Government control to which it had hitherto been subjected. This step was distasteful to the India House ; and not only was he passed over for Madras, but the North-West provinces were once more reduced to a Lieutenant-Governorship before the appointment there was again offered to him. The slight was too grave ; and Metcalfe resigned the Indian service, to follow out his distinguished career in Canada and elsewhere.

**Appoint-ment of Lord Auckland.** With Lord Auckland's administration there commenced a new era of warfare, with its inevitable result of expanding dominion, reaching its climax in the rule of Lord Dalhousie and the transfer of the Government from the Company to the Crown in consequence of the great Mutiny.



## CHAPTER XVII

### THE SYSTEM

**A** STAGE has now been reached in the story of the British Expansion, at which it becomes practicable to give a connected review of the machinery by which the expanding rule was made effective, and of the results which that rule brought into being.

In the early days of British dominion, the whole system of government was tentative, experimental, amounting to very little more than a makeshift. Between 1760 and 1765 it was no better than that of the Afghan Nawabs. Clive's last visit had wrought considerable improvements. Then came the open assumption of the Diwani, North's Regulating Act, and the Governor-Generalship of Hastings. That temporary constitution has been already examined. In 1785 it was replaced by the new Constitution framed under Pitt's India Act, which remained substantially in force until the Act renewing the Company's Charter in 1833; from which time until the suppression of the Company in 1858 no grave change was introduced.

Now in 1785, the British dominion proper extended on the Ganges over Bengal, Behar, and certain ceded districts on the east of Oudh, forming the Bengal Presidency: the Northern Sarkars, and some districts in the Carnatic, forming the Madras Presidency: and some districts in the neighbourhood of Bombay, forming the Bombay Presidency; the whole extent of which may be seen at a glance on the map (VIII. A). As new districts were acquired, those south of the Krishna River were attached to Madras: those on the west of the Nizam's dominions to Bombay; and the rest to the dominating Presidency of Bengal. In course of time the great accumulation of new territories attached to Bengal led

First stages of Ascendancy.

The growth of the three Presidencies.



to the institution of separate Lieutenant-Governorships or Commissionerships within the Presidency, such as the North-West Provinces—*i.e.* the Ganges districts above Behar—the Central Provinces, Arakan, and the Panjab; but the army in all was the Bengal army.

The Constitution of 1784. Primarily then, the Constitution of 1784 recognised the three Presidencies, each having its own Governor, its own Council, its own army, and its own Commander-in-Chief. But the Governor, Council and Commander-in-Chief in Bengal were also supreme over the Madras and Bombay authorities. With them lay the making of treaties, of war, of peace. Bombay could not again drag the Governor-General into a war, as it had done with Warren Hastings over Ragoba's affairs, nor could Madras make havoc of the results of a successful campaign as it had done in Mysore in 1784. As yet however, the two minor Presidencies were independent in the matter of legislation.

Technical powers of the Governor-General. The supreme government in India, then, was that of the Governor-General in Council. The other members of Council being now three in number, the support of one of them sufficed to ensure that there should be no such unseemly thwartings of the Chief as had made the tenure of office by Warren Hastings so incomparably and unreasonably difficult. Further, the Governor-General had power to act on emergency without consulting his Council. Thus when immediate action was necessary, he was no longer under the necessity of submitting to formal checks and delays, or to the risk of being hampered by unprofitable hesitations. At the same time, no practical danger existed of the liberty being abused, since he was liable to be called to account, and to be compelled subsequently to justify the treatment of any particular crisis as an emergency.

His practical powers. On the other hand, he was obliged to exercise what almost amounted to the authority of an autocrat on the spot with an eye to the supreme authority in England. He was in fact much in the position of the Manager of a Company whose Board lays down the general principles of policy, but leaves him a large latitude in neglecting the letter of their instructions provided that he can point to a reasonable



justification in the circumstances for his having done so. Thus, according to Cornwallis's instructions, he was taking a risk in going to war with Mysore without express permission from home; but the London authorities commended him for having done so. Wellesley carried out his policy at his own risk, dragging a more or less reluctant assent after the act from London, until at last London refused to assent any longer. His successors would not venture to ride roughshod over the sentiments of the home authorities, trusting to the accomplished fact as their justification: but Lord Hastings succeeded in carrying them with him sufficiently far for the execution of his plans, though in the interval Lord Minto had been restrained from the degree of activity which he himself rightly deemed desirable. But in any case, the home authorities could be absolutely secure that each of their Governors-General left England with views in substantial agreement with their own; and the Governor-General knew that if his own views at starting became materially changed, he would either have to subordinate them, or to convert the home authorities, or to take the risk of being recalled, censured, and possibly impeached.

The Home authorities were on one side the Company, The Board on the other the Parliamentary Board of Control. In all of Control. political matters the initiative as well as the guidance lay with the latter body: which was required by the Act of 1793, renewing the Charter, to meet for the authorisation of dispatches. This Board consisted originally of sundry members of the Privy Council and two others; the Charter Acts of 1793 and 1813 left it unaltered, but that of 1833 made some additional Ministers *ex officio* members. As a matter of practice however, it appears that the whole of the real work of the Board was done by the President and a couple of secretaries; acting no doubt largely in accordance with the recommendations of the Directors.

The partial abolition of the Company's monopolies by Charter the Charter Act of 1813 led to a more careful consideration Acts of 1813 and 1833. on its part of political problems; and this change was made more complete by the act of 1833: the last also modifying the Constitution of the Indian Governments. By it, the



legislative powers of the Presidencies were subordinated to the supreme Government. Moreover, the Supreme Government was now made to consist of the Governor-General, three members of the Company's service (one being military) and a legislative member from home. If the Governor-General was not also Commander-in-Chief—functions which had been combined several times, when he was an experienced soldier—the Commander-in-Chief might act as an extra member of Council.

Within the actual British Dominion, then, Government was in the hands of the Presidency Governors-in-Council, except so far as they were subordinate to the Supreme Political Government at Calcutta: while the deposed sovereigns or relations. their families enjoyed ample pensions, retaining in sundry cases something of the pomp and circumstance of royalty, but absolutely without power. Within the sphere of Ascendancy—practically that is where subsidiary alliances prevailed—Government lay with the Native Durbar, but external relations were controlled by the British Supreme Government, acting through a Resident or Agent at the Capital, who also exercised some degree of informal influence in domestic affairs. These officers might be either civilians or soldiers, and the proportion of the latter increased as time went on, the appointment to their posts resting with the supreme Government. The employment of soldiers as "politicals" is one of the notable features of the system, and a certain jealousy between the Services is occasionally observable in the memoirs of distinguished members of both branches; though it would be extremely difficult to award the palm of superiority to either, where services so brilliant were rendered by both.

The Com-  
pany's  
Service. Until the conquest of Bengal, the civilian servants of the Company in India had been in fact clerks of various grades in a great commercial concern. Then in spite of themselves the clerks were forced to learn the business of government. Warren Hastings had to initiate the process by which they were to be converted into administrators. It was many years however before the Company began to feel that trade was no longer its own primary *raison d'être*, and also



that of its civilian employés. But the facts were too strong, and under persistent pressure from one Governor-General after another, from Cornwallis onwards, the training and the character of the Civil Service improved till it became a body of quite exceptional efficiency and capacity. Its more brilliant members found their way into the ranks of the Residents and Agents, Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, Members of Council. The functions of the general body were associated either with revenue or judicial business or both, according as the working system was from time to time modified.

Bengal was the birth-place of British administration ; for many years its only field. Before North's Regulating Act, the Company had already "stood forth as Diwani" and begun to lay upon its servants the duties of Collectors and Magistrates, though as yet the native servants of the titular Nawab exercised functions both in the revenue and judicial departments. By North's Act, the new Judicial element of the Supreme Court was introduced, with results at the time which have been already examined : while the responsible revenue offices were withdrawn from the natives.

Early administrative methods.

Under Hastings then, the judicial system was at first as follows. In the several districts of Bengal, a civil court, and a criminal court were established, the European Collector being in charge not only of the Revenue but also of the Civil Court : while the Criminal Court retained its native judges, administering the Mohammedan law. Two corresponding Courts of Appeal were established at Calcutta, the Governor presiding in the civil court, and a Mohammedan judge in the criminal. In the districts the Collector, and at Calcutta the Governor, exercised a certain supervision over the Mohammedan Courts. On the arrival of the Supreme Court, consisting of judges from England, these claimed entire control of the judicial system, administering the Law according to the canons of Westminster ; with the disastrous results we have seen, until something like a working compromise was arrived at by Hastings and Impey. In 1780, regulations were issued, under which the ordinary Civil



Courts were placed under officers appointed thereto, instead of the Collectors: but the Collectors retained the charge of Revenue suits.

**Changes under Cornwallis.** In 1787, however, under Cornwallis, there was first a reversion; the Collectors again becoming the Civil judges. Moreover their jurisdiction was at the same time extended to minor criminal offences. But in 1790, owing to the prevalence of crimes of violence, another step was taken. Four Courts of Circuits were appointed for the administration of Criminal justice in Bengal and Behar, each under two British Judges appointed from the Company's servants. The Governor-General and Council at the same time took over the Criminal Court of Appeal in Calcutta. The Mohammedan law remained except for the abolition of such barbaric forms of punishment as mutilation. Finally the junction in one person of the offices of Civil Judge and Collector proved to be dangerous in working, because it enabled an unprincipled officer to confirm in one capacity his own derelictions of duty in the other; hence before Cornwallis left India, the judicial and the revenue functions were completely separated, and the principle which Warren Hastings had attempted to establish was vindicated. Further, four "Provincial" Courts of Appeal were established, intervening between the lower courts and the "*Sadr Adalat*" or Court of Final Appeal at Calcutta.

**Changes under Bentinck.** The system remained unchanged till the time of Lord William Bentinck, who once more turned over some of the judicial functions to the Revenue Department: to the detriment of the magisterial work, which the Collector was apt to regard as a mere appendage to his normal duties. But another change effected by him was of a very different order. It was a fundamental part of the Cornwallis system to exclude Natives from any but the lowest offices. Hence on the one hand the Natives had a grievance, and on the other there were not enough Europeans to do the work. Bentinck considerably extended the openings for Natives, and during his term of office, the dispatches from London definitely laid it down as a principle that colour or creed as such were no longer to debar from office. The removal of



the legal barrier by no means abolished the practical barrier ; but did render it no longer insurmountable.

. Subject to some modifications, the system in force in Bengal applied to the territories acquired up to Lord Minto's time, and to the bulk of those acquired under Lord Hastings : which were inclusively termed Regulation Provinces. In the Sikh Cis-Satlej territories, however, in central India, and in Burma, known as Non-regulation provinces, administrative posts were to a great extent entrusted to soldiers, and the system was allowed to shape itself much more according to the peculiar circumstances of the district ; larger latitude and independence being allowed to the officers there : a rule applying generally where British Ascendancy had been less felt before it was transformed into Dominion.

Regulation and Non-regulation Provinces.

Generally then in the sphere of Government and judicial administration certain periods may be observed. First the tentative period, at the close of which Warren Hastings had fore-shadowed the principles which ultimately guided us, but which he was not always allowed to carry out. Second, the period of the Cornwallis system, practically synchronous with the domination at home of Pitt and his Tory successors. Third, the modified system initiated under Lord William Bentinck, and by the Charter Act of 1833 : corresponding with the era initiated in Home affairs by the struggle over the Reform Bill. The good and the evil of the political ideas prevailing at home during each of these periods finds its counterpart, of course with modifications, in the Government of Britain's great dependency : just as we have already noted the reflection in Indian politics of European complications.

Three administrative periods.

To one branch of the service however these considerations do not apply, and it remains to conclude this chapter with a brief account of the Army.

The troops employed in India were of two branches—the King's army, and the Company's three armies. The former were British regiments, sent out to take their turn of service in India. The latter were almost entirely Native regiments, with a small number of regiments of Europeans raised and paid by the Company for the Company's service. In each of the three armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, the general

The Army in India.



principles were the same. In the Native regiments, all the commissioned officers were British, while the non-commissioned officers were promoted from the native rank and file. But there were characteristic differences of detail. In the Bengal army, promotion went practically by seniority; in the other two, mainly by selection. The Bengal army was recruited mainly from the Brahmins and Rajputs of the upper Ganges with a leaven of Mussulmans; Hindostanis. In southern India, where the proportion of Brahmins and especially of Rajputs to the general population was very much smaller, the bulk of the regiments were drawn from lower castes; though in Bombay, the Hindostani element was considerable. Now, the higher the caste, the more stringent are the regulations and observances required of the pious Hindu, the heavier are the penalties attached to breaches thereof, and the greater is the danger of a collision between the demands of military and religious obedience. Hence the risk of such a collision was greater in the Bengal army than in those of Madras and Bombay. Added to this, the mixture of castes in the southern armies tended to produce a purely regimental esprit-de-corps; while the system of recruiting in the North gave scope for an extra-regimental clan or family bond among the soldiers, which when they were loyal would be an element of strength, but if they turned disloyal became an element of indiscipline. Moreover the southern plan of promotion by merit, while apt to cause jealousies, still gave control to men who by the fact of their promotion were attached to the system, and *ceteris paribus* were more likely to offer a decisive opposition to anything like mutiny. The utmost care was indeed required even in Madras, as the Vellur affair proved: but the Burmese war also proved that demands might be made on the Madrasis which could not with safety be pressed upon the Hindostanis.

It has further to be noted that every annexation of territory and every subsidiary alliance entailed an increase in the number of sepoy regiments, and ought for safety's sake to have been accompanied—though it never was—by a proportionate increase in the number of King's regiments or at



least of the Company's Europeans. If the sepoy was to have a master, he preferred the "*Sahib*"; but owing to the disregard of this precaution, a time came when he became possessed with the idea that he could dispense with masters altogether.



## CHAPTER XVIII

### LAND SETTLEMENT

Land taxation the main source of Indian revenue.

**I**N India, the prime source of revenue is the Land, and it is from the land that the great mass of the inhabitants derive their maintenance. The Land "settlements" therefore are of vital importance both in the fiscal and the social system. The subject is unattractive to the ordinary reader, and it is particularly complicated because the actual historical facts are often in dispute, and are made more confusing by being translated in terms of Western half-analogies. In the present chapter, we shall endeavour to make clear the different methods of settlement adopted in different parts of the peninsula, the reason for the differences, and their effects.

At all times it had been a matter of course that whatever other taxes might be levied, the Government claimed a share of the produce of the soil. The assessment of the value of the produce, the share to be so appropriated, and the method of collection, all lay with the ruling Power for the time being, and had varied considerably. So did the tenures under which the cultivators occupied the lands they tilled.

The Mogul system.

When the Mogul dominion had been in full and undisputed force, the system followed had been roughly as follows. The land was parcelled out into considerable districts: the amount of land under cultivation and the nature of the crops were ascertained; from this the normal yield was estimated, and so the amount to be paid to the Government by each district was arrived at. A collector was appointed for the district who was responsible for paying over the sum fixed on to the Government, less the amount of his own allowance; and it was his business to see that the amount which he collected was not less than that which



he had to pay. The collector was called an *āmil* or a *zemindār*, and the collectorship, and the district a *zemindāri*. The *zemindār*. Officers were in many cases given districts, as a reward for services, without having to pay the assessed tax to the Government, on condition of rendering certain military services. A district so assigned was called a *jaghir*, and the officer a *jagirdār*. The grant of a *zemindāri* or a *jaghir* was not in form hereditary, but in practice both became so, subject as a rule to the payment of fines on succession. Technically, the Sovereign retained the right of resuming either *jaghir* or *zemindari* at pleasure.

The persons from whom the *zemindar* claimed the tax or rent varied according to the locality. It might be the individual cultivator. It might be the Village Community, an institution to which we shall presently revert. It might be a local chief, recognised by his clansmen as the lord of the soil.

Now it was not unusual for the office of *zemindar* to have been conferred on one of these local chiefs, who might be regarded as having something resembling a proprietary right dating from a remote antiquity. But the *zemindar*, as such, had no proprietary right; he merely held a position which he had a reasonable expectation would in the ordinary course be continued to him and his heirs, subject always to the caprice of the Monarch.

Where the regulation methods of the Moguls had been less generally enforced, as for instance in the Southern and Western Dekhan, the *zemindar* here generally known as a *poligar* was less prominent, or non-existent; the office was not hereditary, and the individual was not permanently associated with the district.

Such were the main features of the prevalent system or Want of systems in operation when the British first began to exercise security. dominion. The actual assessment was liable to arbitrary revision. The share demanded by Government was liable to arbitrary enhancement. The tenure of the rent or tax-collector's office might, from the Government point of view, be merely temporary or practically hereditary; his status, from the peasant's point of view, might be that of a



Highland chief or that of a magnified exciseman. And the actual cultivators held their plots in virtue of no legal enactments but in accordance with infinitely varying local usages. To Western eyes, the system wore the appearance not of system at all but of chaos. All that it was possible for Warren Hastings to do was to endeavour to extract from the chaos some guiding principles, and on them to base tentative but necessarily very defective arrangements.

When Lord Cornwallis arrived in Bengal, the subject absorbed a great share of his attention, and that of some of his most capable subordinates, notably Shore.

Bengal. Throughout Bengal and Behar, and the Sarkars — the regions which now practically made up the British Dominion — the Mogul system was in full force. The country was divided into zemindaris. Nearly always, the zemindars were Hindus, since for financial purposes the Hindus had always been better agents than Mussulmans. Within the last half century, several of the great zemindars had been elevated to the rank, and bore the title, of rajas.

Superficially, these zemindars presented a considerable analogy to the great landlords, the County Families of England. Guided by that analogy, Cornwallis constructed the Permanent Settlement of Bengal.

The English land-owner. Under the English system, the welfare of the whole agricultural community is largely dependent on the prosperity of the landlord class. A century ago, the landowner in theory at least, was the source of all progress in the rural population: it was he who found the money for improvements, encouraged industry and thrift, and preserved the spirit of order and loyalty in the peasantry. In general, he might be trusted to be generous according to his lights; and anything which would have tended seriously to diminish his influence would have been accounted a misfortune. His position was secure, unless he forfeited it by grave misconduct or folly: and his security was in no small degree the cause of his usefulness.

Theory of the zemindari settlement. Thus it was argued that if the zemindar were given the same security he would have the same inducements to exercise his influence and to spend his money for the



general benefit, looking for his return to the increased value of his property. Moreover he would acquire a strong interest in the maintenance of the Government to whom he owed his security. In short, just as in England, the proprietary right in the soil was for the most part vested in landowners, while the cultivation was carried on by their tenants, so also it should be in Bengal: the cultivator holding from the zemindar under the conditions established by custom.

The vital matter then was that the zemindar should feel that he was not going to be displaced, and that if he spent his money on improvements, the Government would not step in and demand an increased rent from him.

To attain this object, the land was assessed; the rent or tax to be paid by the zemindar was then fixed, and was established in permanence.

The Permanent Settlement: its effect on the zemindar.

The actual result was that the zemindars of Bengal and Behar did become a loyal body, and kept firmly to their allegiance when the mutiny came: they did not, however, fulfil the expectations of Cornwallis in introducing agricultural improvements; and no opportunity was left for anyone but the zemindars themselves to profit by the system. Improvements in the value of the land might come from the energy of the cultivators, from the action of the zemindars, from the general effects of a strong Government which prevented war and pillage, from specific measures of the Government such as irrigation works; the profit in each case went to the zemindar, except where the cultivator could show that he had a title to the benefit of his own improvements.

The Cornwallis Settlement was the archetype of all zemindari settlements; those, that is, in which the cultivator held from the zemindar, the zemindar held from the Government, and the Government claimed its rent or land-tax not from the cultivator or from a group of cultivators but from the zemindars—whether these intermediaries were of old or recent standing. In his capacity as a tenant from the Government, the zemindar got what he never had before—fair rent, fixity of tenure, and freedom of transfer. The



only legitimate ground for his ejection was his failure to pay the rent. But as landlord, he was bound in his treatment of the cultivators to act in accord with established usages, and to justify an enhancement of rentals before the Court when challenged.

**Its defect.** In making the settlement absolutely permanent Cornwallis acted against the judgment of Shore. In the view of the latter, a fully sufficient security would have been given by fixing the settlement not in perpetuity but for a long term of years. The contrast between that security and the previous capricious tenure would have satisfied the zemindars, and have given them not much less inducement to devote energy and money to getting the most out of the land. On the other hand it would have enabled the Government ultimately to participate in the increased profits of production and of the new land brought under cultivation; and also to readjust the relations of the zemindar and the cultivator in the light of a wider and more accurate knowledge of the traditional rights of the latter.

Experience has endorsed Shore's view. The Permanent Settlement deprived the Government of future days of what would have become a perfectly legitimate source of revenue that would have entailed no sort of hardship or injustice on the zemindars; and also made it impossible to confer on the cultivators or restore to them proprietary rights which might have been desirable. Still in its broad outline, the Cornwallis Settlement was a valuable piece of legislation; which, without being intended to do so, in fact revolutionised, greatly for the better, the pre-existing state of affairs.

The accession of territory in Southern India consequent upon the Mysore wars of Cornwallis and Wellesley made a settlement necessary in the newly acquired districts. The leading principle was to adapt and regulate the existing system. The Bengal settlement was an adaptation of the existing zemindari system. In the South, Haider Ali and Tippu had worked something of the kind, but it was not the traditional system, and the zemindari was not an established institution. Here the name most closely

The Ryot-  
war settle-  
ment,  
Madras.



connected with the Settlement is that of Sir Thomas Munro.

Munro was one of the remarkable trio of Scotsmen, all of very much the same standing, who did much to mould the future of India during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Although one of the three was a civilian, Elphinstone, all of them rendered distinguished service in the field; all displayed great ability as administrators; all were diplomatists of a high order. Twice while still a young man Malcolm, the third, was the chosen envoy to Persia of the Indian Government; it was he who nipped in the bud the attempt of the Indur Marathas to take active part in the Pindari war, and he to whom the Peshwa surrendered.

Elphinstone, when four and twenty, rode by the side of Arthur Wellesley in the Maratha Campaign of 1803; when the great soldier told him that nature had meant him for a soldier—a judgment ratified by the skill and resource with which he baffled the Marathas at Kirki, having performed with great ability the functions of Resident at Puna, at the court of the crafty Baji Rao, as well as those of first envoy to Kabul in 1808. To him, when the war was over, was entrusted the Settlement of the districts added to the Bombay Presidency, a task carried out in the light of Munro's example in the Madras territory.

Of Munro's talents as a soldier, the fact that Arthur Wellesley invited his criticisms of the campaign of 1803 is a sufficient proof, ratified again by his skilful operations in the southern Dekhan during the last Maratha war: but perhaps his highest title to fame is that he led the way in the great work of endeavouring to establish the land-settlement on the basis of customs understood and prevalent, instead of on theories derived from misleading western analogies. He was little more than a boy when with Major Read as his superior he examined and reported on the tenures in the Baramahal district just ceded by Tippu to Cornwallis. A little later, he had like work to do in Canara, and finally after Tippu's fall in the "ceded districts," or territories lying between Mysore and the Nizam's dominions.

The system established is distinguished as the *Ryotwāri*.



The *Raiyat*, or in familiar spelling Ryot, is the term for a peasant cultivator; under the system, he holds direct from the Government, with no intervening landlord; hence the name Ryotwari, as the name zemindari applies where it is the zemindar who holds from the Government.

The essence then of the Ryotwari system is that the proprietary right in the soil belongs to the Ryot: though it may be questioned whether the term "proprietary" is not somewhat strained both in his case and in the zemindar's, the Government having the right of resumption if the rent is unpaid. The primary object of the zemindari settlement, economically, is to give the landlord a direct interest in improving his estate; that of the Ryotwari is to give the cultivator a like incentive. The valuation was made and the Government rental fixed for an extended term of years, giving the cultivator his fair rent, freedom of transfer, and practical fixity of tenure. A good deal of misapprehension however has arisen from the fact that an annual assessment was necessitated by the Ryot's privilege of surrendering a part of his holding or taking up a new holding hitherto waste. The rent in consequence fluctuated according to the changes in the boundaries of the ryot's holding, and hence an impression arose that the assessment of the plots under cultivation was annually revised. Nothing of the kind occurred under the zemindari settlements, where the zemindari included jungle, and the assessment was not affected by its being brought under cultivation or lapsing into non-cultivation.

The Ryot-  
wari settle-  
ment,  
Bombay.

The subsequent appropriation of Maratha territories under Lord Hastings led to a ryotwari settlement on very similar lines in the new territory, under the management of Mountstuart Elphinstone, in the Western Dekhan. It is to be noted that in these settlements the share claimed by the Government was considerably lower than that demanded by its native predecessors: and further, that the individual ryot was dealt with. The previously existing usage, which had treated the whole group forming a village as being responsible for the rent of each member, was abolished. If the individual failed to pay his rent, he lost his holding and Government lost the rent; whereas the agents of



Haidar and Tippu had compelled the village to make up the amount. There was nothing unjust in the old system; essentially the Village Community had been looked upon as the real unit, and so regarded itself: but as yet the communal idea had not become familiar to the British mind, which gave a readier acceptance to the ultra-individualist doctrines of Jeremy Bentham.

Under a ryotwari settlement then, nothing even remotely resembling a landlord class existed: though there was a brief interval, when Barlow was Governor of Madras, during which an attempt was made, but soon abandoned to create a class of zemindars.

In the next great settlement, however, the Village Community played a more important part. This was in the North-West Provinces, that is the districts on the Jamna and Ganges above Behar, the country to which the name Hindostan is applied in its narrowest signification. Here the Permanent Settlement had not been introduced, assessments had been made for short terms, and no principle recognising ownership in the soil had been established. It was resolved under Lord William Bentinck to organise a settlement on a lasting basis; of which the ground-work was laid down by Robert Merttins Bird, and the structure was completed by James Thomason. Thomason was not at the head of the work until the next decade: but it will be more convenient to treat the whole subject in the present chapter.

In the Bengal settlement, the zemindar was constituted the proprietor. In the Dekhan settlements, the ryot was constituted the proprietor. In the North-West Provinces, it was recognised that the question, Who should be recognised as proprietor? was one that might be answered in various ways. The great work Bird and Thomason had to accomplish was, first the assessment, and secondly the registration of rights.

We saw that in Bengal, the zemindar was sometimes a local chief, who in a sense had already been looked upon by the peasants as the lord of the soil. Such chiefs were known as *talukdars*; and Hindostan was full of talukdars. In the Dekhan, we saw that the predecessors of the British had treated the Village Community as a unit, though the

The  
North-  
West  
Provinces.

The  
talukdar.



The Village Community. Theory of Thomason's settlement. British did so no longer. In Hindostan the structure of the Village Community was still more marked, and it was constantly evident that the proprietary rights in an estate lay with the Village, not with the individuals whom it comprised. And there were cases in which it appeared that the proprietary right lay with the individual ryot. As before, the intention of the settlement was to secure to the proprietor, whoever the proprietor might be, a fair rent, fixity of tenure, and freedom of transfer. So the assessment was made for at least thirty years, and the Government claim was fixed for that period. If the talukdar could make his title good, his right was confirmed: if the ryot did so, his right was confirmed. The joint responsibility of the Village Community wherever it already subsisted was maintained. In short, the utmost care was taken to ascertain and give the full force of law to native usages, without reading foreign Western analogies into them.

So far then, the principles of the settlement were entirely sound. There was no idea of forcing upon the people a law theoretically perfect in the eyes of the legislator; the object was to bring existing usages into working order. But in deciding between the conflicting claims of co-existing usages, there was very considerable scope for the theoretical bias of the administrator to come into play.

The conflicts in the North-West Provinces arose between the claims of talukdars and ryots.

Objections to the actual settlement. According to one set of theorists, the talukdar was an excrescence on the ancient system of a peasant proprietary. According to the opposing theory, his rights were at the least of a very respectable antiquity. There were plenty of cases where the latter view was evidently true, and the talukdar was readily confirmed. In others it was evidently not true, and the talukdar's claim gave way to that of the ryot. But in an immense number of instances, it was not at all clear whether abstract justice ought to confirm or to cancel the talukdar's title. The bias of the Thomsonian settlement leaned steadily to the ryot.

Democratic ethics support Thomason's principle. Abstract economics are on the same side. But strong political reasons could be adduced in opposition, and it is certainly doubtful



on which side the popular sentiment lay. What we are in the habit of calling the feudal feeling was strong; it has valuable moral effects when present; and it is contended by the critics adverse to the Thomasonian method that the consideration afforded to that feeling was altogether insufficient. The effect at any rate was to diminish the power and authority of the talukdars individually and collectively, and to deprive a class singularly wanting in initiative energy, of such leadership as the talukdars might have supplied: presenting those chiefs with a grievance against the British, while the class benefited lacked a countervailing appreciation of what they had gained. On the other hand, it is in the gains of the latter and the general economic advancement that the Thomasonians find their own sufficient justification and reward.



## CHAPTER XIX

### GENERAL PROGRESS

Settled  
govern-  
ment.

**W**E have observed the continuous progress of the system of Indian administration from the days of Clive to those of Lord Auckland. We have watched the extension of the peace area, and the consequent cessation of rapine and bloodshed on the greater scale. We have noted the gradual establishment of judicial tribunals which possessed at least the merit of being incorruptible and impartial, even if they failed in complete adaptation to native habits and ideas: and we have seen revenue systems framed with immense care, which, whatever might be said against them, aimed at giving stability to existing institutions, and did give to the tillers of the soil a security hitherto unknown. The British, in short, had raised up in India a government which consistently and conscientiously strove to maintain order and justice throughout its own dominions and to urge the rulers outside its dominions to like efforts. Had this been the sole result of the rise of the British Power it would still have been an immense improvement on a state of things in which order and justice depended mainly on the convenience and capacity of individual nawabs and rajas.

Beyond this, however, there was room for progress in two directions: one the abolition of customs in their nature barbarous and dating from barbarous ages; the other, the introduction of positive improvements tending to raise the material, moral and intellectual condition of the people, by public works, education, and the force of example.

Difficulty  
of intro-  
ducing re-  
forms.

In these directions, progress was slow. Immemorial customs cannot be rooted out without risk of producing violent irritation; new ideas are received with intense suspicion; the type of man drawn to India in the Company's



service, in its early days, required improvement before much moral influence could be habitually exercised by him. The efforts in this direction of Hastings, Cornwallis, and Wellesley were increasingly effective; but they hardly bore visible fruit before the second decade of the century. The real tangible progress therefore did not receive its full impulse till the British Ascendancy was completed by the Pindari and Maratha wars; and the Burmese interlude over, Lord William Bentinck was enabled to devote his full energies to matters which had necessarily received only a fraction of the attention of his predecessors.

In various parts of India and with varying degrees of virulence, practices subsisted which were essentially barbarous, sanctioned by neither the Hindu nor the Moham-medan code, but in two cases at least grafted on to the former—*Suttee*, the self immolation of the widow on the death of her spouse: and Infanticide. Two others, *Thuggee* and *Dacoity*, have an odd association with caste. A fifth, that of human sacrifices, has no sort of connection with Hinduism.

Of these institutions, the most gruesome was Thuggee;<sup>1</sup> Thuggee. an organised system of murder and robbery, existent from time immemorial, which remained actually unsuspected for many years after the establishment of the British Power. It appears to have prevailed all over India—known to the population but carefully concealed from the British. The Thugs were a hereditary association of murderers: a caste. They had their tutelary goddess, their initiatory observances, their mythical origin, their sacrificial and other rites in connection with their hereditary occupation. Their business was the strangulation and robbery of travellers. If a man started out on a journey and never reached his destination, there were plenty of ways of accounting for his disappearance. The kinsfolk rarely attempted to trace his movements. The Thugs worked in small gangs; when they were not engaged in their abominable trade, they were usually peaceful dwellers in villages. Often enough they were known to

<sup>1</sup> The spelling *Thuggee*, *Dacoity*, and *Suttee* is too familiar to give place to the more correct *Thagi*, *Dakaiti* and *Sati*.



their fellow villagers: but superstition held that they were under divine or diabolic protection, and that ill would befall anyone who went against them. Their method of procedure was usually to entice the intended victim into conversation, slip a noose round his throat in an unsuspecting moment, throttle, rifle and bury him. Hence the pick-axe as well as the noose was an emblem of their trade. The deed done, they would return to their ordinary avocations—very likely paying toll to the *pātēl*, or headman of the village.

The suppression.

Popular belief in the *ikbal* or Luck of the Company, proved to be of no little assistance in the stamping out of the institution. It was soberly believed that the great Madhava Rao Sindhia had been smitten with his fatal illness by the guardian goddess of the Thugs, for having disposed of a nest of them; but it was admitted that the Company's *ikbal* was too strong for Davi, as the goddess was named. Evidence therefore was easier to obtain. It was about 1829 that the systematic suppression of Thuggee was decided on; the man entrusted with the leading part therein was Major Sleeman. The process of bringing particular crimes home to the perpetrators was immensely difficult; but it became gradually easier as the nature of the organisation was laid bare. Captured Thugs turned informers, and gave invaluable evidence not only about specific cases but about the whole system. The village patels began to dread finding themselves brought in as accessories. Various legal regulations, constructed on the British principle of giving every conceivable advantage to the accused, were relaxed; the chances of evading trial or punishment on a merely technical plea were diminished. The Thugs themselves, who had considered that Davi's protection made them invulnerable, were disgusted at discovering their error; and their employment lost something of its zest, though their consciences remained quite unperturbed. The result was that within ten years Thuggee in the British dominion had practically ceased, and had largely disappeared in the independent native States as well.



Dacoity proved more difficult of suppression. The secret Dacoity. methods of Thuggee had kept it beneath the surface; many as were its victims, they were less numerous than those of the Dacoits. The Thugs were, so to speak, scientific garotters; dacoity was an organised brigandage. There is a silent ghastliness about the noose and pick-axe of the Thug: the dacoit worked with lance and fire-brand. As with the Thugs, there were regular dacoit castes, who pursued their trade with an accompaniment of similar rites. But unlike the Thugs, the dacoits worked in large gangs; murder was merely a normal incident in their operations, not an essential feature; in the separate gangs, the majority were not of the genuine dacoit families, though the inclusion of some of these as leaders was considered a necessary element of success. Among them were numbers of highly respectable members of society. Their contributions were of considerable importance to the finances of not a few village communities and landholders, and again the difficulty of bringing crimes home in the face of organised perjury was enormous. Warren Hastings had proposed the applica- The con-  
tion of very summary methods, discarding the rules of flict with  
evidence which obtain in British law-courts, and assuming Dacoity.  
the complicity of Village Communities *en bloc*. But, on the principle that it was better that twenty innocent persons should fall victims to the dacoits than that one innocent person should be falsely condemned for dacoity, British legality vetoed Hastings's plan, and dacoity continued to flourish, though here and there some few of its practisers suffered exemplary punishment. Even when the methods which had proved so successful with Thuggee were applied by the same skilful operator (now Colonel) Sleeman, the dacoits moved to new pastures and were still flourishing almost under the walls of Calcutta in Dalhousie's time; partly no doubt because at the headquarters of the British government it was less easy to dispense with the legal technicalities in which the brigands found protection.

The origin of the practice of Suttee—*sati*, "dedicated"—Suttee. is unknown. It was more prevalent in Hindostan than in other parts of India. Having no sort of sanction from the



sacred books of the Hindus, it is still possible to see how it may have arisen out of the conditions produced by Hindu law. The position of a widow is, under that law, painful ; that of a childless one doubly so. The idea of a faithful spouse following her husband out of life is not a wholly repulsive one ; it supplies a motive for suicide which at least is not degrading. It is notorious that many a woman became *sati*, deliberately dedicating herself to the flames, not only with willingness, but with an enthusiasm akin to that of some among the religious devotees in Christian convents. A splendour of sanctity attached to the wife who thus devoted herself. The ethics of the West have recognised the "canon 'gainst self-slaughter" from whatever motive ; but in its purest form, suttee was in fact honoured as an act of almost divine self-sacrifice.

Need for  
its sup-  
pression.

Yet although we may find not justification but a moral explanation of the pure form, in which the motive was a passionate self-devotion, the existence of the custom leant itself to a palpable horror. An unwilling suttee is an unspeakable cruelty ; and widows were with painful frequency morally driven to the pyre. It is well to distinguish between acts which revolt the moral sense, and others which, however they may set at naught the Christian code, still invite a degree of admiration for the doer : but when no test can be applied to show that a particular act belongs to one class rather than the other, the distinction cannot be recognised in practice. The Mohammedan emperors forbade the immolation of an unwilling widow, and sometimes actively interfered ; for a long time, the British attempted to work on the same lines ; but in the great majority of cases, it was impossible to ascertain whether the widow acted under pressure. The relatives of the deceased husband had motives of convenience in urging the widow to destruction ; they could point to the supposed rewards of the fatal act, and could threaten the recalcitrant with long years of utter joylessness ; so that a woman might easily be led to elect for death, yet be practically murdered. Therefore suttee involved in effect an abomination which could be cured by nothing short of total prohibition.



No doubt the actual prevalence of the practice was much exaggerated, though in 1819 between six and seven hundred cases were reported in Bengal alone: yet so strong was the impression of its hold upon the religious imagination of the people, that one after another of the Governors-General hesitated to do more than threaten condign punishment on all who were responsible for an unwilling suttee. Even when the Court of Directors at home expressed themselves emphatically on the subject, Lord Amherst, after obtaining numerous reports, believed that any more active interference than that of moral suasion would excite the mind of the natives so greatly as to render the risks too serious to run. At last, however, Lord William Bentinck faced the evil; and supported by the weight of opinion among those who knew the natives best, promulgated a law in 1829 prohibiting suttee altogether in British territory, and rendering guilty of culpable homicide all persons aiding and abetting a ceremony of the kind, whether the widow were a willing party or not. It is remarkable that the prognostications of violent opposition were entirely falsified, and the complete disappearance of suttee in the British dominions was accomplished without endangering the public peace. With the British success before their eyes and British remonstrances in their ears, the Native rulers were not disinclined to follow an example which, public opinion—under the circumstances—proved unexpectedly ready to endorse.

Its suppression after long hesitation.

Though Thuggee and Dacoity were profitable to others besides those who actually practised them, and therefore found shelter under a certain degree of popular protection of a negative kind, they were always regarded as crimes; whereas Suttee was an honoured custom. But Infanticide was accounted as a sort of peccadillo necessitated by the conditions of society. As in the case of Suttee, it had no sanction—was indeed forbidden—in the sacred books. Yet in many parts of India, so persistent was the habit of destroying female babies that among some tribes or clans the proportion of girls to boys was about one to six. The motive lay in the disgrace attaching under the Hindu religion to unmarried women; a disgrace reflected on their

Infanticide.



parents. It was better that a babe should die than that she should grow up to remain unwed. But the marriage of daughters involved two difficulties: that of finding a husband of admissible caste; and that of providing the wedding expenses. The higher the station of the parents, the more serious became both these difficulties; the stronger was the temptation to evade them by having no daughters to marry; the more resolutely did public opinion close its eyes to the methods by which that evasion was achieved.

Difficulty  
of dealing  
with it.

Two circumstances combined to make infanticide easy: one, the impenetrable veil behind which the Zenana was and is hidden from all enquirers; the other, the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the real cause of an infant's death. It needs only not to "strive officiously to keep alive." From the beginning the British endeavoured to eradicate the custom; the Natives admitted its existence, readily owned that it was very wrong, zealously declared their intention of putting it down—but the huge disproportion between girls and boys continued unabated. Practically it was only in the small district of Merwara or Mairwarra in the hills near Ajmir in Rajputana that any important advance was made before the fourth decade of the century.

The motives to Infanticide minimised.

Hitherto nothing had been tried but moral suasion, for the plain reason that there was no practicable method of applying force, and no alternative course had been discovered; now however it was resolved to attack the *cause*. Custom had made imperative an expenditure on wedding festivities so immense, that to marry and dower a single daughter often exhausted the savings of a lifetime. The individual was hopelessly shackled by Convention. For those shackles, the fetters of law were substituted, limiting the expenditure on marriages, and forcibly excluding the hordes of privileged beggars who swarmed to every such ceremony and exacted alms and entertainment as a sacred right. By a happy chance, the guilt of certain chiefs was brought home to them, and they were compelled to pay exemplary fines. Thus the removal of the great source of temptation was followed by alarming breaches in the immunity which had prevailed hitherto; with the excellent result that in a few



years, in one after another of the worst districts, the number of growing girls had recovered its normal proportion to that of the boys. The evil did not indeed disappear, but it ceased to be a horrible portent.

The abolition of Thuggee and Suttee, the declaration of a remorseless war with Dacoity, the immense reduction in the crime of Infanticide, were all in effect the work of Bentinck's administration, though those objects were none of them completely achieved immediately; and of themselves were a sufficient justification of British dominion. Nor can there be the slightest real doubt that but for the British dominion, every one of these practices would have remained active until the present day. Their suppression became possible only when the Pax Britannica was thoroughly established.

Equally characteristic was the civilisation of the wild hill tribes who came under British rule—folk of more primitive races, dwelling in the Aravalli mountains of Rajputana, the western Ghats of Kandesh, the hilly tracts on the east through which the Mahanadi flows.

Merwara has already been mentioned. It fell under British sway at the close of the career of Lord Hastings in 1821. The Mers, its inhabitants, lived as banditti, by plunder; agriculture in the barren hills was too precarious too dependent on accidents of weather to satisfy them. The district was placed in charge of Captain Hall who adopted the expedient which has served as a precedent for all similar cases; he converted the bandit into a soldier of the Government. Companies of Mers were formed who forthwith became a highly efficient and loyal police. The Agent won the personal devotion of the people, and with it an almost unbounded influence over them. Under his direction they were ready to appreciate the advantages of arbitration as compared with the various forms of trial by ordeal which had hitherto prevailed; they gave up the immemorial habit of selling their womenkind, and they led the way in putting an end to infanticide, when a Government grant was made for the purpose of providing the necessary dower for their daughters. Hall was succeeded in 1835 by

These reforms due wholly to British rule.

The civilising of Merwara.



Dixon, another of the same type; who gave to agriculture a new impetus and a new security by making wells and reservoirs; and then literally created or imported a *bazaar* or market town into their midst, which gave an impulse hitherto unknown to the arts of peace and the desire for order.

The Bhils. As with the Mers of Merwara, so was it with the Bhils of Kandesh—the hill-country where the Peshwa's domains touched Holkar's. The Bhil country was ceded at the end of the Pindari war, but the Bhils defied authority. British invitations to settle down peaceably were regarded as mere pretences: British troops were easily evaded in the passes by the expert hill-men. Conciliation and coercion appeared to be equally futile. The tribe of primitive savages who had set at defiance the punitive enormities of Maratha over-lords were not to be quelled by the most rigorous pressure that the British Government could sanction.

Outram and the Bhils. In 1825 the task of bringing them to order was entrusted to Lieutenant James Outram, in after days renowned as the "Bayard of India." Outram began operations with a practical illustration of the superiority of British troops, by falling suddenly with a few sepoy on a Bhil encampment, scattering most of them, killing a few and capturing a considerable number. The eyes of the prisoners were opened to the real purposes of the British; they were transformed into envoys to their own people. With deep suspicion and much hesitation the Bhils began to come in, to see for themselves. The personal contact with Outram was the one thing needed; they found him trusting them, and they trusted him in return. His frankness, his courage, his sportsmanship, conquered them. Outram's own sepoy acted in the spirit of their leader, and suspicion yielded to confidence. Hitherto the Bhils had rejected all attempts to enlist them—now a Bhil corps was speedily enrolled with results precisely like those in Merwara. The work so well begun was efficiently carried on, on the same lines: agricultural settlements were formed, arbitration courts were established, money was advanced for farm-stock; on the other hand, strict police regulations were enforced, but



always on the plan of making the Bhils responsible, and turning the village patels into responsible officers of the government; and so, as time passed, the Bhils were converted from a primitive banditti into an orderly agricultural folk.

The story of the Khonds of Orissa, and the abolition of Human sacrifices prevalent in that district, belongs to the next decade, and will be related in a subsequent chapter.

So far we have dealt chiefly with the abolition of evil customs, and with the encouragement of peaceable occupations in the wilder districts. But perhaps the movement forward with which Bentinck's name is most intimately associated in the British mind, is that of Education; and this for the reason that Macaulay was himself intimately connected with Lord William's measures. Macaulay went to India as the first Legal Member of Council under the Act of 1833: and he found Calcutta rife with discussion of the Education question.

Until 1813, nothing had been done in that direction: in that year, the Directors gave instructions that a lakh of rupees should be set apart annually for educational purposes. But education had been interpreted as meaning instruction in the language and literature of the classic tongues of the Hindus and the Mohammedans—Sanskrit and Arabic: in other words, the inculcation of purely Oriental learning; which was very much as if in Europe public instruction should be confined to the language and the treatises of the mediæval schoolmen. The Calcutta College, a private institution which sought to introduce the natives to Western science and English literature, received no Government support till ten years later; and this enlightened theory of education continued to be entirely overshadowed by the idea that the Oriental classics were the proper subjects for Orientals to study—in part perhaps from the very misleading analogy of the study of Greek and Latin in Europe. Bentinck and his advisers however recognised that neither Sanskrit nor Arabic was the language of India, the tongues of the people being many: that English had become the proper official language, associated with the various vernaculars. The immensely superior value of English literature as an instrument



The learning of the West. of education, and of western knowledge as a subject of study, was recognised and maintained with unanswerable skill by Macaulay; and early in 1835 an order was promulgated by the Governor-General in Council, providing for the new teaching instead of the old in all the Government schools and colleges. The effect of the change was very far-reaching, since without it there would have been no possibility of natives becoming practically fitted to enter the public service. By it, the necessary equipment was placed at least comparatively within their reach, if they could show also the necessary capacity and character. The bar to their advancement was removed, without any risk that they would crowd in dangerous numbers through the open portals.

Public Works. Finally, in the matter of Public Works; the British Government made no attempt to emulate the Moguls or their predecessors in the erection of buildings which like the Taj Mahal, should rank among the wonders of the world; but already in Lord Minto's time the enormously important question of Irrigation began to attract its attention, and by slow degrees the creation of canals for the distribution of water was taken up in the North-West Provinces. Roads also were improved; the Grand Trunk Road from Calcutta to Delhi, ultimately carried on to Lahore and Peshawar, was built, and that from Bombay to Agra was commenced. But although these measures had an excellent effect on the revenue, there is always a difficulty in grasping the fact that a very heavy expenditure may be financially more than justified by indirect results; and it is probable that a more lavish outlay on public works would not only have done much towards mitigating recurrent famines with all their horrors, but would also have been repaid in the increase of the Government Revenue, and of the national wealth.



**BOOK IV**

**COMPLETION OF DOMINION**










Map VI.



Matheson & Co.



## CHAPTER XX

### TRANS-INDUS: A RETROSPECT

*(Maps I. and VI.)*

**I**N the twenty years from 1818 to 1838 the only extensive military operation of Government had been the Burmese war. For twenty years to come, wars of varying gravity were to afford constant occupation. The disastrous Afghan war; the short and sharp campaigns of Sindh and Gwalior; the two fierce conflicts with the Sikhs, involving at least three battles of a desperate character; the second Burmese war; finally the grim struggle in which month after month the European garrison of Hindostan supported by a few loyal native regiments fought with their backs to the wall till the longed-for succour came and the great mutiny was crushed; these followed on each other in steady succession. A fresh era of war.

Hitherto Lahore and Sindh and Kabul have hardly influenced the policy of Governors-General: now they become factors of the first importance. Hitherto, consequently there have been only incidental allusions made to them: now a retrospective chapter will enable us to follow the course of events with unbroken continuity.

Mention has been made of the Sikhs as a Hindu people occupying the Panjab and Sirhind. The Panjab proper is the great triangle of which the Indus and the Satlej form two sides, and the Kashmir mountains the third. This "land of the Five Rivers" has a title which the geographers have some difficulty in explaining, since the great rivers which water it are six in number, not five, and it is a moot question whether the Indus, the Satlej, the Ravi, or the Beas, is the one which is excluded. Sirhind lies between the Satlej and the Jamna, on which Delhi stands. This district is also known The Panjab.



by the same name as a portion of the Maratha dominion, Malwa. The Satlej, for military and political purposes, has always been an effective dividing line ; and consequently the whole Sikh territory is in two parts — the Panjab, Manjha, or Trans-Satlej ; and the Sirhind, Malwa, or Cis-Satlej.

This distinction however became marked only with the development of the Sikh political organisation, towards the close of the eighteenth century.

The Sikhs. Racially the inhabitants of the whole Sikh region are partly Pathan, especially in the northern and western parts, but mainly Rajput or Jat ; between whom many ethnologists recognise little if any distinction. The proportion of Mussulmans is large, forming about half the population. The Sikhs primarily are not a separate race, but a Hindu sect which has gradually absorbed a large number of the Hindus in a particular area. Their peculiar tenets however, the persecutions to which they were at times subjected, the sense of fraternity and unity amongst themselves in the conflict with those who do not accept their doctrines, have combined to induce a constant separateness which in turn has endowed them with racial characteristics, physical, moral and intellectual, until the Sikh has in fact become a definite and distinct breed.

Nanuk,  
founder of  
the Sikh  
sect.

The founder of the sect was Nanuk, a teacher who was about contemporary with Baber ; whose doctrine was in the main a protest against the formalism and the hide-bound conventions of the Hinduism of his day. He reverted to first principles : he taught of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of Man without distinction of caste or creed : of virtuous living in the world of men as the way of Salvation in the future life : and he had the very exceptional experience among reformers of arousing no hostility, winning the regard and honour both of Mussulmans and Brahmins. His followers took the title of Sikhs (disciples), forming a united band of religious enthusiasts, under a succession of *Gurus*—a term better rendered by “prophet” than “priest”—gradually assuming a military character under the pressure of Mohammedan fanaticism and the laxity of Oriental rule ; a transformation which



culminated, in the days of Aurangzib, in the person of the tenth Guru, Govind Singh—Govind's father had been slain with the connivance if not by the order of the imperial zealot. The religious fervour of the son developed into a fanatical wrath against Mohammedans at large, and the Moguls in particular. Under Govind's leadership the Sikh brotherhood was transformed into the *Khalsa*, "the army of the free"; bound together by solemn rites and curious distinctive observances—the wearing of blue garments, total abjuration of razor and scissors, constant carrying of steel, the adoption of the common name of *Singh* (Lion), which led to their being frequently referred to as the Singhs; marked by the same kind of devoted adherence as the Covenanters of Scotland who at very much the same period were bidding defiance to Claverhouse. About a year after Aurangzib's death, Govind was assassinated by the sons of a man who had died by his orders; and a long period followed of bloody insurrections and bloody suppressions, in which the *Khalsa* seemed time after time to have been wiped out, yet time after time revived.

Govind,  
the organ-  
iser of the  
Sikhs.

The great expansion of the Maratha power and the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah at last delivered the Sikhs from Mogul dominion, and during the concluding forty years of the eighteenth century, the *Khalsa* becomes a great association of Sirdars, or what may be called baronial families, in Sirhind and the Panjab; not organised as a State, but every sirdar with his retainers fighting for his own hand; acting however for the most part in aggregates known as *Misls*, bound together by the intense *esprit de corps* of common devotion to the *Khalsa* against all external foes, without feeling thereby precluded from internal rivalries and dissensions; owning and disowning allegiance to Afghan or Mogul viceroys and governors as the convenience of the moment might dictate; and capable on occasion of offering a combined and formidable resistance to such armies as either Kabul or Delhi could send to operate in their territories.

Develop-  
ment of the  
*Khalsa*.

In 1780 was born the man who was to weld this loose confederacy into the powerful Panjab State, Ranjit Singh.



West of the Indus above its confluence with the Satlej lies Afghanistan, with Biluchistan to the South. Of Afghanistan proper there are four principal towns: on the western side, close to the Persian frontier, Herat; on the eastern, near the Indian frontier, Kabul; on the south, about equidistant from Herat and Kabul, Kandahar; and on the direct line between Kabul and Kandahar, Ghazni. The passage from Afghanistan into India through the mountains is either from Kabul by way of the Khyber Pass—through which flows the Kabul river to join the Indus near Attok—guarded by the great military post of Peshawar; or else from Kandahar through the Khojak and Bolan passes by way of Quetta on the Biluchi border: the one route lying through the Panjab, and the other through Sindh. At the end of the eighteenth century the Afghan kings sprung from the Durani chief Ahmed Shah ruled not only over Afghanistan but also over Kashmir, and dominated both Sindh and the Panjab; holding both the great passes, Biluchistan being tributary. Afghan Governors were posted at Peshawar and at Multan; and the Sikh or Rajput Rajas of the country, as far as Pātiāla in Sirhind, held their titles formally by the Kabul monarch's patent.

When the new century opened, the occupant of the throne at Kabul was Zemān Shah, one of Ahmed Shah's grandsons; of the Sudozai clan or family. All over India, by British and natives alike, his power was vastly overestimated in consequence of the achievements of his predecessors; his desire to invade Hindostan was known; the Mussulmans were anxious to welcome him as a deliverer in the name of the Prophet. Moreover the belief that an invasion would be heavily backed up by Napoleon was universally prevalent. As a matter of fact however, neither the finances nor the stability of the Kabul throne were equal to any such schemes on Zeman's part; every movement towards the Indus was quickly rendered abortive by insurrections in Afghanistan; and the Sikh Misls were quite as likely to attack as to help a Mussulman invader. In 1801, a family known as the Barakzais obtained the reins of power; the eldest of a score of brothers Fateh Khan,



deposed Zeman Shah whose eyes were put out; and after some vicissitudes the Shah's younger brother, Shuja, became king; making his peace with the Barakzais as well as with the incompetent usurper they had proposed to set up.

By 1808, Ranjit Singh had become the recognised leader of the Panjab Sikhs. Shah Shuja was not yet dispossessed at Kabul. Lord Minto was Governor-General; and the Napoleonic terror was still prevalent. It was eminently desirable therefore to insure that Afghanistan should be an effective buffer against any possible combinations into which France, Persia, and Russia, might enter. It was also very undesirable that Ranjit Singh, now Raja of Lahore, should be allowed to have his wish of bringing the Sirhind Sikhs under his sway, and forming a great military State extending across the Satlej; while the Sikh Power was already quite sufficient to make the maintenance of friendly relations with it important. Mountstuart Elphinstone was accordingly sent in charge of a mission to Kabul, and Charles Metcalfe in charge of a mission to Ranjit. Just at this time, however, the rupture between France and Russia and the progress of the Peninsula War relieved the tension of feeling about the possible projects of Napoleon: the fear of the French faded; and negotiations with the Asiatic Powers were ultimately conducted on the revised hypothesis that it was they rather than the British who could least afford to quarrel. Shah Shuja's attitude was entirely friendly to the British. Ranjit Singh had a sounder appreciation of British power and British armies than almost any other Oriental. Consequently while he pressed his claims to the utmost limit of diplomatic bargaining, he was resolved throughout his career to keep the British Government as his very good friends. Thus the treaties of 1809 proved satisfactory to all parties. That with Shah Shuja indeed turned out to be of little moment, as he was in his turn deposed and driven out of Afghanistan in the following year. By that with Ranjit, the Cis-Satlej Sikhs were (in accordance with their own desire) taken under British protection, Cis-Satlej estates held by Trans-Satlej chiefs being on the same footing as the rest: while in the Panjab the British recognised Ranjit as

Mission to  
Shah  
Shuja and  
Ranjit  
Singh:  
1808.



Maharaja, and in effect promised him a free hand so long as he did not attack British interests. An anti-French treaty of friendship was at the same time concluded with the Amirs of Sindh.

Ranjit  
Singh and  
Shah  
Shuja.

For some thirty years, Ranjit, the one-eyed "Lion of the Panjab," continued steadily and gradually to augment and consolidate his dominion, till it included one slice after another cut from the dominion of Afghanistan. Jammu, Kashmir, Multan, the Derajat, Peshawar, were absorbed, and the Khalsa developed into a mighty engine of war. Throughout the same period Shah Shuja was ever making fresh attempts, with or without the assistance of the Sindh Amirs, of Ranjit, or of the British, to recover the throne from which he had been driven. It would be difficult in all history to name a man with whom the whirligig of fortune played stranger pranks. Also throughout the same period the Barakzai brothers from Fateh Khan to Dost Mohammed managed among them to dominate affairs in Afghanistan, to a normal accompaniment of internecine strife, interspersed with foul murders and assassinations of which they were sometimes the victims and sometimes the perpetrators.

The problem of forming a nation out of the confederacy of Sikh Misl resolved itself primarily into that of finding an individual who could succeed in getting himself accepted as its head. The secondary condition was that the head, when found, should avoid challenging combat with the one Power which was certain to win if it came to fighting.

Estimate  
of Ranjit  
Singh.

Ranjit Singh possessed precisely the requisite qualities. Like the Maratha Sivaji, he was a mere boy when he began to distinguish himself, and was regarded as the greatest figure of his race before he reached thirty. He achieved his position by a combination of military skill, daring, extreme shrewdness, a consciousness that treachery is not an end in itself but only an occasionally useful means, an entire absence of scrupulosity, a pose of religious enthusiasm, and unfailing self-confidence, courage, and doggedness. Gratitude to benefactors and compassion for the weak were unknown to him; but so long as anyone was of use to him, the services



rendered were adequately remunerated in some form or other. In action, he displayed a rare admixture of salutary caution with calculated audacity. But what distinguished him most from the ordinary type of military adventurer who achieves empire was the absence of what the Greeks called *ἰβρις*; the sane measurement of his own powers, the level-headedness which averts Nemesis. Without for an instant placing him in comparison with a supreme genius like Akbar, we may fairly class him along with Sivaji and Haidar Ali—all three were absolutely illiterate—among the most uniformly successful of Asiatic monarchs, and that in despite of exceptionally difficult conditions: a curious contrast to his Durani contemporary.

For Shah Shuja's virtues and vices were precisely those which do not make for success. He was persistent, but irresolute; intellectual, but devoid of shrewdness; magnanimous on occasion, without the strength needed to make magnanimity politic; loyal, but not without lapses; ambitious, but hopelessly improvident. Ranjit Singh knew in whom he could repose confidence, whom he must outwit, whom to use as a tool, whom to stamp out. Shah Shuja was habitually outwitted, and made a tool of; he never stamped out anyone; and his confidence was constantly given to the wrong people. Therefore he lost his throne, and for nearly thirty years failed in every effort to recover it: therefore also when he was reinstated, it was only to reign for a short time as a puppet, and to perish at last by the hand of an assassin.

Estimate  
of Shah  
Shuja

There may have been an interval, before Ochterlony in Nepal restored British prestige, shaken by the first stages of the Ghurka war, when Ranjit contemplated war with the British as a feasible item in his scheme of aggrandisement. If so, the idea was quickly removed from his mind.

By the normal Oriental, power is conceived of mainly as a means to conquest. The normal native prince could not assimilate the idea of a great military State which was not bent on possessing itself of its neighbour's territory. The acquisition of wealth preferentially by commerce was an idea altogether foreign to him: just as, to the uneducated mind, mechanical improvements always presented themselves as

Commerce  
as a politi-  
cal end.



devices to tighten the grip of the governing race or class on the general population. Hence the entirely honest professions of the British Government have rarely obtained credence: their wish to introduce factories and acquire commercial rights beyond their own borders have been habitually accounted as the first insidious step in a systematic scheme having annexation as its goal. Suspicion breeds secret hostility, which in its turn causes counter-irritation; the latent hostility becomes overt; the collision arrives, and a new territory is added to the British Raj.

Insight  
of Ranjit  
Singh.

Ranjit however was almost unique in realising that the British as a simple matter of fact did not want his territory. He knew that the time would come when his Sikhs would get out of hand, and bring about the downfall of his kingdom. There is an authentic story that, near the close of his career, he sent the son of one of the Sirdars to Ludhiana to get learning from the British; and the lad returned with some government maps. Ranjit looked at them. "What are all those red circles?" he asked. "They mark the Dominions of the Feringhis." Ranjit kicked the map from him with a wistful exclamation—"It will be all red soon." But he did not mean the Panjab to be red while he lived; and nothing would induce him to risk a quarrel.

Develop-  
ment of his  
army.

Therefore he devoted his energies to organising the Khalsa on lines which should make it as formidable as possible when opposed to other native levies; he perceived that European methods gave an immense superiority in the field, and that the instrument of their power lay in a strong artillery, a compact infantry, and the presence of European officers. On these lines he organised his army, with the assistance of Europeans—Allard, Ventura, Court, Avitabile—who had seen service in the wars of Napoleon. To such an army, a couple of crushing defeats in the field were far more destructive than to the ill-disciplined mounted hordes of Haidar Ali or Holkar, so that there is ground for regarding it as less fitted than they were to war with the British, less suited to maintain a prolonged struggle. But in proportion to its numbers, it made an exceptionally effective machine for native wars, and the British themselves found more difficulty



in dealing with it at odds of three to one than in routing thrice the numbers of Mysore or Maratha troops.

Ranjit's policy, then, was to extend and consolidate his dominions beyond the Satlej, where his proceedings would not disturb British susceptibilities; and he set about his work systematically, advancing step by step and making his conquests sure as he advanced. He had acquired his predominance among the Sikhs by finding pretexts for overthrowing rivals and appropriating their estates, and by calmly dispossessing minors and others who were too weak to resist. It was now his object to complete his dominion in the Panjab proper by the acquisition of Multan which was a province of the Afghans; to extend his own frontiers across the Indus over Peshawar and the Derajat, and to add Kashmir to his territory. His aims.

An opportunity for operating against the Afghan monarchy arose almost immediately after his treaty with the British when, in 1810, Shah Shuja was driven from Kabul and Fateh Khan the Barakzai set up another of the Sudozai family, Mahmud, in his place; making himself Wazir and actual ruler, and placing Kandahar, Ghazni, and Peshawar, in the hands of others of his own brotherhood. Ranjit seized the occasion to offer Shah Shuja his assistance, for a consideration. The Shah moved against Peshawar, but his attempt failed; he was carried off into Kashmir by his own pretended friends, and there held a prisoner. This gave both Ranjit and Fateh Khan the Barakzai a pretext for attacking Kashmir: and the two came to terms, neither having the slightest intention of carrying them out, if he could repudiate them to his own advantage. Fateh Khan anticipated his ally in reducing Kashmir, and at once declined to go shares with the Maharaja. The Maharaja in return captured Attok, and got possession of the person of Shah Shuja. For the time however, his projects in Kashmir were checked, Fateh Khan's brother Azim being left there as Governor. Shah Shuja also succeeded with much difficulty in escaping from his clutches, leaving behind him however the famous Koh-i-nur diamond which Ranjit had long coveted greedily; and after various vicissitudes he found Ejection of Shah Shuja from Kabul.



an asylum at Ludhiana, the British advanced fort on the upper Satlej.

**Ranjit absorbs Multan.** Foiled for the time in Kashmir, Ranjit renewed his attentions to Multan; where the Governor professed allegiance to the reigning king at Kabul, while confining its expression to opposing Ranjit. In 1818, Multan after a long and stubborn resistance was suddenly carried by a furious and unpremeditated assault, met and almost repulsed by the desperate valour of the garrison.

**Embroidments in Afghanistan.** In Afghanistan meantime Fateh Khan had practically parcelled out the whole kingdom except Herat—which was retained as the headquarters of the Sudozai kings—among the Barakzai brotherhood. Persia was encroaching on the western border. Thither marched Fateh Khan, ostensibly to check the Persians, incidentally to acquire Herat. The capture of Herat, with the king and prince Kamran was entrusted to a young brother, Dost Mohammed. But Dost Mohammed, while he succeeded in breaking into Herat, committing sundry outrages, and placing himself beyond the pale of pardon by violating the royal Harem, failed to secure his position and had to fly for his life to his brother Azim in Kashmir. The great Wazir fell into the hands of Kamran and was horribly mutilated and murdered. The Barakzais determined on revenge. Shah Shuja from Ludhiana was drawn into the vortex, but vomited out again as a less convenient puppet than one or two others of the Sudozai dynasty. Kabul was captured; Kamran failed in his attempt to recover it and retired to Herat; and once more the whole country with the exception of that province was in the hands of the Barakzais, who now accepted Azim as the head of the family, Kabul falling to his share while Dost Mohammed took possession of Ghazni.

**Ranjit secures Kashmir.** These complications gave Ranjit Singh his opportunity. Azim had found it necessary to be at the centre of events, and in his absence from Kashmir the forces left behind there offered no strong resistance to Ranjit. Kashmir was added to the Panjab dominion, a year after Multan.

As soon as Azim felt his own position sufficiently established, he resolved to attack Ranjit Singh, and collected a



mighty force to march by way of Peshawar. But the Maharaja was an adept at intrigue, and drew Dost Mohammed as well as Sultan Mohammed, the brother in command at Peshawar, into a conspiracy against Azim. The advancing army was filled with rumours of treachery: suddenly, almost in a night, it melted away. Azim had to return to Kabul a broken man, and died there in 1823. Sultan Mohammed remained at Peshawar as Ranjit's tributary and governor in his name, till Azim's death; returning thither in the same capacity after a brief struggle for supremacy among the Barakzais in which he was defeated by Dost Mohammed. The Dost, still professing allegiance to a Sudozai king, assumed the office of Wazir, the Governorship of Kabul, and the headship of the brotherhood, in 1826; and remained the first man in Afghanistan till the reinstatement of Shah Shuja.

Rise of  
Dost Mo-  
hammed.

In 1834, Shah Shuja made another attempt to get to Kabul, this time seeking to approach Kandahar from Sindh; the northern part of which was nominally a province of Afghanistan. Ranjit would give no help—his terms were too high. The British Government had declined to break through its policy of non-interference. Shah Shuja collected and marched an army to Shikarpur, and, after inflicting a defeat on the Sindh Amirs, induced them to acknowledge his sovereignty, and to assist his advance. But when he entered Afghanistan, he failed as usual. He reached Kandahar, but the place held out till a relieving force arrived; when the Shah was completely defeated, but was allowed to escape over the border to Kelat, in Biluchistan, and thence to his asylum at Ludhiana.

Shah  
Shuja at-  
tempts to  
recover the  
throne.

In the meantime Ranjit Singh took possession of Peshawar. While Sultan Mohammed was there, it would have been difficult to say whether the fortress belonged to the Lahore or the Kabul State. But now Sultan Mohammed took the opportunity practically to make a present of it to the Maharaja. This was too much for Dost Mohammed, who proclaimed a *jehād* or religious war against the Sikh monarchy, adopting for himself the title of Amir as "Commander of the Faithful." The fanaticism of both sides was aroused. Moslems of every

Ranjit se-  
cures  
Peshawar.



description flocked to the Amir's standard. But intrigue proved too much for Dost Mohammed, as in like case it had done for his brother Azim. An American adventurer, Harlan, was sent by Ranjit Singh ostensibly to negotiate, actually to sow dissension. He proved completely successful. Sultan Mohammed suddenly deserted with ten thousand men. When the next morning dawned, the Amir's camp was broken up, and the jihad was over.

In 1837 there was another collision between the Afghans and the Sikhs at Jamrud above Peshawar, when the latter lost their general, and received a severe defeat; but Ranjit had organised his military system so thoroughly that reinforcements and guns were pushed up to the front with extraordinary rapidity, and the Afghans found that whatever chance they had of recovering Peshawar was hopelessly lost. The district was now placed under the command of Avitabile, one of the Maharaja's Europeans, and was finally and completely incorporated in the Panjab domains.

Ranjit and  
Sindh.

In one direction only had the British interfered with Ranjit Singh's plans. He had desired to carry his arms into Sindh; but just at the same time the British had made up their minds to get the Indus opened up for commerce; and a war between Sindh and the Panjab would have disconcerted their measures. Ranjit Singh bowed to the inevitable, silencing the murmurs of his sirdars with the unanswerable argument—"Where are the two hundred thousand spearmen of the Marathas?" But the consequent irritation, and the suspicion engendered by investigatory expeditions sent up the Indus, bore their fruit at a later day when the strong hand and shrewd brain of Ranjit Singh had ceased to control the Khalsa.

Not long after the rounding off of his dominion by the final occupation of Peshawar, the great Panjab monarch died; some months after the ill-omened expedition of the British to Afghanistan had started on its way (June 1839).

At the beginning of the century the Sikhs were only commencing their career as an independent Power. Afghanistan was already falling into the turbulent and disorganised condition which destroyed its power of serious independent



aggression. Its real importance lay in its position between Persia and the Indian peninsula—and Russia loomed beyond Persia. Persia and Russia.

We have already noted the part played by embassies to Persia in the first decade of the century, when the Power that oppressed the minds of Indian statesmen was France. On our part, the Persian treaties were directed against France: on the part of Persia however, they were directed against Russia. Virtually though not explicitly the idea was that we guaranteed Persia against Russian designs in return for Persia's guarantee against French designs. By 1826, however, we were in no danger from France. It is the recognised rule of British politics, that movements in unfamiliar geographical districts attract no attention till we find ourselves plunged into an unexpected war; and accordingly Westminster was not interested in the progress of Russia in Central Asia. It is a singular fact that when either Russia or England goes to war in the East the open rupture is always due to an act of aggression by the Asiatic Power against Russia or England. The overt act of hostility comes from the other side. The explanation of course is different in the two cases. Russia, we know, provokes the aggression on purpose; with us there would be no provocation, but for persistent if intelligible misconstruction of our benevolent intentions. That is how the matter ordinarily and honestly presents itself to the British but not always to the Continental mind.

In 1826 Russian progress excited Persia into a *jehad* against her, with the natural result when a weak State attacks a strong one. Persia had to make an ignominious peace. England was bound by the definitive treaty of 1814 to support Persia in a war with any European Power, unless Persia should be the aggressor. England in this case applied to Russia the doctrine which she usually keeps for application at home; and so finding Persia the aggressor refused assistance. There was an uneasy feeling in the British mind that we had in this done something very like shirking a positive obligation; and we adopted the unimpressive course of giving Persia cash to pay her indemnities in consideration of her formally cancelling such obligations for the future. Russo-Persian war, 1825.



Persia for her part formed the conclusion that England was a broken reed, and resolved for the future to cultivate by preference the amity of Russia.

Persia is  
Russia's  
protégé.

When the horse had been stolen the use of stable doors began to be borne in on the political mind. Russia and Persia were suddenly become friends; and Persia began to find warm and hardly veiled encouragement to aggression in the direction of the Indian border. Under the ægis of Russia, she became suddenly formidable. The alarm which had once been inspired by Zeman Shah in combination with French possibilities was transferred to Persia combined with Russian possibilities, and from that day to this the latter have never ceased to dominate all Indian military or politico-military problems; not because a Russian invasion is practicable, but lest the hope of Russian help should rouse the natives of India to revolt. The idea of a great Mussulman invasion backed by Russia, and of a call to arms of the Mussulmans in India, followed hard on the Russo-Persian treaty; and there is no doubt that the idea was seriously entertained by the Persian princes. Afghanistan however must first be absorbed. Herat was in the hands of the Sudozai Kamran, who was anathema to the Barakzais as the murderer of Fateh Khan. If nevertheless the brothers should fail to join for his destruction, the group at Kandahar might as a next step, be detached from the Amir at Kabul.

Aggressive  
designs of  
Persia,  
1834.

The new aspect of affairs did not immediately penetrate to the official mind, though Persian restlessness caused it some uneasiness. The Shah-in-Shah's grandson Mohammed moved on Herat in 1833, but he was obliged to withdraw by his father's death and a threatening of troubles about the succession. In the next year these difficulties were disposed of; Mohammed Shah ascended the throne on his grandfather's death, and the talk of vast aggressive schemes became more open.

A new move on Herat was in contemplation. There was in fact a good deal of solid justification for such an expedition in the conduct of Kamran who had raided Persian territory and kidnapped Persian subjects. But the British objections were as obvious as the Russian encouragement. Pressure



was brought to bear on the Shah and on Kamran to force them to terms: but while the Afghan proposals were reasonable, the Persian demands under Russian influence passed all bounds; including not merely Kamran's submission as a vassal of the Shah but the recognition of Afghanistan as far as Ghazni as a Persian province. Kamran would not assent: Petersburg repudiated in public the action of its representative but did not interfere with him. In 1837 the Shah with a great army marched on Herat. The Barakzais at Kandahar, by no means with Dost Mohammed's approval, displayed an inclination to side with the invader. The expectation of a great Mussulman irruption, with Russia behind it, was setting all India in a ferment. It was evident that unless active and energetic steps were taken at once to counteract the intrigues of Russia, consequences of the most serious character might ensue to the British supremacy.

The  
Persians  
march on  
Herat,  
1837.

WOMEN'S COLLEGE,  
M. A. Road Srinagar.  
General Library Books,  
Acc. No 25 Oct. 9. 2.....



## CHAPTER XXI

### THE AFGHAN EXPEDITION: AUCKLAND AND ELLENBOROUGH

*(Maps I. and VI.)*

Lord Auckland. **I**N 1836, Lord Auckland arrived in India as Governor-General with the most beneficent and peaceful intentions. He was greeted by a letter of welcome and congratulations from Dost Mohammed, in which the Amir invited his good offices against the pestilent Sikhs. The Governor-General replied that the British never interfered in their neighbours' quarrels; and the Amir opened negotiations with Russia, not because he wanted a Russian alliance, but to facilitate diplomatic pressure on the British.

The situation, 1837. By the Autumn of 1837, the Shah of Persia was in full march on Herat; the Sikhs were in full possession of Peshawar; the Barakzais at Kandahar were negotiating with the Persians; and Alexander Burnes arrived at Kabul on what purported to be a commercial mission in connection with the opening up of the Indus in accordance with the schemes referred to in the last chapter.<sup>1</sup> Russia was urging the Shah forward, and her envoy was hastening to Kabul. Also a young subaltern of the Bombay army, named, Eldred Pottinger, was making his unofficial way—partly to gather information, and partly from sheer love of adventure—towards Herat, to which city he was to prove a sort of Deus ex Machina.

The central fact in the situation clearly was this: Since Persia had been thrown into the arms of Russia, her aggression, with all the accompanying dangers to our rule in India, must be checked by the interposition of a Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Chap. xx. p. 230.



ment in Afghanistan friendly to us, strong enough to hold its own against Persia, and with a knowledge that it could rely upon our support in case of necessity as confidently as the Western Power could rely upon that of Russia. It was of manifest importance that this should be effected without bringing about any sort of rupture between ourselves and the Lahore State.

The obvious course then was to secure the *de facto* Government of Afghanistan. From the time when Dost Mohammed had emerged as the recognised chief of the Barakzai brotherhood, he had thrown off the excesses of his turbulent youth, and approved himself capable; just, as compared with his neighbours; and, for an Afghan, quite unusually loyal and straightforward. There is no sort of doubt that he was extremely anxious for the British alliance, extremely averse to exchange it for Russian friendship. In the view of M'Neill our Minister at the Persian court, and of Burnes at Kabul, our wise course was to cement a close alliance with the Amir. The only difficulty lay in the relations between him and Ranjit Singh, and that was by no means insuperable. The Amir wanted Peshawar restored to him; Ranjit was quite ready to give it up—on terms. His Sikhs loathed the place, and were mutinous when there. Its worth to him lay in its value for negotiations with Afghanistan. There was nothing to prevent an adjustment with which both parties would have been sufficiently content.

But Lord Auckland and his advisers were possessed with an entire mistrust of Dost Mohammed: and also, as it would seem, with a craving to bestow upon Ranjit Singh favours for which the Maharaja had no sort of desire. They thought of extending his dominion to Kabul; they would not hear of his handing over Peshawar, unless Sultan Mohammed, a most experienced traitor, were reinstated there as his tributary. They treated the Amir as a person who ought to be quite grateful if he conceded everything and got nothing in return; and finally as an apt illustration of the theory that the British never interfered with the private affairs of neighbouring States, they made up their minds that the *de facto* Government of Kabul should be

The true  
British  
policy.

Policy of  
Lord  
Auckland  
to restore  
Shah  
Shuja,



upset, and the exiled Shah Shuja restored to the throne, by the help of the Sikhs whom the Afghans abhorred.

by means  
of British  
bayonets.

In its first form, this surprising scheme involved only that Shah Shuja's army of restoration should be officered and trained by British. But it was presently borne in upon the authorities that if the plan was to be carried to a successful issue a large force involving the employment of quantities of British troops would be desirable, especially as Ranjit Singh was obviously half-hearted; in spite of the fact that Shah Shuja himself took by no means the same view of a restoration by British bayonets as of one by troops whom he could regard as his own. The justification of the plan lay in the fact that Herat had already been besieged for a long time, and that it would require a great force, either to save it or to counteract the impetus which the Persian invasion would receive from its fall. Such, therefore, was the scheme which, with the official reasons and explanations, was announced to the world in the Simla manifesto, issued on October 1st, 1838.

Successful  
defence of  
Herat.

In the meantime however, the chief *raison d'être* of the scheme had disappeared. On November 23, 1837, the Persian army had sat down before Herat. Month by month, the besiegers attacked, bombarded, and were repelled by the stubborn determination of the garrison, maintained by the persistent energy of Eldred Pottinger, who had volunteered his extremely valuable services. Russian officers were aiding and encouraging the besiegers: M'Neill's arrival in the Persian camp had brought hopes of an accommodation, but an immediate access of Russian activity much more than neutralised his influence. Still, the brilliant conduct of the defence held the Persians at bay. A last desperate attack was desperately repulsed in June, and the siege became a blockade. But a small expedition dispatched from India to the Persian Gulf was magnified by report into an overwhelming force; the Shah began to realise that Russia did not intend to compromise herself more deeply, and to believe that England was going to put forth her might against him; and on September 9, 1838 he broke up camp and retired. For the time the danger



of Russo-Persian aggression was at any rate completely scotched.

Nevertheless, to the general amazement, Lord Auckland and his advisers resolved to go on with their plan for the restoration of Shah Shuja; a plan of which it may be said that practically every competent authority disapproved, as not only barely practicable in itself but involving consequent complications of incalculable extent. Auckland had the support of the Cabinet at Westminster guided by Sir John Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control; but the policy met with unmitigated condemnation not only from Wellesley, Bentinck, and the Duke of Wellington, but also from experts such as Elphinstone and Metcalfe. It was probably the most unqualified blunder committed in the whole history of the British in India.

The army assembled at the British cantonments of Ferozpur, on the Satlej. Ranjit Singh naturally objected to its marching through his dominions, so it was arranged that Shah Shuja, accompanied by Sir W. Macnaghten as Envoy and adviser, with the main army under Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton, should march by way of Bahawalpur, Sindh, Biluchistan, and the Bolan and Khojak passes on Kandahar; while the Sikh expedition accompanied by Colonel Wade and Shah Shuja's son Timur should make its entry by the direct route for Kabul, by way of Peshawar and the Khyber pass. The reluctant Sindh Amirs were required to pay a heavy subsidy, influenced by the persuasive presence of Keane's troops.

It was not till the end of February (1839) that the Sindh difficulty was settled, and Cotton's column began to move from Shikarpur. The "military promenade" was tedious and painful; there was want of water and forage; it took sixteen days to traverse the country from Shikarpur to Dadar, the beginning of the Bolan pass. To get through the pass took six days more; and had not the Khan of Kelat restrained the tribesmen, the journey would hardly have been accomplished without disaster—though the Khan had also impeded the collection of supplies. Quetta was reached at the end of March. Early in April, the whole army was



assembled there, very much in want of supplies, and firmly convinced that the Khan of Kelat had been and still was deliberately throwing every possible obstacle in its way. But there was no military resistance, and at the end of the month Shah Shuja entered Kandahar, amid popular excitement which, at the moment, passed for enthusiasm; his formal installation a fortnight later hardly appearing to excite interest. There is no doubt that the restoration of the legitimate monarch presented itself to the Afghans merely in the light of a successful foreign invasion.

Capture of Ghazni. A mission was dispatched to Herat; and on the arrival of much needed supplies, about the end of June—while Ranjit Singh was dying in the Panjab—the army proceeded against Ghazni; Dost Mohammed having by its inaction been misled into a belief that Herat, not Kabul, was its objective. Ghazni was an almost impregnable fort, and Keane arrived before it without a siege train. By a convenient accident however, the fact was betrayed to Major Thomson of the Engineers that one of the gates had not been walled up, and might be breached. The defenders were beguiled by a feint, the gate was blown up and entered by a storming party: the strongest fortress in Afghanistan had fallen into our hands almost without an effort, though the actual fight to secure it was a sharp one.

Shah Shuja back at Kabul. The Amir at Kabul would fain have resisted, but the only terms offered him were, an asylum in British territory. He made a stirring appeal to his followers to let him lead them in a last charge; but their loyalty was not equal to the demand on it. Flight alone was left, and he escaped to the Hindu Kush, across the Afghan border, in spite of a hot pursuit. On August 7th Shah Shuja entered Kabul. Three weeks later he was joined by his son Timur, the Sikhs having been enabled to pass through the Khyber without difficulty by the successful tactics of Colonel Wade. For a little while it was imagined that fresh lustre had been added to the British Arms. By the end of 1841, that lustre, such as it was, had been lamentably besmirched.

Shah Shuja had been restored on the hypothesis that he was to be hailed with acclamation by a devoted population,



and maintained on his throne by their loyalty. Almost from the first moment it was manifest that he owed his re-instatement entirely to alien arms, and that if the British retired, he would have to make haste after them, back to Ludhiana. It was resolved to retain a garrison of 10,000 British troops at Kandahar, Kabul and other points, the main body at Kabul; where Cotton at first remained in command, but was later succeeded by the hopelessly incompetent General Elphinstone—a very different person from his particularly competent civilian namesake. General Nott was appointed to Kandahar where he performed his work well. Macnaghten with Burnes at Kabul controlled Political affairs. The way for ultimate disaster was carefully paved by the extraordinary folly which, in deference to Shah Shuja's request, resigned to him and his seraglio the citadel known as the Bala Hissar which completely commanded Kabul, and relegated the garrison of 5000 men to almost indefensible cantonments outside.

British  
occupation  
of Afghani-  
stan.

Persia was now quiescent; Russia had more than enough to occupy her in Turkistan; the Khan of Kelat had been duly punished for his supposed delinquencies; the separate government of Herat was enjoying large subsidies; the tribal chiefs of Afghanistan (notably the Ghilzais of the Kandahar district who in the previous century had for a time made themselves masters of Persia), were bribed into good behaviour. Dost Mohammed was still at large, but the danger from him was removed in 1840. By a desperate charge at the head of a few horsemen, he had scattered in ignominious flight a much larger body of troops which had been sent against him; and having thus retrieved his honour, he voluntarily surrendered himself, and was placed under honourable restraint within the British dominion. Macnaghten and Burnes believed themselves to be complete masters of the situation.

Surrender  
of Dost  
Mo-  
hammed

The expense, however, was enormous. The actual army of occupation is said to have numbered some 25,000 men. The Dost's surrender seemed to offer a legitimate opportunity for withdrawal, but neither Macnaghten nor Lord Auckland would countenance such a step. Retrenchment was the



course adopted, and the form it took was the withdrawal of the subsidies to the tribal chiefs. The whole country was promptly in a ferment of latent hostility, aggravated at Kabul by the habitual and flagrant misconduct of some of the English there. Suddenly in November (1841) the flame blazed out.

Murder of  
Burnes,  
Nov. 1841.

It began with an *émeute* in Kabul which ought to have been promptly and easily suppressed. A mob attacked the house of Sir Alexander Burnes, captured it, and murdered Sir Alexander. The mob was not yet large; there were 5,000 troops outside. To have marched in and crushed the rising within twenty-four hours would have presented no difficulties to any commander of ordinary capacity. But the insurgents were allowed instead to sack the treasury and capture the military stores, while the General did nothing: and every Afghan was in arms forthwith.

Messages were dispatched to Nott at Kandahar and to Sale at Gandamak, calling for assistance: but the latter was in no position to answer the call, and took the wisest available course of falling back on Jellalabad, so as to command the Peshawar road. Nott dispatched a brigade, but with a strong conviction that between the snow which was beginning to fall and the now inevitable opposition of intervening tribes, it would either fail to reach Kabul or would only get there shattered, useless, and too late to help. The Brigade started; but its commander soon made up his mind that the advance was wholly impracticable, and returned to Kandahar.

Mis-  
manage-  
ment at  
Kabul.

At Kabul, Elphinstone's imbecility was palpable, and matters were not improved by the association with him of Shelton, whose temper rendered him equally destructive. Day after day every conceivable blunder was committed; disaster was heaped on disaster; by the end of the month the General informed Macnaghten, that it was impossible to maintain the position, and he must negotiate. The Afghans demanded the unconditional surrender of the whole force. Macnaghten refused; but the General in his turn obstinately declined either to occupy the Bala Hissar as Shah Shuja himself had urged, or to attempt to collect food and forage by force of arms.



On December 11, Macnaghten, made helpless by the military authorities, renewed negotiations. The terms agreed upon were that the troops at Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jellalabad should evacuate the country; hostages were to be left; and the Afghans were to supply provisions and carriage to expedite departure. Shah Shuja might stay, with a pension, or retire, as he chose. The ignominy of the surrender was without parallel. It can only be said, that in the face of the attitude of the military authorities, Macnaghten had no choice, if the lives of any of the garrison were to be saved.

But Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammed, who immediately after the rising had been recognised by the insurgents as their chief, took no steps to carry out his part of the bargain, and began demanding the surrender of the military stores, and of more hostages. Macnaghten decided to try and play the game of intrigue: Akbar Khan proposed and Macnaghten accepted a plan for a plot which in saner moments the British Envoy would have recognised as a palpable trap for his destruction. In accordance with the proposal he gave his directions to the General, and went out to meet Akbar, with a total escort of three officers and sixteen men. The four officers were suddenly seized; Macnaghten struggled; in a moment of exasperation Akbar shot him dead with his pistol; the captors of the other three with difficulty carried two of them to a place of safety. The third fell, and was murdered where he lay.

Murder of  
Mac-  
naghten.

Major Eldred Pottinger, a recent arrival, on whom now devolved by general consent the office which had been held by Macnaghten, tried hard to have the convention repudiated: but the military authorities over-ruled him. It was ratified on January 7th, and orders were sent for the evacuation of Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jellalabad; at each of which places however, the instructions were repudiated. Two days later the evacuation of Kabul began, some 15,000 souls starting on the march: men, women, and children, insufficiently provided with food and clothing, and without means of defence, they went out through storm and snow. One day, three more officers including Pottinger and George Lawrence,

The great  
disaster.



were demanded and surrendered as hostages : a day or two later, eleven ladies with fifteen children and eight officers were handed over ; and again a little later, the generals themselves ; chiefly because their position seemed fraught with less danger as captives, than with the unhappy force. The Afghans entirely disregarded their promises ; in every defile and gorge the tribesmen poured in a heavy fire on the fugitives ; of all that host a single survivor alone reached Jellalabad on January 14, to tell the awful story ; all the rest save the hostages perished on the way, whether from exposure or from the murderous attacks of the Afghans.

The energy of George Clerk at Agra prevailed upon the despondent and almost paralysed Governor - General to dispatch a brigade for the relief of Jellalabad ; but it was incompetently led, and the Sikhs—despite the good-will of Sher Singh, now Maharaja at Lahore—made the merest pretence of rendering assistance. The Brigade failed to advance beyond Peshawar. By sheer persistence Clerk practically forced Lord Auckland and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Jasper Nicholls, to send forward a fresh brigade—commanded this time by the very able General Pollock : though it was still maintained that the sole purpose in view, the sole object to be achieved, was the safe withdrawal of the Jellalabad garrison.

Retire-  
ment of  
Lord  
Auckland. At the end of February (1842), Lord Ellenborough arrived as Auckland's successor : the most disastrous reign in our Indian annals was brought to a close. Lord Auckland possessed admirable qualities for a routine administrator under peaceful and progressive conditions ; but he had proved himself totally incapable of facing a crisis ; his want of self-reliance, his injudicious selection of advisers who controlled him, and his complete lack of nerve, made him utterly unfit to deal with great events. His successor was brilliant, and versatile, but erratic, bombastic, and theatrical to a degree. Lord Ellenborough's career in India destroyed his reputation ; but it was at least less positively disastrous than that of Lord Auckland.

The British forces whose movements have to be followed were posted thus ; the largest body at Kandahar, under Nott,



with a garrison at the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzai; Sale at Jellalabad; Palmer at Ghazni. General England was ordered up to Kandahar with supplies and some fresh troops, by the Quetta route. General Pollock was to advance from Peshawar to the relief of Jellalabad.

At Kandahar, Nott and the political agent Major Rawlinson were in no straits. An attempt to raise the Durani tribe in their support, on the theory that Shah Shuja was in their favour, was unsuccessful; but when an insurgent army moved on the city, Nott inflicted a severe defeat on it after twenty minutes fighting; and in March, after a summons to evacuate, in accordance with the orders sent from Kabul, which was declined, another attempt of the insurgents to make their way in was severely repulsed by a portion of the garrison; the bulk of which had been temporarily enticed away from the scene of action. Ghazni on the other hand was surrendered at about the same time; opinions differing as to how far the Colonel in command was justified. At the end of the same month, General England allowed himself to be checked in his advance from Quetta, and declined to move again until he was sure that Nott was in possession of the intervening Khojak pass.

At Jellalabad the defence was maintained with great skill and success; the main credit being perhaps due to the spirited counsels and energetic action of Captains Broadfoot and Havelock. A day or two after the occupation an attack in force had been soundly defeated. A position at first hardly defensible had been rapidly converted into a strong fort. There was a short period about the end of January, during which the principal authorities wavered, owing to the belief that Government had abandoned them. But while negotiations were passing, news came that Pollock was on his way; a foray brought in a quantity of cattle; the chiefs took heart, and broke off the negotiations. A great earthquake overthrew the fortifications, but they were repaired with such speed and vigour that the enemy believed the shock had passed harmlessly. Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammed, appeared on the scenes and attacked the town; the garrison sallied forth and repulsed him. A

Events at  
Kandahar.

Defence of  
Jellalabad.



few days later, another sally and foray brought in another ten days' supplies. Before the ten days were out, the garrison (April 7th) arranged a decisive plan of attack on the besiegers, drove them from all their positions into the river, captured guns and supplies, and effectively raised the siege.

A week later Pollock arrived. He had reached Peshawar on February 5th, but for two months he had been employed in mastering the mutinous spirit not only of the Sikh allies, but of some of his own officers. Not till April 5th had he been able to move, clearing the Khyber by masterly manoeuvring; when he joined hands with Sale at Jellalabad, the whole of the district, as well as the whole Kandahar district, was practically under British control again.

The position in April '42.

Such was the position in Afghanistan, when, in Hindostan, the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief made up their minds that Kandahar and Jellalabad must both be evacuated and the troops withdrawn at the earliest possible date; the prisoners being still in the hands of the Afghans, and the career of the luckless puppet king at Kabul having been ended by his assassination two days before the siege of Jellalabad was raised.

Nott and Rawlinson received the order to retire; in spite of their disgust, they had no alternative but to set about the preparations for carrying it out, although their position had been still further strengthened by the complete repulse, with heavy slaughter, of a fierce attack on Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Pollock discovered that the want of cattle must prevent an immediate evacuation of Jellalabad, and might detain him for several months. Throughout the Indian peninsula there was an explosion of indignation. Just in time, Lord Ellenborough discovered a way to maintain a particularly empty show of consistency, and at the same time to satisfy the universal demand for the decisive re-conquest of Kabul and recovery of the prisoners as a preliminary to withdrawal. On July 4th he dispatched a letter to Nott, suggesting that he might perhaps, if he thought the risk not too great, retire from Kandahar *via* Ghazni and Kabul: and a copy of the same to Pollock, with a suggestion that if Nott elected to retire *via* Kabul, the Jellalabad force might co-operate. It was

Withdrawal *via* Kabul.



somewhat as though a French army occupying Dresden should be instructed to withdraw with the option of taking Berlin *en route*.

Nott had nearly completed his preparations for retirement; Pollock had accumulated large supplies. Both promptly decided in favour of the novel method of withdrawal suggested. On August 7th, Nott marched in force from Kandahar; on the 20th Pollock advanced from Jellalabad. The former re-took Ghazni, and blew up the fortifications; the latter inflicted a complete defeat on Akbar Khan at Tezin. On the 15th September he hoisted the British Flag once more on the Bala Hissar at Kabul; on the 16th, Nott joined him.

The prisoners during these months had been shifted from place to place; sometimes protected, not without difficulty, by the good offices of a chief named Zeman Khan; but on the whole receiving fairly good treatment. When Nott and Pollock advanced on Kabul, Akbar Khan hurried his captives off to the Hindu Kush, and they were given to understand that their destiny was, to be distributed in permanent captivity among the Usbeg chiefs beyond the Afghan border. Before reaching a place called Bamian, however, the cupidity of the chief of their escort was so worked upon that when they were there, Pottinger assumed command, set up a new Governor, retained the escort in his own service, and prepared for a siege. On receiving the news of Pollock's victory at Tezin, the party resolved on an immediate return to Kabul, started on September 16, were met next day by the advance body of troops sent to recover them, and on the 22nd were once more at Kabul—free.

Nott and Pollock had vindicated the honour of the British arms. They had proved that we had competent commanders against whom the Afghan levies could make no stand. They had rescued the prisoners. They had re-taken Kabul. The Insurgents were everywhere in full flight. Their troops, in Kabul itself, getting out of hand, had taken signal vengeance for the fate of their comrades. There was nothing more to be done but to retire from the hopelessly false and untenable position into which Lord Auckland's great blunder had thrust

The  
British  
prisoners.

The  
triumphal  
march  
back.



us. On October 12, the victorious forces began a triumphal march from Kabul to Agra. Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation which would have done credit to Bonaparte. The sandal-wood gates of the temple at Somnath—or copies of them—carried off centuries ago by Mahmud of Ghazni, were brought back as a trophy, the centre of much grandiloquent rhetoric; and promptly forgotten. At Firozpur there was a grand review, with great pomp and circumstance, intended especially to impress the Sikhs. Finally, Dost Mohammed was liberated, and returned to rule for several years at Kabul; where in 1856 his successful opposition to Persia showed how entirely superfluous the whole disastrous episode had been.

Effect of the episode. But that wanton act of interference bore its evil fruit for us, not only in the great disaster of 1841; and subsequent internal complications in Afghanistan, but also in its revelation to the Native mind—as the events of the next six years proved, at the cost of no little bloodshed—that possibly after all the British arms might not be invincible.



## CHAPTER XXII

### SINDH AND GWALIOR: AUCKLAND AND ELLENBOROUGH.

(*Maps I. and V.*)

**I**F the Afghan episode is the most disastrous in our Indian annals, that of Sindh is morally even less excusable.

Sindh is the country lying on both banks of the Indus below the Panjab, with the Shikarpur region at the extreme north, and the sea on the south. The upper districts had been tributaries of the Durani kingdom. The chieftainship of the whole was divided amongst a Biluchi family, known as the Talpurs, in three groups—the Amirs of Khairpur, Mirpur, and Haidarabad; their subjects were mainly Biluchi Mussulmans.

Sindh and  
the Sindh  
Amirs.

As early as 1809 a treaty had been made between them and the British, for excluding "the tribe of the French." From 1832 to 1838 various commercial agreements were made in connection with the opening up of the Indus. In the last year, Ranjit Singh had been doing his best to obtain the assent of the British to his carrying his arms into Sindh; and the treaty with the Amirs provided for our mediating between them and the Maharaja. This mediation took the form of an arrangement by which Shah Shuja as *de jure* monarch of Kabul released the Amirs from all claims to service or tribute in consideration of a cash payment whereof some two-thirds was to be handed to Ranjit Singh. The demand for payment however was not pressed till negotiations for a fresh treaty in connection with our advance into Afghanistan were set on foot in 1839. The justification of the proposals then made is not obvious, seeing that the Shah had already given the Amirs a formal release in return



for benefits received on the occasion of his attempted restoration in 1833; and also we now claimed what had been expressly refused to us in existing treaties, the right of sending our forces and stores through Sindh. On the other hand, it is fair to recognise that the Amirs had been showing signs of hostility to us, and threatening alliances with Persia; which conduct at least gave colour to a demand on our part for a subsidy and a military station at Thatta on the Indus, some sixty miles below Haidarabad. The Amirs submitted under protest; and if they were sore at our treatment, they still fulfilled the letter of their engagement throughout our Afghan troubles, when it lay in their power to cause us considerable embarrassment.

Outram. Shortly after the restoration of Shah Shuja in 1839 Major James Outram—"the Bayard of India," as Sir Charles Napier named him later—was appointed Resident for Sindh and Biluchistan, in which post he did much admirable work, especially in the pacification of Kelat. Unfortunately for himself, he offended Lord Ellenborough—who had virtually promised to make him Envoy instead of merely Resident—by restoring Quetta and the Shal valley to the new Khan (from whose predecessor they had been taken), in accordance with his recommendation approved by Lord Auckland but neither ratified nor rejected by the new Governor-General.

The disasters in Afghanistan had created much unrest, which affected the Amirs unfavourably. Such charges against them as required investigation were formulated by Outram; and there is little doubt that in self-defence it was advisable for us to demand concessions which would enable us more readily to check anything like active disaffection. But in the autumn of 1842, while Nott and Pollock were restoring British prestige in Afghanistan, Outram was superseded by the veteran soldier Sir Charles Napier who was placed in supreme control both military and political.

Sir Charles Napier and the Amirs. Sir Charles conducted his operations on the theory that the annexation of Sindh would be a very beneficent and advantageous piece of rascality for which it was his business to find an excuse—a robbery to be plausibly effected. Ali Murad, a brother of Rustam the old Rais or head of the



Khairpur Amirs, is the villain of the piece. Rustam had no sort of idea of resisting the British power; but Ali Murad wanted the "Turban" or symbol of authority for himself. To Napier he posed as the one friend of the British, while he terrified the old Rais by friendly warnings of the dire fate that awaited him if he fell into the hands of the British Commander; whose hectoring tone gave a certain specious plausibility to the flagrant misrepresentation of his intentions. Rustam did not dare to obey Sir Charles's summons to meet him: Sir Charles attributed his conduct to contumaciousness, regarded his excuses and protests as mere prevarication, and made Ali Murad Rais in his place: at the same time sequestering the upper territories of Khairpur as far as Sakhar (Sukkur). The rest of the Amirs were then ordered to meet Outram at Khairpur to sign a treaty which was practically an abrogation of their sovereign status. Ali Murad succeeded in preventing their attendance on the appointed day, and on their arrival two days later, they were ordered to meet Outram at Haidarabad instead.

The result was that the treaty was not signed till Feb. 12 (1843), by which time the Biluchi population at Haidarabad had been roused to a violent pitch of animosity; and three days later they made a fierce attack on Outram at the Residency. The attack was brilliantly repelled, but Outram was obliged to withdraw to his steamer on the river. This overt act necessitated the appeal to arms. Napier, who, two months before, had deliberately dispatched a force of some five hundred men to seize the fort of Imamgarh in the Mirpur territory without provocation—an act of splendid audacity from the military point of view, but morally indefensible—was now marching on Haidarabad. With a force of 2700 men, he met the Biluchi army numbering 20,000 at Miani a few miles from Haidarabad on Feb. 27; and by brilliant generalship routed them completely with great slaughter, at the cost of casualties amounting to about a tenth of his little force. Haidarabad surrendered, and the Amirs submitted. About a week later, Sher Mohammed of Mirpur made a gallant attempt to recover independence, but was completely routed at Daba, a village not far from

The Sindh War.

Miani.



Haidarabad ; a detachment was sent to seize Amirkot ; Sir Charles Napier made his famous and only too truthful pun—" *peccavi*, I have Sindh"—and another province was annexed to the British empire.

The Annexation of Sindh. The fatuity and blundering which had marked our operations in Afghanistan until the armies of Kandahar and Jellalabad vindicated our honour, were counterbalanced by the brilliancy of the general commanding in Sindh ; but the story of the annexation is a unique and deplorable example of departure from every principle which had hitherto made annexation only the last resort in dealing with persistently irreconcilable powers, or at most the final remedy for endless misrule. Our interference in Afghanistan, however unjustifiable, was at least not dictated by the desire of territory. Sindh is the one instance in which it is difficult to believe that the case for annexation was not more or less deliberately manufactured, in opposition to the declared sentiments of the most high-minded, capable, and well informed servants of the Government.

The excuse, such as it was, is to be found in the loss of prestige consequent on the Kabul disaster, though such disaffection as it had produced in the Amirs was trivial enough. But elsewhere it was not trivial, and was responsible for the particularly short and sharp two days' campaign of Gwalior, and, two years later, for the first sanguinary struggle with the Panjab State. The annexed territory was placed for the time under the administrative control of Sir Charles Napier.

Mutinies of sepoy regiments. A minor result of the annexation—not however without significance in the light of later events—was the first grave outbreak of a mutinous spirit among the sepoy regiments ; the first sign of a tendency which was probably intensified by the Sikh wars, during which perpetual appeals were made by the agents of the Khalsa to the cupidity as well as the religious sentiment of the sepoys, and comparisons instituted between the rate of pay for serving and for opposing the British. In the case of Sindh, the trouble arose because before the Annexation the sepoys of the Bengal Army in Sindh were paid as for service on a foreign station ; after it,



they were required to serve beyond the Indus without extra allowances. The matter was probably made worse by the fact that many of the sepoys employed in the Afghan war had literally lost caste on service. One regiment after another refused to march: the 64th N.I. at last breaking into open mutiny. They were quieted by injudicious and unauthorised promises on the part of the Colonel; and the promises being repudiated at Shikarpur, they mutinied again. The General commanding in the district, recognising the provocation, was content with punishing the ringleaders. Very much the same thing happened with some Madras regiments which were ordered to Sindh: after which, neither Bengal nor Madras troops were called upon to serve there, the province being associated with the Bombay army. But the beginnings of insubordination were a premonition of troubles to come, as yet unsuspected by all but a few.

In an earlier chapter (xv.) it has been observed that on Gwalior. the conclusion of the Maratha wars in 1818, Daulat Rao Sindhia at Gwalior was allowed to retain a very much greater independence than any of the other Maratha princes; since he had displayed, though much against his will, a practical recognition of British paramountcy. Daulat Rao died without issue in 1827; when his energetic and ambitious widow found herself compelled to adopt his kinsman Jankoji, though she retained the government in her own hands for some six years. In 1833 Jankoji wrested control from her, and she was driven from his dominions. In 1843 (February), Jankoji died, leaving an extremely youthful widow, Tara Bai—she was in her thirteenth year—without issue and without having adopted a successor. Tara Bai adopted a boy of eight years old, with the concurrence of her own chiefs and of the Governor-General. Under such circumstances, and considering the great extent of Sindhia's dominions, Lord Ellenborough insisted on the appointment of a single regent in lieu of a Council. The Rani's selection for the post was Intrigues for power. the hereditary chamberlain known as the Dada: Lord Ellenborough's was an uncle of Jankoji's known as the Mama. The Mama was duly appointed: and the Rani and the Dada



proceeded forthwith to intrigue against him, while the British Government was under the circumstances obliged to range itself definitely in his support. Now, Sindhia—that is to say the Gwalior Government—was lord of one of the two great native armies still existing in India, the second and the greater being the Khalsa in the Panjab. When a political situation develops such as had now appeared in Gwalior, and also as we shall presently see in the Panjab; when the Government is divided into factions, and there is also a large and united army; the army very promptly becomes the leading factor in the situation, and can dictate its own terms to the rival factions as soon as it realises its own powers.

The Gwalior army. It may be remarked that, while Sindhia was a Maratha, the whole of his principality was outside the real Maratha country, in the heart of Hindostan. The army consisted mainly of Brahmin or Rajput regiments with no sentimental allegiance to the Maratha dynasty which was of inferior caste to their own; to the arrogance of conscious power it added the pride of caste—the pride not of nationality but of race: to which was conjoined unity of religion. The special danger of the situation lay in the fact that the Sikhs also were a sect, if an unorthodox sect, of Hindus; the religious antipathies of Hindu and Mussulman would not be present to stand in the way of a combination; a combination would mean a desperate bid for the recovery of Hindu supremacy throughout the Indian Peninsula: and the general belief in the practicability of such an attempt had been immensely advanced by the Kabul disaster, while the newly reported victory of Miani had been effective more as restoring our own confidence in ourselves than as recovering our prestige among the natives in general: and finally the controlling perspicacity of Ranjit Singh in the Panjab had been removed for nearly four years.

For some months the Gwalior army continued to wax in insubordination and arrogance. The court intrigues continued. The Mama was not strong enough to control the situation; the Rani dismissed him from his office, and the Dada drove him from the country. Lord Ellenborough



took the next step to breaking off diplomatic relations by withdrawing the Resident to Dholpur on the border.

Withdrawal of the British Resident.

The Rani was now nominally at the head of affairs: the Dada was practically dominant. The Rani entreated the Resident to return: he replied that the Dada must be surrendered as a condition precedent. The Rani offered to deprive the Dada of office, but demurred to giving up his person. Some of the nobles, supported by part of the army, captured him; but he escaped, resumed office, and succeeded in issuing eight months' pay to the troops, thereby securing them on his side. In the meantime, Sher Singh the Sikh Maharaja, who had been personally loyal to the British, was assassinated, and the attitude of the Khalsa was increasingly threatening. The Governor-General made up his mind that the Gwalior crisis must be ended.

A "camp of exercise" was formed at Agra; in other words a very considerable army was assembled there and set in fighting trim. Thither came Lord Ellenborough on December 11th, 1843, and forthwith he informed the Rani that a friendly government capable of keeping order must be established at Gwalior, and that his army was on the march to see that it was done. A week later this message was supplemented by a demand for the reduction of the Gwalior army, and the increase of the British subsidiary contingent in the dominion. The Governor-General somewhat characteristically backed his demand by reference to a treaty nearly forty years old which had been ignored by both parties from the date of its signature. Moreover he declined to remain within the British border, to receive the Rani for the signature of the proffered treaty. The army was not to be held back; the meeting was to take place on the 26th, in Gwalior territory.

Demands of Lord Ellenborough.

The Gwalior chiefs and the army alike regarded this as tantamount to declaring the independence of the State at an end: and the army in particular felt that its doom would be sealed by submission. It was resolved to fight. The Rani was dissuaded or frightened out of attending on the day named. The bulk of the army marched out to a strong

Maharajpur.



position at Chanda, and on the night of the 28th entrenched itself at Maharajpur. Another column on the south of Gwalior awaited the expected advance of a second British column in that quarter from Jhansi.

On the morning of the 29th Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, with between six and seven thousand men, advanced on Maharajpur. A complete conviction prevailed in British quarters that the resistance would be insignificant, and not only Lord Ellenborough but a party of ladies accompanied the advance. The nature of the country made it impossible to bring up the heavy guns. The enemy's lines were as a matter of fact carried only by sheer hard fighting in the face of exceedingly stubborn resistance, their men standing fast and fighting hand to hand; but they were finally driven in complete rout, with heavy loss.

**Puniar.** On the same day, General Grey, advancing from Jhansi, routed the second Gwalior column at Puniar, losing only some two hundred men. The total British casualties in the two engagements were just over 1000.

**New arrangements at Gwalior.** There was no further resistance. Sindhia's kingdom was not dismembered but was deprived of independence. A council of regency was appointed to conduct the government until the young Raja should come of age, the Resident having authority to dictate their measures at his discretion. The army was reduced from 40,000 to 9,000 men, and a British contingent of 10,000 was subsidised. This contingent, it may be remarked, subsequently became a particularly well-appointed and capable instrument of war, which in the time of the Mutiny joined the revolt, murdered its British officers, and had the unique credit of defeating an English General on its own responsibility.

**Recall of Lord Ellenborough.** Six months after Maharajpur, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and was succeeded in the Governor-Generalship by Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge. His erratic methods and his gasconading proclamations had been no less distasteful to the India House than the dictatorial tone of his correspondence with them: while his absorption in the excitement of military programmes had entirely withdrawn



his attention from administrative concerns. In Afghanistan he had fortunately changed his policy between April and July. In Sindh he had unfortunately withdrawn his confidence from Outram and transferred it to Sir Charles Napier. At Gwalior he had adopted a sound course, but had gone out of his way to put forward an unsound justification. His proceedings were a series of surprises and produced a nervous perturbation, and an uneasy suspense, particularly ill adapted to the exigencies of the government of India: the feeling that he was not "safe" was irresistible. No one had ever suspected Lord Auckland of genius; he was simply a capable domestic administrator who found himself involved in diplomatic and military complications entirely outside his province and beyond his capabilities. Different as were the causes of his failure, Lord Ellenborough is perhaps the only one of our Governors-General to whom the famous phrase about Galba applies—*omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset*.



## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE PANJAB: HARDINGE

(*Map VI.*)

Sir Henry Hardinge. **L**IKE each of his immediate predecessors, Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in India, hoping for an era of peace; as in their case, his rule is remembered as an era of war. In no other respect, however, does his administration resemble that of either Auckland or Ellenborough. The Afghan affair was wantonly conceived, recklessly conducted, and brought its own nemesis. The Sindh business had destroyed such credit as we had hitherto obtained for abstaining from wilful aggression. But the war with the Sikhs was forced upon Lord Hardinge by an unprovoked invasion; the terms imposed at the close of a hard-fought but triumphant campaign were studiously moderate; the Panjab State was maintained in its independence in spite of a quite legitimate excuse for annexation. The men who were brought to the front by the Governor-General's choice or with his approbation were those whose names stand in the front rank of the British roll of honour. Retrenchments were required of him where policy would have maintained the existing expenditure, but the resulting dangers were reduced to a minimum by judicious organisation; and the great soldier who had won a European reputation in Spain before he was thirty added a fresh wreath to his laurels, partly, it must be admitted, owing to the undue detraction of which his Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, was made the object.

The Panjab after Ranjit Singh. There were many reputed sons of Ranjit Singh, but only one his paternal relationship to whom he confidently recognised. This prince, Khārāk Singh, who was almost imbecile, succeeded Ranjit as Maharaja, the government falling into



the hands of his son Nao Nihāl Singh, and of the family variously known as the Dogra Rajas or the Jammu brothers, of whom the chief were Dhiān Singh and Gholāb Singh. These men were not Sikhs, but Rajputs, who had won the favour of the old Lion of the Panjab—very able, very unscrupulous, and decidedly unpopular with the Sikhs themselves. At the end of 1840, Kharak Singh died, and his son—too capable and promising to suit the Jammu brothers (so called, because Ranjit Singh had made them jointly Rajas of Jammu when he acquired that country)—met with a fatal “accident.” Sher Singh, a reputed son of Ranjit, was made Maharaja, with Dhian Singh as Wazir, Gholab Singh retiring to Jammu. Sher Singh and his brothers kept the Khalsa under some degree of restraint, and the Sikh government succeeded in maintaining a friendly attitude to the British throughout the Afghan troubles. In 1843, Dhian Singh, aiming at greater power, joined in a plot for the assassination of Sher Singh; but this was hardly accomplished when his fellow-conspirators removed him also; and his son Hira Singh in turn overthrew the conspirators, made himself Wazir, and established as Maharaja the boy Dhulip Singh, a possible son of Ranjit’s by a young wife known as the Rani Jindan. She with her brother and her paramour Lal Singh, played a leading part in the Sikh Anarchy which followed.

Now it was that the Khalsa became the principal factor in the situation. We have seen that the great Maharaja had organised a powerful standing army on European models, with the help of European officers. It included some Mussulman regiments, but the great bulk of it consisted of Sikhs, who were fanatical religionists however little they respected the moral code of Nanuk. They had a curious constitution of their own; the regiments were really controlled, not by their officers, but by elected committees of five known as *Panchayets* on the analogy of the Village Communities. Their insubordinate conduct towards the officers had given to British observers a totally erroneous idea of their effective discipline in the field, for to the instructions of the panchayets they were absolutely obedient. Their armament included 250 guns, in the management

The  
Khalsa.



of which they were experts; and when we found ourselves at war with them it was discovered that they were also experts in the art of rapidly throwing up entrenchments behind which they would fight with unsurpassed doggedness and courage. The Sikh Sirdars were able to bring large bodies of armed retainers into the field, but these were quite inferior to the Khalsa regiments as instruments of war, and quite inadequate to making head against them for political purposes.

**Intrigue and Anarchy.** The Rani and her entourage intrigued against Hira Singh; both parties endeavoured to win over the Khalsa. Both had in their minds the consciousness that so long as the Khalsa, loyal to itself and to "Govind" only, retained its organisation, any and every Government would be insecure. Both had the idea that the way out of the difficulty might be found in letting the army loose against the British; in which case, it would either solve the problem by being totally wrecked, or would by victory give prestige to the Government, which would claim the credit. The Sikh Sirdars were afraid of the army; they hated alike the Rani's circle and the Jammu party; and their sentiments to the British were mixed. In the game of intrigue, the Rani won, and Hira Singh, whose success might perhaps have eventually produced a strong government, was killed. The Khalsa more than ever became masters of the situation; and by the autumn of 1845, there was little room to doubt that they had resolved to make a bid for the Empire of Hindostan.

**The Sikh problem.** Ever since the assassination of Sher Singh the Sikh Anarchy had been a source of grave anxiety to the British Government. It had hurried on the decisive action of Maharajpur: which in its turn had helped to curb, for the time, the aggressive inclinations of the Khalsa, and had most fortunately cleared away the one formidable force whose geographical location at Gwalior would have rendered it not only an inevitable but an exceedingly dangerous ally of Sikh invaders, by threatening the rear of our advance. The Lahore Government could put at least fifty thousand drilled troops and probably nearly twice as many irregulars in the field, and the British forces in the frontier districts were quite insufficient to deal with such an army effectively: while to



increase their numbers would be to court the charge of wilful provocation. But in the circumstances, the thing had to be done, and was done with no little skill and the least possible display. Nevertheless, the problem of balancing the demands of political against military expediency offered its usual difficulty, and the attempt to evade war involved making the shock of sudden onset the more perilous.

During October and November (1845), the Khalsa obtained entire control over the Lahore Court or *Durbar*; but the British Political Agent, Major Broadfoot, still thought it possible that the Sikhs would abstain from the irrevocable step of crossing the Satlej. The British troops, of which an unduly small proportion were Europeans, were now collected to the number of 7,000 at the advanced fort of Firozpur, and were in considerable force at Ludhiana, Amballa, and one or two other forts west of the river Jamna. The largest station was at Mirat, or Meerut, east of the Jamna. The threatening movements of the Sikhs led Sir Hugh Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, to order up some of the Mirat troops; but optimistic advisers induced Hardinge, who was himself at Ludhiana, to have them sent back, though all available regiments were ready to move on receiving the order. On the 9th Dec. Broadfoot announced the Sikhs' advance. On the 12th came the news that they were over the Satlej and marching on Firozpur; on the 13th the Governor-General issued his declaration of war, and the troops at the western station were immediately on the march.

Disposition of British troops.

The Sikhs cross the Satlej.

Gough himself was in command; and the Governor-General, whose military repute was of the highest, placed himself a week later at the service of the Commander-in-Chief as second in command. The situation was somewhat awkward; previous Governors-General, who had been soldiers, had either exercised their right of taking supreme control, or had not accompanied their armies.

The advance was performed with extraordinary rapidity; the Amballa force starting on the 12th, overtaking that from Ludhiana and reaching Mudki on the 18th, having covered about 140 miles in seven days, their route lying for the most part through heavy sand or jungle.



**Mudki.** On reaching Mudki after a twenty mile march the troops numbering some ten thousand had halted to rest, when approaching clouds of dust heralded the arrival of the advance column of the Sikh army; the battle was joined at about four in the afternoon. The engagement was fierce and the resistance stubborn, but the Sikhs, whose number may have been anything between twelve and thirty thousand were driven from the field, with the loss of 17 guns. So hot was the fighting while it lasted that the victors lost little short of 900 men.

**Firozpur.** Firozpur was now not very far off; and after two days' halt to enable more troops to join, the army advanced on its way thither. Littler, commanding there, had orders to join hands with the relieving force. It was known that one portion of the Sikh army under a prominent Sirdar, Tej Singh, was before Firozpur; and the other portion under Lal Singh the Wazir, the Rani's favourite, had been thrown forward to oppose the advance. By skilful manœuvring, Littler brought a division out of Firozpur, evading Tej Singh, on the 21st, while Gough and Hardinge on the same day moved from Mudki. The Sikhs had entrenched and occupied at Firozshah a formidable position shaped like a horse shoe, impossible to turn, commanding the line of march.

**Firozshah,**  
**Dec. 21.** Here in the morning, the main British army found them. Gough, having inspected the position, was anxious to make an immediate attack: Hardinge wished to wait for Littler's re-inforcement. After the unlooked-for vigour of the opposition at Mudki, the Governor-General was so convinced of the immense risk involved, should his force prove insufficient, that he exercised his authority and over-ruled Gough. Littler arrived at three o'clock; the attack commenced at four. When night fell, the British had partly carried the entrenchments, but the fight was still raging, the troops were losing touch of each other in the dark, and there was nothing left for it but to fall back and renew the attack next day. Never had a British army in India been placed in so critical a position; for no one could feel that defeat was impossible, especially if Tej Singh should re-inforce Lal Singh; and defeat would mean annihilation for the force and, for the



time being, of the British Power in India. The stubborn resolution of officers and men alike was rewarded when in the early morning the entrenchments were rushed and it turned out that dissensions, born of distrust in the competence and loyalty of their leaders, had caused the Sikhs to withdraw most of their forces during the night, falling back towards the north.

The crisis was not passed, for the British had been for no long time in occupation of the Firozshah position—they were too much exhausted for effective pursuit—when Tej Singh with some thirty thousand fresh men was seen to be approaching. If a new attack were vigorously pressed, disaster was still possible. But though it was opened with vigour, it was not maintained. For some reason unknown, Tej Singh began to fall back. A small body of light Dragoons and Lancers made a sudden charge, which precipitated retreat into flight: the great struggle was converted into a complete rout of the foe.

Firozshah,  
Dec. 22.

It is commonly assumed that Hardinge's action in overruling Gough on the 21st saved India from disaster. Yet it is at least an open question whether Gough's plan was not the sounder. As it fell out, the attack did not begin till four o'clock in the afternoon of the shortest day of the year. But of Littler's force, for whose arrival it had been delayed, only one regiment took effective part in the fight. Before night fell, the entrenchments had been forced, and another hour of daylight would have made the victory complete. If Gough had had his way, Littler would have been in time, with his reinforcement, to make the result secure, much as it befel Moltke at Sadowa, and Tej Singh's appearance next day would have been fraught with nothing like the same danger. It may be that of the two plans Hardinge's was on the whole the right one—the less risky—to follow; but it is certainly unjust to describe the one as a piece of hot-headed rashness and the other as a counsel of sober judgment. Both the alternatives—there was no third—carried the risk of an overwhelming catastrophe; the one chosen all but led to disaster, but ended, not without the help of good fortune, in complete success, though at the cost of close upon 2,500 casualties.

Current  
criticisms



Firozshah broke up the Sikh invasion; it was now our turn to overthrow the Khalsa in the Panjab. Within two months, on Feb. 10th, the decisive battle was fought at Sobraon. In the interval, the British were engaged in gathering their forces for the final blow, the Sikhs in completing their defences on the Satlej, and in threatening the British line of communication towards Ludhiana. A partial success at Budhowāl on Jan. 20th was redeemed by Sir Harry Smith's decisive victory at Aliwāl on the 26th when the raiding column was driven over the river.

Sobraon, Feb. 10, '46. The Sikh position at Sobraon, on the British bank of the Satlej, was of extraordinary strength; but if it could be stormed, retreat would be for the bulk of the enemy impossible. Gough resolved to storm it. At sunrise on Feb. 10, the artillery opened fire; but after a two hours' duel, it was clear that we had gained no advantage. The advance with musket and bayonet was ordered; after desperate fighting, with more than one check, the entrenchments were carried, the Sikhs resisting valiantly to the last; when finally they were being driven in complete rout over the bridge, it gave way with them; their losses amounted to not less than 10,000 men and sixty-seven guns; the possibility of effective resistance was at an end. The British losses were much the same as at Firozshah, though the proportion of killed was much smaller.

In two months there had been four fierce engagements, all stubbornly fought, two of them at greater cost than even Assaye. The resistance had been of a quality such as no native opponents had ever before displayed except the Ghurkās; in sixty days, the menace of the Khalsa was shattered.

The Lahore treaty. Annexation, or the attempt to establish a capable government in the Panjab, were the alternatives before the Governor-General, who chose the second. At the end of March (1846) the Lahore treaty was signed. By way of penalty and indemnity, the Jalandar Doab—*i.e.* the lands between the Beas and the Satlej—was annexed; about a million and a half sterling was demanded, and the cession of Kashmir with half a million sterling accepted instead;



Kashmir was then handed over, as an independent State, to Gholab Singh of Jammu for a million; the Sikhs gave up the artillery they had used in the war; their army was reduced to thirty thousand men; a Council of Regency was appointed, by desire of the Sirdars, British troops were to remain at Lahore till the end of the year, the chiefs declaring that without such assistance they could not be responsible for maintaining order; Henry Lawrence was appointed Resident with large powers, and the great race of British Frontier Officers was called into existence. The excitement created throughout India by the Sikh invasion, and by the rumours of a coming Hindu triumph, was allayed by a triumphal march on which the 250 surrendered or captured guns were displayed. When Lord Hardinge retired (he and Gough having been raised to the peerage) something less than two years later, early in 1848, he was under the belief that no more wars would be needed for several years to come.

The task before the Resident, Henry Lawrence, in the Panjab, was one of extraordinary difficulty, and was performed by him with extraordinary success. The personal confidence and the influence he acquired among the Sirdars, were amazing. Hardly was he established at Lahore when in October this power was shown by his leading a Sikh army with only a small contingent of British troops to force the recalcitrant governor of Kashmir to yield that country to Gholab Singh; a mission accomplished without a single blow being struck. The Court party however, were by no means satisfied with the new order of things, intriguing against the Resident, and fomenting the ill-feeling of the Khalsa, which retained a conviction that its defeat had been due to the treachery of its Commander, not to its own military inferiority. When the time came at the end of the year, for the retirement of the British troops, the Sirdars again declared that anarchy must result. Despite the Governor-General's anxious desire to withdraw from the Panjab, the force of the Sirdars' argument was conclusive. A new treaty was accordingly concluded at Bhairawal or Bhyrowal by which the Panjab administration was placed absolutely under

Henry  
Lawrence.

Treaty of  
Bhairawal



British control—Henry Lawrence becoming virtual dictator—until the young Maharaja Dhulip Singh should come of age in a little less than seven years' time; when the British were to withdraw altogether.

The Panjab officers. During 1847 many of the Panjab men who were to become famous learned their work under Lawrence's inspiration—John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, James Abbott, and others including Henry Lawrence's no less famous brother John. One notable effect of their actions was that the Pathan and Biluchi tribes, from Hazara on the North to the Sindh border on the South, learned a curious devotion to the Englishmen which stood them in good stead when the Khalsa again rose. For the Mussulman tribesmen did not love their Sikh masters, whose conception of Government had been hitherto restricted to the collection of tribute. Their method was unconsciously summed up by the remark of a Sirdar, that as there had been no contributions from the Derajat for two or three years, it was "time to send an army." The methods of Edwardes, Abbott, and the rest were less drastic but more efficacious and a good deal less costly; persuasion coupled with an occasional display of supreme audacity, impressing the untutored mind in a way which astonished the Sikhs. It must not be forgotten however, that all the time Lawrence's men were acting as representatives not of the British Power but of the Lahore Government temporarily administered through them.

Outlook in the Panjab. The Rani's party had been weakened before the treaty of Bhairawal by the removal of Lal Singh who was implicated in the resistance of Kashmir: and in 1847, the discovery of other plots and correspondence caused the Rani herself to be removed from Lahore, though not for some months, unfortunately, from the Panjab. By the end of the year, it seemed as if the Khalsa itself was settling down into a sullen acquiescence in the new order; a good many of the Sirdars were becoming more definitely well-disposed to the British; the non-military population was discovering the advantages of British administration; the hill tribes were increasingly friendly. Could Henry Lawrence's sympathetic acumen have been retained at Lahore continuously for the



next six years, it is more than possible that a complete and salutary revolution of Sikh sentiment, and even of Sikh methods of government, might have been peacefully brought about. But Lawrence's health broke down; the situation demanded an extraordinary man, and he was replaced by an ordinary one; while simultaneously a new and inexperienced if exceptionally able Governor-General succeeded Lord Hardinge. In January, 1848, Hardinge and Lawrence sailed together from India: Lord Dalhousie arrived at Calcutta: and Sir Frederick Currie was placed in charge at Lahore. A new war was not long in following.



## CHAPTER XXIV

# CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB, AND OF PEGU: DALHOUSIE

(*Maps I. and VI.*)

**Position of British forces.** **T**HE desire for retrenchment and the expectation of a prolonged peace induced Lord Hardinge before his retirement to make a very large reduction in the Native or Sepoy army; though he so reorganised the distribution of forces that a greatly increased mass of troops was placed in the North West districts. At Lahore, Jalandhar (the newly ceded territory), and Ferozpur, brigades were formed as movable columns of all arms, which made a repetition of the Satej campaign impossible. Nevertheless, before the end of April (1848) a revolt broke out which in six months' time had developed into a fresh rising of the Khalsa against British influence.

**The Multan revolt.** Multan, at the South Western corner of the Panjab, was the scene of the outbreak. The Governor, Mulraj, had been in correspondence with the Rani. He had declared his desire to be relieved of the Governorship, on the ground that he was not able to collect the revenues of his district. On his presenting himself at Lahore, it was decided to allow his resignation; and two British officers, Vans Agnew and Anderson, accompanied by Sikh and other troops, returned with him to take temporary charge of affairs. On reaching Multan, Mulraj's soldiers rose; he declared that they would not permit his resignation; Agnew and Anderson were murdered, and a revolt against the British domination was proclaimed.

Multan was in rebellion against what was not a usurped but a perfectly legitimate Government at Lahore. Techni-



## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB AND PEGU 267

cally it was the business of the Sikh authorities to suppress the rebellion. But if the rebellion made head, there was every probability that the Sikh soldiery would join instead of suppressing it. A message had been got through by Agnew, before his murder, calling for help, to Herbert Edwardes in the Derajat; and the news was soon at Lahore and Ferozpur. At the moment, it seemed incumbent on the British to march to the rescue of the Englishmen in Multan, regardless of the technicality. But when it was known that the murders were accomplished, the position changed. Punishment was the business of the Sikh Government: and it was resolved that the British troops should not interfere. The argument was, that interference might be resented; that if the Sikh State were really well disposed, it could and would quell the rebellion; if it were not, the whole country would shortly be in arms, and the risk to small columns in such an event would be greater than the chance of their being able to quench the conflagration at the outset. Lord Gough preferred the chance of a big revolt with the certainty of throwing a powerful conquering army into the Panjab late in the year to the hazard of at once sending a small force, when failure might precipitate serious disaster: especially as Multan was reputed to be exceedingly strong, and the country a dangerous one to Europeans for summer campaigning, being intensely hot. This view was endorsed by Dalhousie, and acquiesced in by Currie. Campaign deferred.

For a year past, Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes had been employed under the Sikh Government, controlled by Henry Lawrence, as an officer in the Derajat beyond the Indus. There he had wrought wonders among the tribesmen by the novelty of his methods. Never before had discussions between them and the collectors of taxes been carried on with arguments less material than the musket or the tulwar. His frankness, his geniality, his audacity and his untiring energy won their confidence and admiration; between them and their old Sikh oppressors there was no love lost, but in Edwardes they recognised a born leader. Remote as was his position, he could not await orders, and when Agnew's message reached him, he did not hesitate to take Herbert Edwardes.



on himself the responsibility of action. The hill-men answered to his call, and he soon had at his back Pathan levies whom he could trust, as he could not trust the Sikhs who formed his regular troops. His chief reliance was upon a very able, brave, and wholly trustworthy Mussulman, Feujdar Khan, and a capable half-caste commander, Van Cortlandt. He set himself energetically to preparing for a move on Multan, and to urging on the authorities the advisability of securing success by some British help; failing which, he could only do his best with his own regiments, and the assistance of the friendly Mussulman State of Bahawalpur. Meantime the Lahore Government was preparing columns to send to Multan; but it was obvious from the outset that while some reliance might be placed on the Mussulman regiments, those of the Khalsa were by no means trustworthy.

In June Edwardes crossed the Indus; on the 18th, the anniversary of Waterloo he joined hands with the Bahawalpur force, and won a victory at Kiniri. On July 1st, he won another victory at Saddusam which brought him close up to Multan: and a week later, the Khalsa contingents, commanded by the Sirdar Sher Singh arrived. As yet, Sher Singh seems to have been personally well affected; but his father Chattar Singh was playing a double game in the Peshawar and Hazara districts, intriguing for Afghan support in exchange for the cession of Peshawar, and urging his son by letter to use the opportunity to raise a revolt of the Khalsa: and Edwardes was painfully alive to the possibility that the bulk of the army before Multan might go over to Mulraj any day.

About this time, Currie resolved to use his powers, and send the movable columns at Lahore to support Edwardes. Gough thereupon, while protesting against the whole policy of the movement, still considered that if a column was to go, it must be strengthened. The result was that Mulraj continued to improve his defences until, early in September, General Whish joined Edwardes with a division and a siege train. Some minor engagements, preliminary to an intended general assault, met with success; but the situation was suddenly changed when, on the 14th, Sher Singh and the whole of his

Whish sent  
to Multan,  
Sept. '48.



## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB AND PEGU 269

Sikh troops went over to Mulraj. The capture of Multan was now rendered impossible; the besieging force could only sit down in front of it, and three weeks later Sher Singh was able to depart with his troops northwards, unmolested, calling all the old members of the Khalsa to his standard as he went. The Sikhs had committed themselves once more to a stand-up fight with the British. Rising of  
the  
Khalsa.

Gough's plan of operations precluded him from listening to appeals for the help of a brigade at Peshawar, Hazara, or Bannu between Peshawar and the Derajat, though George Lawrence and Abbot were urgent. His scheme required the concentration of his forces, with the exception of the Bombay column ordered to join Whish at Multan: with whom a junction was to be effected after the fall of that town. Consequently the Sikhs from the Derajat prepared to join Sher Singh, and Chattar Singh's intrigues resulted by the beginning of January (1849) in the capture by insurgent forces, with some Afghan help, of Peshawar and Attok, with George Lawrence. The force at Multan was not strong enough to push the attack till the Bombay column arrived late in December, and the place was not finally won till Jan. 22nd.

In the meantime, Gough completed his preparations and began his advance. Broadly speaking, all the districts beyond the river Chenab were in revolt; those between the Chenab and the Satlej were restrained from open rebellion partly by the influence of a few Sirdars, partly by the activity of John Lawrence in securing posts which might otherwise have become centres for the gathering of insurgents. Gough's  
advance,  
Nov. '48.

By the middle of November, Sher Singh was waiting with a large army to dispute the passage of the Chenab, which was not bridged. On November 22 a sharp skirmish took place about the river bed at Ramnagar (Ramnuggar), where a gun stuck fast in the sand under the enemy's fire, and had to be abandoned, while the Sikh advance posts and a regiment of British cavalry, the 14th Light Dragoons, were both severely handled. The Sikh position was too strong to be forced; but a few days later, a considerable body of troops was taken across twenty miles up the stream and moved



Sadulapur. down to attack the Sikh encampment. This turning movement made Sher Singh resolve to fall back to another position. A part of his army engaged the British turning force on the afternoon of Dec. 3 at Sadūlapur, retiring under cover of night; the Sikh leader withdrawing his whole force Northward to the Jhilum river, at Rāssūl.

The Chenab was crossed; but the enemy's army was in full strength, entrenched, in a very difficult country, well supplied with artillery, and thoroughly skilled in maintaining a defensive position though with no corresponding skill in attack. Gough wished to wait for the fall of Multan and the release of his column there before proceeding to strike what he hoped would be the final blow; but strong pressure was brought to bear on him in political quarters to make him advance at once, lest Sher Singh should be re-inforced from the North; a contingency made the more probable by the fall of Attok. Accordingly on Jan. 12 ('49) he moved forward with an army of about 14,000 men; and on the following afternoon was fought the bloody and indecisive battle of Chillianwalla.

Chillian-  
walla,  
Jan. '49. A turning movement being in the Commander-in-Chief's view not practicable it was his intention to make a frontal attack. Towards mid-day on the 13th the enemy's entrenched position was disclosed, extending along the near bank of the river with their left flank resting on the Rassul hills. Gough proposed to camp at Chillianwalla, and to fight next day; but the Sikhs had actually advanced to a nearer point through jungle, and suddenly opened fire showing that the intended encampment would be untenable. It would be necessary for Gough either to fall back or to attack at once; and he chose the latter alternative. In advancing through the jungle, certain brigades failed to keep touch with each other; there was a panic among the cavalry on the right wing, and a stampede, which left the flank uncovered. For a time it seemed possible that there might be a great disaster. But by pluck and hard fighting, the Sikhs were at last beaten off and driven in rout towards the river. Once again, as at Sadulapur and on the first night of Firozshah, a complete if sanguinary victory was snatched from the British



## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB AND PEGU 271

by the fall of darkness ; this was followed up by three days of heavy rains which made further movements impossible. Thus a desperately contested battle left the Sikhs still in occupation of a very strong position at Rassul, where for a month to come the British had to be content with watching them.

The carnage on both sides had been great : colours had been lost : some regiments had brought grave discredit on themselves. There was a great outcry at home and in some circles in India over the disaster, and Sir Charles Napier was appointed to take Gough's place as Commander-in-Chief. But before the change took effect, Gough had already terminated the war by the brilliant victory of Gujerāt.

While Chillianwalla was being fought, the closing operations of the siege of Multan were in progress ; a week later, the citadel fell. The expected re-inforcements from the North came into Sher Singh's camp, but the troops released from besieging Multan were on their way to join Gough. The Sikhs attempted two or three times to draw him into making a fresh attack, in which they were abetted by renewed British political pressure ; but the General was not to be again enticed or pushed until he had his whole army concentrated, and his guns raised to the requisite numbers by the arrival of the batteries from the South. Hitherto, despite the surrender of cannon after the Satlej campaign, the Sikh artillery had always proved superior. Fall of Multan.

A month after the battle, on Feb. 14th, Sher Singh suddenly marched on Gujerat : Gough in turn moving, not to bring on a fight but to cover the river (the Chenab). On the 20th Feb. he was joined by the Multan column and their guns. Next morning the battle opened with heavy cannonading ; but at last the British had the superiority ; in less than three hours the Sikh defence was broken up ; and only then was the general advance ordered. In another hour the enemy were in flight, leaving their camp, their baggage, and their guns ; an effective chase being maintained by the British cavalry till nightfall. The Khalsa had received the final irrevocable blow, our casualties being less than one third of those at Sobraon, Chillianwalla, or Firozshah. Gujerat.



A force was despatched under Sir Walter Gilbert which followed hard on the tracks of the routed Sikhs; who finally surrendered at discretion on March 12. Peshawar was yielded a few days later, and the Afghan contingent made good its escape over the border. This time the Sikhs felt that they had been soundly and unmistakably beaten in fair fight without suspicion of treachery on the part of their leaders; so that a primary incentive to revolt was finally removed.

The Panjab annexed. The attempt to evolve an independent and friendly government in the Panjab had failed. Five years before, Sindh had been annexed without reasonable excuse: in the Panjab we had manifestly done our utmost to abstain from Annexation; but abstention was no longer possible. On March 30th, 1849, the Panjab was formally annexed to the British Dominions; the boy Maharaja, Dhulip Singh, was deposed and withdrawn from the territory, but granted an ample pension; and Lord Dalhousie proceeded to the settlement of the new province.

Henry Lawrence and the annexation. In the beginning of the year ('49) Henry Lawrence had returned from England. In his view, the sound policy to follow was one of conciliation; annexation was at best an unpleasant necessity, and on any other principle would become not only dangerous but also unjust. As he regarded matters, greater tact and skill would have averted the Multan outbreak altogether: failing that, the outbreak could and should have been nipped in the bud. The Sirdars would have remained loyal if they could: but the British had insisted on throwing all responsibility on them, and leaving them to keep the Khalsa in check unaided; the Khalsa had once more proved too strong for them; and they deserved very little blame for finally yielding to the pressure and throwing in their lot with the revolt. Dalhousie had no sympathy with this view, which implied a certain censure on the course he had adopted; he considered that the Sirdars deserved the sternest treatment. Lawrence, again, held that if we annexed, policy apart from justice required that the Sirdars should have increased not diminished power as compared with the soldiery; and that with adequate British



## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAR AND PEGU 273

forces in the province, they would become loyal themselves and exercise a very strong influence in our favour, as the natural leaders of the people. Dalhousie held that the less power they had the more readily would the population at large, be converted into supporters of British rule. And Dalhousie was supported by Henry Lawrence's brother John.

Sir Henry was the last man to be placed in office for the carrying out of a policy to which he was diametrically opposed; while there was no doubt of the practical necessity for retaining his services in the Panjab. Dalhousie solved the difficulty by appointing a Board of three instead of a single Chief Commissioner, consisting of Henry Lawrence as President, with John Lawrence, and Mansel (succeeded by Robert Montgomery) as legal member. The outcome of the brothers' divergent views was a series of compromises. The Sirdars, with diminished wealth and influence, sombrely, if without enthusiasm, acquiesced in a treatment which was at any rate less severe than they might have looked for; and the population at large soon found themselves enjoying an unprecedented prosperity. The Khalsa was disbanded, but many of its members were re-enrolled in new British regiments; while the more turbulent spirits among the frontier tribesmen found scope for their energies in the irregular corps raised to form the afterwards famous Panjab frontier force by Nicholson, Lumsden, Coke, Hodson, and others. A general disarmament, in which the village headmen found themselves associated with Government and made responsible for enforcing its orders, combined with a judicious distribution of garrisons, made the prospect of any organised rising so remote that its possibility soon faded from the popular mind. The essential work of the Board was virtually accomplished before the differences of the two great brothers made a continuation of compromises impossible. Dalhousie then chose the one whose views agreed with his own to be Chief Commissioner; and Henry Lawrence, to the deep disappointment of himself and the "frontier men" who worshipped him, was transferred to Rajputana as Resident in 1852. Here also however his sympathetic tact gave him an influ-

The  
Governing  
Board.

Henry  
Lawrence  
transferred  
to Raj-  
putana.



ence over the Rajput chiefs which enabled him to tranquillise them under the excitement produced by certain aspects of Dalhousie's policy to which we shall presently turn ; but for which it is probable that they would have taken active part in the great rising of 1857.

**Dost Mohammed.** Dost Mohammed at Kabul had practically stood aloof from the Panjab war, though he had allowed his brother Sultan Mohammed to help Chattar Singh. He was now thoroughly convinced of the inevitability and permanency of British Ascendancy ; and in 1855 he made a treaty with Lord Dalhousie's Government, (finally ratified at the beginning of 1857), which bore fruit not only in his successful resistance to Persia in the following year, but also in the complete absence of disturbance on the frontier throughout the Sepoy revolt.

From the conquest of the Panjab we turn to Dalhousie's second conquest, that of Pegu, on the Far East.

**Burmese affairs.** The Burmese monarch, since the peace of 1826, had shown no disposition to carry out the spirit of the treaty then made. The British Residents sent to his capital at Ava had experienced such habitual discourtesy that they had been finally withdrawn. The merchants established on the coast, instead of being protected by the Governor of Rangoon, were harassed in every possible way, subjected to groundless accusations, and fined even when acquitted. By the summer of 1851, matters had reached such a point that in September the European community at Rangoon memorialised the Government at Calcutta, setting forth their grievances, demanding intervention, and declaring that in the alternative they would be compelled to abandon their business and their property.

**Insult to the British, 1851.** Two months later, a British warship anchored off Rangoon : commanded by Commodore Lambert, with authority to enquire into the complaints of the merchants, and to demand suitable compensation from the Burmese Government, together with the removal of the Governor of Rangoon. The attitude of the Governor himself was uncompromising ; but the Commodore's missives were dispatched to Ava, and met with a reply which was taken as being friendly and pacific. Its



## CONQUEST OF THE PANJAB AND PEGU 275

apparent purport was belied by action. The Governor was indeed withdrawn from Rangoon, but with every mark of honour, instead of disgrace. His successor ignored Lambert's existence. An audience was demanded, but when at the appointed hour the officers reached the Palace, they were informed that the Governor was asleep; and after being kept waiting in the open under a burning sun for many hours, they withdrew in great indignation.

Such a deliberate insult changed the aspect of affairs. The Commodore demanded the immediate payment of the compensation, assessed at only £500 sterling, and a personal apology from the Governor. Further, he seized a royal vessel lying in the river. Security for the payment, and announced a blockade. The Governor then addressed Calcutta, but in terms not of compliance but of extreme arrogance.

These events had taken place between September 1851 and January 1852. At the end of the month, Dalhousie, who had been in the North West, reached Calcutta. He made immediate preparations for war, but at the same time, while announcing his intention of appealing to arms, he informed the Burmese Government that a peaceful settlement might still be obtained by meeting all the previous demands and paying a further indemnity of £100,000 by the first of April. It was of the first importance that the campaign should be concluded by the end of that month, by reason of the rains and the unhealthy climate, which the war in Lord Amherst's time had shown to be much more formidable than the Burmese army.

The preparations were pushed on with extraordinary skill and vigour; and with an unparalleled attention to the sanitary requirements of the troops. An important result of the Panjab annexation was now manifested. The problem of transporting Hindu soldiery across the sea had been hitherto serious, for Caste reasons: but it was found that the Sikhs were entirely free from that prejudice, and were perfectly ready to take service.

Early in April, the whole army was concentrated on the Irawadi; on the 11th it was before Rangoon. During the next three days, there was heavy cannonading while the

Preparation for war.

Rangoon.



British General, Godwin, was making his dispositions; on the 14th the great Pagoda, the fortified temple which formed the citadel, was stormed with extraordinary valour; Rangoon was captured, and the British occupation was accompanied by the immediate establishment of a firm provisional Government.

Godwin rightly declined to advance upon Ava in the summer: in September Dalhousie himself arrived on the

And of scene. In October, Prome, half way to Ava, was captured, and a month later the town of Pegu was finally secured.

Prome and Pegu, 1852. This terminated the military operations. The extension of dominion outside the British boundaries was not, *a priori*, a part of Dalhousie's programme, though in the case of the Panjab he had annexed without reluctance. On the other hand, he had no intention of drawing back a yard from territory on which the British flag had once been planted. An advance on Ava would in his view necessitate the annexation of all Burma; and therefore he resolved to proceed no further but to annex the conquered province of Pegu. Even this he described as an annoying necessity forced on him by the circumstances.

Annexa- tion of Lower Burma. The annexation was effected simply by Proclamation, unratified by any treaty—a matter of the less consequence, since it was certain that the Burmese court would have regarded any treaty as waste paper. The act cannot be regarded as in any way exemplifying a spirit of greed or aggression. In the circumstances, there had been no alternative to a war, or to a cession of territory on the conclusion of the war—virtually a universal rule in the East. And in this case, there was no sort of question that the entire population of the annexed province would have chosen, had the choice been offered, to be placed under the British flag in place of the unqualified tyranny under which they suffered. The condition of the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim previously ceded had been the object of their envy for many years: in Pegu the annexation was undoubtedly a matter of rejoicing, and to Pegu it brought unexampled prosperity. It was not however till the time of Lord Dufferin that the further inevitable step was taken, and Upper Burmah also was added to the British Empire.



## CHAPTER XXV

### DALHOUSIE AND THE NATIVE THRONES

(*Maps I. and VIII.*)

AS concerns the two annexations by conquest, of which the history has been related in the last chapter, the verdict that no other course was open to the Governor-General is almost unanimous. It is conceivable that Henry Lawrence might have rebuilt the Panjab State; it is quite certain that no other man in India could have done so. Nor is it possible to find fault with the annexation of Pegu, except on the hypothesis that the despot at Ava was entitled to behave as he pleased to foreigners within his own territory—an argument which would have justified Suraj ud daulah. The annexations by conquest.

The course however which was adopted by Dalhousie towards the dependent and semi-dependent States of India is matter of debate. When the Mutiny broke out, innumerable voices were raised, laying the blame of it primarily upon the "Annexation Policy," and condemning that policy as immoral *per se* and as a departure from all precedent. Since that time, Dalhousie's apologists have held the field; and it has become customary to treat any criticism of him with very scant respect. Yet at the time, not a few of the ablest and most experienced officers in India were on the other side. The "Annexation Policy."

Dalhousie's actual view was frankly and definitely stated in his Sattara Minute; quoted in every book which deals with the subject. He held that if any *legitimate* opportunity occurred for bringing a dependent State under the formal dominion of the Company, it would be wrong to let the opportunity pass. The grounds for that view are no less clear than the view itself. The quality of any native government depended almost entirely on the personal character of Dalhousie's theory.



the ruler for the time being. Under the Oriental system the degeneration of every royal family was assured; while even the ancient remedy of violent deposition by a capable adventurer was now forbidden. Hence, it was only by absorption into the British dominion that any prospect of continuous good government could be obtained.

The opposed theory. In the opposition view, it was maintained that people do as a matter of fact prefer to be ill governed (within limits) under methods with which they are familiar, and which have been evolved in the course of their own history, rather than to be scientifically governed under alien methods. It was better therefore to help the indigenous system to develop in a healthy manner, rather than to impose a foreign system in itself greatly superior. The ceaseless wars of the past had prevented that healthy development; now, with peace guaranteed by the might of Britain, the opportunity had come. Therefore, it was not advisable to annex, except as the alternative to palpable irredeemable mis-government, or to the up-growth of a dangerous militarism.

Conflict- ing views as to land- holders. One point deserves to be noted as strongly influencing the minds of the partisans of either view. British dominion was inevitably accompanied by the loss of influence and wealth on the part of the owners of large estates—jaghirdars or zemindars—and theoretically at least by an improvement in the lot of the peasants. But in many parts of India, especially in the Rajput districts from Behar to Rajputana, the relations of the landholder and the peasantry were often akin to those of Highland chieftains to their clansmen, owing to hypothetical bonds of family: or to the looser but still effective bond of feudalism. The advocates of one view pointed to the palpable, tangible, material superiority of the modern over the mediæval system: the advocates of the other laid stress on the real value of the mediæval sentiment, and the danger of attempting to bridge five centuries by a proclamation.

Policy in the past. It will be observed that the question now presenting itself was different from that dealt with generally by the earlier Empire-builders. Wellesley had extended British dominion by obtaining cessions of territory; but even in the case of



Mysore he had gone out of his way to reinstate a native dynasty; the cessions had been treated as matters of political necessity. His subsidiary alliances and Lord Hastings's treaties had always assumed that the native States should be entirely responsible for their own domestic affairs. The question whether it was better to maintain a native State on these conditions, or to end its existence as a State had been habitually answered in favour of its maintenance; except where, as in the case of Arcot, the reigning dynasty had been given up as past hope. In like manner, the irreconcilable attitude of Baji Rao had led to the annexation of the Peshwa's dominions, but even in the act Hastings had restored the principality of Sattara.

In short, it would seem that the right of annexation on sufficient ground had been recognised and acted upon, whether the ground was irreconcilability or flagrant and continuous misgovernment; but opportunities had not been sought, and where they had occurred they had repeatedly and deliberately been declined more often than accepted. The attitude had been, that the individual case must be judged on its merits, but that the presumption was in favour of maintaining the Native State.

It is here therefore that we shall find Dalhousie's "departure." There was fully adequate precedent for every one of his annexations. But his predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of annexing if he could do so legitimately. Neither Dalhousie nor his predecessors, however, treated the general principle as a Universal Law.

The third alternative, of intervention in the domestic affairs of a native state, without annexation, had never been treated as practicable except when the reigning prince was a minor, as for instance in the Panjab between the two Sikh wars. It was always laid down that such intervention should cease when the prince attained his majority.

Now it happened that during Dalhousie's time a singularly large number of opportunities for annexation occurred. The case of Pegu belongs to the category of cessions rather than

Nature of  
Dal-  
housie's  
departure



annexations; it was the confiscation of territory after a successful war, not the absorption of a principality. The annexation proper, after conquest, of the Panjab, has already been discussed; but there remain the "opportunities" within the sphere of Ascendancy.

Different grounds for annexations. These fall into two classes. In very nearly every instance, annexation was carried out. The classes are, those of lapse or escheat, and those of misgovernment. In the former there are four leading cases—Sattara, Nagpur, Jhansi and Kerauli: in the latter the leading case is that of Oudh.

In each of the five there were two questions to be asked—would annexation be legitimate? And if so, would it be expedient? An affirmative answer to the first question would by no means necessarily involve an affirmative answer to the second. And it might even be that in each case, if treated by itself on its own merits and if treated in conjunction with the rest, a different answer might be given.

The adoption question. In the cases of lapse, the legitimacy turns primarily on the question of Adoption. It was admitted that on the demise of a Dependent Prince leaving no heir, the government legitimately lapsed to the Sovereign Power. The peculiarities however of the Hindu religion had brought about the custom of Adoption. The welfare of the soul in the next life depended in part on the due performance in this world of sundry religious functions by the offspring of the departed: if a man died without offspring, these functions could not be performed: hence the doctrine of adoption, by which all the capacities and qualities of genuine offspring were created in an adopted child, with a full religious sanction. The adopted child became the heir of his adoptive father, precisely as if he had been bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh.

As far as private concerns and private property were affected, this was simple enough: the complication arose when inheritance of political functions also was claimed. It does not appear that in dependent Hindu States, the validity of such inheritance had been disputed. But half the Hindu principalities had been subordinate to a paramount Mahomedan power; and the paramount power had main-



tained that for political purposes its own sanction was required to render an adoption valid. That sanction had been on occasion withheld, and had habitually been made conditional on some sort of payment. In taking the place of that paramount Power, it seems quite indisputable that the British Government were entitled to refuse their sanction to an adoption; and that their refusal rendered it invalid for political though not for private purposes.

Accordingly, as long ago as 1834, the Court of Directors had laid it down that adoptions should be sanctioned not as a matter of course, but only as a matter of exceptional grace. The occasions however had hitherto been rare; though the declaration of 1834, supported by two or three instances which had occurred in the interval, were clearly sufficient to justify Dalhousie in treating fresh cases as "legitimate opportunities" for absorption. Dalhousie had hardly arrived in India when the question was raised in connection with the principality of Sattara. The instructions of 1834.

On the annexation by Lord Hastings of the Peshwa's dominions, the Governor-General had erected out of a portion of them the State of Sattara which he had bestowed upon the representative of the house of Sivaji. In 1839 the Raja had been deposed for persistent misgovernment, and replaced by his brother. The brother had no children; and he recognised the authority of the British Government by repeatedly petitioning for permission to adopt a son, which permission was consistently refused. Nevertheless, just before his death in 1848, he did adopt a son. Hence arose the question—should the British Government recognise that adoption, although it had not been sanctioned, or should it claim that Sattara had lapsed to the Sovereign Power, since there was no other heir to the prince upon whom the State had been bestowed by grace of the British Government in 1818. The case of Sattara.

The legitimacy then of annexation is beyond dispute. It was a departure from a policy which had prevailed up to 1834, but it was in accordance with the declaration of that year, which moreover had been acted upon more than once in the interval: nor did the fact that a different policy had



been followed before touch the legitimacy of a change. The question was which of two legitimate policies should be followed. Dalhousie decided for annexation. The weight of authority favoured that view ; and it received the approbation of authority in England. The opposition, mainly represented by Sir George Clerk, one of the ablest administrators in India, relied on the injustice of acting upon a plea technically valid but by custom exercised only in exceptional cases.

The case  
of Jhansi.

The second case was that of Jhansi, a district in Bandelkhand, ceded by the Peshwa in 1817. The hereditary authority of its subordinate ruler had been then confirmed by the British, and he had been dignified with the title of Raja fifteen years later. On his death in 1835, a son adopted without sanction had been set aside, and a kinsman had been given the succession. On his death, the British had again selected the successor who died in 1853 : leaving an heir whose adoption had not been sanctioned. Again, the legitimacy of absorption is clear ; its expediency from the point of view of the Jhansi population was supported by the disastrous effects of the rule of the first two Rajas. Jhansi was annexed, and the Raja's widow pensioned ; but the proceedings filled her with the bitterest animosity to the British.

The case  
of Kerauli.

Kerauli stands third. This was a small Rajput state, lying just beyond the Chambal, which had been subject to the Marathas. The case differed from those of Sattara and Jhansi in this, that it was a principality of considerable antiquity, in which—as throughout Rajputana—the right of adoption had not hitherto been challenged : whereas both Sattara and Jhansi had been in effect creations of the British, within areas where the political validity of adoption had long depended on recognition by the paramount Power. Dalhousie himself was in favour of maintaining even in this instance the principle of refusing to recognise an unauthorised adoption ; but he was alive to the distinction, and referred the case home. The Directors decided in favour of the adopted heir, on the ground that Kerauli was not a “dependent principality” but a “protected ally.”

These three may be regarded as the test cases of the Adoption question. They implied the definite decision that



in minor dependent States at any rate, the perpetuation of a dynasty by the method of adoption would no longer be permitted, and that such States on the failure of heirs would henceforth be escheated.

The annexation of Nagpur was on a somewhat different footing. Like the Peshwa's dominions, Nagpur had fallen forfeit in 1818; but Lord Hastings then deliberately reinstated a youthful member of the royal house as Raja. During his minority, the administration had been conducted by the British Resident, Richard Jenkins, to the extreme satisfaction of the general population. When the Raja came of age, laxity and dissipation set in. In 1853, about the same time as the Jhansi Raja, the Raja of Nagpur died. He had consistently refused to adopt an heir. There was no legitimate successor. There was a general sense that British administration would be welcome: the alternative was to discover some one, remotely connected with the late Raja, who might perhaps prove a success; but there was no candidate who was in the least promising. On the other hand, Nagpur had been one of the great States of the Maratha Confederacy. Its position after 1817 had been different from that of the states of Holkar or Sindhia; but for certain purposes, such distinctions are apt to be lost sight of. The disappearance of Nagpur would certainly be felt as ominous, its reinstatement would be held as auspicious. In forming his decision Dalhousie placed before all other considerations the prosperity of the people of Nagpur: therefore he annexed. But the bulk of the princes of India attributed his action to the other motive, the desire to add to the Company's territories. In the whole series of annexations by Lapse—and they amounted to more than a dozen in Dalhousie's time—the Governor-General had declared that he did not intend his rule to apply in semi-sovereign States; but it seemed not unreasonable to suspect that its extension to them would follow logically in due course; and it would have been very remarkable if no uneasiness had been produced in such a court as that of Gwalior, where it was at least half believed that every reigning Sindhia was fated to die without leaving any actual heir of his body.



The case of Oudh. The final act of Annexation, that of Oudh, did not turn on the doctrine of Lapse at all. After the battle of Buxar in 1764, Oudh was forfeit to the British by all Oriental precedent. Clive, by what was regarded as a pure act of grace, had then reinstated the Nawab Wazir. Some forty years later, Wellesley had been within an ace of deposing a later Nawab, and annexing his dominions; nor would such a step have seriously shocked the Native mind at that time, when the government was still regarded as existing by grace of the British. But the dynasty had been allowed to go on, though one after another the Governors-General threatened and remonstrated. A century and a quarter of rulership had established a belief in its permanence; yet the misgovernment seemed to grow worse year by year, and the king's mercenary army to grow more dangerous, more undisciplined, more uncontrolled.

Persistent  
mis-  
govern-  
ment.

In 1847, Lord Hardinge had given the king two years to put his government in order, with a very explicit warning that in case of his failing to do so, the British Government would have to assume control. 1849 came, yet once more remonstrance alone was resorted to. Two years later, Colonel Sleeman, then Resident at Lucknow, sent in a report which seemed to point to only one possible conclusion. Finally in 1854, Colonel James Outram, Resident in his turn, once more reported that the condition of the province could hardly be worse.

Alterna-  
tive pro-  
posals.

It was clearly impossible for affairs to continue as they were. The British must undertake the administration, either for a term of years or in perpetuity. In either case, the king might be allowed to maintain his rank and dignities. The only remaining alternative was formal deposition and annexation. Of the three courses, the second was recommended by Dalhousie. In deciding which to adopt, it had to be remembered on the one hand that the dynasty with all its vices had been uniformly loyal to the British, and on the other hand that it was only the British protection of the dynasty which had preserved it from overthrow by revolution. The British could not free themselves therefore from some responsibility for the endless misrule, nor from a very marked obligation to the dynasty.



## DALHOUSIE AND NATIVE THRONES 285

Of the members of Council, two supported Dalhousie's Oudh plan of maintaining the ostensible sovereignty of the king; <sup>annexed.</sup> two advocated open annexation. The arguments appeared to be very evenly balanced and it is noteworthy that in this case it was the Home authorities who decided in favour of the extreme measures to which the Governor-General's judgment was opposed, though not strongly opposed: for in stating his view, he had expressed his own readiness to carry out the annexation if that course should be decided upon. The actual performance of the task was entrusted to Outram; who however failed to persuade the king to abdicate, and Oudh was formally annexed by proclamation on Feb. 13, 1856.

In addition to these annexations, and a series of minor ones mostly effected on the ground of lapse, but partly on that of misgovernment, and partly also, as in the case of Sambalpur, on the petition of the population, the Company's territories were increased by an assignment from the Nizam. The transaction was somewhat complicated and difficult. <sup>The Berar Assign-ment.</sup> According to treaty, the Nizam maintained a Contingent with British officers, controlled by the Resident. The payments were constantly in arrears, but no reduction of the force was practicable; a heavy debt had already been incurred to the Company for advances to cover the deficiency, and still the arrears accumulated. From 1849 onwards, Dalhousie repeatedly pressed the Nizam, and in 1850 a temporary reduction was actually effected, but the debt immediately began to grow again. The Nizam was urged to transfer territory, partly to liquidate the debt, partly to secure the regular payment of the Contingent; he would only reply with promises, and declarations that any cession was quite unnecessary. At last in 1853 a treaty was presented for his acceptance which found favour with his ministers; but the Nizam himself remained obstinate, and was finally with the utmost difficulty persuaded by his own people to sign it in a modified form. Berar and other districts were assigned, to be under the control of the Resident, the Nizam retaining his sovereignty. The Nizam was released from his treaty obligations to help the British



with troops when called on; but the Contingent ceased to be a part of his army, while the British were now under obligation to maintain it. The surplus revenue from the districts was to be paid back into the Haidarabad treasury. It may be remarked that a portion of the territory was restored in 1860, when it had been proved that under British administration Berar by itself supplied the requisite revenue.

In the field of relations to Native dynasties it remains briefly to dismiss certain cases in which the Governor-General was accused of "spoliation" or harsh dealing.

The  
Nagpur  
treasures.

On the death of the Nagpur Raja, the British, correctly as a matter of law, laid claim to considerable treasures which the deceased prince had accumulated out of State funds. Dalhousie however decided that the treasures should be sold and the proceeds appropriated not by the British but for the benefit of the Raja's family. There was some friction, because the Begums refused to give up a part of the treasure for the purpose; and some ill-feeling was aroused because the sale was accomplished by the undignified process of auction; but there was no spoliation in the matter.

The Arcot  
family.

The Nawab of Arcot died in 1853. In 1801, the title, the dignities, and a pension, had been bestowed on a member of the family; but the clause in the draft treaty continuing them to his heirs had been deliberately struck out. The grant was strictly personal. It was renewed however to his son in 1819, and to his son again in 1825. On the death of this last in 1853, a claim to succession was made by his uncle; but the Governor and Council of Madras were supported by Dalhousie in considering that the continuation of the title and dignities would be contrary to the public weal, and that the previous grants, so far from recognising a claim, had expressly disallowed it. It was therefore decided that the justice of the case would be fully met by bestowing adequate allowances on the uncle Azim Jah and other members of the family.

Last is the affair of the notorious Dūndū Pānth, better known as the Nana Sahib who later achieved eternal infamy



by the Cawnpore massacre. He was the adopted son of Baji Rao and the Nana Sahib. Baji Rao, formerly Peshwa. Baji Rao after a career marked by some talent and ceaseless treacheries had been finally dethroned by Lord Hastings, and removed from Puna: where Sir John Malcolm incurred some disapprobation for the exceedingly generous terms granted to the fallen Peshwa, who was to have some eight lakhs—£80,000 per annum. Malcolm did not consider the amount very excessive, precisely because it was granted to him personally, and not to his heirs. Baji Rao lived to 1856, and made sundry unsuccessful attempts to get the pension extended to his heirs. Dying, he left much wealth, and might if he had chosen very easily have left much more. To this wealth the Nana was of course recognised as the heir, and Government added to it a considerable jaghir. Nana Sahib however persuaded himself that he had a right to the continuance of the pension and that he was a victim of the most flagrant injustice. He never forgave the British for treatment which erred, if at all, in the direction of superfluous generosity: and when his opportunity came he took a signal and ghastly revenge.



## CHAPTER XXVI

### GENERAL PROGRESS

1838-1848. **I**N an earlier section<sup>1</sup> of this volume, we described by anticipation some of the administrative achievements of the ten years preceding Dalhousie's arrival in India. To this period belong Thomason's Settlement of the North West Provinces, the greater part of the crusade against Dacoity, and the more definite successes in the combat with Infanticide.

In other respects however, these years, with their constant warfare on and beyond the frontier, were not remarkably fruitful. To Thomason falls the credit of having advanced the cause of Education by the establishment and encouragement of schools in which the vernacular was the medium of instruction. In the department of Public Works, progress was slow. A great famine in 1838 was contemporaneous with and gave an impulse to activity in canal-making; but even in this field, a set-back was given by Lord Ellenborough, who disorganised the great scheme of the Ganges canal, then slowly progressing, partly by reducing its scope, partly by changing its main purpose from irrigation to transport. Lord Hardinge however reverted to the original project. But throughout these years all public works were woefully hampered through coming under the financial control of a body called the Military Board which acquired a singular reputation for preventing efficiency wherever its power extended. Another change also took place after 1842, which greatly affected India, though it did not emanate either from the Company or from Government; in the establishment of a great service of steam communication *via* Suez by the

<sup>1</sup> Chaps. xviii., xix.



famous Peninsular and Oriental Company. Tentative efforts had been made in this direction under Lord William Bentinck, but the Home authorities had discouraged and discountenanced them.

There remains during this period one important piece of work to which only a brief reference has hitherto been made; the abolition of the custom of Human Sacrifices among the Khonds of Orissa.

The Khonds were a primitive race, dwelling in the hilly districts about part of the Mahanadi. Technically their country fell partly in the Madras Presidency, partly in that of Bengal; but in fact they had not been brought under British control. They believed in a Good Spirit, and also in an Evil Spirit; but whereas one section believed that the former had brought the latter into subjection, another section held that prosperity was conditional on an adequate propitiation of the evil goddess. This propitiation could only be effected by the ceremonial sacrifice of human victims. These people were also much given to Infanticide though for a peculiar reason. When one of their women was wedded, the husband paid a large price to her father; but she was free to leave him after a year, and in that case the price had to be repaid; which might be a difficult matter. Also the woman might elect to attach herself to a new husband who was thereupon bound to receive her—and to pay. But in each case, it was not only the individual but the entire tribe which became responsible for the payment. Consequently the man who possessed marriageable daughters was by no means to be envied, for the feuds arising out of these peculiar matrimonial customs were innumerable. Therefore the habit was to take the short way of avoiding the possession of marriageable daughters.

The district of Gumsūr is on the edge of the Khond territories, under the hills, almost on the border of the Northern Sarkars. Gumsur was tributary to the British, and its failure to pay in 1835 brought the British for the first time into actual contact with the Khonds. The resulting punitive expedition revealed some of the peculiarities of these unknown tribes; and Captain Charters Macpherson,



remaining at the Agency in those parts, became keenly interested in studying them. Reports were made on the subject of the Human Sacrifices. No systematic effort was made to put them down; but an occasional rescue party marched into the hills and rescued a batch of victims.

At last however, in 1842, Macpherson was commissioned to deal with matters more systematically. He proceeded on the principles which Hall and Outram had found so successful with the Mers and the Bhils. He gradually persuaded the Gumsur Khonds that his intentions were entirely friendly. He got himself called in to preside over their judicial councils; where his awards were accepted with keen satisfaction. He argued out with them the principles of their theory of sacrifices, pointing out how other races had outgrown the idea. At last he persuaded them to attempt the alarming experiment. The British, he said, would accept the responsibility. The goddess might be invited by the Khonds to visit her vengeance on them as the real cause of this defection from her service. The experiment was tried. The victims who were to have been offered at the great annual sacrifice, whereof the particular object was to secure a good harvest, were handed over instead to the British—and as it befel, the harvest was certainly none the worse. The Gumsur Khonds were convinced, and made up their minds that at last the Good Spirit had got the evil goddess fairly in subjection.

Abolition  
of Human  
Sacrifices.

Macpherson's operations were at first confined to the Madras territory; but he was presently deputed by the Governor-General to deal with the Khonds in general, whether in the Madras or the Bengal regions. The adjoining tribes of Bod or Boad followed the example of Gumsur; and though Macpherson's work was greatly thrown back by his removal from the district, under circumstances which reflected very little credit upon those who were responsible for that wholly inexcusable step, the work of civilisation was carried on by the Khond Agency, until human sacrifices entirely disappeared, and infanticide was at least very greatly reduced.



Before Lord Dalhousie's time, the most important of the non-regulation provinces was the newly-conquered Sindh, where the administration was given a singularly military form under the control of Sir Charles Napier. But of the new territories acquired under Dalhousie's rule, one—the Panjab—immediately assumed a position of the first importance. The Governor-General dominated every department of the State: but to none were his energies and his interest so enthusiastically given as to the organisation of the new Province. He devised for it a scheme of Government, in the form of the triple Board, without precedent and without parallel; but that scheme—impossible for continuance, and most galling to the members of the Board while it lasted—was precisely calculated to effect the immediate objects which Dalhousie had in view. Antagonistic as were the ideas of the Lawrence brothers, most of the subordinate officers had already absorbed the spirit of the one before he was transferred to Rajputana; while the other, seeing eye to eye with his chief, had imported a greater strictness of method and a closer attention to detail than was compatible with Henry's temperament or was much to the taste of the brilliant subordinates who chafed against the bonds of what seemed to them superfluous control. Nevertheless, they were allowed in their own districts a freedom of initiative and an amplitude of personal responsibility unknown elsewhere. However deeply the once great jaghirdars might resent their loss of power, prestige, and wealth, to the population in general the new order of things quickly proved acceptable enough. Many taxes were removed altogether, others which had been intolerably heavy were very much lightened; with the usual paradoxical result that they yielded a greatly increased revenue, owing to the increased demand and the improved profit on production. Reasonable assessments reconciled the frontier tribes to paying their dues without having an army sent to extort them. The Hill-men found their thirst for fighting satisfied in the ranks of Coke's Rifles or Lumsden's Guides; and their military talents were utilised in the suppression instead of in the practice of robbery, the bandit or assassin of one day becoming the loyal soldier of the next. Thuggee

Dalhousie  
and the  
Panjab.

The  
Lawrence  
brothers.

Benefits of  
their rule.



which had survived under the Lahore Government was stamped out. The great inducement to infanticide was removed with excellent results; for here too, despite the strong injunctions of Nanuk, the father of the Sikh religion, infanticide had prevailed. The barbarous punishment of mutilation tempered by fines which had been extended to every sort of offence by Ranjit Singh, gave place to the milder, but not less effective penalties acceptable to British ideas. Further, Dalhousie, more lavish in his expenditure on public works than any of his predecessors, was most lavish in his favourite province; in which, it is to be finally observed, alone among his acquisitions, a really adequate military force was raised or planted, with a proper proportion of European troops, and officered by the pick of the service—an arrangement which bore very good fruit in the Panjab itself, but increased the already excessive disproportion between Sepoys and European soldiers through the whole of Hindostan.

Increased  
import-  
ance of  
the Upper  
Provinces.

In other respects, the Panjab helped to shift the Imperial centre of gravity. Simla became almost as much the headquarters of Government as Calcutta; the relative importance of Mirat (or Meerut) as a military station was greatly increased, many more troops being concentrated in the Upper Ganges Provinces. To the extension of territory may also be attributed the change by which Bengal was now placed under a regular Lieutenant-Governor, the Governor-General being relieved of any specific association with that province.

Educa-  
tion.

The first steps towards the institution of Vernacular education had been taken by Thomason; and after a brief experience, Dalhousie proposed to extend the scheme throughout the North-West Provinces. The home authorities however, went beyond what he had recommended; and in 1854 a despatch from Sir Charles Wood laid down new principles, which were vigorously applied by the Governor-General, and amounted to what might be called an educational Charter. A complete system was established of schools regularly graded, from the local native schools up to Universities, under State control; and these have steadily increased and multiplied, till their students at the present day number some millions.



It is only when we succeed in realising the enormous **Import-** extent of India that we can quite grasp the vastness of **ance of** the change introduced by a revolution in the means of **improved** communication and of transit. Vienna is the European **communi-** capital furthest from the sea; the distance from Delhi to **cation.** the coast is nearly double as great. Supposing Vienna to occupy in Europe the traditional political position of Delhi; the distances from Delhi in a straight line to Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Lahore correspond nearly to the distances from Vienna of St Petersburg, Madrid, Paris, and Berlin respectively. From Calcutta to Peshawar is about as far as from Paris to Constantinople. Hence for the purposes of Government from any one centre the process of communication before the introduction of steam and telegraphy was infinitely slow; and that of transferring the Governor-General with his entourage from point to point—not to speak of masses of troops—involved an immense expenditure of time.

Until Lord Dalhousie's time, railway enterprise had **Railways.** received the minimum of encouragement. The risk for private capital was far too great; and Government would undertake nothing and guarantee nothing. Lord Ellenborough scoffed at the whole idea. The financial railway crash in England frightened the investing public. By 1852, the whole of the mileage of railway lines sanctioned in India amounted only to a couple of hundred miles. In that year however, Dalhousie was urgently pressing for a change of policy in this matter; English capitalists were already waiting only for guarantees to be more than willing to invest; and the next year the renewal of the Company's Charter was to come before Parliament. Presented with so many motives for action, the Directors resolved to take up railway construction; Dalhousie laid his plans for running lines all over India; thousands of miles were brought under survey for the purpose and railway works were commenced. Had these schemes been initiated ten years earlier and carried out with the same vigour, Government, when the Mutiny came, would have been able to shift and transport troops in a way which might easily have crushed the great Revolt before it



had assumed formidable proportions. The sanction came too late for that. By a curious irony, the railways in 1857 had not yet reached the stage of being actively serviceable, while the operations connected with them had gone far enough to arouse by their incomprehensibility the suspicions of uneducated Native intelligence. But in a few years' time they were to bear ample fruit.

**The Telegraph.** Something of the same kind happened with the Telegraph. Experiment of any kind was made particularly difficult by the liability of the atmosphere to violent electrical disturbances and by the lack of skilled electrical engineers; but the difficulties were triumphed over. The magic wires were stretched across the land. The story is familiar, how the cool-headed operator in Delhi flashed to Lahore the news of the rising in a sentence that was barely finished; and Sir Colin Campbell throughout his campaigns was in telegraphic communication with Calcutta. But the system was still too incomplete for full use to be made of it, and in the popular mind it was still a thing uncanny, suspicious, and reflecting suspicion on the British. As it was Dalhousie whose designs ultimately brought Peshawar as near to Calcutta as Patna had been in the days of Warren Hastings, so it was to Dalhousie's energy that the creation of the telegraphic system was due.

**The P.W.D.** Dalhousie also created a new Department of Public Works with an Engineer at its head in each Presidency, abolishing the effete and unworkable Military Board. Roads were built of which the most notable was perhaps that from Dakka to Arakan, whereby it became possible for the sepoy to march from Bengal to Burma without crossing the "black-water." Irrigation by canals was greatly advanced, and more particularly the great Ganges canal was at last completed, watering the upper Ganges districts. Steamers also were multiplied on the Hugli, the Indus, and the Irawadi. Not the least important of the reforms for which Dalhousie was responsible was the creation of a half-penny post for the whole of India; in lieu of the old system of heavy charges, varying according to distance, and materially increased by the illegitimate demands of local native officials: a charge

**Half-penny Post.**



which broke down the walls that isolated every village, and immensely facilitated the free communication which is invaluable to commerce.

When at the beginning of 1856 Dalhousie withdrew from the scene of his labours, his exhausted frame bore witness to the amazing energies he had devoted to his task. He had not been satisfied to conduct a part of the Government himself and to supervise the rest; everywhere he had exercised a control so vigorous and intimate as to render him in fact the working head of every department. Swift in decision and utterly self-confident, he was a complete autocrat; and though, when his affections were stirred, he could on occasion show no little kindness and even tenderness, he was as a rule little disposed to show consideration for the susceptibilities of others, and tolerated nothing that savoured of opposition to his will. When that equally autocratic veteran, Sir Charles Napier, came into collision with him, the Commander-in-Chief was forced to resign. Over such a man as Henry Lawrence he asserted his authority with an absence of courtesy and an arrogance of tone which were needlessly galling. Hence, as not seldom happens with men of a masterful genius, many of Dalhousie's subordinates learnt to regard themselves as mere instruments, and lost the spirit of initiative and the readiness to assume responsibility so necessary in a crisis, when the master hand was no longer there.

Estimate  
of Lord  
Dal-  
housie

The day is still to come when the final judgment shall be passed on the great Governor-General: for he left many documents with strict injunctions that they should not be made public till fifty years after his death. But whether he is to be adjudged greater or less great than the general verdict pronounces him to-day, more far-sighted or less so than we deem him, it is at least certain that his place will be found amongst the Great rulers who have guided the destinies of the race, and have emphatically "made History."







**BOOK V**

**THE CONFIRMATION OF  
SOVEREIGNTY**







## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE EVE OF THE MUTINY

**E**ARLY in 1856, Dalhousie's successor arrived. Lord Canning was George Canning's third son: but both his elder brothers had died. Canning himself had been offered, without accepting the post of Foreign Secretary, and in 1855 was a member of the Cabinet, when he accepted the Indian appointment; to become the last of the Company's Governors-General, and the first of the Viceroys of the Crown. His rule was the epoch of a great convulsion; and before following its events, it is well to examine the actual situation in India, as left by Lord Dalhousie. Lord Canning.

Dalhousie had completed the Dominion of the British. From the mountain barrier to the sea, all India acknowledged their supremacy; though Native princedoms remained in varying stages of dependence, from the Nizam and Sindhia down. The Nizam's rule in the Dekhan, and the old Mogul's court at Delhi, were practically all that was left of the great empire of Baber's race, and the Mussulman supremacy. Of the Maratha pentarchy, the formal head had long been removed, and the greater part of the real Maratha country had been annexed at the same time. Then another cantle of the Maratha country had been absorbed with Sattara, and another of the pentarchy had vanished with the last Nagpur Bhonsla. Of the three remaining members, the Gaikwar had never been dangerous; Holkar's power had been shattered; and that of Sindhia, the least Maratha of the five, had been diminished. Not fifteen years ago, the independent State of Sindh had been annexed, and six years later the independent State of Lahore. The last act of the administration just closed had been the deposition of one of the two still reigning Mussulman dynasties in Oudh. The disappearance of Independent States.



## 300 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

**British  
versus  
Native  
Dominion.** Now the history of India had been the history of a series of alien conquests. The Mogul dominion was alien. The Maratha dominion in Hindostan was for the most part alien. The Mussulman sultanate of Mysore was alien. But the British dominion was more distinctively alien than that of any predecessor just as in Teutonic Europe the Turk would be more alien than the Spaniard.

It will not be pretended that the change to British Government was anything less than an incalculable benefit to the mass of the population. To them, the enforcement of the *Pax Britannica*, and the protection of the weak against the strong, were an unmixed blessing. But for those who had been the "strong"—who had been wont to reap the advantages of the "good old rule, the simple plan"—the blessings were less obvious. It was precisely this section which was capable of becoming dangerous; and within British territory this section, already deprived of licence, was inevitably restive; while in the semi-independent territory the annexation policy caused it to anticipate a like fate in the near future. That this should have been the case is no condemnation of that policy. It meant in the first place that the conditions of life in India through centuries had taught a large proportion of the inhabitants to be turbulent and predatory and opposed to all restraint by whomsoever exercised, except so far as organisation was helpful in the practice of plunder. To all such spirits, British government was unpopular precisely in proportion to its restraining force. This was the class which would always desire to have no settled government at all: the class which attained its worst development in the old Pindari days, and was now not stamped out but caged. To these must be added the classes which had been accustomed to exercise dominion, including particularly the Mussulmans associated with the Mogul supremacy. The glory had departed from Delhi. It is probable enough that without our intervention the Marathas would have wiped out the glory with thoroughness: but it appeared to be the British who had wiped it out, an impression intensified by the Oudh annexation. The Marathas themselves on the other hand felt that they had been beaten in their bid for empire, while



in them that feeling was joined to the Pindari spirit. And beyond these wherever the British had come seeking to alleviate the lot of the peasant at the expense of the landholder, the landholder, whether he happened to be called a jaghirdar, or a zemindar, or a talukdar, felt himself to be a person with a legitimate grievance.

The irony of the situation lay in the fact that those vast classes who did definitely gain by British rule, could neither appreciate the extent of their advantages, nor appear as active factors in any political or military complications. When the wolf and the sheep-dog fall out, the flock has very little to say to the contest. Also, guarded by the dog, it learns to forget the wolf's bite, whereas the dog's bark makes it feel nervous. In like manner, the British method of government made the peasantry nervous.

The industrial classes.

A vigorously effective combination of these various elements for hostile purposes was not in any event probable; their conjunction was only possible for purely destructive ends; they would inevitably split over their incompatible policies of reconstruction. Moreover it was palpable that so long as the British wielded the sepoy army, any attempt to resist them was foredoomed to entire failure. In the control of the sepoy army lay the crux of the position.

Could the sepoys have brought a trained political judgment to bear upon the facts, it would have been evident that for them in the aggregate at least, the British rule was satisfactory. Under it the sepoy's livelihood was secure, and he would expect his sons and his son's sons to follow him in taking service with the British. The Brahmins and Rajputs, of whom the Bengal army was mainly composed, had no natural inclination to become subject to low-caste Marathas or to Mussulmans. But when once an army has become imbued with the idea that it can choose its own Cæsar, it is apt not to be governed by cool reasoning, but to become the tool of political intriguers — though with the proverbial qualities of edged tools.

The Sepoys.

Here, then, lay the danger. The paradox of the British conquering India and holding it mainly with native troops was sufficiently surprising: but from the earliest times every



## 302 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Deficiency of European troops. Governor-General had recognised that unless a due proportion of British to Native troops were maintained, the paradox might have alarming developments. It had always been admitted that a ratio of one to four was absolutely the lowest which could be viewed without very serious apprehension, and that a ratio of one to three would be anything but excessive. Yet in 1856, the ratio of British soldiers to sepoy was no more than one to five. This was due in part to the great increase in the number of sepoys necessitated by the annexations (Note B), the additional troops being required in the new districts: in part to the reduction of the British garrison by the home authorities, who, instead of sending out additional regiments as urged by Dalhousie, withdrew troops to serve in the Crimea and never even replaced them.

This disproportion, dangerous in any case as tending to produce in the sepoy mind a conviction that the native army was the real master of the situation, was rendered the more so by other considerations. The blunder which in defiance of the terms of enlistment had ordered Bengal sepoys to serve in Burma, had quite recently enabled one regiment to achieve a victory over the authorities. The withdrawal of British troops to the Crimea, had revived the idea that Britain's resources were not sufficient to cope with her foes elsewhere. The newly acquired Panjab had absorbed a disproportionate share not only of European regiments but of the best British officers, denuding Hindostan. Outside the Panjab, the military commands were held by men who at the worst were something less and at the best very little more than respectable from the professional point of view.

Unconsciousness of danger. Finally, it was not the least perilous feature of the situation that the authorities, almost without exception, appear to have been totally unconscious of the thinness of the ice. Henry Lawrence was awake to the danger, but practically every one else, including his brother John in the Panjab was utterly taken aback when the outbreak came; and except in Lucknow no precautions had been taken. It is pathetic to read how the officers of one regiment after another fell victims to the conviction that, whoever else might mutiny, *their* men would prove staunch.



Apart from these political and military considerations, the native mind generally was in that condition of nervous disquietude which is the opportunity of the secret agitator. Even in the long ago days of the Vellur mutiny, suspicion had been rife that the British intended to force Christianity on their Native subjects mainly by the insidious method of making them break caste rules. There were always a few British officers who were far too ready to override religious prejudices in their disciplinary regulations. Of recent years, missionaries had been allowed to become more aggressive. The Government had put down the practice of suttee, and had refused to let a change of religion interfere with inheritance as the Hindu law prescribed. The Educators had hardly concealed their expectation that with western knowledge the sacred fairy tales of the East would be dissolved, and the basis of popularly cherished creeds would be swept away.

The religious disquietude.

These things were not enough to produce revolt, but they created an atmosphere favourable to revolt. And lastly, apart from the prestige of Government, the prestige of the "sahibs" as sahibs was—in the view of many who were in India in those days—materially diminished by the tone of superiority adopted by the "pukka" civilians, *i.e.* those in the Government service, not only towards the up-country planters and dealers, but towards the military branch as well.

The British tone.

During the fifteen months which passed between the succession of Canning and the outbreak of the Revolt, some of these conditions were modified, it might be for the better—it might be for the worse.

The deposition of the King of Oudh irritated the Mussulman population of the province, who were chiefly congregated in the cities. But the greater part of the land was in the possession of talukdars, of Rajput or semi-rajput clans or castes, surrounded by their clansmen who had no particular interest in the Mussulman dynasty. While Outram remained to administer the newly annexed country, the talukdars were by no means dissatisfied with the change, Outram being one of those who had learned by his experience with the Bhils

The condition of Oudh.



and in Sindh to pay a due regard to the fixed ideas and prejudices of the native mind, however little they might be consonant with the abstract political theories of the West. But Outram was compelled by health to go home on leave: and for some months the district was administered by subordinates. Dalhousie, with his masterful practice of dominating every department, would have kept them in order himself: but this very masterfulness had tended to bring to the front officials who were excellent servants but wanted initiative and capacity for independent action. Canning with his task to learn, slower to form unalterable convictions, and slower in acting upon them, did not assume a mastery like Dalhousie; and the subordinates were inadequately controlled. They set about reforms with more zeal than discretion; they ignored the clan-relation between the talukdars and the people; the former found themselves deprived of traditional rights, while the latter failed to appreciate material benefits which they hardly knew how to utilise, conferred at the expense of immemorial sentiments. Oudh was soon in a ferment, which however was to a great extent allayed when Henry Lawrence was called from Rajputana to take charge. The beneficent effect of his influence was seen after a few weeks; the vast majority of the talukdars refusing to join in the revolt, until they were persuaded that the British had given up the hope of fighting their way through to Lucknow, and had surrendered the Residency garrison to its fate.

Rajputana  
and the  
Panjab.

The same influence, exercised in Rajputana, had already toned down the alarm created among the princes of that semi-independent province over the Adoption question; and a like spirit to Sir Henry's was shown by his brother George who succeeded him there. In the Panjab, the policy of John Lawrence and Dalhousie had not conciliated the Sirdars, but it had deprived them of much of their influence; while the old Khalsa men, whatever their sentiments might be towards the British, were more positively hostile towards the Hindostani sepoys, who were apt to assume the offensive airs of conquerors. The British Frontier officers had acquired the devoted adherence of half the hill tribesmen;



there was even a sect of "Nikalsainis," who had deified John Nicholson to his own intense disgust. And beyond the border, Dalhousie's movement—instigated by Herbert Edwardes—towards an alliance with Dost Mohammed of Kabul, was successfully consummated by treaty in Feb. 1857, with the result that the old Amir stood loyally by his troth when the conflagration came.

On the other hand, the state of the Bengal army was increasingly unsatisfactory. Except for a few recently raised Sikh and Ghurka regiments, it was enlisted almost entirely from the Hindostanis, that is from the dwellers in Hindostan proper; a small proportion were Mussulmans, but the great bulk were high-caste Hindus. By the terms of enlistment they might not—except in the case of six specific regiments—be called upon to serve outside India: and they further differed from the Bombay and Madras armies in regimental organisation, in ways which induced a comparative laxity of discipline. Now the annexation in Burma had put the authorities in a dilemma. Burma needed troops. To increase the call on the Madras army would check enlistment in that province. To meet the difficulty, Lord Canning issued the General Service Enlistment Act, under which all recruits for the Bengal army were in future to be liable for general as well as for home service—a serious matter for the high-caste families, who looked to the army as a profession for their sons after them, and to whom the crossing of the sea involved a breach of caste. The new regulation appeared to have been accepted quietly; but it was soon brought, in the minds of the sepoys, under the category of the insidious measures aimed at Caste: another of the items accumulating to form an avalanche.

At the end of 1856, a quarrel which had been growing with Persia came to a head. Encouraged by the Crimean war, the attitude of the Persian Government had for a year past been first insolent and then defiant. In spite of vigorous representations, the Persians marched an army on Herat, and took it in October. War was declared next month, and in the beginning of 1857 a considerable force from Bombay, including some European regiments, and commanded by

The Ben-  
gal army.

The  
General  
Service  
Enlist-  
ment Act.

The  
Persian  
expedi-  
tion.



## 306 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Outram with Havelock and Jacob under him, was engaged in bringing Persia to reason. Thus the loyal garrison was further reduced at the most critical time. For India it was a fortunate accident that Britain had also become involved in a war with China—whereby in the summer, the Indian government was enabled to intercept and detain for its more urgent need some troops which arrived from England under orders for the Chinese war.

Then in the beginning of 1857 came the blunder, which gave the enemies of British rule a gratuitous lever wherewith to engineer an upheaval.

The cart-  
ridge inci-  
dent.

This was the affair of the greased Cartridges. It had been decided to replace the musket hitherto in use by the Enfield rifle. Depôts for the new weapon were established at Dumdum, one of the cantonments near Calcutta, and at Amballa in Sirhind, and a cartridge factory also at Mirat, south-east of Delhi where there were several regiments. A lubricant was needed in the manufacture of these cartridges, which the sepoy would have to bite before using. At the beginning of January—before a cartridge had been issued—a low-caste employé at the Dumdum factory, quarrelling with a high-caste sepoy, threatened him with impending loss of caste and degradation for all sepoys because he said cow's fat and pig's fat were being used in the manufacture of the new cartridges: for the Hindu accounts the cow as sacred; and the Mussulman too would be defiled, since Mohammedans hold swine to be unclean. From station to station the report sped like wild fire. The minds of the sepoys, wrought up to an acute stage of religious nervousness already, were gripped

The  
Mussul-  
mans and  
the Nana  
Sahib.

by it. Agitators who had been watching for their opportunity seized it. The panic among the soldiery was vigorously if secretly fomented. Moslem fanatics found excited listeners of their own creed. Intriguers of the Mogul party played insidiously on the fears of the "infidels" whom they meant to use as catspaws: the Brahmin heir of the late Peshwa, hot with wrath against the British, from his jaghir at Bithûr near Cawnpore, began secretly to play for his own hand.

Signs of  
unrest.

Denials and explanations were vain; the Government regulations as to the ingredients in the manufacture had been



strict enough, but contractors were known to have evaded them to some extent. In February a regiment near Murshidabad, the home of the old Bengal dynasty, refused the cartridges, and practically carried their point. Incendiarism broke out. At the end of March a Barrackpur regiment became insubordinate. There were no objectionable ingredients in the cartridges issued, but nothing would convince the sepoys that it was so; instead, the wildest rumours were swallowed of contamination in other government supplies. A prophecy was repeated from lip to lip that the British were to reign for their hundred years—and this was the hundredth year from Plassey. Yet the authorities continued to take no steps for dealing with a possible outbreak. In the end of April, some troopers at Mirat mutinied: the mutiny was suppressed, and the men were thrown into gaol. The insubordinate Barrackpur regiment was disbanded; so was that of Murshidabad. Then suddenly, at the centre of Mogul disaffection, the blow was struck.

The truth has to be found somewhere between those who say that the Revolt was simply a Mutiny of sepoys in a panic, and those who call the Mutiny an organised Revolt. The panic was engineered by political intriguers: but the insurrection was not organised. None of the Native rulers had made up their minds to rise. There is every indication that the sepoys took their leap blindly in the dark, not knowing whither they were going. But there is also every indication that the Nana Sahib on one side and a Mogul faction on the other had a great deal to do with working them up to take the leap, and that the Mogul faction at least had a tolerably definite idea of the use which was to be made of the leap when taken. It was a use which did not appeal to the Hindu princes; and by showing their hand at the outset, the Mussulmans provided these last with an excellent reason for holding back. Whether they would otherwise have risen remains an open question; but on the surface, it would seem that the panic took effect prematurely, and so forced a premature pronouncement from the Moguls.

At any rate, on the tenth of May, the sepoys at Mirat The mutinied, released their imprisoned comrades, broke open the outbreak.



## 308 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

gaols, shot their officers, killed every European they could find away from the British regimental quarters and made for Delhi. On their arrival there the next morning, the city population rose : the Europeans were massacred : half a score of British held the arsenal for some time—then when resistance was no longer possible blew it up, and with it two thousand of the insurgents ; and then the Restoration of the Mogul Empire was proclaimed. The Revolt had begun.











## CHAPTER XXVIII

### REVOLT

(*Map VII.*)

THE outbreak at Mirat and the seizure of Delhi by the insurgents were the beginning of the great revolt: yet the explosion did not follow immediately. Had the rising been thoroughly organised, the mutineers could have practically made themselves masters of the country from Delhi to Patna. Had the British, on the other hand, been prepared for the emergency, they could have paralysed the revolt, unorganised as it was at the beginning. As matters stood, nearly all the sepoys in the Ganges districts were given the opportunity of joining the insurgents, while on the other hand the British were given time, so to speak, to get their backs to the wall. Breathing-time.

Between Delhi and Patna there were an immense number of sepoy regiments; but the supply of European troops was extraordinarily small. At Mirat there were two regiments and a strong force of artillery: at Agra, one regiment, and some artillery: at Lucknow, one regiment and a few artillerymen: at Dinapur, near Fatna, one regiment: at Cawnpore, there was a detachment of the Lucknow regiment. The Native regiments at these stations were—Mirat, three; Agra, two; Lucknow, four; Dinapur, four; Cawnpore, four. At Benares, and at the all-important station and fortress of Allahabad, there were no European troops at all, and none at Delhi. Disposition of troops.

It was within this region that the British with the loyal Native regiments, were at death-grips with the sepoys, until the pressure was relieved by the capture of Delhi and the first relief of the Lucknow Residency in September. Outside Area of the Mutiny.



## 310 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

this area, prompt and vigorous measures entirely prevented the rising from making any head in the Panjab; it was held in check in Bengal; and though the Gwalior army rose after some delay, it did not throw itself into the struggle during this first stage. South of the Nerbadda, there was no outbreak. Of the reigning native Princes, none associated himself with the revolt, for the Mogul at Delhi was a mere simulacrum; but the Oudh Begum and her son, the Rani of Jhansi, and Nana Sahib the adopted son of the quondam Peshwa Baji Rao, threw all their energies into the struggle.

The real series of mutinies did not begin till May 28th, nearly three weeks after the Mirat outbreak. In the interval, the Panjab had been secured: a force had been collected at Amballa and Mirat to attack Delhi: Henry Lawrence in Lucknow had been steadily pressing on preparations in expectation of a siege, and detachments of troops were beginning to make their way up from lower Bengal towards Allahabad.

The Panjab secured. In the Panjab were many of the men whose names men hold in highest honour: John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, at the head; Neville Chamberlain, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson in the Peshawar district; Montgomery: M'Leod, Richard Lawrence, J. D. Macpherson and Corbett, at Lahore. At the moment of the Delhi news arriving, John Lawrence himself was absent. The Lahore officers forthwith resolved to disarm the sepoy regiments. The presence of a British regiment there, and of two others at the arsenals of Ferozpur and Phillur made it possible to carry out the disarmament and secure those important points. With John Lawrence's assent, the frontier officers promptly formed a movable column, which marched rapidly upon disaffected stations, and soon brought the whole province under control. It must be observed that in the Panjab, not only was there an exceptionally large proportion of European soldiers, but also the levies of frontier tribesmen such as the famous Guides, and the regiments composed of Panjabis and Sikhs, were antagonistic to the Hindostani regiments of the Bengal army, and in many cases enthusiastically devoted to



their British officers: so that there was also an exceptionally large proportion of well-affected Native troops.

Between May 30th and June 14th nearly every regiment from Delhi to Benares mutinied. Some murdered their officers: others escorted them to places of safety. Some of the regiments marched off to join the main body at Delhi, others to swell the armies gathering on Lucknow. The mutineers of Cawnpore were actually taking the former course, when Nana Sahib induced them to return to besiege Cawnpore. Series of mutinies.

At Benares the mutiny took place on June 4, but the station was saved by Neill who had just arrived with a British detachment. At Allahabad, Brasyer with a Sikh regiment seized the fort, which was secured five days later by Neill's advance from Benares.

West of the Jamna and the Chambal, outside of the Panjab, the sepoys mutinied successfully at Hansi, Hissar, and Sirsa; to the east of those places, the chiefs of the Cis-Satlej Sikhs were actively loyal. Southwards, Nasirabad close to Ajmir was one of the first to revolt, the sepoys afterwards distinguishing themselves by maintaining their order and discipline among themselves: and at Nimāch, well to the South, the men also mutinied. These regiments went to swell the army at Delhi.

The Gwalior contingent, in Sindhia's service, officered by British, mutinied on June 14th: but Sindhia himself, guided by his able minister Dinkar Rao, and the agent S. C. Macpherson, was loyal and succeeded in conveying most of the British to Agra. The Gwalior troops for the time remained south of the Chambal and Jamna. At Jhansi the mutineers massacred the British; but at Sāgar, southwards, a loyal native regiment secured and held the fort.

By June 12, the column from Amballa and Mirat had driven the mutineers opposed to it into Delhi after some sharp engagements, and was in occupation of the famous Ridge. Being gradually joined by forces from the Panjab, its numbers at the end of June reached 6500: while the Delhi sepoys were probably nearly 30,000. The force before Delhi.

At Cawnpore, a handful of combatants and a large number



## 312 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

of non-combatants held out against the Nana from June 8 to June 26. By that time the defences had become worthless and the defenders were decimated. The station had at one time been of great importance, and it now contained a large number of European women and children. These had been collected together behind very inadequate intrenchments; but the swarming sepoys and followers of Nana Sahib were kept at bay day after day with extraordinary resolution, the small garrison pouring so fierce a fire upon the enemy that they were constantly beaten off. But the sufferings of the besieged were intense; in less than three weeks some two hundred and fifty had perished; and when the Nana offered terms, it was felt that for the sake of the women and children they must be accepted. The whole party were to be placed in boats, and sent down to Allahabad under safe conduct. Then ensued that ghastly act of treachery which roused the English People to frenzy, and to a thirst for vengeance which dominated every other sentiment. The exhausted garrison were allowed to reach the river, and were packed into the thatch-covered native boats; but instead of starting on the journey down stream, the Native boatmen slipped overboard, and volley upon volley was poured into the doomed vessels. The thatch was fired: as a last resort, men, women, and children struggled into the water. The men were killed, save a very few who succeeded in escaping; the women and children were allowed to live, and were taken back to Cawnpore, to be literally butchered, in cold blood, to the number of over two hundred, not three weeks later, when Havelock's force was all but entering the town.

Prepara- The fall of Cawnpore turned the siege of Lucknow into a  
tions at certainty. There Henry Lawrence had made the Residency  
Lucknow. ready for a prolonged resistance, while maintaining the Machi  
Bhaun fort temporarily, in order to control the city. Now  
however, the mutineers concentrated on the N.E. An  
attempt to check them was foiled at Chinhath; it then be-  
came necessary to evacuate the Machi Bhaun, which was  
successfully accomplished; and the famous siege of the  
Residency or Baily Guard began upon June 30th.

On the same day, Henry Havelock who had been on the



Persian Campaign arrived at Allahabad and took over the command there.

With the close of June ends the first phase of the revolt, by which its character was established. Whatever the original design may have been, it had actually resolved itself into a rising of the Hindostani sepoys, of whom the vast majority were Brahmins or Rajputs—high-caste Hindus; while owing to the deliberate policy of the British, only a small proportion of Mussulmans were recruited. The Mussulman population however, was heartily on the side of the rebellion, which the Mohammedan leaders intended to turn to account for the restoration of the Mogul dominion. But as yet, not only did the princes, Maratha, Rajput, and Sikh, abstain from hostilities, but the great landholders and their clansmen in Oudh also held aloof; with the exception only of such as considered that they had an extreme personal grievance against the British, like Nana Sahib and the Jhansi Rani, their tendency was to observe neutrality. Nor was there any recognised head, or any clearly defined policy; for while the Mogul party had a programme, it was not one acceptable to the Hindus.

Hence at this point, the total result was:—The mutineers controlled by Mussulman leaders were in great force at Delhi (where the British had planted themselves on the ridge lying on the N.W. side of the city). They were in great force at Lucknow, where the British were completely hemmed in, and where the party of the Oudh Begum was dominant. They were in strong force at Cawnpore, which commanded the passage of the Ganges, where any force advancing to the relief of Lucknow would have to cross, and here they were under the command of the Maratha Brahmin, Nana Sahib. On the south of the Jamna, the mutineer regiments had not yet concentrated; but later on, they drew together near Kalpi. Eastward of Benares and Azimgarh, they had not yet broken out, and the line of communication between Allahabad and lower Bengal *via* Dinapur was not cut, so that along this line British reinforcements were pushing up steadily though in dribblets. Hence during the next three months attention is concentrated on three points—

Composi-  
tion of the  
mutineer  
armies.

Distribu-  
tion of  
mutineer  
armies,  
June 30.



## 314 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

the operations before Delhi of the British, gradually reinforced by troops from the Panjab : the defence of Lucknow : and the advance of Havelock to the relief of Lucknow. With each one of these forces there were bodies of loyal sepoys.

Operations before Delhi.

The Commander-in-Chief, Anson, had originally intended to conduct the Delhi operations ; but he had died of cholera at the end of May, being succeeded in the command by General Barnard. On July 9, Barnard in turn succumbed, and was succeeded by General Reed, who, from illness, had to give place immediately after to Archdale Wilson.

From the Ridge, the line of communication to Kurnal, Amballa, and so to the Panjab, was open. On the other hand, the enemy were free to move where they would. There had been a moment, just after the Ridge was seized, when it had seemed possible that the walls of Delhi might be captured at once by a sudden attack ; but the doubtful opportunity was not used, and there was nothing for it but to settle down to a siege, in which it was open to question which of the combatants was really besieger and which besieged. It was clear however that the city could not be carried until the arrival of the siege train from Ferozpur. During July, and the beginning of August, it was the mutineers who attacked the British position ; four times in force in July, and on August 10-12 ; but each time they were repulsed, as were also innumerable minor attacks. In the meantime, the uncertainty as to the state of the Panjab was passing away ; John Lawrence was very urgent that Delhi should be taken, but it was some while before he would consent either to the raising of Sikh levies in the Panjab itself, or to the dispatch from it of Nicholson's movable column—either measure being obviously full of risk, but the second at least being essential if the Delhi force was to accomplish its object. At last however yielding to the urgent representations of Macpherson and John Nicholson, he resolved to take the risk ; for the greater need, the Panjab was almost denuded of troops ; and Nicholson led reinforcements to the Ridge which brought up the numbers there to more than 8000 effectives, of whom nearly half were British. An attempt was made at the end of August to intercept the

Reinforcements from the Panjab.



approach of the siege train but this was brilliantly foiled by Nicholson. By Sept. 6, the siege train had arrived, and about 3000 additional native levies had joined. Wilson was persuaded, not without difficulty, to adopt the scheme of attack laid down by Baird Smith the chief engineer, the arrangements being carried out with great skill and audacity by Alexander Taylor. The breaching batteries began to open out on the 11th, and continued through the 12th and 13th. On the night of the 13th an immediate assault was resolved on. Four columns of attack were prepared : early on the morning of the 14th, the way was laid open for one of them by the splendid act of Home and Salkeld, who blew in the Kashmir gate. Two other columns forced their way through the breaches, but the fourth assault was repulsed. The ramparts were won, but in the attempt to press forward Nicholson received a mortal wound—Nicholson, the dauntless soldier, whose figure has become perhaps more vividly impressed upon the English mind than that of any other among the heroes of the war. So grave was the situation that Wilson is erroneously supposed to have been on the verge of ordering a withdrawal. But if there was any indecision in his mind, it was removed by the unanimous opinion of those round him. At all risks, the foothold won was to be maintained. Gradually, day by day, the British drove their way through the city ; on the 21st the whole of it, with the person of the Mogul, was in their hands, and the mutineers were in full flight to join the army in Oudh. A column was despatched first in pursuit, and then to Agra ; whence later on it went to join Sir Colin Campbell's relieving force at Cawnpore.

The storm-  
ing of  
Delhi.

Meanwhile, the force at the Lucknow Residency had been maintaining a fierce struggle. In it were some 3000 souls, including more than 500 women and children, 700 loyal sepoy, and 1000 British combatants. There was food enough stored for a long siege—there were more guns than could be adequately worked. But round about lay thousands of the enemy, under cover, which in places brought them within a few yards of our defences.

The de-  
fence of  
the Luc-  
know  
Resi-  
dency.

The garrison suffered a terrible blow at the outset, Henry Lawrence receiving a mortal wound. The plans for defence



## 316 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Character of the siege. however were thoroughly understood. It did not take long to learn that the ramparts were too well prepared to be rushed, and that there was no fear of the enemy's artillery making an effective breach. The supreme risk lay in the almost limitless possibilities of mining. The amazing fact of the siege is, that out of thirty-seven attempts, from July 20 to Sept. 23, one only was successful in making a breach; six mines, which were duly exploded, were short, and did no harm; whereas no fewer than twenty-five were either broken into and destroyed by counter-mines or abandoned on hearing counter-mines. The circumference which had to be defended was about a mile. The ceaseless toil and vigilance entailed on the engineers, and on the men detailed for mining—there happened to be a good many Cornish miners among the English troops, which was fortunate—may be imagined. Had the enemy run galleries as they might easily have done, at several points simultaneously, it would have been physically impossible to detect and meet them all.

Perilous position of the garrison. The mutineers could not storm the defences; but they could and did make it impossible for any member of the garrison to expose himself from a loophole, for however short a time, without receiving a bullet. Three times also they made attacks in force; and though all were triumphantly repulsed, the fighting force was being seriously and constantly reduced by wounds and sickness. On the one occasion when a breach actually was made by mining, it was effectively repaired before an attempt was made to storm it. But the strain was terrific. Communications with the outside world were almost entirely cut off. Rumours of disaster were rife. Some of the loyal sepoys, doggedly though they fought, had made up their minds that unless relief came by the end of the month, they would abandon the defence. An impression prevailed, which was carried through to Havelock, that the food supplies were all but exhausted. It became known that Havelock, after penetrating into Oudh had been forced to fall back to Cawnpore: which was construed as the abandonment of Oudh. The clansmen of the Oudh chiefs from that time swelled the ranks of the besiegers. As a matter of fact, the food supplies were ample, and the actual strength of the garrison was



sufficient to have held the position for some time longer ; but it is extremely doubtful whether the "Banner of England" would have continued to blow after Oct. 1st, if Havelock and Outram had not arrived before the mutineers from Delhi.

On June 30th Havelock was at Allahabad and forthwith dispatched Renaud with a party in advance towards Cawnpore. He had hardly done so, when the news of the fall of Cawnpore arrived. The whole of Nana Sahib's force was now free to act against Renaud, and might be joined by the mutineers from Benares and elsewhere. But on July 7, Havelock was ready to march, leaving Allahabad garrisoned. He had with him not two thousand men, of whom more than a fourth were sepoy, mostly Sikhs. On the 11th he came up with Renaud. Next day he drove back the enemy from Fatehpur, where they had expected to catch Renaud. Three days later he again routed them in two successive actions. It was believed that there were still prisoners to be rescued at Cawnpore. He pushed on. Next day, the 16th, his force, now reduced to less than 1500, routed a mass of the Nana's troops which included 5000 regulars ; pushed on to find the enemy again drawn up and reinforced ; routed them again ; was faced a third time in the same day on the outskirts of Cawnpore ; drove them in rout a third time ; and entered Cawnpore the next day—to find that the Nana had already completed his ghastly work by slaughtering the prisoners.

It was not possible to push on towards Lucknow without a brief delay ; but on the 29th Havelock was across the Ganges with but 1500 men, and advanced to fight two more successful actions on that day ; leaving an entrenched post behind him at Mangarwar, on the Oudh bank of the Ganges besides three hundred men under Neill in Cawnpore itself. Nineteen guns were captured ; but between the fighting and an outbreak of cholera, a sixth of his force was killed or *hors de combat*. And then came the news that the Dinapur regiments down the river had mutinied, the communications with Bengal were threatened, and there was no present prospect of reinforcements coming. Havelock had no choice but to fall back on his entrenched post at Mangarwar.

Thence he again marched on Aug. 4, to fall on the

Havelock's advance to Cawnpore.

Havelock in Oudh.



## 318 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

gathering enemy a second time at Basharat Ganj, the scene of his last victory. But again cholera was ravaging his little force ; and to add to his difficulties, there seemed to be every prospect of the mutineers at Kalpi moving on Cawnpore. With intense reluctance, Havelock felt that he must retire to Cawnpore though not without first inflicting a third defeat on the rebels at Basharat Ganj, and clearing them from his own neighbourhood.

Have-  
lock's re-  
tirement to  
Cawnpore,  
August. The retirement to Cawnpore meant evacuation of Oudh territory. To the Oudh local chiefs, this seemed the abandonment of the Residency garrison. At last, they yielded to the pressure from the rebels, and sent their retainers, as we have seen, to join the mutineer army at Lucknow ; but till this time, they had not done so, nor even now did they personally take up arms. They did no more than accept what appeared to be a *de facto* dominion.

Besides the threatening Gwalior Contingent at Kalpi, the Rohillas were now gathering at Firakabad, to the N.W.

In the meantime, however, the line of communication *via* Dinapur had been cleared. The sepoy in Behar had not mutinied till near the end of July ; when they did so, the leadership was taken up by Raja Kunwar Singh of Jugdespur (south of the Ganges), an aggrieved talukdar ; who turned his forces against Arrah, a post where there were a very few Europeans and some treasure. But besides the Europeans, there were fifty of Rattray's Sikhs at Arrah. A Civil Engineer, Mr Vicars Boyle, had on his own account converted a house into a fort ; in which the fifteen Europeans and the Sikhs collected, and conducted a brilliant and successful defence. A detachment was sent from Dinapur to relieve them, but it was ambushed and driven back with heavy loss. Major Vincent Eyre, however, who was proceeding up the river with some guns, learning the position of affairs, collected a small force, marched upon Arrah defeating and dispersing a large body of the enemy, relieved the place, and with the garrison and some further reinforcements, broke the neck of a resistance which had threatened seriously to delay the arrival of the forces about to proceed to Cawnpore.



These events happened between July 26th and August 13th; and a few days later, Outram, who had recently arrived at Calcutta and was given supreme command in the district, was on his way to join Havelock. On reaching Cawnpore, with a couple of fresh regiments, instead of taking command over Havelock, he declared that his comrade should have the glory of the Relief, he himself serving as a volunteer. But this junction of Outram with Havelock was not completed till Sept. 15. Neither the Gwalior mutineers nor the Rohilla troops were moving. By the 20th, the little army, scarcely over 3000 in number, was in Oudh once more. On the 21st it routed an opposing force at Mangarwar. On the 23rd it reached and captured the Alam Bagh fort, four miles from the Lucknow Residency. On the 25th, leaving a sufficient force to hold the Alam Bagh, it fought its desperate way into the Residency. Lucknow was saved.

Outram  
joins  
Havelock.

Rescue of  
the Luck-  
now Resi-  
dency.

The great defence had been of incalculable service to the Delhi force, by detaining so large a mass of the rebels in Oudh. It is a curious point that had Delhi been captured sooner, Lucknow itself might have been overwhelmed by the influx of regiments retreating from the capital, before Havelock and Outram could have reinforced the garrison.

Technically a "relief" involves the liberation of the garrison relieved. In this sense, the reinforcement of Outram and Havelock was not a relief, as it did not allow of the withdrawal of non-combatants. But it was a rescue, inasmuch as the Residency was in real danger of falling, partly owing to the exhaustion of the defenders under the strain, though there was no fear whatever of starvation, partly because the Native portion of the garrison, loyally as it fought, was meditating withdrawal. That danger was now entirely removed. The force within the Residency now knew that it would have no difficulty in holding its own against the besiegers for at least a couple of months, in an extended position with improved means of defence. The rear-guard left at the Alam Bagh was also able to communicate with Cawnpore, and by semaphore with the garrison. So the Residency settled down to the second stage of the defence.



## CHAPTER XXIX

### CONQUEST: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

(*Map VII.*)

Events  
elsewhere.

Change in  
the situa-  
tion.

Relief of  
the Luck-  
now Resi-  
dency.

WHILE these great events had been taking place, there had been no mutiny south of the Nerbadda. The Nizam's Mussulmans were restive and even clamorous: but they were kept in hand by the ability of his minister Salar Jang. The attitude however of the Marathas in what had been the Peshwa's dominions, irritated by the Sattara annexation, and much in sympathy with Nana Sahib, caused a good deal of anxiety and prevented the Bombay forces from securing Holkar's territory; where the soldiery, whether sepoy or local levies, declared against the British without making any very active movement. Mhow, however, the station close to Indur, was occupied early in August by a British brigade. The outbreak had thus been stemmed and its impact broken at the end of September by the forces already in Hindostan. But now on the one hand the fall of Delhi gave a tremendous impulse to the hitherto doubtful loyalty of the Panjab, in which it at once became practicable to raise immense levies for the suppression of the revolt; and on the other hand strong reinforcements were beginning to pour in at Calcutta and Bombay, the former to be used in the Ganges provinces, the latter in the Central Indian districts. Sir Colin Campbell had arrived in September to take the chief command; in October he was organising his campaign. In the beginning of November, he had six thousand men at Cawnpore, and battalions on their way up from Bengal. On November 9 he crossed the Ganges leaving a garrison of 1000 men at Cawnpore: on the 12th he reached the Alam Bagh: and then, after some hard fighting,



the Residency was finally and formally relieved on the 17th. The next ten days were occupied in the withdrawal of the whole force from that position to the Alam Bagh, where Outram was left with 4000 men. Havelock, his great comrade in arms, had passed away on November 24th, the end achieved for which he had fought so heroically.

In the interval, the Gwalior mutineer army dropped its rôle of being merely threatening, and became for the first time actively aggressive, under Tantia Topi, the ablest leader the mutineers produced. While Sir Colin was engaged in relieving Lucknow, Tantia Topi crossed the Jamna at Kalpi, was joined by Nana Sahib's forces, descended on Cawnpore, was met by Windham, whose troops he drove back step by step into their own lines, and on Nov. 28 was seriously threatening the position; when Sir Colin was able to dispatch the rescued non-combatants of the Lucknow Residency to Allahabad on their way to Calcutta; and then on the 6th attacked the rebel force, and drove them in rout with great slaughter, some across the Ganges, and others across the Jamna.

This virtually commenced the campaign of conquest. During the next three months, the armies gathered to crush the rebels in Oudh. From the east by way of Sultanpur came Franks with a column, followed by a Nepalese contingent led by Jang Bahadur; from the west, Sir Colin, with reinforcements from Agra; at the Alam Bagh lay Outram with his 4000 men. Both Franks and Outram had sharp fighting before the columns had formed their junction; but in the second week of March, the siege of the great mutineer army in Lucknow had begun; by the 17th the whole city was in the hands of the British, and the rebel forces were in full flight; but it was unfortunate that the cavalry missed their opportunity, and failed to cut off the retreat or rather the rout of the enemy, who were still able to re-assemble and take the field.

In the Indur district, Durand inflicted considerable punishment on the rebel forces, between October and December when Sir Hugh Rose took over the command. In January his force began its march—one column towards



## 322 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Agra, the other with Sir Hugh himself, for Sagar and Jhansi. The left column cleared the country up to Gunah on the direct road; and then during March, moving eastwards, attacked and on the 17th captured the strongly held fort of Chandairi. The right column, advancing to Sagar, relieved it on Feb. 3, and after capturing the fort of Garrakōta started for Jhansi on the 27th. By skilful manœuvring in difficult and hilly country and not without some sharp fighting, Sir Hugh reached Jhansi on March 21, where he was joined by the column from Chandairi, during the next four days.

**Capture of Jhansi.** Jhansi was a powerful fortress, with 10,000 men behind its ramparts. After commencing the siege, Sir Hugh learnt that Tantia Topi was on the march to raise the siege. Thereupon Rose, leaving the bulk of his force to carry on the operations, marched with 1500 men to meet Tantia Topi, routed him completely, and captured all his guns. Returning to Jhansi, he captured the city on the 3rd April, and on the night of the 4th the Rani evacuated the fort, escaping with her troops towards Kalpi. Thus, with Lucknow and Jhansi both captured by early April, the war—in familiar phrase—was “practically over.”

**Recrudescence of the struggle in Oudh.** This however did not mean that the fighting was finished. The Mussulmans had congregated in Rohilkhand; Tantia Topi, and the Jhansi fugitives joined forces south of the Jamna; and the Governor-General, acting on a misapprehension, issued a proclamation the intention of which was in turn misunderstood by the Oudh Talukdars; who now, believing that mere confiscation and ruin were to be their portion, took the field in person with their clansmen, with an energy which heretofore they had not displayed. The result was a prolonged and very trying period of active guerilla warfare, and some heavy fighting. It was not till the close of December, and after the younger Havelock (afterwards Sir Henry Havelock-Allen) had induced the authorities to employ mounted infantry, that the last embers of rebellion were crushed out on the north of the Ganges. On the south, the Jhansi Rani and Tantia Topi appeared before Gwalior in June; Sindhia, seeking to resist them, was deserted by his

**Termination of the contest.**



forces and had to fly to Agra ; Gwalior was in the hands of the insurgents, and Nana Sahib was proclaimed Peshwa. Rose however was soon moving against the Rani and she was killed in the course of an action fought on June 17. From this time, the war dropped into a pursuit of Tantia Topi, who with dwindling forces was hunted month after month, till, left with only a few followers, he was finally betrayed and handed over to the British in April of the following year, to die for his complicity in the Cawnpore massacre.

And so guttered out the last sparks of the great conflagration.

So far this chapter has been occupied with a simple narrative of events. It is now time to examine some particular aspects of the revolt.

As to its constituents : in the earlier stage, those who took part in it were of these classes : The Hindostani sepoys of the Company's army ; the Hindostani sepoys of the Native "contingents," as at Gwalior ; the Mussulmans of the Ganges provinces ; a few aggrieved Talukdars in Oudh, with their clansmen ; among the Marathas, the Nana Sahib, the Jhansi Rani, and a few minor chiefs. Havelock's retirement to Cawnpore added to these the levies of the Oudh Talukdars generally ; but these never showed fight till the last part of the war, when Canning's proclamation made the Talukdars actively instead of formally hostile. Then the Rajput clansmen became formidable foes. The Mussulmans of Afghanistan and the frontier, the Sikh, Ghurka, and Madras sepoys, almost without exception remained staunch. The Princes held aloof. They made declarations of loyalty, but would not be answerable for their troops.

The active elements then are reduced to three—Mussulmans associated with the Mogul tradition ; aggrieved chiefs and their retainers or sympathisers ; Hindostani sepoys. Now these last consisted of a small proportion of Mussulmans, and a very large proportion of high-caste Hindus. It was the Hindostani sepoys that rose : but it was the Mogul party which forthwith attempted to turn the rising to political account ; with them lay the immense advantage of possessing

Who took part in the revolt.

Active participants.



## 324 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

a figure-head. But their action served to check the rebellious element in the Hindu community. What might have happened if Sindhia had rallied the Marathas to his name, it is hard to say ; but even the Nana Sahib was not set up as representing a cause till June '58. It is quite clear therefore that there was no concerted attempt at a Hindu rising ; but it is almost equally clear that there was a definite Mussulman plot to foment a general Mutiny as a means to a Mogul restoration. That the plot would have come to anything without the cartridge incident is improbable enough ; but that incident provided a first-class lever to work with on the high-caste regiments of the Company's army ; more particularly in conjunction with the General Service Enlistment Act. Once the mutiny was on foot, its extension to the Gwalior Contingent, largely recruited from the same field, was natural. That the Mussulman party was prepared beforehand to work the Mutiny for its own ends is a sufficiently obvious inference from the promptitude with which on its outbreak they took its direction on themselves both at Delhi and in Oudh.

Neutral  
elements.

On the other hand, the Panjab and Frontier Mussulmans were not associated with the Mogul tradition. The Sikhs, Gurkhas and Madrasis were not high-caste Hindus. For the third factor, such general suspicion and hostility to the British Raj as had been aroused among Hindu princes and chiefs had been very much allayed in Kajputana by the management first of Henry and then of George Lawrence, and in Oudh by Henry. Except among a few Marathas, it was not sufficient to produce active hostility ; that needed the sense of personal grievance to be found in Nana Sahib and the Jhansi Rani. But, in spite of those soothing influences, and of such ministerial control as was exercised by Dinkar Rao at Gwalior, and Salar Jang at Haidarabad the anti-British sentiment was sufficiently strong to preclude active support of the British, until after the fall of Delhi ; except from such quarters as the loyal Maharaja of Patiala, and the particularly astute Gholab Singh of Kashmir, who inherited from the master of his youth, Ranjit Singh, a conviction that in the long-run the British were sure to come out, so to speak, on top.



The conclusion then, in view of all the facts, seems to be this. The condition of any sort of successful rising was the development in the sepoy of a determined spirit of rebellion. There were two classes of malcontents—the Mogul party and the aggrieved chiefs—who had a direct interest in fostering such a spirit. But the aggrieved chiefs had no definite policy, the Mogul party had one. The latter therefore were able to calculate that it was their main business to make sure of a rising big enough to throw off the British yoke, because they themselves would inevitably reap the fruits of possessing a definite policy, and would emerge dominant among the other conflicting parties. Without active fomentation, the mutinies would have been sporadic, and readily suppressed. Without the cartridge incident, the mutinous spirit could not have been sufficiently fomented. The revolt was not long prepared; to say that it was organised would be an undeserved compliment to the Mussulmans; but for some months before the outbreak, the Mussulmans were seeking to convert the Hindostani army into a catspaw for their own political ends.

Next, as to the attitude of the Panjab, and the frontier. Dost Mohammed at Kabul remained entirely loyal to his engagement, vindicating thereby the policy of alliance with him, on which opinion had differed among the highest authorities. Dalhousie adopted the policy, which really emanated from Herbert Edwardes; men whose theories were poles apart like John Lawrence and John Nicholson agreed in disliking it. But the result was convincing. In the Panjab itself, there was sympathy neither with the Mogul nor with the Hindostani sepoys; yet it was not till the fall of Delhi that John Lawrence could venture on allowing levies *en masse*. Here is one of the insoluble problems of the might-have-been. The policy carried through by Dalhousie and John Lawrence prevented the Sikh Sirdars from being actively dangerous. The policy advocated by Henry Lawrence would have made them an active power for good or for evil. Would they have thrown in their lot with the British or with the rebels? Under Henry Lawrence's own guidance, it may be confidently held that they would have

General  
con-  
clusions.

Behaviour  
of Dost  
Moham-  
med.

Attitude of  
the Pan-  
jab.



## 326 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

been loyal like their kinsmen in Sirhind ; but under any guidance less sympathetic the effect might have been far otherwise.

So much for the "might-have-been." For the actual conditions, they seemed to John Lawrence in June so serious that he actually proposed the transfer of Peshawar and the trans-Indus to Dost Mohammed, in order to set free the troops there to join the Delhi force. Fortunately however other counsels prevailed ; and, in spite of the risk, he presently assented to the dispatch of Nicholson's column, and the employment of Gholab Singh's Kashmir levies—measures entirely justified by the result.

Conduct of  
the Hindo-  
stani  
sepoys.

As to the attitude of the Hindostani sepoys themselves ; in the majority of cases they followed the call of a few energetic spirits ; hanging together, but rarely even fighting with much enthusiasm. There were some wholesale massacres of British officers and residents ; but it was not unusual for those officers only to be murdered whose popularity and influence were feared, and this not so much from a vengeful spirit as from the leaders' desire to make the regiments feel that they had committed themselves irrevocably. The massacres at Delhi, at Jhansi, and at Cawnpore obliterated from the ordinary British purview the many cases in which officers and families were escorted to the protection of friendly chiefs or of British garrisons by sepoys, who, after accomplishing their task, returned to throw in their lot with the mutineers.

Lord  
Canning.

Throughout the great crisis, the conduct of the Governor-General was the subject of bitter animadversion in Calcutta and in England. As a matter of fact he appears to have made two mistakes altogether. The first was before the mutiny ; the General Service Enlistment Act, already discussed.

His Oudh  
Proclama-  
tion.

The second was the proclamation in 1858 directed against the Oudh Talukdars. Virtually it declared them all to be rebels, and their estates forfeit, subject to such relief as a benignant government might think fit to grant. More troubles arise from misapprehensions than from any other source. Canning intended the Talukdars to understand that if they behaved themselves they would be reinstated by



grace of the Government. What they did understand was that they were to be treated as rebels by a Government which they expected to be vindictive. Canning, in common with most of the community, believed that they had been active in the rebellion, whereas in fact they had only joined it in a very perfunctory fashion when they thought the British had themselves given up hope of recovering Oudh. So that Canning's objects, present to his mind as fair and generous, were interpreted by them as being vindictive and harsh ; and the proclamation at last turned them into really active rebels. It was a curious piece of irony that "Clemency Canning" was then rated in England, by way of a change, for harshness and injustice.

For the most part this title of Clemency Canning expresses the attitude towards him both in England and in Calcutta. At home the reports of massacres awoke a passion for vengeance in which all sense of discrimination was lost : to urge discrimination was felt as a kind of sacrilege towards the memory of the helpless victims so cruelly butchered. In Calcutta the feeling was for obvious reasons greatly aggravated ; and in addition, the British population there furiously resented the application of any sort of restraint on themselves. But Canning resolutely insisted on discriminating, and on imposing restraints on the British in Calcutta. In nothing that Canning said or did was there a hint that anything short of the uttermost farthing should be exacted from ringleaders, or from participators in murder or massacre. But the regulations and instructions which he issued, after the great Mutiny was an accomplished fact, recognised that whether the question were argued on the ground of morality or of expediency, sheer undistinguishing vengeance on the entire population was not to be permitted ; and recognised also that the irresponsible members of the British community had been roused to a pitch of excitement incompatible with the formation of a cool judgment on the facts, or with sober action in the absence of restraint. The horrors of the mutiny, and the consequent irrepressible lust for blood that attended its suppression, left behind them an evil legacy of mutual hostility, to be eradicated only by long years of

Canning  
and his  
critics.



## **328 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY**

**resolutely just administration ; a legacy which would have been infinitely more intolerable, perhaps ineradicable altogether, but for the unfaltering firmness with which Clemency Canning, amidst a storm of taunts and bitter attacks, pursued his policy of unswerving justice.**



## CHAPTER XXX

### EPILOGUE

**T**HE great Mutiny ended the reign of the East India Company. For a hundred and forty years, it had been a trading Company and nothing more. Then it had become embroiled in a sharp conflict first with the French and secondly with the Native ruler of Bengal; from which it had emerged after some fifteen years as actually, though not in the strict technical sense, a territorial and military Power without any European competitor. After another brief interval, the Company recognised its own new responsibilities, and the Parliament at Westminster also realised that these responsibilities were in some degree shared by the nation at large. The first experiment at Constitution-making under new conditions was followed by Pitt's India Act, which indicated the Parliamentary idea of the proportion of obligation lying on the Country and the Company respectively, and laid down the plan whereby the responsibilities were to be distributed. As time passed, the Company was forced more and more to subordinate its commercial to its political functions; while the inconveniences of a divided control were in no way modified, and the State evinced a growing inclination to extend its own activities. Just when the Company was completing its century of supremacy, the crisis of 1857 arrived, compelling the decisive termination of the dual system.

The  
Company's  
Record.

That it did so is no reproach to the great Company. The inherent difficulties of governing from London a dependency so distant, when the only means of communication was by means of sailing vessels, were immense. It was inevitable that the men in London should fail to realise always and completely the pressing necessities which were

The Com-  
pany's  
Task.



## 330 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

apparent to the men on the spot: yet London could not simply wash its hands of responsibility, and allow its administrators in India to take the law absolutely into their own hands. To-day, when steam and electricity have so immeasurably increased the facility and rapidity of communication, the difficulty is still sufficiently apparent; in the days of which we have been writing it was incomparably greater. Yet over and above that difficulty, the Company itself was subject to the control of a higher power possessed of no better information than its own, though without quite the same bias against expenditure. And in governing India it was conducting an operation entirely without precedent in history, amidst a vast population whose manners and ideas were wholly alien, to deal with whom successfully it was a prime necessity to divest the mind of superficial western analogies, and arguments based on fundamentally foreign political and ethical conceptions. If under such conditions the Directors had not made grave mistakes, treated their pro-consuls with occasional injustice, hampered their action at times, resisted their expenditure, and failed to encourage their activities in directions which the experience of later days shows to have been desirable, they would have been more than human. On the whole, the Directors deserved well of mankind; and it may be doubted whether the immediate government of Parliament would have been a whit better.

Now however the time had arrived when the State was prepared to take the entire responsibility on its own shoulders, at a moment when the old difficulty of communication, of keeping due touch with the great Dependency, was fast vanishing. The formal change of government did not so much create a new era as express the fact that a new era had begun.

**Transfer of Government to the Crown.** In 1857, Lord Palmerston was in office: and in February 1858, a bill was brought in to transfer the government of India from the Company to the Sovereign. The Company was by no means willing to surrender its powers and privileges, and fought against the new proposals. Palmerston, defeated on his "Conspiracy to Murder" bill, resigned: and Lord



Derby took office. A new India bill was brought in, which, after many vicissitudes, and much modification, finally passed into Law in August 1858.

By the new Constitution, the East India Company and the Board of Control were both abolished. Instead of them, the ultimate responsibility for the Government of India was vested in a parliamentary Secretary of State who should be a member of the Imperial Government for the time being, with a Council appointed for life—a term of years being afterwards substituted. The first Council consisted partly of Directors of the old Company, partly of civil or military officers from India. As the Directors disappeared, their places were filled by Indian officials or ex-officials, the India Office thus becoming a Department of State in the hands of experts, with a Parliamentary chief.

In India also some degree of reconstruction took place. The work of administration remained in the same hands, the Company's "Covenanted Service" becoming the Indian Civil Service of the Crown. The Governor-General or Viceroy was given an Executive Council of seven, including his Commander-in-Chief, the member for Public Works being a later addition. There is also a Legislative Council without whose assent no law can be passed, consisting of the Executive Council with additions. The additional members usually include some Natives of standing, and some representatives of the mercantile community. There is nothing elective or democratic about the system: the members of Council are nominated from above. It rests on the theory of government by experts, which has its disadvantages, but also has merits which are perhaps less obvious or less readily recognised, from the prevalent theory in England that experience connected with any given department probably makes a man unfit for supreme control of it. It is not clear however that as a mere matter of efficiency the Indian system is not on the whole the more successful.

In three respects it is to be noted that the Mutiny was followed by and was probably the cause of a change of policy. The attitude on the Adoption Question so conspicuously assumed by Dalhousie was given up, and the



## 332 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Native Princes were well pleased to know that what they regarded as the legitimate course of succession would not again be hastily set aside. The Talukdars were gratified by a new move in the direction of restoring the status to which, as some held, they were entitled, and which, as others held, they had usurped though it is hardly probable that this alteration has been altogether to the advantage of the ryots. Third and not least in importance: the military arrangements were re-modelled. The rule was laid down, that one third of the military forces in India must consist of European troops. The old jealousies between the "king's officers" and the "Company's Officers" were obliterated by the amalgamation of the forces. The vital fact however was that the European soldiery could never again be outnumbered in the overwhelming proportions which had rendered the struggle in the early months of the mutiny so desperate.

Last  
ords. It is not our part in this volume to enter on the history of the new régime. We have had to trace the history of the British in India from their earliest connexion with the East until their supremacy was acknowledged from the mountains to the sea over all the land. When their first factory was established, the son of Akbar the Great ruled at Agra, and the Mussulman kingdoms of the Dekhan still survived in the south: while their future power was yet undreamed of, the Dekhan kingdoms fell under the Mogul dominion. While rival French traders were establishing themselves, the Maratha Power was growing, and the Delhi Empire fell to pieces. After a short and sharp contest, the French rival was driven from the field, and Plassey made the British masters of the richest province of India. A century passed; and the heir of the house of Baber was a State prisoner, while every prince acknowledged the British over-lordship, confirmed by the failure of the great convulsion. The pen of Macaulay has made the story of Clive and Warren Hastings familiar in some of its aspects: many pens have related the stirring episodes of the mutiny. But of the changes which took place between 1783 and 1857, and of the men who made those changes, the great majority are curiously ignorant.



The details are difficult to unravel, difficult to view in their true connexion. It has been the primary object of the present writer to simplify the problem for the student; to help him to a mastery of the fundamental points which shall enable him to appreciate the more readily the records of heroic action, of resolute patience, of unswerving justice, with which our Indian annals abound: to distinguish more clearly between the peoples over whom it has been our task to govern.

Forty-three years have rolled by since the Sovereignty of India passed formally to the British Crown. Since that day, there have been wars beyond the border and "little" wars with the frontier tribesmen. That frontier has not ceased to advance. It has girdled in Burma: decade by decade it has embraced fresh tracts of mountains and ravines, fresh clans of wild hill-men, till only recently we have seen the trans-Indus raised into a separate Province. But throughout the years since the last embers of rebellion were quenched in the last days of 1858, within India Proper unbroken peace has reigned. That after all is the most significant of all possible comments on the British Raj. In the Panjab, in Hindostan, in Bengal, in the Dekhan, for forty years no armies have met in the shock of battle. No foreign foe has set foot on Indian soil since the British became definitely the leading power; since the Sovereignty of Britain was proclaimed, no Native potentate has raised his standards either in revolt against the alien dominion or with aggressive intent against his neighbours. Since the days of Mahmud of Ghazni, such a period of peace has no parallel in the Indian annals. We believe at least that the intelligent Natives recognise in the British Supremacy the only alternative to anarchy: that they are alive to the need of some one Power whose paramountcy is beyond dispute; that they know that no other overlord would give them the same security or tax them so lightly.

Constantly, but gradually and not often incautiously, the number of Natives admitted to responsible office tends to increase. But time alone will show whether the Orientalism, the forms of thought, the ideals and the prejudices that are



## 334 CONFIRMATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

inherited in the blood, the traditions that have been handed down through immemorial centuries, can be displaced by those other forms of thought which are our Western inheritance, and without which democratic institutions are unthinkable. Such a change has not taken place, nor are there any trustworthy signs that it is in progress. Still is the East East, and the West West. In a land where dominion has never been seen and never been held without the power of the sword, the military superiority of the dominant race must still be the ultimate sanction of its domination ; where such domination is the condition of order, doctrines of equality cannot take practical effect. But though as yet the British Raj has not brought about the Golden Age, it has brought peace and security and even-handed justice where they never prevailed before save as traditions of a mythical past. Honour to the men who have wrought that great work ; may their sons and their sons' sons merit like honour from generation to generation : worthy, when they depart from the scene of their labours to have graven upon their memorial tablets the words that sound the keynote of high endeavour, the epitaph of one who was not the least among the heroes, Henry Lawrence—

HE TRIED TO DO HIS DUTY.



## **APPENDICES**

**I. NOTES**

**II. AUTHORITIES**







## APPENDIX I

### NOTES

#### A. Ch. X.—THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS.

**T**HE attack on Warren Hastings by Burke and his allies is not strictly speaking a part of the History of India ; but some further reference to it is desirable. Macaulay has written of it in one of his most brilliant passages, and the trial has been the subject of much magnificent rhetoric. A brief summary however, unembellished by eloquence, may be found useful.

Hastings reached England in June 1785. His own first impression was that his reception was entirely favourable, and that ministers would be wholly on his side, though some sort of attack on him would probably be made.

On the other hand, Burke had thoroughly convinced himself that Hastings had been a tyrant ; Fox, whatever his moral convictions may have been, saw in the question of Indian administration an excellent means for placing Pitt in a dilemma : Francis was the relentless enemy of Hastings, and represented the authority of the man who had been on the spot.

In January 1786, the challenge was thrown down by Hastings' own agent, Scott, in parliament ; who invited Burke and Fox in effect to come on if they dared, to which they merely replied that they were coming on when it suited them.

In February, Burke moved for the papers required for framing an impeachment. Parliamentary skirmishing went on during March. Then Hastings made the mistake of asking to be heard in person at the bar of the House ; there proceeding to read a long vindication of his administration, which unfortunately was extremely ill-adapted to his audience less on account of its matter than its manner.

The real campaign began in June, when Burke made the *Robilla* war his ground of assault. The rights and wrongs in



regard to this charge have been discussed in the text. But whatever they were, the fact that Hastings had been nominated to the governor-generalship three times after that war made it something of a *chose jugée*, and Burke's motion was rejected.

Now, the supposed facts of this war formed the strongest part of the indictment against Hastings. No one believed that, after this had failed, any of the other charges would suffice as the basis of an impeachment. The second attack was grounded on the treatment of the Raja of Benares. Great was the astonishment when Pitt after apparently defending Hastings, at length announced that as in his opinion the fine imposed on the Rajah was excessive, he would give his vote in support of the hostile motion. Every sort of explanation for the sudden change of front was offered. The reason given by Pitt himself was universally scouted; nor can it be pretended that it was in any sense sufficient to account for his action. Personal motives were freely imputed both to Pitt and Dundas. The indisputable fact is that when the Rohilla motion came on, Pitt did not intend to countenance an impeachment; when the Benares motion came on, he had made up his mind to countenance it. It is certain that in the interval Pitt had been studying the whole question of the Hastings administration; and setting aside the natural temptation to seek for improper motives in the conduct of ministers, it seems perfectly reasonable to hold, with Lord Rosebery (*Pitt*, p. 85) that Pitt was simply convinced by the evidence examined and digested in the interval not exactly of the guilt of Hastings but of the impropriety of the Government identifying itself with him. The conclusion was only reached at the last moment, but once reached it could only be acted on by accepting the hostile motion.

Pitt's action settled the question. The hostile motion was carried. In February 1787, Sheridan made the famous speech on the affair of the Oudh Begums which was regarded at the time as having touched the high-water mark of British eloquence. The impeachment was now a certainty; and in May, Hastings was formally impeached by Burke at the bar of the House of Lords.

For a fuller account of the proceedings from the picturesque point of view, the reader may be referred to Macaulay's essay: from the historic and ethical point of view, to Lyall's *Warren Hastings* (English Men of Action), chapter viii. Here we need only summarise.



The trial began in February 1788. After the preliminary steps, Burke opened the attack with a general indictment, powerful but violent. Then Fox had his turn and it was not till June that Sheridan again developed his theme in relation to the Oudh Begums. After this the court rose—it had been occupied altogether for thirty-five days. The sittings were not renewed till April of the following year when the court sat for seventeen days. In 1790 it sat for fourteen days, and for five days in 1791. Next year, the defence had twenty-two days. When the defence continued in 1793, “of one hundred and eighty-six peers who had seen the Begum charge opened by the prosecution, not more than twenty-eight were now listening to the defence” (Lyall); yet it was not till April 1795 that the House of Lords gave judgment—acquitting Hastings by a large majority on every one of the questions submitted. The trial had cost the accused about £100,000.

**B. CH. XXVII.—THE INCREASE OF THE NATIVE ARMY  
UNDER DALHOUSIE.**

It is stated in the text, p. 302, that the grave disproportion between British and Native troops was partly due to the increase in the latter necessitated by Lord Dalhousie's Annexation Policy.

This statement, previously emphasised by General M'Leod Innes in his *Sepoy Revolt*, has been challenged in a very recently published work by Mr Demetrius Boulger (*India in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 197), where he writes: “What are the facts? . . . He reduced the number of the native army by 7000 men. . . . Here it must suffice to say that Lord Dalhousie's annexations did not lead, as alleged, to an increase of the native army, but to its reduction, however slight.”

Mr Boulger cites no authorities; and it would be interesting to discover his grounds for this very surprising and positive assertion.

“What are the facts?” In 1845, when the first Sikh war broke out, the numbers of the Native Regular Army were about 240,000 (*cf.* Sir W. W. Hunter's *Dalhousie*, p. 213). When Dalhousie left India in 1856, their numbers were 233,000. That is, between 1845 and 1856 there was a reduction of 7000. Is this the fact over which Mr Boulger has stumbled? If so, it has escaped his attention that, after the first Sikh war, Lord Hardinge reduced the Native army by not less than 50,000 men, and



Dalhousie increased it again by over 40,000. The difference between Hardinge's reduction and Dalhousie's increase would seem to have taken shape in Mr Boulger's mind as a reduction by Dalhousie. Hardinge effected the reduction by lowering the strength of the battalions from 1000 to 800—not by disbanding regiments. Dalhousie effected the increase by the reverse process of raising the same battalions to approximately their previous numbers. (See Henry Lawrence's Paper on Lord Hardinge's administration, in the *Calcutta Review*, 1847: also Viscount Hardinge's "Hardinge" in the *Rulers of India*, p. 167: Sir W. Hunter's *Dalhousie*, p. 213; and reference there given.)

The actual fact therefore appears to be that the great Native army of 1845 was reduced by about twenty per cent. by Dalhousie's predecessor, and that the Annexations necessitated its restoration practically to the earlier strength—mainly at the instance of Sir Charles Napier, who succeeded Gough as commander-in-chief in 1849.

Yet this does not represent the whole increase, for it does not take into account the new regiments raised in the Panjab itself: so that, under Dalhousie's régime, the native army was actually increased by not less than twenty-five per cent.

Dalhousie himself viewed the resulting disproportion with apprehension, repeatedly urged the need for more European troops, and actually raised an additional European regiment in each of the three Provinces: but this was more than counterbalanced by the withdrawal of regiments for the Crimea, in defiance of his protests, and later for Persia also. Moreover, he designed a fresh reduction, by reverting to the lower strength of Native battalions; in almost the last Minute he wrote, he proposed the disbanding of several Native regiments, as well as an addition to the European forces. But the broad fact remains that Dalhousie took the risk of adopting a policy which involved the increase of the Native army by twenty-five per cent., without obtaining a corresponding increase in the European military establishment—although he was alive to the resulting danger and urged the necessary precautions on a deaf Government at Westminster.

#### C. CH. XXIX.—LORD CANNING.

The view of Lord Canning taken in the text is one which is generally repudiated by residents in Calcutta at the time of the



mutiny. Calcutta opinion was unanimously in favour of the most stringent measures ; no severity would have been deemed excessive ; and all restrictions on Europeans were accounted as something of an outrage. The *Times* in London took the same view ; and it is only necessary to look at the *Punch* cartoons of the period to realise that the popular temper had been roused beyond the control of reason. This was natural enough ; and neither Calcutta nor London deserves much reprobation, if it is true that both capitals "lost their heads." But that they did lose their heads, while Canning kept his—that he was right and they were wrong—is certainly the impression produced on the student who comes to examine the question as one not having taken part in it.

Calcutta had many grievances against the Governor-General. It held that the General commanding in Behar should have had positive orders to disarm the sepoys instead of being instructed to act on his own judgment. It believed that he had discountenanced the formation of Volunteer Corps in Calcutta. It was angry because a strict censorship had been extended to the European as well as the Native press, and because Europeans as well as Natives were required to obtain a license if they wished to carry arms. There were individuals whose services did not meet with the recognition they deserved, and for this Lord Canning was held responsible. Yet in some of these cases, it is clear that the Governor-General could not have been personally to blame ; while in others he would have deserved blame if he had acted otherwise than he did.

But the head and front of his offending lay in the Resolution of July 1857, giving instructions to what may be called the emergency officers appointed to deal with deserters and mutineers. The effect of these instructions was to confine severe penalties to mutineers who had taken part in the murder of officers, or in other outrages, or were taken in arms. The storm of indignation roused by the instructions appears of itself to be sufficient proof that they were imperatively needed to check what would afterwards have been recognised as a fatal policy of bloodthirsty reprisals, though the passion of the hour would have accounted them as no more than an instalment of just retribution. Nevertheless it is the fact that Lord Canning deliberately chose to accept the obloquy with which he was bespattered on account of the Resolution, rather than make public the whole of the evidence



on which he acted ; not because the evidence was insufficient, but because it was too staggering. The historian must recognise the splendid courage and self-control displayed under extraordinarily difficult conditions by the Governor-General ; but since the data by which he was guided were not made known to the public, it is scarcely surprising that the public did not take them into consideration though it may be doubted whether in its then frame of mind it would have been greatly influenced by their publication.



## APPENDIX II

### AUTHORITIES

#### A.—GENERAL HISTORY.

*The History of India* by MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE remains the standard English account of the various Native Dominions, prior to the establishment of British Ascendancy. It is a work of immense research, to which all students are deeply indebted : and it covers the whole ground of custom and myth as well as political history.

The standard history of the British Dominion down to the first decade of the nineteenth century is that of JAMES MILL, continued by Wilson to 1835. James Mill however was inclined to pose as the Philosophic Historian ; in other words, as a censor of his own countrymen ; and his interpretation of events is always inclined to err as imputing the baser rather than the higher motive, while he gives undue weight to the evidence against the Empire Builders. Substantially, his views on the character of the leading actors are very much those of T. B. Macaulay.

But from the point where his history closes, there is no other general work of quite the same rank. MARSHMAN'S *History* covers the whole field from the earliest times to the retirement of Dalhousie. It is usually sound, accurate, and impartial ; but occasionally lacks lucidity. To the same class as Marshman belong the *Short History of India* by Talboys Wheeler, and the *Student's Manual* by Meadows Taylor. The former is very well arranged and indexed.

Sir W. W. HUNTER in *The Indian Empire* and the *Brief History of the Indian Peoples* is concerned comparatively little with the story of the rise of the British Power. The two completed volumes of the *History of British India* on which he was engaged at the time of his death only come down to the amalgamation of the rival British Companies in the first decade of the eighteenth century.



Sir ALFRED LYALL'S *British Dominion in India* is an admirable study; but it is more a study than a history, and at any rate after Wellesley it becomes all too brief. As an introduction to the subject, however, it can hardly be surpassed.

There are gaps in the RULERS OF INDIA series, which prevent it from forming a complete story; while the historical interest is, by the scheme of the series, somewhat subordinated to the personal. The individual volumes are referred to below in connexion with their respective periods.

TOD'S *Rajasthan*, CROOK'S *North West Provinces*, and KEENE'S *Hindustan*, are all informing works, though the two former deal rather with the bye-ways and accessories of history than with history proper; and like the valuable but ponderous (larger) History of TALBOYS WHEELER, treat of the Peoples of India, not with the British Expansion. CUNNINGHAM'S *History of the Sikhs*, and GRANT DUFF'S *History of the Marathas* will be found serviceable by the student; and also Sir JOHN MALCOLM'S *Political India* (the Rise of the British) and *Central India* (The Marathas) to 1825, Captain MAHAN'S *Influence of Sea-Power* (chapters vii., viii., and xii.), and the second part of SEELEY'S *Expansion of England*, are almost necessary for the understanding of certain aspects, military and political, of the British Expansion; while the exposition of Native traits in SLEEMAN'S *Rambles and Recollections*, and in LYALL'S *Asiatic Studies* may be supplemented by the intimate knowledge of Native habits shown in the Indian novels *Tara*, *Seeta*, and *Tippoo Sultan*, by MEADOWS TAYLOR.

To these may be added Sir JOHN KAYE'S *Lives of Indian Officers* (a dozen biographical sketches): COMPTON'S *Lives of the Indian Adventurers* which deals rather with the bye-ways of history: MALLESON'S *Decisive battles of India*, a vigorous but not always accurate piece of work: LEE-WARNER'S *Protected Princes of India*, a work to be consulted only by serious students, but of much value: and some portions of Sir JOHN STRACHEY'S *India*, and Sir GEORGE CHESNEY'S *Indian Polity*, both of which are chiefly concerned with post-mutiny conditions.

Apart from Blue-books and Despatches in general, sundry volumes of selections therefrom will be referred to in connexion with their particular periods. Similarly the volumes of the *Calcutta Review* contain valuable articles on current political and



military topics, and questions of administration, some of which will be especially referred to below.

### B.—SPECIFIC

(The letters R. I. and M. A. mean that a volume belongs to the Rulers of India series, or the Men of Action series, respectively. The purpose of this list is not so much to give a partial list of authorities consulted, or for the verification of facts and opinions given, as to refer the reader to books from which he may gain supplementary information.)

- |                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| Cc. i.-iii.          | ELPHINSTONE'S <i>History</i> .<br>KEENE'S <i>Hindustan</i> .   |
| Ch. ii.              | BABER'S <i>Memoirs</i> : translated by Erskine<br>and Leyden.<br><i>Babar</i> (R. I.).<br><i>Akbar</i> (R. I.).  |
| Ch. iii.             | <i>Aurangzib</i> (R. I.).  |
| Ch. iv.              | W. W. HUNTER: <i>History of British India</i> ,<br>vols. i., ii.<br><i>Albuquerque</i> (R. I.).<br>MALLESON: <i>The French in India</i> .<br>„ <i>Dupleix</i> (R. I.).   |
| Ch. v.               | BERNIER'S <i>Travels</i> (Ed. Constable).  |
| Ch. vi.              | MALLESON: <i>Dupleix</i> .   |
| Ch. vi., vii.        | ORME'S (Robert) <i>Military Operations in<br/>Industan</i> .   |
| Ch. vi., vii., viii. | MACAULAY: <i>Essay on Clive</i> .<br>WILSON: <i>Clive</i> (M. A.)  |
| Cc. ix., x           | MACAULAY: <i>Essay on Warren Hastings</i> .<br>LYALL: <i>Warren Hastings</i> (M. A.)<br>TROTTER: <i>Warren Hastings</i> .<br>STRACHEY: <i>Hastings and the Rohilla War</i> .<br>STEPHEN: <i>The story of Nuncomar and<br/>Impey</i> .<br>G. W. FORREST: <i>The Administration of<br/>Warren Hastings; Selections from Letters<br/>and Despatches, 1772-1775</i> .<br><i>Madhava Rao Sindhia</i> (R. I.).<br><i>Haidar Ali</i> (R. I.). |
| Ch. xi.              | <i>Cornwallis</i> (R. I.).   |



- Cc. xii., xiii. . . . *Wellesley* (R. I.).  
 PEARCE : *Life of Wellesley*.  
 OWEN : *Selection from Wellesley's Despatches*.
- Ch. xv. . . . *Lord Hastings* (R. I.).  
*Diary of Lord Hastings in India* (Ed. LADY BUTE).
- Ch. xvi. . . . *Lord Amherst* (R. I.).
- Cc. xvii., xviii., xix. *Cornwallis* (R. I.).  
 ARBUTHNOT, *Sir T. Munro* [Minutes and Reports of Sir T. Munro, with an Introduction].  
*Sir T. Munro* (R. I.).  
 COLEBROOKE : *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone*.  
*Elphinstone* (R. I.).  
*Lord W. Bentinck* (R. I.).  
 KAYE : *History of the Administration of the E.I.C.*  
 KAYE : *Life of Lord Metcalfe*.  
 „ *Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. i.  
 MAYNE : *Village Communities*.
- Cc. xx., xxi. . . . *Ranjit Singh* (R. I.).  
*Auckland* (R. I.).  
 CUNNINGHAM : *History of the Sikhs*.  
 GOUGH (Sir C.) : *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*.  
 KAYE : *Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. ii.  
 „ *History of the Afghan War*.
- Ch. xxii. . . . GOLDSMID : *Life of Sir James Outram*.  
 NAPIER : *Life of Sir Charles Napier*.
- Ch. xxiii. . . . *Hardinge* (R. I.).  
 BROADFOOT : *The Career of Major Broadfoot*.  
 LAWRENCE (Henry) : *The Administration of Lord Hardinge* (*Calcutta Review*, vol. viii.).  
 GOUGH (Sir C.) : *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*.  
 INNES (Gen. M'Leod) : *Henry Lawrence*.  
 CUNNINGHAM : *History of the Sikhs*.
- Ch. xxiv. . . . GOUGH (Sir C.) : *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*.



- EDWARDES (Herbert) : *A Year on the Panjab Frontier.*  
 Lady EDWARDES : *Life of Sir Herbert Edwardes.*  
 SHADWELL : *Life of Lord Clyde.*  
 THACKWELL : *The Second Sikh War.*  
 DURAND : *Life of Sir H. M. Durand.* (Vol. ii. Essays and Minutes.)  
*Dalhousie* (R. I.).  
 Ch. xxv. . . *Dalhousie* (R. I.).  
 TROTTER : *Dalhousie.*  
 xxvi. . . TEMPLE (Sir R.) : *Thomason.*  
 MACPHERSON : *Memorials of Service in India.*  
*Dalhousie* (R. I.).  
 DALHOUSIE : *Minute of Feb. 28, 1856.*  
 xxvii., xxviii., xxix. KAYE and MALLESON : *History of the Indian Mutiny.*  
 INNES (Gen. M'Leod) : *The Sepoy Revolt.*  
 " " *Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny.*  
 FORREST (G. W.) : *Selections from the letters and dispatches in the Military Dept. 1851-8.*  
 Canning (R. I.).

(For the Mutiny, there are innumerable biographies dealing with portions or aspects : *c.g.* of Colin Campbell, Havelock, Outram, Nicholson, the Lawrences ; Reminiscences, as those of Lord Roberts, Lady Inglis, Hoimes, Maude, etc. It is impossible to produce a working list. There is something to be learnt from nearly all such books. The first on the list, Kaye and Malleson, treats the whole story in great detail ; though the personal predilection of the authors are given considerable scope. The two next are markedly careful and accurate, but concise, the work of an actor in the drama ; the fourth is a selection of official documents ; and the last contains a lucid summary of the political aspects of the episode, and of the policy of the Governor-General.)



## GLOSSARY

OF INDIAN TERMS, AND PHRASES LIKELY TO BE MET WITH, EITHER  
IN THIS VOLUME OR IN WORKS USED FOR REFERENCE

(Where the modern spelling is given, and the reader may be doubtful as to pronunciation, the vowels are marked long or short—ā, ă.)

**ADĀLAT** or **ADAWLUT**: court of justice. *Sadr Adalat* or *Sudder Adawlut*=supreme court.

**AFGHĀNS**: (1) present inhabitants of Afghanistan; (2) Indian Mussulmans of Afghan descent.

**AGENT**: title of the British representative at the protected or semi-independent courts: except the most important, where the official is termed a Resident.

**AMIL** or **AWMIL**: one of the titles for Revenue collectors under the Native rulers.

**AMĪR**: lord, chief; a Mohammedan title; also appearing as *Emir* and *Mir*. Appropriated in particular by the rulers of Sindh, and by Dost Mohammed and his successors at Kabul.

**ANA, ANNA**: a small coin= $\frac{1}{4}$  of a rupee; formerly reckoned as equivalent to 1½d.

**BABOO**: originally a title of respect, very much like Master or Mr. Being particularly affected by the class of clerks in Lower Bengal, it is now used in common parlance to denote a member of that class.

**BADMASH, BUDMASH**: a rogue.

**BAHĀDUR**: champion. A title implying distinction in battle.

**BATTA**: extra allowances beyond the pay originally fixed for

military officers, granted on a regular scale. The *batta* came to be regarded as an actual right; and reduction to "half-batta" was a serious grievance.

**BAZAAR**: the market, the streets in which the natives buy and sell. "Bazaar rumours," the common talk in the streets.

**BEGUM**: princess, especially the daughter, wife or widow of a monarch.

**CANARESE**: a pre-Aryan dialect spoken in parts of the N.W. Dekhan.

**CHAUTH** or **CHOUR**: the tribute demanded by the Marathas, amounting to one fourth of the revenues of the district in which it was levied.

**CHUPATTY**: a sort of flat cake, the common food in Hindostan.

**COLLECTOR**: the District head of the Revenue department.

**COMMISSIONER**: governor of a province. *Chief Commissioner*, governor of the greater provinces which have not been raised to Lt. Governorships.

**COOLY**: labourer. Probably derived from the race-name *Koli* of tribes in the N.W. Ghats.

**CRORE**: 10,000,000; used as the equivalent of a "million sterling" in the old calculations which



- reckoned 10 rupees to the sovereign. So a *lac* or *lakh* = 100,000 rupees = £10,000; or 1/10 of a crore.
- CUTCHA**: not genuine—the opposite of *pukka*; the nearest general equivalent would be “shoddy.”
- CUTCHERRY**: administrative office, or court-house.
- DACOIT** or **DAKAIT**: member of a gang of professional robbers.
- DAK** or **DAWK**: post or transport, by means of relays of carriers established at definite points. Hence *Dak-bungalow*, the equivalent of a posting inn.
- DARBĀR** or **DURBAR**: (1) the court and council of a monarch. (2) A Court function.
- DAROGA**: local head-constable or Chief of Police.
- DECCAN** or **DEKHAN**: (1) India south of the Nerbadda; (2) in a more restricted sense, the Nizam's dominions.
- DEEN** or **DĪN**: the Faith, i.e. Islam; the slogan of Moslem fanaticism.
- DEWĀN** or **DIWĀN**: head of the exchequer. So **DIWANI** = revenue administration.
- DŌĀB**: the land between two rivers above their confluence, “Mesopotamia.” “The Doab” *par excellence* is that between the Ganges and the Jamna.
- DURBAR**: see **DARBĀR**.
- FACTORY**: a trading establishment of the East India Company.
- FAKĒR** or **FAKĪR**: a Mohammedan devotee or fanatic.
- FERINGHI**: a European—the name being derived from the Arab form of the term “Frank” applied especially to the Portuguese, but also to the British when a certain measure of hostility or contempt is intended to be conveyed.
- FIRMAN**: an imperial decree.
- FIVE RIVERS**: land of the; the Panjab, between the Indus and the Satlej.
- GENTILE** or **GENTOO**: the old terms for the Hindus, as distinguished from the Mohammedans who were spoken of as “Moors” or “Moormen” and sometimes as “Moguls.”
- GHAZIS**: Mohammedan fanatics.
- GRANTH** or **GRUNTH**: the Scriptures of the Sikh sect.
- GURU**: prophet, religious leader. A term of special prominence among the Sikhs. The first Guru was the founder of the sect, Nanuk; the tenth in succession, and the last, was Govind Singh, who gave the Sikh institutions their final authoritative form.
- HAVILDĀR**: a non-commissioned officer in a native regiment.
- HINDI**: the purest of the dialects descended from Sanskrit.
- HINDOSTAN**: (1) All India. (2) India north of the Nerbadda, as opposed to the Dekhan (*q.v.*) or India south of the Nerbadda. (3) Hindostan proper, i.e. Northern India exclusive of the Panjab and of Behar and Bengal.
- HINDOSTANI**: (1) an inhabitant of Hindostan proper (*v.s.*). (2) a dialect, otherwise called Urdu, of which the chief components are Hindi and Persian; which grew up in the mixed camps of the Mogul armies, becoming a sort of *lingua franca* or general medium of communication.
- HOKAM**: an order.
- IKBAL**: luck, “star.”
- INTERLOPER**: the name applied to unlicensed traders in the days of the East India Company's monopoly.
- JAGHIR** or **JAGĒR**: an estate



- granted rent-free on condition of military service; usually but not necessarily continued to the successors of the grantee on payment of fines or fees. Hence **JAGHIRDAR**, the holder of a *jaghir*.
- JEMMADAR**: a native officer in a sepoy regiment.
- KHALSA**: the Sikh body in its aspect as a military brotherhood; the Sikh regiments of the army of the Panjab state.
- KHĀN**: chief, lord; a Mohammedan title, commonly borne by commanders. When a *Khan* possessed himself of a crown, he took the title of Shah instead: e.g. Ahmed Khan Durani became Ahmed Shah, and Nadir Khan became Nadir Shah.
- LAC** or **LAKH**=100,000: hence usually for a *lakh of rupees*=£10,000.
- LAT-SAHIB** or **LORD-SAHIB**: native title for the Governor-General.
- MAHARĀJA**: a Hindu title=great king, or king of kings: later, the high title of honour granted to Hindu princes by the Emperor or the British.
- MASNAD** or **MUSNUD**: the royal cushion or throne.
- MĪR**: see **AMIR**.
- MISL**: the great Sikh body was a combination of smaller groups or confederacies called *Misls*.
- MOFUSSIL**: the country districts, as distinguished from the cities.
- MOGUL**: (1) title of the emperors of the house of Baber; (2) Mussulmans other than Hindu converts or those of Afghan descent; (3) the **MUGHAL** division of the Tartar race; the origin of both the other applications of the term.
- MOHĀRRAM**: an annual period of fasting among the Mohammedans, accompanied by great religious excitement.
- MOHUR**: the standard gold coin of India, of the approximate value of 15 rupees.
- MONSOON**: the periodical south-west wind blowing generally from May onwards; also used for the N.E. trade wind, blowing in October and November.
- MOONSHEE**: secretary, or tutor.
- MOOR** or **MOORMEN**: the name used by old writers for the Indian Mussulmans.
- MOULVIE**: a Mohammedan doctor or professor of the Law.
- MUG**: the name used by the British for the people of Arakan.
- MULLAH** or **MOLLAH**: the same as **MOULVIE**.
- MUSNUD**: see **MASNAD**.
- MUSSULMAN**: Mohammedan. Apparently corrupted from *Musliman* the plural of *Moslem* or *Muslim*.
- NABOB**: a corruption, (1) formerly used for *Nawab* (*q.v.*) as equivalent to Potentate; (2) hence applied to Europeans who returned from India with long purses and Oriental habits.
- NĀWĀB** or **NUWAB**: a Deputy, or nominally subordinate governor of a Province of the Mogul Empire, e.g. Oudh, Bengal, the Carnatic. It seems in fact to have been originally a plural of **NAIB**=deputy in the same way that *Omrah* came to be used as=chief or lord, from being originally a plural of *Amir*.
- NAIK**: chief, not a title of the first rank. Haidar Ali was known as Haidar *Naik* before he made himself Sultan of Mysore.
- NULLAH**: the bed of a stream, whether dry or running.
- NUZZUR**: a gift, fine, or benevolence from a feudal inferior.
- OMRAH**: chief or lord. Properly,



the plural of Amir, *q.v.* A Mohammedan title.

**PADDY** field : rice field.

**PADISHAH**, or **FADSHAH** : the great King. A title reserved to the Mogul, but bestowed latterly by the British on the king of Oudh.

**PAGODA** : (1) a Hindu Buddhist temple ; (2) more rarely, an idol ; (3) a coin, generally but not always gold.

**PANCHAYET** or **PUNCHAYET** : a committee or council primarily consisting of five members (from *panch*, five), which controlled the affairs of the village communities, with the *Patel* or head-man as its president. Hence applied to other committees, notably those elected by the *Khalsa* (*q.v.*) regiments formed on the same analogy.

**PANDIT** or **PUNDIT** : a man of learning, the Hindu equivalent of the Mohammedan Moulvie.

**PANDY** : the name commonly applied to the Mutiny sepoys. *Pāndē* is the name of a Brahmin caste which supplied a large proportion of the recruits from the Upper Provinces in the Bengal army : hence applied generally to the Hindostani sepoys.

**PANJAB**, **PUNJAB**, or **PUNJAUB** : (1) the country lying in the triangle formed by the Indus, the Satlej, and the Kashmir mountains ; literally *Panch-ab*, the Five Waters (*cf.* Doab, the land between two waters), watered in fact by six rivers—Indus, Jhilum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, Satlej ; authorities differing as to which of the six is excluded, whether on account of size or of position. The Panjab was organised as a State by Ranjit Singh. (2) For administrative purposes, the name is extended to embrace a province of the British System which includes Delhi on the E. and Peshawar

on the W. (3) A portion of this province (trans-Indus) has in 1901 been incorporated in a new "frontier" province and is no longer part of the official Panjab.

**PARSEE** : Persian sun-worshippers who formed and maintain a separate community.

**PATĒL** : the headman of a village community. Madhava Rao Sindhia with mock humility called himself—and was generally called—the *Patel*. The pronunciation is shown by the common spelling, *Potail*, of pre-mutiny writers.

**PĀTHĀN** : (1) name of the N.W. frontier tribesmen ; (2) equivalent to *Afghan*, an Indian Mussulman of the stock deriving from Afghanistan ; (3) specifically, of the Mussulman robber companies associated with the Pindaris, whose most famous chief was Amir Khan.

**PEISHWA** or **PESHWA** : primarily, the title of a minister of the Maratha heirs of Sivaji. The office became hereditary in the family of the Brahmin Balaji Wiswanath, the Peshwas absorbing the supremacy in the Maratha confederacy, while the representative of Sivaji became a *roi fainéant*.

**PEON** : chiefly in use in S. India ; (sometimes) for a foot-soldier ; an orderly, or a member of the police.

**PERGUNNAH** : sub-division of a District or *Zillah*.

**PERMANENT SETTLEMENT** : the *zemindari* land settlement of Bengal made by Lord Cornwallis, fixing in perpetuity the amount of the rent or land-tax payable by the *zemindaris*.

**PERWANNA** or **PURWANNA** : an official order.

**PESHCUSH** : fee, fine, or quit-rent.

**PINDĀRI** : a class of free-booters, mainly Maratha, who developed into an army of marauders, in



conjunction with the organized bands of Pathans. The most celebrated chiefs of the two hodies were Amir Khan, and Chitu. Their head-quarters were in Central India, N. of the Nerbadda.

**POLIGAR**: title of estate-holders in the Madras Presidency.

**POLITICAL**: applied only to "foreign" affairs. The "Political" Department is the Department for foreign affairs, and "politicals" the officers engaged thereon.

**POTAIL**: *see* **PATEL**.

**PUCKA**: genuine, hall-marked, the opposite of *cutcha*.

**PUNDIT**: *see* **PANDIT**.

**PUNJAB**: *see* **PANJAB**.

**PURDAH**: the curtain, secluding the women of the household.

**RAJA**: a Hindu title, originally equivalent to "king," with Maharaja as a sort of superlative. The head of any Rajput clan was a Raja. The Moguls granted the title to sufficiently important Hindu zemindars or chiefs. "Prince" is perhaps the nearest equivalent. RAIS and RANA are variants: so is the RAO common among Maratha names.

**RANA**: the form of *Raja* appropriated by the chief of Udaipur, in Rajputana.

**RANI**: Queen or Princess: feminine of Raja.

**RAYAT** or **RYOT**: an actual cultivator of the soil. Hence **RYOT-WARI SETTLEMENT**, a revenue settlement under which the collector levies the government rent or land-tax from the cultivator, direct, without intervention of a superior land-holder.

**RESIDENCY**: the quarters of the Resident (*q.v.*).

**RESIDENT**: the accredited representative of the British at the greater protected or semi-independent courts.

**RUPEE**: a silver coin, reckoned as worth two shillings or one-tenth of a pound sterling, until the depreciation of recent years. A *lakh* = 100,000 R $\text{₹}$  = £10,000. A *Crore* = 10,000,000 R $\text{₹}$  = £1,000,000.

**RYOT**: *see* **RAYAT**.

**SADR** or **SUDDER**: supreme: esp. the *Sadr Adalat* or Supreme Court.

**SAHIB**: title of respect, gentleman: applied generally to the British.

**SATI**: dedicated; specifically, a widow dedicated to self-immolation, on her husband's funeral-pyre. The custom was peculiar to Hindus. More commonly written *Suttee*.

**SEIAD**: a Mohammedan of a family claiming descent from the Prophet.

**SEPOY**: a native soldier in the British service. Also written **SIPAHI**.

**SHAH**: Mohammedan equivalent of king.

**SHAHZADA**: heir-apparent.

**SHASTER**: the Hindu sacred writings. **SHASTRI**, a professor of the Hindu Law.

**SHIA**: name of one of the two great sects of the Mohammedan body. The Persian "Sofy," and the Mussulman kings of the Dekhan were Shias. The Moguls belonged to the opposition sect of **SUNNIS**.

**SHIKARI**: hunter.

**SIKHS**: originally a religious sect of "reformed" Hindus, founded by Nanuk: who gradually became formed into a semi-religious semi-military community, and acquired the control of the Panjab and Sirhind. *Sikh* = disciple.

**SINGH**: lion. A common name among Rajputs, adopted universally by all **SIKHS**; who in the literature of the Panjab wars are often referred to as the "*Singhs*."



**SIPĀHI** : *see* SEPOY.

**SIRDAR** : officer, chief, lord.

**SIRKAR** or **SIRCAR** : (1) the supreme Government ; (2) the Eastern districts of the Dekhan ; also spelt *Circar* and *Sarkar*.

**SOFY** : the European corruption of *Safavi*, the name of a Persian dynasty.

**SUBAH** : (1) a province ; (2) used for **SUBADAR**, the governor of a province. Thus the Nizam was also called *Subadar* of the Dekhan. In regimental language, the *Subadar* is the highest grade of native officer.

**SUDDER** : *see* SADR.

**SUNNI** : *see* SHIA.

**SUNNUD** or **SANNAD** : a patent from Government.

**SUTTEE** : *see* SATI.

**TALUKDAR** : a landed proprietor ; a term in use in Hindostan. Hence, **TALUKDARI SETTLEMENT** ; a revenue settlement under which the land-tax or government rent is levied from the *talukdars* without intervention of a superior *zemindar*.

**TAMIL** : a pre-Aryan language, spoken in parts of the Dekhan.

**TELUGU** : a pre-Aryan language, spoken in parts of the Dekhan.

**THUGGEE** or **THAGI** : the occupation of the THUGS, or THAGS, tribes of professional hereditary murderers.

**URDU** : the language of the camp, *i.e.* *Hindustani* (*q.v.*).

**VAKIL** or **VAKEEL** : secretary ; or member of a minor embassy or deputation.

**VEDAS** : the sacred books of the Hindus.

**VIZIER** or **WAZIR** : chief minister.

**WRITER** : junior clerk in the service of the K.E.I.C.

**ZEMINDAR** : landed proprietor ; **ZEMINDARI** : the office or the estate of a *zemindar*. Hence, **ZEMINDARI SETTLEMENT** ; a revenue settlement under which the land-tax or government rent is levied from the *zemindars*.

**ZENANA** : the women's apartments ; hence the women of the household.

**ZILLAH** : a revenue district.



## INDEX TO MAPS

THE numbers are those of the maps on which the entries are to be found. Places marked on the general map (I.) have also letters showing their position on that map.

Places which the student is likely to find mentioned in other works, with a spelling materially differing from that in the text or on the map, are entered in both forms in the index.

Afghanistan . . . . .	1Aa, 2.	Bandelkhand (Bun- } delcund) . . . . .	1Ed, 5, 7.
Agra . . . . .	1Dc, 2, 5, 7.	Bangalur . . . . .	1Dh, 3.
Ahmedabad . . . . .	1Cd, 5.	Bannu (Bunnoo) . . . . .	1Ca, 6.
Ahmednagar . . . . .	1Cf, 5.	Bardwan (Burdwan) . . . . .	1Gd, 4.
Ajmir . . . . .	1Cc, 5, 7.	Barech . . . . .	7.
Aligarh . . . . .	1Dc, 5, 7.	Barcilly . . . . .	7.
Aliwal . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Baroch (Broach) . . . . .	1Ce, 5.
Allahabad . . . . .	1Fd, 4, 7.	Baroda . . . . .	1Ce, 5.
Almora . . . . .	7.	Basherat-Ganj (Bushi- } erut Gunge) . . . . .	7.
Amballa (Umballa) . . . . .	1Db, 6, 7.	Bassein . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Ambur . . . . .	3.	Beas R. . . . .	6.
Amirkot (Ummercote) . . . . .	1Bd.	Beejapore (Bijapur) . . . . .	1Df.
Amrawati . . . . .	5.	Behar . . . . .	1Fd, 2, 4.
Amritsar (Umritsar) . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Bellary (Ballari) . . . . .	1Dg.
Arakan . . . . .	1He, 2.	Benares . . . . .	1Fd, 4, 7.
Aravali Hills . . . . .	2.	Bengal . . . . .	1Gd, 2, 4.
Arcoi . . . . .	1Fh, 3.	Berar . . . . .	1De, 2, 5.
Angon . . . . .	1De, 5.	Bhartpur (Burtpore) . . . . .	1De, 5, 7.
Arni . . . . .	1Fh, 3.	Bhawalpore (Baha- } walpur) . . . . .	1Ce, 6.
Arrah . . . . .	7.	Rhopal . . . . .	1Dd, 5, 7.
Atlas . . . . .	1Cc, 5.	Bhotan . . . . .	1Gc, 4.
Asirgarh . . . . .	5.	Bijapur (Beejapore) . . . . .	1Df.
Assam . . . . .	1He, 2, 4.	Bikanir . . . . .	1Cc.
Assaye . . . . .	1Dc, 5.	Biluchistan . . . . .	1Ac, 2, 6.
Attok . . . . .	1Ca.	Bithur . . . . .	7.
Aurangabad . . . . .	1Df, 5.	Boad . . . . .	1Fe.
Ava . . . . .	1e.	Bolan Pass . . . . .	6.
Azingarh . . . . .	7.	Bombay . . . . .	1Cf, 2, 5.
Bahawalpur (Bhawal } pore) . . . . .	1Cc, 6.	Boondce (Bundi) . . . . .	5.
Bag Baj (Budge Budge) . . . . .	4.	Brahmaputra R. (Bur- } rampooter) . . . . .	1He, 2, 4.
Baksar (Buxar) . . . . .	1Fd, 4.	Broach (Baroch) . . . . .	1Ce, 5.
Bellari (Bellari) . . . . .	1Dg, 3.		
Bombay . . . . .	1Ba, 6.		



Budge Budge (Baj Baj)	4.	Circars (Sarkars)	1H, 2.
Bundelcund (Bandel- khand)	1Ed, 5, 7.	Cochin	3.
Bundi (Boonde)	5.	Coimbatore (Koim- batur)	3.
Bunnou (Bannu)	1Ca, 6.	Comorin, Cape	1Di, 3
Buranpur (Burham- pore)	1Dc, 5.	Concans (Konkans)	1Cf, 5.
Burdwan (Bardwan)	1Gd, 4.	Conjeveram	3.
Burrumpooter R. (Brahmaputra)	1Hc, 2, 4.	Coorg (Kurg)	1Dh, 3.
Burma	1Ie, 2.	Coromandel Coast	3.
Burtpore (Bhartpur)	1Dc, 5, 7.	Cotah (Kotah)	1Dd, 5.
Busherat Gunge (Bas- herat Ganj)	7.	Coveripak (Kaveri- pak)	1Ek.
Buxar (Baksar)	1Fd, 4.	Cuddalore (Gudalur)	1Ek, 3.
Cabul (Kabul)	1Ba, 2, 6.	Currachee (Karachi)	1Ad.
Cachar (Kachar)	1Hd.	Cutch (Katch)	1Ed.
Calcutta	1Ge, 2, 4.	Cutwah (Katwah)	4.
Calicut (Kalikat)	1Dh, 3.	Dadar	1Bb, 6.
Calpee (Kalpi)	1Ed, 7.	Dakka	1Hd, 4.
Candahar (Kandahar)	1Ab, 2, 6.	Delhi	1Dc, 2, 5, 6, 7.
Candeish (Kandesh)	1Ce, 5.	Derajat	1Bb, 6.
Canouj (Kanouj)	1Ec.	Devikota	1Ek, 3.
Carical (Karikal)	1Ek, 3.	Dholpur	5.
Carnatic	1Dh, 2, 3.	Dindigul	3.
Cashmere (Kashmir)	1Da, 2.	Dinapur	7.
Cauvery R. (Kaveri)	1Dh, 2, 3.	Doab, The	7.
Cauveripack (Kaveri- pak)	1Ek, 3.	Emamgur (Imamgarh)	1Br.
Cawnpore (Kahnpur)	1Ec, 4, 7.	Faizabad (Fyzabad)	7.
Ceylon	1Ei, 2, 3.	Fatehpur (Futteypore)	7.
Chambal R. (Chum- bul)	1Dd, 2, 5, 7.	Ferozepore (Firozpur)	1Cb, 6.
Chandairi (Chundey- ree)	7.	Ferozeshah (Firoz- shah)	1Cb, 6.
Chandernagar (Chun- dernagore)	1Ge, 4.	Ferruckabad (Firak- abad)	5.
Chenab R.	1C, 6.	Fort St David	1Ek, 3.
Chengalpat (Chingle- put)	3.	Fulta	4.
Chillianwalla	1Cb, 6.	Futteypore (Fatehpur)	7.
Chinsura	1Gd, 4.	Fyzabad (Faizabad)	7.
Chitaldrag	1Dg, 3.	Gandak R.	7.
Chittagong	4.	Gandamak (Gunda- muck)	1Ba, 6.
Chumbul R. (Cham- bal)	1Dd, 2, 5, 7.	Ganges R.	1Gd, 2, 5, 7.
Chunar	4.	Gantur (Guntoor)	1Eg, 3
Chundernagore (Chan- dernagar)	1Ge, 4.	Gawilgarh	5.
Chundeyree (Chan- dairi)	7.	Ghats, E.	2.
		Ghats, W.	2.



Ghazipur . . . . .	7.	Jelum R. (Jhelum) . . . . .	Ca, 6.
Ghazni (Guznee) . . . . .	1Ba, 6.	Jessalmir (Jeysalmeer) . . . . .	1Bc.
Gheriah . . . . .	1Cg.	Jhansi . . . . .	1Dd, 5, 7.
Gorakhpur . . . . .	1Fc, 7.	Jhelum (Jelum) . . . . .	1Ca, 6.
Gingee (Jinji) . . . . .	1Eh, 3.	Jinji (Gingee) . . . . .	1Eh, 3.
Goa . . . . .	1Cg.	Jodhpur . . . . .	1Cc, 5.
Godaveri R. . . . .	1Ef, 2, 5.	Jubbulpore (Jabalpur) . . . . .	1Ee, 4, 5, 7.
Gogari R. (Gogra) . . . . .	1Fc, 7.	Juggernaut (Jaganath) . . . . .	1Fe.
Golconda . . . . .	1Df, 3.	Jummoo (Jammu) . . . . .	1Da, 6.
Goomtee R. (Gumti) . . . . .	1Ed, 4, 7.	Jumna R. (Jamna) . . . . .	{ 1Ed, 2, 4, 5, 7.
Goona (Guna) . . . . .	7.		
Gooty (Guti) . . . . .	1Dg, 3.	Kabul (Cabul) . . . . .	1Ba, 2, 6.
Gorakota . . . . .	7.	Kachar (Cachar) . . . . .	1Hd.
Gudalur (Cuddalore) . . . . .	1Eh, 3.	Kahn timer (Cawnpore) . . . . .	1Ec, 4, 7.
Gujerat (Goojerat) . . . . .	1Ch, 6.	Kalikat (Calicut) . . . . .	1Dh, 3.
— . . . . .	1Cd, 2, 6.	Kalpi (Calpee) . . . . .	1Ed, 7.
Gumti R. (Goomtee) . . . . .	1Ed, 4, 7.	Kananur . . . . .	3.
Guna (Goona) . . . . .	7.	Kanauj (Canouj) . . . . .	1Ec.
Gundamuck (Ganda- mak) . . . . .	1Ba.	Kandahar (Candahar) . . . . .	1Ab, 2, 6.
Guntoor (Gantur) . . . . .	1Eg, 3.	Kandesh (Candeish) . . . . .	1Ce, 5.
Guti (Gooty) . . . . .	1Dg, 3.	Karachi (Currachee) . . . . .	1Ad.
Guznee (Ghazni) . . . . .	1Ba, 6.	Karikal (Carical) . . . . .	1Eh, 3.
Gwalior . . . . .	1Dd, 2, 5, 7.	Kashmir (Cashmere) . . . . .	1Da, 2, 6.
		Katch (Cutch) . . . . .	1Bd.
Haidarabad (Hydera- bad) . . . . .	{ 1Df, 2, 3.	Katmandhu . . . . .	1Fc, 4.
— . . . . .	1Bd.	Kathiawar . . . . .	1Be.
Hazara . . . . .	1Ca.	Katwa (Cutwah) . . . . .	4.
Herat . . . . .	1Aa.	Kaveri R. (Cauvery) . . . . .	1Dh, 2, 3.
Hindur . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Kaveripak (Coveri- pack) . . . . .	{ 1Eh, 3.
Hissar . . . . .	7.	Kelat . . . . .	1Ab, 2, 6.
Hugli . . . . .	4.	Kelat-i-Ghilzai . . . . .	1Bb.
Hugli R. (Hooghley) . . . . .	1Gd, 4.	Kerauli . . . . .	1Dc, 5, 6, 7.
Hugri R. . . . .	3.	Khaibar Pass (Khyber) . . . . .	6.
Hyderabad, <i>see</i> Haidarabad		Khairpur (Kyrpore) . . . . .	1Bc.
		Khatmandu . . . . .	1Fc, 4.
Imamgarh (Emamgur) . . . . .	1Bc.	Khistna R. (Krishna) . . . . .	1Dg, 2, 3.
Indore (Indur) . . . . .	1De, 5, 7.	Khyber Pass (Khaibar) . . . . .	6.
Indus R. . . . .	1Bc, 2, 6.	Kohat . . . . .	6.
Irawadi R. . . . .	2.	Koimbatour . . . . .	3.
		Kojak Pass . . . . .	6.
Jabalpur (Jubbulpore) . . . . .	1Ee, 4, 5, 7.	Konkans (Concans) . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Jaganath (Juggernaut) . . . . .	1Fe.	Kotah (Cotah) . . . . .	1Dd, 5.
Jalandar (Jullunder) . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Krishna R. (Khistna) . . . . .	1Dg, 2, 3.
Jammu (Jummoo) . . . . .	1Da, 6.	Kumaon . . . . .	1Eb.
Jamna (Jumna) . . . . .	{ 1Ed, 2, 4, 5, 7.	Kurg (Coorg) . . . . .	1Dh, 3.
Jaunpur . . . . .	7.	Kurnal . . . . .	7.
Jeipur (Jeypur) . . . . .	1Dc, 5, 7.	Kyrpore (Kairpur) . . . . .	1Bc.
Jellalabad . . . . .	1Ba, 6.	Lahore . . . . .	1Cb, 2, 6.
		Laswari . . . . .	1Dc, 5.



# INDEX TO MAPS

357

Lucknow . . . . .	1Ec, 2, 4, 7.	Painganga R. (Pen- gunga) . . . . .	5.
Ludhiana . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Panipat . . . . .	1Db, 6.
Madras . . . . .	1Eh, 2, 3.	Panjab . . . . .	1Cb, 2, 6.
Mahanadi R. . . . .	1Ee, 2.	Patiala . . . . .	1Db, 6, 7.
Maharajpur . . . . .	1Dc, 5.	Patna . . . . .	1Fd, 2, 4, 7.
Mahé . . . . .	1Ch, 3.	Pegu . . . . .	1If, 2.
Mahi R. . . . .	5.	Pengunga R. (Pain- gunga) . . . . .	5.
Maisur (Mysore) . . . . .	{ 1Dg, 2, 3; 1Dh, 3.	Peshawar . . . . .	1Ca, 2.
Malabar Coast . . . . .	3.	Phillibit . . . . .	7.
Malwa . . . . .	1Dd, 2, 5.	Plassey . . . . .	1Gd, 4.
Mandalay . . . . .	1Ie.	Pollilur . . . . .	3.
Mangalur . . . . .	1Ch, 3.	Pondichery . . . . .	1Eh, 2, 3.
Mangarwar (Mungar- war) . . . . .	7.	Poonah (Puna) . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Manipur (Munnypore) . . . . .	1Hd.	Porto Novo . . . . .	3.
Masulipatam . . . . .	1Eg, 2, 3.	Prome . . . . .	1If.
Meeanee (Miani) . . . . .	1Bc.	Puna (Poonah) . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Meerut (Mirat) . . . . .	1Dc, 5, 6, 7.	Puniar . . . . .	1Dd, 5.
Mhow (Mhao) . . . . .	7.	Puttiala (Patiala) . . . . .	1Db, 6, 7.
Midnapur . . . . .	1Ge, 4.	Quetta . . . . .	1Bb, 2, 6.
Miani (Mecanee) . . . . .	1Bc.	Raigarh . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Mirat (Meerut) . . . . .	1Dc, 5, 6, 7.	Rajputana . . . . .	{ 1Cc, 2, 5, 6, 7.
Mirpur . . . . .	1Bd.	Ramnagar . . . . .	1Cb, 6.
Moodkee (Mudki) . . . . .	1Dh, 6.	Rampura . . . . .	1Dd, 5.
Mooltan (Multan) . . . . .	1Cb, 6.	Rangoon . . . . .	1If.
Moorshedabad (Mur- shedabad) . . . . .	1Gd, 2, 4.	Rassul (Rusool) . . . . .	1Ca, 6.
Mudki (Moodkee) . . . . .	1Db, 6.	Ravi R. . . . .	1Cb, 6.
Multan (Mooltan) . . . . .	1Cb, 6.	Rewa (Riwa) . . . . .	1Ed, 4, 7.
Mungarwar (Mangar- war) . . . . .	7.	Rohilkhand . . . . .	{ 1Ec, 2, 4, 5, 7.
Munnypore (Manipur) . . . . .	1Hd.	Rusool (Rassul) . . . . .	1Ca, 6.
Murshedabad (Moor- shedabad) . . . . .	1Gd, 2, 4.	Sadulapur . . . . .	1Cb, 6.
Mysore (Maisur) . . . . .	{ 1Dg, 2, 3; 1Dh, 3.	Sagar (Saugur) . . . . .	1Dd, 5, 7.
Nagpur . . . . .	1Ee, 2, 5.	Sakhar (Sukkar) . . . . .	1Bc, 6.
Nasirabad (Nusseera- bad) . . . . .	7.	Salsette . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Negapatam . . . . .	1Eh, 3.	Sarkars (Cirkars) . . . . .	1Ff, 2.
Nepal . . . . .	1Fe, 2, 4, 7.	Satara (Sattara) . . . . .	1Cf, 5.
Nerbadda R. . . . .	1De, 2, 5, 7.	Satlej (Sutledge) . . . . .	1Cb, 2, 6.
Nimach (Neemuch) . . . . .	7.	Saugur (Sagar) . . . . .	1Dd, 5, 7.
Nusseerabad (Nasira- bad) . . . . .	7.	Scinde (Sindh) . . . . .	1Bc, 2, 6.
Oodeypore (Udaipur) . . . . .	1Cd, 2, 5.	Seetapore (Sitapur) . . . . .	7.
Orissa . . . . .	1Fe, 2, 4.	Seringapatam . . . . .	1Dh, 2, 3.
Oudh . . . . .	1Ec, 2, 4, 7.	Shikarpur . . . . .	1Bc, 6.
		Sikkim . . . . .	1Gc, 4.
		Simla . . . . .	1Db, 6.
		Sindh R. . . . .	5.



## INDEX TO MAPS

Sindh (Scinde) . . .	1Bc, 2, 6.	Trincomali . . .	1Ei, 3.
Sirhind . . .	1Db, 7.	Tumbudra R. (Tan-ghabadra) } . . .	1Dg, 2, 3.
Sirsa . . .	7.		
Sirur . . .	5.		
Sitapur (Seetapore) . . .	7.	Udaipur (Oodeypore) . . .	1Cd, 2, 5.
Sobraon . . .	6.	Umballa (Amballa) . . .	1Db, 6, 7.
Sukkur (Sakhar) . . .	1Bc, 6.	Ummercote (Amirkot) . . .	1Bd.
Suleiman M. . .	2.	Umritsur (Amritsir) . . .	1Db, 6.
Sultampur . . .	4, 7.		
Surat . . .	1Ce, 2, 5.	Vellur . . .	1Ek, 3.
Sutledge R. (Satiej) . . .	1Cb, 2, 6.	Vindhya Hills . . .	2.
		Vizagapatam . . .	1Ff.
Tanghabadra R. (Tumbudra) } . . .	1Dg, 2, 3.	Vizierabad (Wazirabad) } . . .	1Cb, 6.
Tanjore . . .	1Ek, 3.		
Tapti R. . .	1Ce, 2, 5.	Wainganga R. . .	5.
Terai, the . . .	1Ec.	Wandewash . . .	1Ek, 3.
Thatta . . .	1Bd.	Warda R. . .	1De, 2, 5.
Tonk . . .	5.	Wargam . . .	1Cf, 5.
Travancore . . .	1Di, 2, 3.	Wazirabad . . .	1Cb, 6.
Trichinopoli . . .	1Dh, 3.		



## INDEX

- ABBOT, J.**, 264, 269.  
**Abdalis**, 76, 83, 84.  
**Abercrombie, Gen. Robert**, 130, 133.  
**Adam, Mr.**, 179.  
**Adoption**, 280, 304, 331.  
**Afghanistan**, 222-224, 227-233; *see* Kabul.  
**Afghans**, 13, 14.  
**Agitators**, 306.  
**Agnew, Vans**, 266, 267.  
**Agra**, 55, 151, 253, 309, 311, 315, 321.  
**Ahalya Bai**, 147.  
**Ahmed Shah**, 76, 83, 85.  
**Ahmedabad**, 100.  
**Ahmednagar**, 14, 20, 21, 28, 150, 151.  
**Aix-la-chapelle**, 62, 65.  
**Ajmir**, 311.  
**Akbar**, 17-20, 51.  
**Akbar (Prince)**, 27, 32.  
**Akbar Khan**, 2, 1, 243, 245.  
**Ala-ud-din**, 14.  
**Alam Bagh**, 319, 320, 321.  
**Albuquerque**, 39.  
**Alexander the Great**, 6.  
**Aligarh**, 151.  
**Ali Murad**, 248, 249.  
**Ali Vardi Khan**, 36, 62, 76.  
**Aliwal**, 262.  
**Allahabad**, 88, 90, 95, 96, 97, 134, 309, 310, 311, 313, 317.  
**Almora**, 166.  
**Alptegin**, 13.  
**Amar Singh**, 165-167.  
**Amballa**, 259, 306, 310, 311, 314.  
**Ambur**, 66.  
**American war**, 94, 99, 102.  
**Amherst, Lord**, 179-185, 211.  
**Amils**, 197.  
**Amin Chand**, *see* Omichund.  
**Amir (Kabul)**, 229; *see* Dost Mohammed.  
**Amirs of Sindh**, *see* Sindh.  
**Amir Khan**, 147, 158, 162, 163, 166, 169-174.  
**Amirkot**, 250.  
**Amrawati**, 171.  
**Angria**, 71.  
**Anderson**, 267.  
**Annexations and Cessions—**  
     **Allahabad**, 134.  
     **Arakan**, 182.  
     **Assam**, 182.  
     **Bandelkhand**, 161.  
     **Baramahal**, 131.  
     **Benares**, 106, 109, 114.  
     **Carnatic**, 141.  
     **Jalandar**, 262.  
     **Jhansi**, 282.  
     **Kachar**, 186.  
     **Maratha districts**, 151, 174.  
     **Mysore districts**, 131, 140.  
     **Nagpur**, 283.  
     **N.W. Provinces**, 143.  
     **Panjab**, 272, 277.  
     **Pegu**, 276, 277.  
     **Sagar**, 174.  
     **Samhalpur**, 285.  
     **Sarkars**, 90.  
     **Sattara**, 281.  
     **Sindh**, 250.  
     **Surat**, 141.  
     **Tanjur**, 141.  
     **Tenasserim**, 182.  
**Annexation policy**, 277 //.  
**Anson, Gen.**, 314.  
**Anwar-ud-din**, 62, 65, 66.  
**Apa Sahib**, 169-175.  
**Appeal Courts**, 192.  
**Arabs**, 12, 172.  
**Arakan**, 179, 180, 182, 276, 294.



- Arcot, 68, 100, 142, 279, 286; *see* Carnatic.  
 Argaon, 151.  
 Army, 89, 134, 193, 250, 258, 266, 292, 301, 302, 305, 309, 332, 339, 340.  
 Arni, 69.  
 Arrah, 318.  
 Arras, 98.  
 Aryans, 6.  
 Asaf Jah, *see* Nizam.  
 Asaf-ud-daulah, 109, 116.  
 Asingarh, 174.  
 Assam, 179, 182.  
 Assaye, 150.  
 Assessment, 112, 132, 197, 202.  
 Attok, 227, 269, 270.  
 Auckland, Lord, 186, 234-242, 245, 248, 255.  
 Aurangabad, 29, 150.  
 Aurangzib, 18, 22, 24-33, 43, 51.  
 Ava, 179, 182, 274.  
 Avitabile, 226, 230.  
 Azim (Barakzai), 227, 228, 229.  
 Azim Jah, 286.  
 Azimgarh, 313.  
  
**BABER**, 13-17, 19.  
 Bahadur Shah, 30, 34.  
 Bahawalpur, 237, 268.  
 Baillie, Col., 103.  
 Baily Guard, 312.  
 Bairam, 18.  
 Baird, David, 144.  
 Baj-Baj, 77.  
 Baji Rao, *see* Marathas, Peshwa.  
 Baksar, *see* Buxar.  
 Bala Hissar, 239, 240, 245.  
 Balaji Rao, *see* Marathas, Peshwa.  
 Balaji Wiswanath, *see* Marathas, Peshwa.  
 Balban, 13.  
 Bamian, 245.  
 Bandula, 180-182.  
 Bandelkhand, 161.  
 Bangalur, 130.  
 Bannu, 269.  
 Barakzais, 222, 224, 227, 232.  
 Baramahal, 131, 201.  
 Barlow, Sir G., 155, 157-161, 203.  
 Barnard, Gen., 314.  
 Baroch, 151.  
 Baroda, *see* Marathas, Gaikwar.  
 Barrackpur, 183, 307.  
 Barwell, 93, 98, 110.  
 Basharat Ganj, 317, 318.  
 Bassein, 98.  
 Batta, 89.  
 Battles—  
     Aliwal, 262.  
     Ambur, 66.  
     Argaon, 151.  
     Arni, 69.  
     Arras, 98.  
     Assaye, 150.  
     Basherat Ganj, 317, 318.  
     Budhowal, 262.  
     Buxar, 88.  
     Chillianwalla, 270.  
     Chinhat, 312.  
     Daba, 249.  
     Dig, 153.  
     Firozshah, 260, 261.  
     Gujerat, 271.  
     Kaveripak, 69.  
     Kiniri, 268.  
     Kirki, 172.  
     Laswari, 151.  
     Maharajpur, 254.  
     Miani, 249.  
     Mudki, 260.  
     Naval battles, 94, 105, 112, 137, 156.  
     Panipat, 16, 18, 83, 84.  
     Plassey, 80.  
     Pollilur, 104.  
     Porto Novo, 104.  
     Puniar, 254.  
     Ramnagar, 269.  
     Saddusam, 268.  
     Sadulapur, 270.  
     Sikri, 17.  
     Sitabaldi, 172.  
     Sobraon, 262.  
     Solingarh, 104.  
     Tezin, 245.  
     Wandewash, 73.  
 Beejanuggur, 14.  
 Beejapore, *see* Bijapur.  
 Begum of Oudh (a) 109, 116; (b) 310, 313.  
     Mani B., 108, 110.  
 Benares, 106, 109, 114, 309, 313, 317.



- Bengal, 5, 41, 44, 71, 75 ff., 87 ff., 198, 292.  
 Bengal sepoy, *see* Hindostanis.  
 Benthamism, 203.  
 Bentinck, Lord W., 159, 179, 185, 186, 203, 211, 213, 215, 237, 289.  
 Berar, 151, 285; *see* Marathas, Bhonsla.  
 Bernier, F., 51, 55, 56.  
 Bhairawal, 263.  
 Bhamani dynasty, 14.  
 Bhartpur, 153, 183-185.  
 Bhawalpore, *see* Bahawalpur.  
 Bhils, 214.  
 Bhonsla, *see* Marathas, Bhonsla.  
 Bhopal, 100, 168, 170.  
 Bhyrowal, 263.  
 Bijanagar, 14.  
 Bijapur, 14, 20, 21, 28-33.  
 Biluchis, 264.  
 Biluchistan, 222, 229, 237, 248.  
 Bird, R. M., 203.  
 Bithur, 306.  
 Black Hole, the, 76.  
 Board of Control, 124, 189, 331.  
 Bod, 290.  
 Bolan Pass, 222, 237.  
 Bombay, 42, 98, 99, 103, 106, 201.  
 Boondie, *see* Bundi.  
 Boscawen, Adm., 64.  
 Boughton, 41.  
 Bourquin, 151.  
 Boyle, Vicars, 3-8.  
 Brahmaputra, 179.  
 Brahmins, 8, 27, 194, 252, 301.  
 Broach, *see* Baroch.  
 Brasyer, 311.  
 Brathwaite, 104.  
 Broadfoot, 243, 259.  
 Bruce, 103, 106.  
 Buddhism, 9.  
 Budge Budge, *see* Raj Raj.  
 Budhowal, 262.  
 Buffer-state, 234.  
 Buildings, 23, 55.  
 Bundelcund, *see* Bandelkhand.  
 Bundi, 158.  
 Bunnoo, *see* Bannu.  
 Burhampur, 100.  
 Burke, E., 92, 117, 337.  
 Burma, 179-182, 274-276, 305.  
 Burnes, A., 234, 235, 239, 240.  
 Burtpore, *see* Bhartpur.  
 Busherut Gunj, *see* Basherat Ganj.  
 Bussy, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 79, 84, 105.  
 Bute, Lord, 91.  
 Buxar, 88, 144.  
 CABUL, *see* Kabul.  
 Cachar, *see* Kachar.  
 Calcutta, 43, 327.  
 Calliaud, 87.  
 Calpee, *see* Kalpi.  
 Campbell, Sir A., 181.  
 Campbell, Sir Colin, Lord Clyde, 320, 321.  
 Canals, 216, 288, 294.  
 Canara, 201.  
 Cananore, *see* Kananur.  
 Candahar, *see* Kandahar.  
 Candeish, *see* Kandesh.  
 Canning, George, 168, 177, 179.  
 Canning, Lord, 299, 304, 322, 326, 328, 340-342.  
 Canouj, *see* Kanauj.  
 Cape Route, 39.  
 Carnac, 88.  
 Carnatic, Nawabs of, 62-74, 100, 141, 142, 279, 286.  
 Cartridge Incident, 306, 324, 325.  
 Cashmere, *see* Kashmir.  
 Caste, 8, 181, 194, 251, 275, 303, 305, 306.  
 Castlereagh, 179.  
 Cawnpore, 309, 311, 312, 313, 316-321, 323, 326.  
 Ceylon, 104, 144.  
 Chambal R., 151, 158, 311.  
 Chamberlain, N., 310.  
 Chanda, 254.  
 Chanda Sahib, 65 ff.  
 Chandairi, 322.  
 Chandernagar, 46, 71, 77.  
 Charter Acts, 40, 44; *see* Parliament.  
 Chatham, Lord, 62, 71, 91, 92.  
 Chattr Singh, 268, 269, 274.  
 Chauth, 31, 35, 90.  
 Chenab R., 269, 270, 271.  
 Cheyt Singh, 115.  
 Chillianwalla, 270.  
 Chinhai, 312.  
 Chinsura, 82.  
 Chitaldrag, 140.



Chittagong, 179, 180, 181.  
 Chitu, 167, 171, 172.  
 Cholera, 171, 317.  
 Chout, *see* Chauth.  
 Chumbul R., *see* Chambal R.  
 Chunar, 115.  
 Chundernagore, *see* Chandernagar.  
 Chundeyree, *see* Chandairi.  
 Circars, *see* Sarkars.  
 Cis-Satlaj Sikhs, 162, 193, 311, 324.  
 Clavering, Gen., 98, 99, 107, 112.  
 Civil Service, 190, 331.  
 Clerk, Sir G., 242, 282.  
 Climate, 5, 183.  
 Clive, Robert—  
   First appearance, 68; at Arcot, 68, 69; at Trichinopoli, 69; returns to England, 71; destroys Angria, 71; recovers Calcutta, 77; Omichund intrigue, 78; the two treaties, 79; advance to Plassey, 79; the battle, 80; conduct as victor, 81; sends Forde to Sarkars, 73, 81; foils invasion, 81; his jaghir, 82; Dutch episode, 82; goes home, 82; return (in '65), 85, 88; reforms, 89; suppresses mutiny, 89; policy to Delhi and Oudh, 90; accepts Diwani, 90; final retirement, 90; character and work, 91; miscellaneous, 92, 93, 95, 117, 284.  
 Clive, Lord (Madras), 142.  
 Clyde, Lord, *see* Campbell, Sir C.  
 Coalition Ministry, 122.  
 Codification of Laws, 132.  
 Coimbatore, *see* Koimbatour.  
 Coke, 273, 291.  
 Colbert, 42.  
 Collectors, 132, 191.  
 Colleges, 146, 215.  
 Communication, 57, 288, 293, 294, 299.  
 Company, the Hon. East India, 40, 70, 92, 189, 329, 330, 331.  
   — Dutch E. I., 40, 45.  
   — French E. I., 42, 45-47, 70.  
 Concans, *see* Konkans.  
 Control, Board of, 124, 189, 331.  
 Coorg, *see* Kurg.

Coote, Sir Eyre, 73, 79, 80, 88, 104, 105, 112.  
 Corbett, 310.  
 Cornwallis, Lord, 124, 127—  
   Character, 128, 132; the Nizam, 128; letter, 129; independence of action, 129; takes command, 130; retreats, 131; decisive campaign, 131; policy and administration, 132, 137; retirement, 132; refuses reappointment, 135; settlement, 198; return to India, 153, 155, 157; miscellaneous, 137, 188.  
 Cotah, *see* Kotah.  
 Cotton, Sir W., 237, 239.  
 Council (Calcutta), 93, 98, 107 ff., 188, 190.  
 Courts, 110, 113, 191, 192.  
 Coveripack, *see* Kaveripak.  
 Cowley, Lord, *see* Wellesley, H.  
 Crimean War, 302.  
 Cromwell, Oliver, 42, 44.  
 Cuddalore, *see* Gudalur.  
 Currie, Sir F., 265, 267, 268.  
 Cutwah, *see* Katwa.  
 DABA, 249.  
 D'Aché, 72.  
 Dacoity, 209, 211, 213, 288.  
 Dada, the, 251-253.  
 Dadar, 237.  
 Dakka, 294.  
 Dalhousie, Lord—  
   Arrival in India, 265; second Sikh war, 267; annexation of Panjab, 272 ff.; attitude to Sirdars, 272, to Henry Lawrence, 273; Burmese war, 275; views on annexation, 276-279; Sattara Minute, 277; theory of adoption, 280; Sattara, 281; Jhansi, 282; Kerauli, 282; Nagpur, 283, 286; Oudh, 284, 285; treatment of Nizam, 285; Arcot, 286; Nana Sahib, 287; system in Panjab, 291; education, 292; railways, 293; telegraph, 294; public works department, 294; roads, 294; post, 294; retirement, 295; character, 295; miscellaneous, 304, 325.



- Daoodpootras, *see* Bahawalpur.  
 Daulat Rao, *see* Marathas, Sindhia.  
 Davi, 208.  
 Dekhan, 4 *ff.*, 5c.  
 De Boigne, 137, 150.  
 Delhi, 13, 35, 37, 55, 90, 151, 153, 184, 308, 311, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320, 326.  
 Deogaon, 151.  
 Derajat, 227, 264, 267.  
 Derby, Lord, 331.  
 Devikota, 66.  
 Dhian Singh, 257.  
 Dholpur, 253.  
 Dhulip Singh, 257, 264, 272.  
 Dig, 153.  
 Dinapur, 309, 313, 317, 318.  
 Dinkar Rao, 311, 324.  
 Directors, 49, 81, 92, 99, 146, 211, 281.  
 Disaffection, causes of, 300 *ff.*  
 Diwani, 90, 108.  
 Dixon, 214.  
 Doab, the, 143, 151.  
 Dost Ali, 65.  
 Dost Mohammed, 228, 229, 230, 234, 235, 238, 239, 246, 274, 305, 325, 326.  
 Drake, 76.  
 Dumas, 46, 65.  
 Dumdum, 306.  
 Dundas, 117, 123, 124.  
 Dundu Panth, *see* Nana Sahib.  
 Dupleix—  
     Rise of, 37, 62; views of British rivalry, 62; schemes, 63; attacks Madras, 63; tricks Anwar-uddin, 64; supports Native pretenders, 66; thwarted by Clive, 69; his resistance, 70; retirement and disgrace, 70; miscellaneous, 118.  
 Dupleix-Fatehabad, 68.  
 Durand, 321.  
 Duranis, 83, 84, 222, 243.  
 Durjan Sal, 184.  
 Dutch, 40, 42-45, 82, 104.  
 EAST India Company, *see* Company.  
 Education, 215, 288, 292, 303.  
 Edwardes, Herbert, 264, 267, 268, 305, 310, 325.  
 Egypt, 137, 144.  
 Elizabeth, Queen, 40.  
 Ellenborough, Lord, 242-246, 248, 251-255, 288, 293.  
 Ellis (Patna), 88.  
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 161, 169, 172, 176, 201, 202, 223, 237.  
 Elphinstone, Gen., 239, 240.  
 Emamgur, *see* Imamgarh.  
 Enlistment, General Service, 305, 324, 326.  
 England, Gen., 243.  
 Eyre, Vincent, 318.  
 FAIZABAD, 116.  
 Famines, 95, 288.  
 Fanatics, 306.  
 Farokshir, 34, 35, 44.  
 Fateh Khan, 222, 224, 227, 228.  
 Feroze—, *see* Firoz—.



- Ghat Mts., 4.  
 Ghazni, 222, 227, 228, 241, 243, 245.  
 Ghilzais, 36, 239.  
 Gholab Singh, 257, 263, 324, 326.  
 Ghorî dynasty, 13.  
 Ghurkas, 165-167, 321, 323, 324.  
 Gilbert, Sir W., 272.  
 Gillespie, 149, 163, 166.  
 Gingee, *see* Jinji.  
 Goa, 40.  
 Godaverî, 4.  
 Goddard, 100, 103, 106.  
 Godwin, Gen., 276.  
 Gohud, 100.  
 Golconda, 14, 20, 21, 30, 32, 33.  
 Gorakpur, 165.  
 Gough, Lord, 254, 256, 259-263, 267-271.  
 Governor-General, powers of, 93, 188, 190, 331.  
 Govind Singh, 221.  
 Grenville, 91.  
 Grey, Gen., 254.  
 Griffin, 64.  
 Gudalur (Cuddalore), 105.  
 Gujerat (Hindostan), 13, 32.  
 — (Panjab), 271.  
 Gumsur, 289, 290.  
 Gunah, 322.  
 Gundamuk, *see* Gandamak.  
 Guntur Sarkar, 128.  
 Gurkhas, 165-167, 321, 323, 324.  
 Gurus, 220.  
 Gutî, 69, 140.  
 Gwalior, 103, 185, 251-255, 283, 311, 322, 324.  
 — Contingent, 254, 310, 311, 318, 321, 323, 324.  
**HAIDAR ALI—**  
 Rise, 83, 84; progress, 85, 101; quarrels with Madras, 86, 102; invades Carnatic, 100, 102; contest with Coote, 104; death, 105; character, 101; miscellaneous, 128, 140, 200.  
 Haidarabad (Dekhan), 35.  
 — Contingent, 160, 176, 285.  
 Haidarabad (Sindh), 247, 249.  
 Hall, 213.  
 Hamilton, Dr., 44.  
 Harbours, 5, 48, 65.  
 Hardinge, Lord, 254, 56, 259-263, 265, 284, 288.  
 Hansi, 311.  
 Hari Pant, 131.  
 Harlan, 230.  
 Harris, Gen., 139.  
 Hartley, 99, 103, 130.  
 Hastings, Lord, 163—  
 Arrival in India, 164; situation, 164; Ghurka war, 165-167; Pindari troubles, 167; attitude of Marathas, 168, 170; alliances of Hastings, 169, 170; strategic dispositions, 171; Pindari war, 170-174; subsequent treaties, 174, 175; Palmer & Co., 176; character and treatment, 177; miscellaneous, 180, 188, 279.  
 Hastings, Warren—  
 Early career, 87, 96, 107; governor of Bengal, 96; Rohilla war, 97; governor-general, 93; struggle with council, 98, 108-112; the Oudh Begums, 109, 116, 338; Maratha complications, 98 ff.; Diwani, 108, 112, 198; Nuncomar, 110; letter of resignation, 111; contest for Governor-Generalship, 112; contest with High Court, 113; judicial arrangements, 108, 111; Oudh subsidiary alliance, 112; action against Haidar, 104; conduct of foreign affairs, 106; Cheyt Singh, 114, 338; administration, 112; character, 106, 116; impeachment, 116, 337-339; death, 178; miscellaneous, 127, 190, 209.  
 Havelock, Sir H., 243, 306, 312, 316-319, 321.  
 Havelock-Allen, 322.  
 Hazara, 264, 268, 269.  
 Herat, 222, 228, 232, 236, 238, 305.  
 High Court, the, 110, 113.  
 Himalayas, 3.  
 Hindi, 6.  
 Hindostan, 4 ff., 22, 203.  
 Hindostani, 6.  
 Hindostanis, 194, 304, 305, 310, 313, 323, 325, 326.



- Hindu Kush, 238, 245.  
 Hinduism, 6, 8, 181, 252, 280, 303, 306.  
 Hira Singh, 257, 258.  
 Hissar, 311.  
 Hobart, Lord, 137.  
 Hobhouse, Sir J., 237.  
 Hodson, 273.  
 Holkar, *see* Marathas, Holkar.  
 Holland, 40, 43-45, 104.  
 Home, 315.  
 Hornby, 98, 103.  
 Hughes, 105.  
 Hugli, 42.  
 Human sacrifice, 289, 290.  
 Humayun, 17.  
 Hyder—, *see* Haider.  
  
 IMAMGARH, 249.  
 Impey, 109, 112, 113, 114, 132.  
 India Acts, *see* Parliament.  
 India House, 93, 146, 152, 153.  
 Indur, 150, 320, 321.  
 Indus R., 230, 234.  
 Infanticide, 211, 213, 288, 289, 292.  
 Interlopers, 43.  
 Invasions of India—  
     Ahmed Shah, 76, 83, 85.  
     Alexander, 6.  
     Arabs, 12.  
     Aryan, 6.  
     Baber, 14.  
     Ghori, 13, 14.  
     Mahmud of Ghazni, 13.  
     Nadir Shah, 36.  
     Scythian, 6.  
     Tamerlane, 14, 15.  
 Irawadi R., 179, 181, 275.  
 Irrigation, 216, 288, 294.  
  
 JACOB, 306.  
 Jacobitism, 61.  
 Jaghirdars, 197, 278.  
 Jalandar, 262, 266.  
 Jammu, 257.  
 Jamna R. (Jumna), 3, 311, 313, 321.  
 Jamrud, 230.  
 Jang Bahadur, 321.  
 Jats, 9, 183.  
 Java, 163.  
 Jehandar Shah, 34.  
 Jehangir, 20, 41.  
 Jeipur, 25, 158, 185.  
 Jellalabad, 240-244.  
 Jelum R., *see* Jhilum R.  
 Jenghis Khan, 15.  
 Jenkins, R., 172, 173, 174, 176, 283.  
 Jeswant Rao, *see* Marathas, Holkar.  
 Jeswant Singh, 27, 29, 30.  
 Jey Singh, 29, 30.  
 Jhansi, 254, 280, 282, 310, 311, 322, 326.  
 —, the Rani of, 282, 310, 313, 322, 323, 324.  
 Jhats, 9, 183.  
 Jhilum R., 270.  
 Jindan, the Rani, 257, 258, 264, 266.  
 Jinji (Gingee), 33, 67.  
 Jodpur, 25, 166.  
 Jones, Sir Harford, 160.  
 Judicial System, 110, 113, 191, 192.  
 Jugdespur, 318.  
 Jummoo, *see* Jammu.  
 Jumna R., *see* Jamna.  
 Justice, Courts of, 108, 110, 111, 113.  
  
 KABUL, 16, 161, 222, 227, 228, 238, 240, 241, 245.  
 Kachar, 186.  
 Kahnpur, *see* Cawnpore.  
 Kali R., 167.  
 Kalpi, 313, 318, 321, 322.  
 Kamran, 228, 232.  
 Kananur, 139.  
 Kanauj, 13.  
 Kandahar, 222, 227, 229, 238, 240, 241, 243.  
 Kandesh, 214.  
 Karim, 171, 172.  
 Kashmir, 227, 262, 263, 324, 326.  
 Katmandhu, 165.  
 Kattak, 37, 151.  
 Katwa, 79.  
 Kaveripak, 69.  
 Keane, Sir J., 237, 238.  
 Keating, Col., 98.  
 Kelat, 229, 237, 238, 239, 248.  
 Kelat-i-Ghizai, 243, 244.



- Kerauli, 280, 282.  
 Khaibar Pass, *see* Khyber Pass.  
 Khairpur, 247, 249.  
 Khalsa, the, 221, 226, 252, 257.  
 Kharak Singh, 256, 257.  
 Kharran, *see* Shah Jehan.  
 Khilji dynasty, 13.  
 Khistna R., *see* Krishna R.  
 Khojak Pass, 222, 237.  
 Khonds, 215, 289, 290.  
 Khyber Pass, 222, 237, 238, 244.  
 Kiniri, 268.  
 Kirki, 172.  
 Kirkpatrick, 138.  
 Knox, 87.  
 Kohinur, 227.  
 Koimbatour, 130.  
 Konkans, 32, 103.  
 Kotah, 152.  
 Krishna R., 4, 141.  
 Kshatryas, 8.  
 Kumaon, 166.  
 Kunwar Singh, 318.  
 Kurg, 186.  
 Kurnal, 314.  
  
 LA BOURDONNAIS, 63, 118.  
 Lahore, 262, 264, 266, 268, 292;  
     *see* Sikhs.  
 Lake, Lord, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158.  
 Lal Singh, 257, 260, 264.  
 Lally, 71-74, 118.  
 Lambert, 274, 275.  
 Land-holders, 108, 198 *ff.*, 278, 301,  
     313.  
 Land-settlements, 132, 196-205.  
 Languages, 6, 215.  
 Lapse, *see* Adoption.  
 Laswari, 151.  
 Law of Laureston, 69.  
 Lawrence, George, 241, 269, 304,  
     324.  
     — Henry, 263-265, 272, 273,  
         274, 277, 291, 295, 302, 304,  
         310, 312, 315, 324, 325.  
     — John, 264, 269, 273, 291, 302,  
         304, 310, 314, 325.  
     — Richard, 310.  
     — Stringer, 64, 67, 69, 72.  
 Leadenhall Street, 93, 146.  
 Lenoir, 46.  
 Littler, Sir J., 260, 261.  
  
 Lodi dynasty, 14, 16.  
 Lucknow, 109, 302, 310, 312, 315-  
     317, 319, 321.  
 Ludhiana, 228, 259.  
 Lumsden, 273, 291.  
 Lushai, 179.  
  
 MACARTNEY, Lord, 104, 124, 137.  
 Macaulay, Lord, 97, 109, 153, 185  
     215.  
 Machi Bhaun, 312.  
 M'Leod, D., 310.  
 Macnaghten, 237, 239-241.  
 M'Neill, Sir J., 235, 236.  
 Macpherson, Sir J., 124, 127.  
 Macpherson, J. D., 310, 314.  
 Macpherson, S. C., 289, 290, 311.  
 Madagascar, 45.  
 Madhava Rao, *see* Marathas, Sindhia.  
 Madoji, *see* Marathas, Sindhia.  
 Madras—  
     Established, 42; captured by La  
     Bourdonnais, 64; restored, 65;  
     feeble policy, 66; Governor  
     Saunders, 68; relations with  
     Salabat Jang, 85; relations with  
     Haidar, 86; general mismanage-  
     ment, 102, 105, 106; land settle-  
     ment, 201.  
 Madras sepoy, 181, 194, 251, 305,  
     323, 324.  
 Magistrates, 132.  
 Mahanadi R., 4, 269.  
 Maharajpur, 254, 258.  
 Mahé, 46, 102.  
 Mahmud of Ghazni, 13, 246.  
     — Ghilzai, 36.  
     — Sudozai, 227.  
 Maisur, *see* Mysore.  
 Malaun, 166.  
 Malcolm, Sir J., 138, 145, 156, 160,  
     171, 173, 176, 201, 287.  
 Malik Amber, 21.  
 Mama, the, 251, 252.  
 Manchus, 12.  
 Mangalur, 129.  
 Mangarwar, 317, 319.  
 Manipur, 179, 182.  
 Mansel, 273.  
 Marathas—  
     First appearances, 21, 27; rise  
     under Sivaji, 28-31; under Sivaji's



## Marathas—*continued.*

successor, 32-34; development under Peshwas, 37; in Carnatic, 46, 69, 73; expansion in Hindostan, 84; checked at Panipat, 83, 84; Ragoba, 84, 94, 98-100; war with Bombay, 98 ff.; Mysore war, 131; the Pentarchy, struggles for ascendancy, 133, 138, 147; wars with Wellesley, 150-154; cessions, 151; the Pindari war, 170-174; Gwalior intrigues, 251-253; Maharajpur, 254; in the Mutiny, 320, 323; miscellaneous, 56. Baroda, *see* Gaikwar.

## Bhonsla—

Pantaji, 34.  
Ragoji I., 37, 46, 76, 84.  
Janoji, 84.  
Mudaji, 98, 100, 103.  
Ragoji II., 149-151, 163, 168, 169.  
Apa Sahib, 169-175.  
Later, 283, 286.

Gaikwar, 34, 98, 103, 150, 168.

Gwalior, *see* Sindhia.

## Holkar—

Mulhar Rao, 34.  
Takoji, 95, 98, 103, 133, 147.  
Jeswant Rao, 147-150, 152, 153, 157, 158, 162.  
Mulhar Rao II., 169.  
Takoji II., 320.

Indur, *see* Holkar.

Nagpur, *see* Bhonsla.

## Peshwa—

Balaji Wiswanath, 34.  
Baji Rao I., 36.  
Balaji Rao, 37, 38, 84.  
Madhu Rao, 84, 95, 98.  
Naraian Rao, 98.  
Baji Rao II., 133, 147, 166, 168-175, 279, 287.

Puna, *see* Peshwa.

## Sindhia—

Madhava Rao (Madoji), 95, 98, 99, 103, 116, 125-127, 133, 137, 208.  
Daulat Rao, 133, 147-151, 157, 158, 166, 168-175, 185.  
Jankoji, 251.  
Jyaji, 251, 254, 311, 322.

## Marathas—Sindhia—*continued.*

Ranoji, 34.  
Sivaji, 21, 26, 28-31.  
Marley, Gen., 166.  
Marriage, 212, 289.  
Martin, F., 42, 45.  
Masulipatam, 73, 81, 160.  
Mauritius, the, 45, 63, 102, 144, 163.  
Medows, Gen., 130.  
Meeanee, *see* Miani.  
Meerut, *see* Mirat.  
Mercenaries, 56.  
Merwara, 212, 213.  
Metcalf, Lord, 162, 176, 177, 184, 186, 223, 237.  
Mhow, 320.  
Miani, 249, 252.  
Military Board, 288, 294.  
Mines at Lucknow, 316.  
Minto, Lord, 155, 159-163, 188.  
Mir Cassim, 87, 88.  
Mir Jafar, 78 ff., 87, 88.  
Mirat, 259, 292, 306, 307, 309, 310, 311.  
Mirpur, 247, 249.  
Misls, 221, 222, 224.  
Missionaries, 303.  
Moazzim, *see* Bahadur Shah.  
Mogul Dominion—  
Political theory, 52; Diwani, 19, 26, 52, 196; justice, 53, 55; merits and demerits, 53 ff.; magnificence, 22, 55; aristocracy, 54.  
Mogul party, 306-308, 313, 323, 324, 325.  
Mohammed (Mahomet), 6, 12.  
— Ali, 66-70, 100.  
— Ghor, 13, 14.  
— Reza Khan, 107, 108, 111.  
— Shah (Mogul), 35, 37.  
— — (Persia), 232, 236.  
Mohammedanism, 6, 13, 15, 26, 306.  
Mohammedans, 6, 252, 306-308, 313, 320, 323, 324, 325.  
Mohan Persad, 110.  
Moir, *see* Hastings, Lord.  
Monopolies, 43, 146, 189.  
Monson, 99, 112.  
Monson, Col., 152.  
Monsoons, 5 ff., 65.



- Montgomery, 273, 310.  
 Moodkee, *see* Mudki.  
 Mooltan, *see* Multan.  
 Moorshedabad, *see* Murshidabad.  
 Morari Rao, 69, 70.  
 Mornington, *see* Wellesley, Lord.  
 Morrison, Gen., 182.  
 Morse, 63.  
 Moti Masjid, 23.  
 Mudki, 259, 260.  
 Mughals, 12.  
 Mulraj, 266-269.  
 Multan, 227, 228, 266, 268-271.  
 Mungurwar, *see* Mangarwar.  
 Munnipore, *see* Manipur.  
 Munro, H., 88, 102, 201.  
 Munro, T., 174, 176, 181.  
 Murray, Gen., 152.  
 Murshidabad, 76.  
 Mussulmans, *see* Mohammedans.  
 Mutinies—  
     British : under Clive, 89.  
     — — — Shore, 134.  
     — — — Barlow, 159.  
     Sepoy : Vellur, 159, 303.  
     — Barrackpur, 183, 307.  
     — Trans-Indus, 250.  
     — Murshidabad, 307.  
     — Mirat, 307.  
     — The revolt, 308 *ff.*  
     — Series of mutinies, 311 *ff.*  
 Muzaffar Jang, 66, 67.  
 Mysore, 69, 70, 131, 140, 157, 185 ;  
     *see* Haidar Ali and Tippu.  
  
 NABOBS, 92, 123.  
 Nadir Jang, 66, 67.  
 Nadir Shah, 35, 36, 62, 83.  
 Nagpur, 37, 280, 283, 286.  
 Nana Farnavis, 96, 98, 100, 125,  
     147.  
 Nana Sahib, 286, 287, 306, 307,  
     310-313, 317, 320, 321, 323, 324.  
 Nanda Kumar, *see* Nuncomar.  
 Nanuk, 220, 292.  
 Nao Nehal Singh, 257.  
 Napier, Sir C., 248-250, 271, 291,  
     295.  
 Napoleon, 73, 122, 136, 144, 156,  
     160, 163, 222.  
 Nasir Mohammed, 170.  
 Nasirabad, 311.  
  
 Nationality, 9.  
 Naval influence, 48, 62, 71, 137,  
     156.  
 Nawab Wazir, *see* Oudh.  
 Neemuch, *see* Nimach.  
 Negapatam, 104.  
 Neill, 311, 317.  
 Nepal, 164-167.  
 Nerbadda R., 4, 167, 310, 320.  
 Nicholls, Gen., 242, 244.  
 Nicholson, J., 264, 273, 305, 310,  
     314, 315, 325, 326.  
 Nile, battle of, 137, 156.  
 Nimach, 311.  
 Nizam—  
     Asaf Jah, 35, 55, 66.  
     Nadir Jang, 66, 67.  
     Muzaffar Jang, 66, 67.  
     Salabat Jang, 67, 70, 73.  
     Ali, 101, 103, 125, 128, 133, 138,  
         140, 151.  
     Later Nizams, 158, 169, 176, 285,  
         320, 324.  
 Non-regulation Provinces, 193, 291.  
 North, Lord, 92, 93, 107, 113, 122.  
 North-west Provinces, 143, 186,  
     188, 203, 216, 288, 292.  
 Nott, Gen., 239, 240, 243, 244,  
     245.  
 Nuncomar, 108, 110.  
 Nur Jehan, 20, 21.  
 Nusseerabad, *see* Nasirabad.  
  
 OCHTERLONY, Gen., 153, 166, 167,  
     176, 184.  
 Omdal-ul-Omrah, 142.  
 Omichund, 78, 79, 80.  
 Oodeypore, *see* Udaipur.  
 Orientalism, 9, 10, 225, 278.  
 Orissa, 37, 90, 167.  
 Oudh, 36, 76, 88, 90, 109, 112,  
     116, 127, 134, 143, 167, 176,  
     185, 280, 284, 285, 303, 313,  
     315-319, 321-324, 326.  
 Ouseley, Sir G., 161.  
 Outram, 214, 248, 249, 284, 285,  
     303, 317, 319, 321.  
  
 PALMER, 243.  
 Palmer & Co., 176, 243.  
 Palmerston, Lord, 330.  
 Panchayets, 257.



- Panipat, 16, 18, 84.  
 Panjab (District), 3, 50, 84, 219.  
 — (Province) in the Mutiny, 310, 314, 320, 325; governing board, 273, 291; administration, 291; army in, 292, 302, 310.  
 — (State), *see* Sikhs.  
 Paris, Peace of, 73.  
 Parliament—  
   Relations to the H.E.I.C., 92.  
   Parties in, 91.  
   North's Act, 93, 107.  
   Coalition ministry, 122.  
   Fox's Bill, 122.  
   Pitt's Act, 123, 188.  
   Declaratory Act, 123.  
   All-the-talents ministry, 155.  
   Charter Act (1793), 189.  
   — (1813), 189.  
   — (1833), 187, 189.  
   Transfer to Crown (1858), 331.  
   Miscellaneous, 121.  
 Passes, 1, 222, 237, 238, 244.  
 Patel, 126, 208.  
 Pathans, 147, 162, 167-172, 264, 268.  
 Patiala, 222, 324.  
 Patna, 81, 87, 88, 308.  
 Peasantry, *see* Ryots.  
 Peninsular and Oriental Co., 288.  
 Pegu, 179, 276.  
 Perron, 150, 151.  
 Persia, 145, 156, 160, 231-237, 239, 246, 274, 305.  
 Persian Gulf, 236.  
 Peshawar, 222, 227, 229, 235, 243, 268, 269, 272, 326.  
 Peshwas, *see* Marathas.  
 Peyton, Commodore, 63.  
 Phillur, 310.  
 Pigot, Lord, 101.  
 Pilgrimages, 43.  
 Pindaris, 163, 167-174.  
 Pitt, W. (1) *see* Chatham; (2) 117, 123, 338.  
 Plassey, 80.  
 Poligars, 197.  
 Politicals, 190.  
 Pollilur, 104.  
 Pollock, Gen., 242, 244, 245.  
 Pondichery, 42, 45, 64, 73.  
 Poonah, *see* Puna.  
 Popham, 100, 103, 106, 115.  
 Porto Novo, 104.  
 Portuguese, 39-41.  
 Post, 294.  
 Pottinger, Eldred, 234, 236, 241, 245.  
 Presidencies, 187.  
 Prome, 182, 276.  
 Proprietors, Court of, 49, 92, 146.  
 Public works, 216, 288.  
 Puna, 38, *see* Marathas, Peshwas.  
 Puniar, 254.  
 Purandar, 99.  
 QUEBEC, 62.  
 Quetta, 222, 237, 243, 248.  
 Quiberon, 62.  
 RACES, 6.  
 Ragoba, 84, 94, 98-100, 106.  
 Ragoji, *see* Marathas, Bhonsla.  
 Ragonath Rao, *see* Ragoba.  
 Raigarh, 29, 33.  
 Railways, 293.  
 Rainier, Admiral, 144.  
 Rains, 5.  
 Raj Singh, 27.  
 Raja Kam, 33.  
 Raja Sahib, 69.  
 Rajputana, 3, 36, 50, 163, 176, 185, 273, 282, 304, 324.  
 Rajputs, 8, 12, 17, 19, 25, 26, 27, 150, 158, 170, 174, 194, 252, 278, 301, 303.  
 Ramnagar, 269.  
 Rampura, 150, 152.  
 Rangoon, 181, 274-276.  
 Ranjit Singh, *see* Sikhs.  
 Rassul, 270, 271.  
 Rawlinson, 243, 244.  
 Raymond, 133, 137, 138.  
 Reed, Gen., 314.  
 Regulation Provinces, 193.  
 Religions, 7-10.  
 Renaud, 317.  
 Residency (Lucknow), 312, 315-317, 319, 321.  
 Residents, 190.  
 Revenue, 196-205, 216.  
 Revolt, the, 308-323.  
 Ridge, the, 314.  
 Roads, 216.



- Rockingham, 91.  
 Rodney, 94, 112.  
 Roe, Sir T.; 41, 55.  
 Rohilkhand, 85, 96, 97, 322.  
 Rohillas, 85, 86, 96, 97, 318.  
 Rose, Sir H., 321-323.  
 Rumbold, 101.  
 Russia, 144, 156, 160, 162, 231, 232, 234, 236, 239.  
 Rustam (Rais), 248, 249.  
 Ryots, 108, 200 *ff.*, 301, 332.  
 Ryotwari, 202.  
  
 SAADAT ALI, 134, 143.  
 Sacrifices, human, 289, 290.  
 Saddusam, 268.  
 Sadr (Sudder) Courts, 114, 192.  
 Sadulapur, 270.  
 Sadutulla, 65.  
 Safavis, 36.  
 Safdar Ali, 65.  
 Safdat Ali, 76.  
 Sagar, 168, 174, 311, 322.  
 Saho, 33, 35, 38.  
 St Lubin, 99.  
 Sakhar, 249.  
 Salabat Jang, 67, 70, 73.  
 Salar Jang, 320, 324.  
 Sale, Gen., 240, 243, 244.  
 Salkeld, 315.  
 Salsette, 98.  
 Salt-tax, 89.  
 Sambaji, 32, 33.  
 Sambalpur, 285.  
 Sarkars, 70, 72, 90, 177, 289.  
 Sati, *see* Suttee.  
 Sattlej, 3, 4, 210, 259, 262, 269.  
 Sattara, 172, 174, 179, 280, 281.  
 — Minute, 277.  
 Saunders, Governor, 68.  
 Scinde, *see* Sindh.  
 Scindia, *see* Marathas, Sindhia.  
 Scythians 6.  
 Sea-power, 48, 62, 71, 137, 156.  
 Seiads, 14, 34, 35.  
 Seringapatam, 130, 139, 141, 160.  
 Settlements, Land, 132, 196-205, 288.  
 Shah Alam, 81, 85, 86, 87, 90, 151, 152.  
 Shah Jehan, 21, 22, 28, 41, 51.  
 Shah Shuja, 161, 223, 224, 225, 227, 229, 236-244, 247.  
 Shahab-ud-din, 13, 14.  
 Shahji Bhonsla, 21, 27, 28.  
 Shaista Khan, 29.  
 Shal valley, 248.  
 Shelton, 240.  
 Sher Mohammed, 249.  
 Sher Shah, 17.  
 Sher Singh, Maharaja, 242, 253, 257.  
 Sher Singh, Sirdar, 268-271.  
 Sheridan, R. B., 117, 338.  
 Shikarpur, 229, 237, 251.  
 Shore, Sir J., 133-135, 180, 200.  
 Shuja Daulah, 88, 96, 109.  
 Sieges, etc.—  
   Aligarh, 151.  
   Arcot, 68, 69.  
   Arrah, 318.  
   Bangalur, 130.  
   Bhartpur (1), 153.  
   — (2), 184.  
   Cawnpore, 312.  
   Delhi, 311, 314, 315.  
   Fort St David, 64, 72.  
   Gawilgarh, 151.  
   Ghazni, 238.  
   Gudalur, 105.  
   Gwalior, 103.  
   Herat, 236.  
   Imamgarh, 249.  
   Jellalabad, 243.  
   Jhansi, 322.  
   Kandahar, 243.  
   Lucknow Residency, 312, 315, 317, 319-321.  
   Lucknow city, 321.  
   Madras, 64, 72.  
   Masulipatam, 73, 81.  
   Multan, 268, 269, 271.  
   Patna, 87.  
   Pondichery, 64, 73.  
   Rangoon, 276.  
   Seringapatam, 131, 139.  
   Trichinopoly, 69.  
   Wandewash, 102.  
 Sikhs—  
   Ethnology, 220; origin, Nanuk, 220; creed, 220; development, Govind, 221; Khalsa, 221, 226, 252, 257, 269, 273; Misls, 221, 222, 224; Cis-Sattlej Sikhs, 162, 223, 311; Ranjit, 221, 223-230



## Sikhs—*continued.*

- (*see infra*); subsequent anarchy, 253, 256-258; Khalsa domination, 253, 257, 258, 259; first Sikh war, 256, 259-262; Lahore treaty, 262; under Henry Lawrence, 263-265; Multan outbreak, 266; siege of Multan, 268, 271; second Sikh rising, 269; second Sikh war, 269-272; annexation, 272, 277; government under Dalhousie, 273, 291; miscellaneous, 9, 158, 166, 174, 238, 242, 304, *see* Panjah.
- Govind Singh, 25, 221.
- Hira Singh, 257, 258.
- Nanuk, 25, 220, 292.
- Rani Jindan, 257, 258, 264, 266.
- Ranjit Singh—  
Metcalf's embassy, 162; rise of Ranjit, 162, 224, 227; character, 224; political insight, 223, 225, 226; absorbs Multan, 228; absorbs Kashmir, 228; absorbs Peshawar, 229; Sindh, 230, 247; attitude to British, 162, 225, 230; organisation of Khalsa, 226, 230; death, 230, 238; miscellaneous, 126, 235, 236, 252, 256, 292, 324.
- Sher Singh, Maharaja, 242, 253, 257.
- Sher Singh, Sirdar, 268-271.
- Sikh sepoys, 274, 310, 317, 318, 323, 324.
- Sikkim, 165.
- Sikri, 17.
- Simla, 292.
- Sindh, 3, 161, 229, 230, 237, 247-251, 291.
- Sindhia, *see* Marathas.
- Sirhind, 162, 219.
- Sirsa, 311.
- Sirur, 173.
- Sitabaldi, 172.
- Sivaji, 21, 26, 28-31.
- Slave kings, 13.
- Sleeman, 208, 284.
- Smith, Baird, 315.
- Smith, Sir Harry, 262.
- Smith, Col., 86.
- Sobraon, 262.
- Solingarh, 101.
- Somnath, 13, 246.
- Spain, 39, 61, 94, 102.
- Spice Islands, 39.
- State, theory of, 51.
- Staunton, Capt., 173.
- Steam-ships, 288, 294.
- Stewart, Gen., 139.
- Strathnairn, *see* Rose, Sir H.
- Subsidiary Alliances, 112, 134, 141, 143, 169, 170, 174, 254.
- Sudder Courts, *see* Sadr.
- Sudozais, 222, 227, 229.
- Sudras, 8.
- Suffren, B., 105.
- Sukkur, *see* Sakhar.
- Suleiman Mts., 3.
- Sultan Mohammed, 229, 230, 235, 274.
- Sultanpur, 321.
- Suraj-ud-daulah, 76-80.
- Surat, 29, 41, 45, 46, 98, 100, 141.
- Surji Arjangaon, 151.
- Sutlej R., *see* Satlej.
- Suttee, 20, 207, 209-211, 213, 303.
- TAJ MAHAL, 23, 216.
- Takoji, *see* Marathas, Holkar.
- Talpurs, 247.
- Talukdars, 203, 301, 303, 304, 316, 318, 322, 323, 326, 332.
- Tamerlane, 15.
- Tanghabadra R., 5, 141.
- Tanjur, 66, 72, 101, 141.
- Tantia Topi, 321-323.
- Tara Bai, 251-254.
- Tartars, 12, 15.
- Taylor, Alexander, 315.
- Teheran, 145.
- Teignmouth, Lord, *see* Shore.
- Tej Singh, 260, 261.
- Telegraph, 294.
- Tenasserim, 179, 182, 276.
- Terai, 165, 167.
- Tezin, 245.
- Thatta, 248.
- Thomason, 203, 288, 292.
- Thomson, Major, 238.
- Thuggee, 207, 211, 213, 291.
- Timur Sudozai, 237, 238.
- Timur, 15.
- Tippu Sahib, 105, 125, 127, 129-131, 137-139.



Todar Mal, 19.  
 Tonk, 174.  
 Trafalgar, 156.  
 Travancore, 129.  
 Treaties and Conventions of :—  
   Aix-la-Chapelle, 62, 65.  
   Bassein, 148, 152.  
   Bhairawal, 263.  
   Deogaon, 151.  
   Lahore, 262.  
   Mangalur, 106, 129.  
   Paris, 73.  
   Purandar, 99.  
   Salbai, 105.  
   Surat, 98.  
   Surji Arjangaon, 151.  
   Tilsit, 156, 160.  
   Versailles, 105.  
   Wargam, 99, 101.  
 Treaties with :—  
   Burma, 182.  
   Bhopal, 170.  
   France, 62, 65, 73, 105.  
   Gwalior, 254.  
   Kabul, 161, 274, 305.  
   Marathas—  
     Bhonsla, 151, 160, 174.  
     Holkar, 158, 174.  
     Puna, 99, 105, 148, 170.  
     Sindhia, 151, 158, 171, 174, 254.  
     Miscellaneous, 98, 105.  
   Mogul, 85, 90.  
   Mysore—  
     Haidar, 86.  
     Tippu, 106, 129, 131.  
   Nepal, 167.  
   Nizams, 128, 141.  
   Oudh, 90, 134, 142.  
   Panjab, 161, 223.  
   Persia, 231.  
   Sindh, 161, 223, 247.  
   Trichinopoli, 66, 69.  
   Trimbakji, 168, 170.  
   Trincomali, 104, 105.  
   Troops, *see* Army.  
   Tughlaks, 14.  
   Tumbudra R., *see* Tanghabadra.  
   Turks, 12, 13-16.  
 UDAIPUR, 19, 27, 32.  
 Umballa, *see* Amballa.

Ummercote, *see* Amirkot.  
 Upton, Col., 99.  
 Urdu, 6.  
 Usbegs, 245.  
 VAISYAS, 8.  
 Vans Agnew, *see* Agnew.  
 Van Cortlandt, 268.  
 Vansittart, 87.  
 Vedas, 8.  
 Vellur, 303.  
 Versailles, peace of, 105.  
 Viceroy, 331.  
 Village communities, 203.  
 Vindhya hills, 4.  
 Vizayanagar, 14.  
 Vizier—, *see* Wazir—.  
 WADE, 237, 238.  
 Walker, Major, 150.  
 Wandewash, 73, 102.  
 Warda R., 4, 151.  
 Wargam, 99, 101.  
 Wars—  
   Asiatic—  
     Afghan, 240-246, 256.  
     Bengal, 77-80.  
     Burmese, (1st), 181, 182.  
     — (2nd), 175, 176.  
     Carnatic, 63-73.  
     China, 306.  
     Ghurka, 165-167.  
     Gwalior, 253-255.  
     Maratha (W. Hastings), 99, 100, 103.  
     — (Wellesley), 150-154.  
     — (Lord Hastings), 170-174.  
     Mutiny, 308-323.  
     Mysore, Haidar, 102-106.  
     — Tippu (1st), 130, 131.  
     — — (2nd), 137-140.  
     Persian, 305.  
     Perso-Russian, 231.  
     Pindari, 170-174.  
     Sikh (1st), 256, 259-262.  
     — (2nd), 267, 269-272.  
     Sindh, 249, 256.  
   Extra-Asiatic—  
     American, 94, 99, 102.  
     Crimean, 302, 305.  
     Egyptian, 137, 144.  
     French (1744), 63.



## Wars—Asiatic—*continued.*

- French (1793), 132.
- Peninsula, 156.
- Seven Years, 70.
- Spanish (1739), 61.
- Wail Mohammed, 171, 172.
- Watson, Admiral, 71, 77, 79.
- Wazir Ali, 134.
- Wazir of Oudh, *see* Oudh.
- Wazir Mohammed, 168.
- Wellesley, Lord, 135—
  - Previous career, 136; arrival in India, 137; theory of balance of power, 136; Tippu and the French, 137, 138; Mysore war, preparations, 138; Mysore war, campaign, 139; partition of Mysore, 140; Tanjur, 141; Surat, 141; the Carnatic, 141; Oudh, 142; plans to take the Mauritius, 144; Egyptian expedition, 144; Persian mission, 145; disagreements with directors, 146; letter

## Wellesley, Lord—*continued.*

- of resignation, 147; policy towards Marathas, 148; declaration of war, 150; successes (of 1803), 151, 152; Monson's disaster, 153; recall, 153; policy, 156, 176; miscellaneous, 176, 180, 188, 237, 279, 284.
- Wellesley, Sir A., 139, 150, 237.
- Wellesley, Henry, 143, 146.
- Wheler, 112.
- Whish, 268, 269.
- Widows, 210; *see* Suttee.
- Wilson, Archdale, 314, 315.
- Wilson, Captain, 82.
- Windham, 321.
- Wiswanath, Balaji, *see* Marathas, Peshwa.
- Wood, Sir C., 292.
- Writers, 48, 68.
- Zeman Shah, 137, 222, 223, 233.
- Zeman Khan, 245.
- Zemindars, 108, 197 *ff.*, 278, 301.



